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Between September 1939 and March 1941, the friends, lovers, fellow 
writers and intellectuals Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir 
saw little of each other. Sartre was mobilized at the beginning of the 
Second World War, and then held for ten months as a prisoner of war. 
During this period of painful separation they wrote to each other 
prolifically, sometimes more than once a day, as Sartre’s Lettres au 
Castor and Beauvoir’s Lettres à Sartre testify. Their posthumously 
published correspondence during the long, anguished months of their 
separation covers more than 500 pages of printed text. This is striking 
in part for its sheer length. It is not as if they had nothing else to do, 
and their correspondence was by no means their only written output for 
the period. Sartre assiduously wrote in what would be published as his 
Carnets de la drôle de guerre whilst working on his novel Le Sursis and 
his philosophical magnum opus L’Etre et le néant; and Beauvoir also 
kept a substantial journal, published as her Journal de guerre, and she 
worked on her first novel L’Invitée. If nothing else, war was very good 
for their productivity as writers, even if not everything they wrote at the 
time was initially intended for publication.
Another striking feature of the correspondence between Sartre and 
Beauvoir is how little it has to say about the war. It is not that they 
had forgotten about it. Of course they hadn’t. It was the cause of their 
separation, and it affected every aspect of their lives. But it was as 
if it was too big to be seen, so totally present that it did not need to 
be mentioned. It is (relatively) unspoken and (absolutely) ubiquitous, 
ubiquitous because unspoken. The war was, according to Sartre at one 
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point in his Carnets de la drôle de guerre, ‘insaisissable’.1 It is both 
there and not there. As their contemporary and sometime friend Albert 
Camus put it in his Carnets from the same period, ‘La guerre a éclaté. 
Où est la guerre?’ (Œuvres complètes II, p. 884).
A central concern for the writers discussed in this book is how to 
perceive, experience and recount the war, how to integrate it into an 
intellectual and aesthetic project, when it is simultaneously elusive, 
intangible and all-pervasive. In his celebrated essay ‘The Storyteller’, 
Walter Benjamin touches on some of the key issues here when he 
discusses the imminent end of the art of storytelling, precipitated in part 
by the First World War. Benjamin describes how ‘men returned from 
the battlefield grown silent – not richer, but poorer in communicable 
experience’ (p. 362). Individual experience had been overwhelmed by 
huge economic and mechanical forces, leaving the ‘tiny, fragile human 
body’ (p. 362) with no story of its own to pass on to others. It is 
nevertheless noticeable that this loss of experience is still to a meaningful 
extent collective: it is shared even if it cannot be communicated through 
stories. Although it was doubtless premature to announce the end 
of storytelling, the particular problems associated with telling about 
experience were exacerbated by the Second World War. The historian 
Olivier Wieviorka contrasts the two world wars in this respect. The 
first may have – as Benjamin argues – deepened the crisis of storytelling 
because its survivors felt ‘poorer in communicable experience’. Even so, 
in fact in France there soon developed a reasonably strong consensus 
about how to tell the story of the war: France had been attacked by 
imperial Germany, fought bravely to defend its territory and its values, 
and emerged victorious and stronger thanks to the valiant efforts and 
sacrifices of its soldiers (La Mémoire désunie, pp. 19–20). However 
traumatic the experience and however difficult to tell the tale, a sense of 
shared and shareable meaning nevertheless endured. The Second World 
War was a different matter. Even today, no way has been found to unify 
the competing strands of defeat and victory, abjection and heroism, 
collaboration and resistance, complicity and dignity. As Wieviorka puts 
it, ‘la mémoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale apparaît, hier comme 
aujourd’hui, comme une mémoire fragmentée, conflictuelle et politisée 
qui sépare plutôt qu’elle ne rassemble’ (La Mémoire désunie, p. 23).
 1 Sartre, Les Carnets de la drôle de guerre, p. 35. Future references to this 
and other quoted works are given in the main text with short titles. Full details of 
editions used are given in the Bibliography.
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One of the premises of this book is that the war is present even, and 
perhaps especially, when it cannot be seen. I am concerned here with the 
great generation of French writers and thinkers who all had in common 
that they lived through the war, as combatants, prisoners, résistants and 
sometimes as passive or active collaborators. The book does not attempt 
to give a comprehensive overview or synthesis of the impact of the 
Second World War on the writing and thought of those who experienced 
it at first hand. Such a project would in all likelihood be interminable, 
though scholars and critics have made important progress with some of 
its key aspects.2 I have chosen here to concentrate on a number of writers 
– Sartre, Beauvoir, Delbo, Camus, Levinas, Ricœur, Althusser, Kofman, 
Wiesel, Semprun – whom I admire, but who do not give grounds to 
establish a consistent, unified story about the war and its lasting impact. 
My aim here is to seek out some of the traces of war in their writing. The 
guiding question is: What mark does war, and specifically the Second 
World War, leave on their work? I am particularly interested in how the 
war is present in their writing precisely when it is not the explicit topic. 
How is it there when it is not there? The theoretical tool I develop to 
explore this is what I call ‘traumatic hermeneutics’, which I introduce in 
Chapter 2.
The book is divided into four sections. The first discusses some of the 
ethical and hermeneutic issues which arise in trauma studies, as critics 
have attempted to speak about and interpret the suffering of others. The 
positions adopted in the two chapters of this section inform and underlie 
the discussion through the rest of the book. The second section looks at 
aspects of the work of perhaps the three best-known French intellectuals 
who lived through the Occupation: Sartre, Beauvoir and Camus. The 
third section considers three of France’s most important post-war philos-
ophers – Ricœur, Levinas and Althusser – all of whom spent most of the 
war in German POW camps. And the final section discusses issues in 
the texts of three survivor-witnesses: Semprun, Wiesel and Kofman. The 
first of these was interned in Buchenwald for resistance activities, and 
the second in Auschwitz because of his race. As a Jewish girl in Paris, 
Kofman survived the war even though her father was deported and 
murdered in Auschwitz; but recounting her memories of the Occupation 
in a brief, poignant memoir was shortly followed by her suicide. In all 
 2 For an overview of some of the work done in this field, see Atack and Lloyd, 
Introduction to Framing Narratives of the Second World War and Occupation in 
France, 1939–2009, pp. 1–15.
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these cases, my concern is to suggest how the war is present in their 
work, sometimes explicitly and sometimes as an occluded but no less 
powerful influence on their thought and writing.
This book is concerned with traces of war rather than the war as a 
theme or object of memory. Work in memory studies has accustomed 
us to the insight that what a text or film represents overtly may not 
be its only or its principal preoccupation. Important works such as 
Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory and Max Silverman’s 
Palimpsestic Memory show how the memory of one event may cover 
or allude to others. Silverman describes how the relationship between 
the past and the present may entail ‘a superimposition and interaction 
of different temporal traces to constitute a sort of composite structure, 
like a palimpsest, so that one layer of traces can be seen through, and 
is transformed by, another’ (Palimpsestic Memory, p. 3). This is not 
exactly the sense of traces which interests me here. Rather, I use the 
word in a sense adapted from Levinas and Derrida to refer to a kind 
of elusive sign which is effaced but still legible, if not ultimately intelli-
gible.3 In ‘La Trace de l’autre’, Levinas describes how the trace signifies 
outside any intention or project (p. 199). It is not so much the trace of 
a retrievable meaning as an opening onto what he calls ‘l’absolument 
Autre’ (p. 200). The trace does not point towards an occluded, forgotten 
or repressed presence, but rather to the disruption of all presence and 
identity through the encounter with otherness: ‘La trace est la présence 
de ce qui, à proprement parler, n’a jamais été là, de ce qui est toujours 
passé’ (p. 201). The trace is a sign which produces signification without 
leading to or recalling a final signified. My suggestion, on this basis, is 
that the traces of war in the works discussed in the current book do not 
make of the Second World War their final, hidden meaning. Rather, 
the war leaves traces insofar as it remains problematically absent, 
unavailable to experience, representation or comprehension. It inflects 
post-war writing precisely because it is invisible except in its barely 
readable traces.
In theoretical terms, the book argues that the ethics of trauma studies 
must also entail a hermeneutics, and that the paradoxical endeavour 
to speak of that which is not there, to say the unsaid, is strengthened 
once it accepts its position within the rich hermeneutic tradition. In 
a nutshell, trauma studies has readily acknowledged and explored its 
 3 See for example Levinas, ‘La Trace de l’autre’, and Derrida, ‘Freud et la scène 
de l’écriture’.
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indebtedness to psychoanalytical pioneers such as Freud and Lacan, 
and to developments in cognitive psychology and neuroscience; but to 
its detriment it has been less eager to embrace the long inheritance of 
hermeneutics, brought to its most powerful expression in the twentieth 
century in the work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricœur.
In this discussion, not mentioning the war may be as significant and 
revealing as mentioning it. Not talking about something may be a way 
of talking about it. To close this Introduction, I want to give a first 
indication of what I mean by this by crossing the Channel from France 
to the UK, to give a sketch of how talking about the war and not talking 
about it are hermeneutically and psychologically confused.
Probably the best-known use of the phrase ‘Don’t mention the war’ 
occurs in the British situation comedy Fawlty Towers, written by and 
starring John Cleese and Connie Booth. Only two series of Fawlty 
Towers – a total of 12 episodes – were made, in 1975 and 1979. John 
Cleese plays Basil Fawlty, the bad-tempered, misanthropic, probably 
sociopathic proprietor of a small hotel in the seaside town of Torquay. 
In the final episode of series one a group of Germans is staying in the 
hotel. Their visit coincides with Fawlty receiving a number of severe, 
accidental blows to the head which leave him concussed, and even more 
out of control than usual. Escaping from his hospital bed, he returns to 
his hotel and attends to two German couples waiting to order dinner. 
As Fawlty desperately endeavours not to mention the war, he can talk of 
nothing else, and takes what he believes to be the guests’ order for prawn 
Goebbels, Hermann Goering and Colditz salad. One of the German 
women becomes upset, leading another member of the group to ask 
Fawlty to stop talking about the war. Fawlty retorts that the Germans 
started it. ‘We did not start it,’ says the German man. ‘Yes you did,’ 
retorts Fawlty. ‘You invaded Poland’. ‘It’ can only mean the war here; 
if there is an ‘it’, the ‘it’ must be the war. The war is the referent that 
informs every utterance. Not mentioning the war turns out to be a way 
of talking exclusively about the war.
The phrase ‘Don’t mention the war’ masquerades as good manners 
because it keeps peace with our former enemies. At the same time, it also 
carries a clear implication of moral superiority. In national memory, the 
early years of the war were Britain’s finest hour. After the fall of France 
in June 1940, the nation stood alone against Nazism, until Japan’s 
ill-judged attack on Pearl Harbour and Germany’s ill-judged attack on 
the Soviet Union. By not mentioning the war, we are silently asserting 
that we are better than other nations: we didn’t capitulate, we didn’t 
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collaborate. Basil Fawlty’s question ‘Who won the bloody war anyway?’ 
is clearly rhetorical. The British did, of course. But the British also pride 
themselves on their manners. We don’t want to offend our defeated 
enemies by reminding them that we are militarily and ethically better 
than they. So not mentioning the war is our way of recalling it, and 
feeling comfortably at home with ourselves in otherwise difficult times.
And yet, in enjoining himself and others not to mention the war, of 
course Fawlty does mention the war. In fact, by insisting that he should 
not talk about it, he does nothing but talk about it. The war turns out 
to be the only thing worth discussing, the only thing Fawlty can discuss, 
the secret or not-so-secret reference point to everything he says. The 
sequence ends with Fawlty imitating Hitler and exaggeratedly goose 
stepping out of the dining room.
This sequence from Fawlty Towers illustrates brilliantly how the war 
is obsessively present precisely when and because Fawlty wants to say 
nothing about it. The war intrudes as an absent presence which informs 
and quietly (or not so quietly) inflects every utterance. Another aspect of 
this absent presence of war can be shown through the example of Robb 
Wilton. It is unlikely that many readers of this book will remember 
or even have heard of Robb Wilton (1881–1957). He was a northern 
comedian who worked in the music halls, and then in film and radio in 
the 1930s and 1940s. He often played bumbling, amiable, officious but 
ineffective characters. He is associated with the phrase ‘The day war 
broke out’. Here is the beginning of one of his monologues, recorded in 
1943:
The day war broke out, my missus looked at me and she said, ‘What good 
are you?’
I said, ‘How d’y’ mean, what good am I?’
‘Well,’ she said, ‘you’re too old for the army, you couldn’t get into the 
navy and they wouldn’t have you in the Air Force, so what good are you?’
I said, ‘I’ll do something!’
She said, ‘What?’
I said, ‘How do I know …? I’ll have to think.’
She said, ‘I don’t know how that’s going to help you, you’ve never done it 
before, so what good are you?’4
The speaker goes on to describe his plan to join the Home Guard and 
defeat Hitler if the occasion arises, all the while countering what he 
 4 The full monologue can be heard at <https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=775DE0YkT3U> [accessed 11/08/2017].
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regards as the unreasonable scepticism of his wife. From the very first 
line, the monologue raises the question of how public events are linked 
to private relations. Neither we nor the narrator are initially sure how 
the chronology of the anecdote, which takes place on the day war broke 
out, relates to the wife’s taunting question: ‘What good are you?’ ‘How 
d’y’ mean, what good am I?’, the narrator immediately replies. What 
point is being made here? Is the suggestion that the husband is useless 
related to the war, or are the war and his uselessness independent from 
one another? In which respects is he no good? Perhaps he is no good as a 
husband, and specifically as a lover. We might recall that much popular 
British humour revolves around the male fear of sexual inadequacy. 
So, at first, we cannot know whether the wife’s complaint about her 
husband’s shortcomings is necessarily related to the outbreak of war, or 
whether it represents a more general dissatisfaction. As the monologue 
develops, it becomes clear that both are in fact the case: the war gives an 
outlet for the wife’s sense of her husband’s underlying inadequacy. And 
yet, the strange dignity of the monologue lies in the narrator’s knowledge 
that he is both useless and willing to serve. How, his wife asks, will he 
know if he comes across Hitler. ‘I’ve got a tongue in me ’ead, ’aven’t I?’, 
replies her embattled but not yet fully exasperated husband.
The examples of Basil Fawlty and Robb Wilton show how the war can 
be simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. It underlies every utterance, 
especially when it is not explicitly named, but at the same time it does 
not entirely explain the fundamental dynamics of what we see or hear. 
There is always something else going on, some other cause of distress or 
behavioural malfunction, something else that needs to be interpreted. 
In this respect, the Second World War shares some of the characteristics 
of trauma, and raises some of the same questions of understanding and 
interpretation. How do we make sense of the suffering of others, when 
its sources, causes and conditions are ambiguously present or all-too-
absent? How do we understand and speak about suffering which we 
can recognize and acknowledge, but which is so far outside our own 
experience that to discuss it seems almost improper? These are the 
questions with which the first two chapters of this book are concerned.

section a
Ethics, Trauma  
and Interpretation

The two chapters in this section explore ethical and hermeneutic issues 
which arise from trauma studies, partly in a theoretical frame, and 
partly with reference to material concerning the Second World War. The 
question discussed in this chapter goes to the core of trauma studies and 
its difficult ethical negotiations: Who should speak for those who do not 
speak for themselves – the dead, the mute, the traumatized, those who 
cannot or will not tell their own stories, or those who have no story to 
tell? In his ‘Plaidoyer pour les morts’, Auschwitz survivor Elie Wiesel is 
adamant that no one has the right to speak in the place of the victims of 
atrocity: ‘Vouloir parler au nom des disparus […] c’est précisément les 
humilier. […] Laissez-les donc tranquilles’ (Le Chant des morts, p. 197). 
We cannot speak on their behalf, nor should we even try to understand 
them: 
Vous voulez comprendre? Il n’y a plus rien à comprendre. Vous voulez 
savoir? Il n’y a plus rien à savoir. Ce n’est pas en jouant avec les mots 
et avec les morts que vous allez comprendre et savoir. Au contraire. Les 
Anciens disaient: ‘Ceux qui savent ne parlent pas; ceux qui parlent ne 
savent pas’. (Le Chant des morts, p. 219) 
We should not have the arrogance to assume that we can share some part 
of what happened to the victims. And yet not to speak for those who 
have been silenced, not to recall, not to study what happened to them 
in the hope of learning something from their stories, would be an act of 
barbarity in itself, hideously complicit with the forces which sought to 
eliminate them. As Wiesel puts it elsewhere, ‘Oublier les morts, serait les 
trahir. Oublier les victimes serait se mettre du côté de leurs bourreaux’ 
(Discours d’Oslo, p. 27).
chapter one
Trauma and Ethics
Telling the Other’s Story
Trauma and Ethics
Traces of War12
Talking of the other’s trauma is an ethical minefield. The duty to 
preserve the memory of pain has been asserted so often that it has become 
difficult to contest. This chapter focuses rather on the less evident but 
insidious dangers inherent in secondary witnessing and vicarious trauma. 
In one of the key texts for the development of modern trauma studies, 
the psychiatrist Dori Laub says that ‘the listener to trauma comes to be 
a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very 
listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in himself’ (‘Bearing 
Witness’, p. 57). This may be psychologically correct, but I find Laub’s 
formulation ethically problematic. My argument here is that we do not 
participate in or co-own the other’s trauma; and the sense or desire that 
we do should be resisted because it gives us the potentially self-serving 
illusion of empathic understanding. Rather than the ‘unsettlement’ 
described by Dominick LaCapra,1 the claim to participate in the other’s 
pain might be used to confirm the authority of the analyst and produce 
premature, unwarranted closure; and closure is not one of the aims of 
the current book. This chapter examines briefly two authors, Giorgio 
Agamben and Shoshana Felman, who represent different but equally 
worrying ways of encroaching on traumas which are not their own; and 
then at slightly greater length it considers Charlotte Delbo, whose book 
Mesure de nos jours seems to do precisely what I am arguing against by 
purporting to speak in the place of traumatized others. The chapter asks 
how it is that Delbo avoids the charge of over-hastily appropriating the 
other’s pain which I shall level against Agamben and Felman.
Is it theoretically possible to settle the meaning of another’s story 
without delusion or falsification? In her book Giving an Account of 
Oneself, Judith Butler suggests that we cannot even give final form to 
our own stories, let alone those of others. There are a number of what 
she calls ‘vexations’ which prevent me from giving a narrative account 
of myself: I cannot narrate the exposure to the other which establishes 
my singularity in the first place; the primary relations which form lasting 
impressions on the course of my life are irrecoverable; there is a history 
which I do not own and which makes me partially opaque to myself; 
 1 On ‘empathic unsettlement’, see for example LaCapra, Writing History, 
Writing Trauma: ‘At the very least, empathic unsettlement poses a barrier to 
closure in discourse and places in jeopardy harmonizing or spiritually uplifting 
accounts of extreme events from which we attempt to derive reassurance or a 
benefit (for example, unearned confidence about the ability of the human spirit to 
endure any adversity with dignity and nobility)’ (pp. 41–42).
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the norms that enable my narrative are not authored by me, so they rob 
me of my singularity at the very moment I seek to assert it; and because 
every account is an account given to someone else, it is superseded by 
the structure of address in which it takes place (p. 39). As Butler puts 
it succinctly, ‘There is that in me and of me for which I can give no 
account’ (p. 40). We cannot offer narrative closure for our lives because 
we are, Butler argues, ‘interrupted by alterity’ (p. 64).
An important point here is that what Butler calls ‘my own foreignness 
to myself’ (p. 84) also entails our foreignness to others and their 
foreignness to us. The Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero, who is 
an important interlocutor for Butler in Giving an Account of Oneself, 
argues against the empathy, identification or confusion through which 
one person’s story may be appropriated by another; as she insists, ‘your 
story is never my story’ (Relating Narratives, p. 92). This view goes 
together with distrust of the first person plural ‘we’, which implies the 
existence of a community where there is none: ‘No matter how much the 
larger traits of our life-stories are similar, I still do not recognise myself 
in you and, even less, in the collective we’ (Relating Narratives, p. 92; 
emphasis in original). Butler is less hostile to the first person plural than 
Cavarero (see Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, p. 33). But we can 
use it, she suggests, only on the understanding that our fundamental 
sociality is constituted on the basis of our foreignness to one another. 
There is no final account of our own lives and no secure bridge between 
our experience and that of other people.
Butler gives good reasons why we cannot provide a definitive narrative 
of our own lives. It follows that it will be all the more impossible to 
account without distortion for the lives and deaths of others. We cannot 
possess our own stories, and a fortiori we cannot claim to possess 
the stories of others. And yet, as critics, historians, analysts, teachers, 
students and readers, we are bound to attempt to do precisely that. As 
inevitable and indeed important as this may be, the current chapter 
suggests that it is fraught with intellectual and ethical dangers.
Agamben and the other’s truth
Giorgio Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the 
Archive has rapidly become an important and widely cited text in 
Holocaust and trauma studies. It has not been exempt from criticism, 
though, particularly for its central move of making the so-called 
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‘Muselmann’ the principal figure for the understanding of Auschwitz.2 
The word Muselmann (Muslim) was used at Auschwitz and some 
other camps to designate a type of prisoner who seemed to have given 
up on life, surviving precariously as a set of biological functions. The 
Muselmänner were, as Thomas Trezise puts it, ‘those who, in the eyes 
of other inmates, had come to stand (or lie) at or beyond the limit of 
the human, those “living dead” produced by the slow murder for which 
most of the concentration camps were designed’ (Witnessing Witnessing, 
p. 134). Drawing on a partial reading of Primo Levi, Agamben elevates 
these figures to being the key which will unlock the significance of 
Auschwitz. He describes the Muselmann’s status between life and death 
as ‘the perfect cipher of the camp’ (Remnants, p. 48); and he insists that 
‘we will not understand what Auschwitz is if we do not first understand 
who or what the Muselmann is’ (p. 52). He then goes on to reveal to us 
the true meaning of the Muselmann, which is also the true meaning of 
Auschwitz and the whole concentrationary universe. Auschwitz appears 
as a kind of terrible experiment which lays bare ‘the hidden structure 
of all subjectivity and consciousness’ (p. 128). The Muselmann is what 
this experiment reveals to be the limit point of human existence: ‘he 
marks the threshold between the human and the inhuman’ (p. 55); and 
he is ‘the final biopolitical substance to be isolated in the biological 
continuum’ (p. 85).
In his account of the Muselmann, Agamben draws on the testimony 
of a number of camp survivors, in particular that of Primo Levi. Indeed, 
Remnants of Auschwitz can be viewed as an extended commentary 
on a few passages from Levi’s work. In a quotation to which Agamben 
repeatedly refers, Levi describes the Muselmänner as ‘the true witnesses 
[…] the complete witnesses, the ones whose deposition would have a 
general significance’ (The Drowned and the Saved, pp. 63–64); but, ‘just 
as no one ever returned to recount his own death’ (The Drowned and 
 2 For criticisms of Agamben’s book, see Mesnard and Cahan, Giorgio Agamben à 
l’épreuve d’Auschwitz; Eaglestone, ‘On Giorgio Agamben’s Holocaust’; Benslama, 
‘La Représentation et l’impossible’; Leys, ‘The Shame of Auschwitz’, pp. 157–79; 
Davis, ‘Speaking with the Dead: De Man, Levinas, Agamben’, pp. 111–27; Trezise, 
Witnessing Witnessing, pp. 122–58. While Agamben’s account of the Muselmann 
has attracted a great deal of criticism, it has been readily accepted by some readers. 
Notably, Slavoj Žižek repeatedly returns to the figure of the Muselmann, basically 
agreeing with and building on Agamben’s analysis. See for example Žižek, The 
Puppet and the Dwarf, pp. 155–59; The Parallax View, pp. 112–13; ‘Neighbors and 
Other Monsters’, pp. 160–62.
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the Saved, 64), they cannot tell of their experiences. In consequence, 
according to Levi, the survivors ‘speak in their stead, by proxy’ (The 
Drowned and the Saved, p. 64). This statement might appear to 
contradict Wiesel’s view, quoted above, that no one could or should 
speak in the name of the dead. In fact, though, the difference between 
Wiesel and Levi on this point is not as great as it might appear. Levi’s 
formulation is characteristically exact. To speak in someone’s stead or 
by proxy is not to assume their voice or to imply that their experience 
can be understood or narrated by another. The survivor speaks because 
someone has to, not because he has access to some otherwise barred 
knowledge. When Levi tells us that only the Muselmann’s testimony 
would have ‘general significance’, he insists on the point that such 
testimony cannot be given and therefore the general significance of the 
camps will never be available. The Muselmänner, Levi insists, have no 
story to tell and no lesson to teach us.3
For all his close reliance on Levi, Agamben misses precisely this point. 
He endeavours to describe the significance of the Muselmann and his 
centrality to the experience of the camps despite Levi’s implicit warning 
that this would be to find meaning – and comfort – where there is 
none. And Agamben’s failure to understand Levi’s point that the general 
significance of the Muselmann’s testimony is not available leads him to 
misunderstand Levi’s related point that survivors speak ‘in their stead, 
by proxy’. Agamben takes this to mean that, despite the fact that no one 
returns to recount their death, ‘it is in some way the Muselmann who bears 
witness’ (The Drowned and the Saved, p. 120). Provoked into speech by 
those who are speechless, the survivor nevertheless in some way testifies 
on behalf of the Muselmann. It is essential to Agamben’s argument that, 
although the Muselmann does not bear witness for himself, there is 
still a lesson to be learned from his existence. So, even if secure, centred 
subject positions are relinquished in Agamben’s account of testimony, 
the speechless one nevertheless speaks. It is hard to avoid the suspicion, 
though, that the position of Agamben himself comes out of this all the 
stronger, as he asserts his authority as interpreter over subjects who can 
no longer speak for themselves. Levi’s point is that speaking by proxy can 
never yield an understanding of the Muselmann. The survivor speaks 
 3 See Levi, If This is a Man, and The Truce: ‘All the musselmans who finished 
in the gas chambers have the same story, or more exactly, have no story; they 
followed the slope down to the bottom, like streams that run down to the sea’ 
(p. 96).
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‘in his stead’ because the Muselmann cannot speak for himself; but the 
survivor speaks in ignorance and incomprehension of the Muselmann’s 
experience. Agamben turns this into something rather different. In his 
account, the witness speaks for the Muselmann, and Agamben speaks 
for the witness. In the absence of the Muselmann’s testimony, he takes it 
upon himself to explain the meaning of the camps. This is confirmed by 
the final pages of Remnants of Auschwitz. Agamben’s book ends with 
texts by a number of Muselmänner who survived the camps. Agamben 
wants, he says, to leave ‘the last word’ to the Muselmänner (Remnants, 
p. 165). On the face of it, the words of the Muselmänner appear to 
contradict the claim that, by definition, they are unable to bear witness. 
Agamben is nevertheless unshaken, and concludes by insisting that 
the testimony of the Muselmänner ‘fully verifies’ (p. 165) the paradox 
according to which they are the witnesses who cannot bear witness. By 
this point he has stopped listening. He has already decided what meaning 
the lives and deaths of the Muselmänner should have.
Agamben tells us that ‘all witnesses speak of [the Muselmann] as 
a central experience’ (Remnants, p. 52). This is simply untrue, but it 
perfectly encapsulates Agamben’s rush to generalize from fragmentary 
material and it decisively inflects his understanding of the camps. 
Moreover, it grossly neglects the variety of experiences of the camps by 
privileging one over all others. Making the Muselmann the key figure 
discounts all those whose experience was quite different: those who 
were killed on arrival at Auschwitz, or those who struggled and resisted 
and died, those who found comradeship and those who lost faith, those 
who survived against all the odds and those who were used in hideous 
experiments or gassed or shot or hanged. All these must take second 
place, in Agamben’s account, to the unutterable yet somehow uttered 
experience of the Muselmann.
Agamben’s understanding of the Muselmann entails, and is enabled 
by, a misreading of Levi’s comments. Showing how Agamben may not 
accurately represent the texts to which he refers (particularly works 
by Levi and Robert Antelme), Ruth Leys states her disapproval of 
‘the partial and misleading way he has of reading certain crucial 
passages, expounding them in terms that are alien to the meaning of 
the texts in which they appear’ (From Guilt to Shame, p. 180). This 
misreading is not merely a matter of literary interpretation, since it has 
far-reaching consequences for Agamben’s thought. According to Leys, it 
underpins his view of the human subject as lacking intention and agency. 
Moreover, it is important because Agamben regards the concentration 
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camps not simply as an anomalous occurrence but, on the contrary, as 
the means to explain the modern world as a whole. The camps are, he 
tells us in Homo Sacer and elsewhere, ‘the hidden matrix and nomos of 
the political space in which we are still living’ (Homo Sacer, p. 166; see 
also Means Without End, p. 36); they appear ‘as an event that decisively 
signals the political space of modernity itself’ (Homo Sacer, p. 174). 
Through the suspension of the normal rule of law in the camps, the state 
creates for itself a place where it can fulfil what is now one of its main 
functions, according to Agamben: to manage ‘bare life’, which otherwise 
cannot be inscribed in the order of the nation (Homo Sacer, 174–76; 
Means Without End, pp. 41–44). The Muselmann manifests this bare 
life in its rawest form. So the Muselmann is presented as the key to 
understanding the camps, and the camps are the key to understanding 
the modern world. Agamben’s rushed appropriation of the other’s 
trauma in his account of the Muselmann underlies and risks discrediting 
his conception of modernity in general.
Felman and the pedagogy of trauma
If Agamben’s study turns into a questionable appropriation of the other’s 
suffering, in Felman’s case it is the participatory re-creation of trauma 
which raises problems. The first chapter of the hugely influential book 
she wrote with Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History, includes her account of a graduate class 
she gave at Yale University in 1984. The class and what happened to it 
played a significant role in the development of modern trauma studies 
since the crisis it underwent contained, as Felman puts it ‘the germ – and 
the germination’ of the book which describes it (‘Education and Crisis’, 
p. 47). Entitled ‘Literature and Testimony’, the class covered works by 
Camus, Dostoevsky, Freud, Mallarmé and Celan, and culminated with 
the screening of two testimonial videotapes borrowed from the Video 
Archive for Holocaust Testimony at Yale. Towards the conclusion of the 
class, something happened. As Felman puts it, ‘The class itself broke out 
into a crisis’ (p. 47). In Felman’s account, she began getting phone calls 
from students at odd hours to discuss the class; colleagues reported that 
Felman’s students could not focus on other work, and talked only about 
the class. The students were, Felman says, ‘obsessed’: 
They felt apart, and yet not quite together. They sought out each other 
and yet felt they could not reach each other. They kept turning to each 
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other and to me. They felt alone, suddenly deprived of their bonding to 
the world and to one another. As I listened to their outpour, I realized the 
class was entirely at a loss, disoriented and uprooted. (p. 48)
After consulting with her colleague and future co-author Dori Laub, 
Felman concluded that in the final session of the class, when the second 
videotape was due to be screened, it was necessary for her ‘to reassume 
authority as the teacher of the class, and bring the students back into 
significance’ (p. 48). She prepared a lecture which summarized and 
interpreted the students’ reactions to the first videotape in the context 
of the rest of the course. In effect, she returned to them their own 
words and responses, but this time overlaid with significance which her 
position as teacher allowed her to supply. On reading the students’ final 
term papers a few weeks later, Felman ‘realized that the crisis, in effect, 
had been worked through and that a resolution had been reached, both 
on an intellectual and on a vital level’ (p. 52).
Rather than breathing a sigh of relief that this difficult situation was 
resolved, Felman now goes on to theorize that a crisis such as the one 
undergone by her students is in fact essential to genuine teaching:
I would venture to propose, today, that teaching in itself, teaching as 
such, takes place precisely only through a crisis: if teaching does not hit 
upon some sort of crisis, if it does not encounter either vulnerability or 
the explosiveness of a (explicit or implicit) critical and unpredictable 
dimension, it has perhaps not truly taught […]. Looking back at the 
experience of that class, I therefore think that my job as teacher, 
paradoxical as it may sound, was that of creating in the class the highest 
state of crisis that it could withstand, without ‘driving the students 
crazy’ – without compromising the students’ bounds. (p. 53; emphasis in 
original)
This is certainly a heady vision of teaching. Rather than enslaving 
ourselves and our students to the demands of the syllabus and 
examinations, we should be provoking crises and opening up ourselves 
and our students to traumatic encounters. It is striking, however, that 
this exposure to trauma does not lead Felman to question her authority 
as a teacher. On the contrary, her account of what teaching should be 
involves maintaining her dominance over the classroom. She seems 
confident that she has the ability, the right and the wisdom to decide 
(to a degree that I, for example, could not) what does or does not 
compromise the students’ bounds, and what does or does not drive other 
people crazy; and she appears to be comfortable with her prerogative to 
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put an end to the crisis by ‘[bringing] the students back into significance’ 
(p. 48). She provokes the crisis and then resolves it, comparing her role 
to that of a psychoanalyst who helps her patients work through their 
trauma (pp. 53–54).
Dominick LaCapra expresses what I believe are legitimate concerns 
about this approach, which entails the traumatization of students 
through encouraging them to identify with the victims of atrocity. 
It would be preferable, he suggests, ‘to avoid or at least counteract 
such traumatization – or its histrionic simulacrum – rather than to 
seek means of assuaging it once it had been set in motion’ (Writing 
History, Writing Trauma, p. 102). The teacher’s placing of herself in 
the role of therapist and the identification of her class with trauma 
victims and survivors are at best questionable and at worst positively 
dangerous. Once the complex dynamics of transference and counter-
transference have been unleashed, it may not be a straightforward 
matter to bring them back under control. The working-through which 
Felman believes has been achieved by the end of the course – ‘I realized 
that the crisis, in effect, had been worked through’ (‘Education and 
Crisis’, p. 52) – may be illusory. Freud concluded his classic paper on 
working-through by warning that the process may turn out to be ‘an 
arduous task for the subject of the analysis and a trial of patience for 
the analyst’ (‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’, p. 155). 
Even if trauma is vicarious rather than primary, it may not be quickly 
resolved by a final course assignment. For LaCapra, the teacher should 
endeavour to avoid or at least to minimize crisis. Felman, by contrast, 
insists that real teaching depends upon instigating the highest level of 
crisis that can be borne, to a degree and in a manner which might be 
thought reckless.
There is, moreover, a normative, even coercive, element in this 
transformation of the classroom into a site of vicarious trauma. After 
the outbreak of the crisis Felman reports how she called the students 
‘who had failed to contact [her]’ to discuss their reactions to what was 
occurring (‘Education and Crisis’, p. 48; my emphasis). It turns out, 
then, that not all students were affected to the extent that they felt 
obliged to contact their teacher; and this response or absence of response 
is designated as a failure. They are at fault for not participating in the 
crisis to an adequate degree or in the right way. Failing to be traumatized 
might lead to failing the class. Felman’s narrative seems to recommend 
forcing students into crisis, sharing it with them and then imposing one’s 
authority as teacher to resolve it:
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I lived the crisis with them, testified to it and made them testify to it. My 
own testimony to the class, which echoed their reactions, returning to 
them the expressions of their shock, their trauma and their disarray, bore 
witness nonetheless to the important fact that their experience, incoherent 
though it seemed, made sense, and that it mattered. My testimony was 
thus both an echo and a return of significance, both a repetition and an 
affirmation of the double fact that their response was meaningful, and 
that it counted. (‘Education and Crisis’, pp. 54–55; emphasis in original)
Describing her students’ experience, Felman refers here to ‘their shock, 
their trauma and their disarray’. The students of trauma have now 
become the victims of trauma, and their teacher wants her part of it too. I 
would argue, however, that witnessing the other’s trauma is precisely not 
to share it. The responsibility of the witness is not to become the victim, 
to partake of the victim’s pain; rather, I want to suggest, it is to regard 
the other’s pain as something alien, unfathomable and as an outrage 
which should be stopped. There is nothing enviable about suffering, and 
for most of us there is nothing to be gained by sharing in it unneces-
sarily. My objection to Agamben is that he wants to speak on behalf of 
the victims of trauma in order to tell us the meaning of their experience. 
Felman goes further, endeavouring to create and participate in a crisis 
that will turn her students into secondary victims. Both Agamben and 
Felman maintain their authority to understand, to bestow significance 
and to theorize. Their magisterial positions remain strangely unaffected 
by the traumas they oversee.
Delbo and the other’s story
The work of Charlotte Delbo, in particular her book Mesure de nos 
jours, speaks on behalf of the victims of trauma;4 however, I shall 
 4 From the growing body of work devoted to Delbo, my understanding of 
her writing has benefited in particular from the following: Thatcher, A Literary 
Analysis of Charlotte Delbo’s Concentration Camp Re-Presentation, and 
Charlotte Delbo: Une voix singulière. Mémoire, témoignage et littérature; Hutton, 
‘Conclusion: The Case of Charlotte Delbo’, pp. 210–19; Jones, ‘“A New Mode of 
Travel”: Representations of Deportation in Charlotte Delbo’s Auschwitz et après 
and Jorge Semprun’s Le Grand Voyage’, pp. 34–53; Marquart, On the Defensive. 
Some of the issues discussed in this chapter, such as the question of community 
and the use of the first person, are brilliantly analysed in Trezise, ‘The Question of 
Community in Charlotte Delbo’s Auschwitz and After’. 
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suggest, it manages to avoid the appropriative assumption of authority 
which problematizes the work of Agamben and Felman. Delbo was 28 
in March 1942 when she was arrested in occupied France along with her 
husband, Georges Dudach, for resistance activities. She was allowed to 
visit her husband for the final time in May of that year on the day he 
was executed. She was subsequently deported to Auschwitz and later to 
Ravensbrück. She was one of the 49 survivors from the 230 women on 
the convoy in which she was transported to Auschwitz.5 After the war 
she published, among other things, three remarkable works grouped 
together as a trilogy under the title Auschwitz et après, which describe 
and comment on experiences in Auschwitz, Ravensbrück and post-war 
France. In the current context, it is the third part of the trilogy, Mesure 
de nos jours, which is of most interest. The book presents a series of 
accounts of the lives of camp survivors after their return to France. Most 
– though not all – of the survivors are women, and most are named in the 
title of the section which presents their story: Gilberte, Mado, Poupette, 
Marie-Louise, Ida, Loulou, Germaine, Jacques, Denise, Gaby, Louise, 
Marceline, Françoise. Most of these accounts are in the first person 
singular. No explanation is offered of how the narratives were gathered 
or composed, and no generic marker on the book indicates whether the 
reader should take them as biographical or fictional. It would seem that 
Delbo is doing exactly what I have been objecting to: speaking in the 
place of others, presenting their stories as first-person narratives when 
the words they use may not be their own.
One way in which Delbo avoids the dangers of asserting authority 
over the other’s story is through the absence of any attempt to unify 
the disparate experiences of her narrators into a coherent aesthetic 
whole. Agamben’s Muselmänner all betoken the same meaning; Felman 
speaks of her students as an undifferentiated block. By contrast, Delbo’s 
approach preserves the specific difference of each narrative. There is no 
consistent theory or diagnosis of survival in Mesure de nos jours, only 
a series of diverse, contradictory stories: one woman recounts how she 
does not marry after her return to France, another marries but does not 
tell her husband about her experiences, another divorces; one shares 
everything with her husband and carefully preserves every memory 
of the camps; one thinks it would have been easier to marry a fellow 
survivor, another does marry a fellow survivor but finds that it is in 
 5 Delbo attempts to piece together the lives and deaths of the women in her 
convoy in Le Convoi du 24 janvier.
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fact no easier; some endeavour to forget the past, others insist on the 
importance of remembering. In a passage quoted above, Cavarero asserts 
that ‘your story is never my story’; Delbo does not ask us to recognize 
ourselves in the stories of others. There is no thematic consistency to the 
lives of survivors which would allow us to interpret Mesure de nos jours 
monolithically as a work of, say, despair or hope. The text implies that 
there is no Story of the return from Auschwitz, rather we are offered a 
multiplicity of stories without overarching sense.
According to a key topos of survivor literature, there is a stark tension 
between the need or duty to narrate and the impossibility of narrating. Even 
as they endeavour to tell their stories, survivors are acutely aware of the 
limitations of their own narrative capabilities and the likely incredulity of 
their audience.6 The impossibility which Butler ascribes to any attempt to 
give an account of oneself is felt with particular keenness by the survivors 
of trauma. Delbo certainly shares the intuition that a story cannot 
succeed in explaining a life to a listener or reader. This awareness can be 
seen in Mesure de nos jours, for example, in the strange incongruence 
between the determined attempt to tell the other’s story as if it were one’s 
own and the recurrent theme that it is impossible or pointless to talk of 
the camps. We are told that it is not worth trying to explain to those who 
cannot understand (p. 44). Referring to the title of the book, one speaker 
says that time that can be measured is not the measure of the survivors’ 
time (p. 48; see also p. 197). Their temporality is not ours, and we cannot 
share it. One survivor talks of her grief to her goats, as if only they can 
understand: ‘As-tu remarqué ces yeux mélancoliques qu’elles ont, les 
chèvres? On dirait vraiment qu’elles comprennent quand on leur parle’ 
(p. 112). The goats may understand, or they may not; what is repeatedly 
suggested, though, is that no human who is not a survivor of the camps 
can share the survivors’ experience. We can be instructed of the facts, but 
we cannot partake of the meaning or the pain, as one of Delbo’s narrators 
explains: ‘Pour les autres, je n’attends pas qu’ils comprennent. Je veux 
qu’ils sachent, même s’ils ne sentent pas ce que je sens moi. Ce que je 
veux dire quand je dis qu’ils ne comprennent pas, que personne ne peut 
comprendre. Au moins doivent-ils savoir’ (pp. 53–54).
 6 This is evident in the earliest accounts by survivors of the concentration 
camps, such as Robert Antelme’s L’Espèce humaine, first published in 1947. 
The opening words of the book’s introduction describe the survivors’ dilemma, 
desperately wanting to speak yet unable to recount or identify with their own 
experiences (p. 9). For further discussion of this issue, see chapters 3 and 10.
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This sense of the necessary unintelligibility of one’s own story is given 
further poignancy when the speaker insists that she is dead. In Edgar 
Allan Poe’s story ‘The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar’, the titular 
M. Valdemar says of himself ‘I am dead’ (p. 277; emphasis original). 
Poe’s text repeatedly marks its awareness that this claim will appear 
nonsensical, defying his narrator’s and reader’s frame of understanding. 
Delbo’s Mesure de nos jours issues the same challenge. The section 
attributed to Mado begins with the words ‘Il me semble que je ne suis 
pas vivante’ (p. 47). Listing the dead – ‘Mounette, Viva, Sylviane, Rosie, 
toutes les autres, toutes les autres’ (p. 47) – Mado believes that no one 
could return from the camps alive. This recalls the title of the first 
volume of Auschwitz et après, Aucun de nous ne reviendra. The fact 
that the book exists suggests that, contrary to the title, some will return 
and that they will tell of their survival in Auschwitz. But they return 
with a sense that in fact they have not survived.7 Their temporality is 
incommensurable with ours because they died in Auschwitz and return 
to tell of their deaths. Mado concludes:
Je ne suis pas vivante. Les gens croient que les souvenirs deviennent flous, 
qu’ils s’effacent avec le temps, le temps auquel rien ne résiste. C’est cela, la 
différence; c’est que sur moi, sur nous, le temps ne passe pas. Il n’estompe 
rien, il n’use rien. Je ne suis pas vivante. Je suis morte à Auschwitz et 
personne ne le voit. (p. 66)
The story of a woman who declares herself to be dead epitomizes 
the narrative deadlock of Mesure de nos jours and survivor literature 
more broadly. The death of the self is unnarratable, and the death of 
the other is irretrievable. At the same time, survivor literature disturbs 
the boundaries between the living and the dead, and shows their eerie 
cohabitation. Robert Jay Lifton describes the survivors of massive 
traumas as fearing that they have become ‘carriers of death’ (Death in 
Life, p. 517). The dead and the living are no longer comfortably separate. 
The opening section of Mesure de nos jours describes how, on her return 
from captivity, the narrator finds herself still accompanied by her dead 
comrades, and asks herself: ‘Si je confonds les mortes avec les vivantes, 
avec lesquelles suis-je, moi?’ (p. 11). None of us shall return, Delbo and 
others suggest, even if it might look to you, the non-survivors, as if we 
 7 This is suggested by the play on the word revenir and the description of 
the female survivors as revenantes, which also means ‘ghosts’, implying that in 
some sense they have died. For discussion, see Davis, ‘The Ghosts of Auschwitz: 
Charlotte Delbo’, pp. 93–110.
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are back among you. The dead cannot tell their own story. The living 
would not, could not and – it is implied – should not understand it. The 
title of the second volume of Auschwitz et après, Une connaissance 
inutile, implies that what the dead know would be of no use to us. It can 
teach us nothing that will help us live more fully. We are better off not 
knowing.
Yet Mesure de nos jours does purport to tell the stories of the dead 
or the living dead who returned from the camps. What saves Delbo’s 
work from what I regard as the failings of Agamben and Felman is not 
simply that she is a survivor herself. It is partly, as already suggested, her 
refusal to exert authority over the stories of the survivors by imposing 
a coherent meaning on them. It also resides, I want now to suggest, 
in the simultaneous merging of voices and loss of voice that constitute 
the intimate texture of her writing. We should note the first person 
plural which occurs in the title of both Aucun de nous ne reviendra 
and Mesure de nos jours. Cavarero’s distrust of the plural ‘we’ is a 
reluctance to allow a singular story to be subsumed in a generalizing 
narrative. Delbo, by contrast, frequently uses the first person plural. In 
her writing, the terror of a loss of self is countered or at least palliated by 
the comfort of belonging to a community of sufferers. Just as the lines 
between the living and the dead are blurred, so is the division between 
self and other; and in the process the subject’s possession of a unique 
voice is thrown into disarray. As Mado, ventriloquized by Delbo, puts 
it: ‘Je suis autre. Je parle et ma voix résonne comme une voix autre. 
Mes paroles viennent d’en dehors de moi. Je parle et ce que je dis, ce 
n’est pas moi qui le dis’ (p. 60). In this passage Mado reflects on the 
question of who is speaking here. Her words are literally not her own 
because they are Delbo’s. Someone else speaks through her. But this 
ventriloquism is not simply Delbo speaking on Mado’s behalf or in her 
place, because every voice in this text is inhabited by others. One of 
the narrators of Mesure de nos jours is identified as Charlotte, and of 
course we are likely to assume that this refers to the author, Charlotte 
Delbo. But the textual Charlotte is no wiser or more all-knowing than 
any other character. The fact that she may be the one who puts pen to 
paper does not make of her an authority figure who bestows significance 
on everything around her.
The merging of voices becomes most evident in the section entitled 
‘L’Enterrement’. A group of camp survivors, including the narrator of 
this section, who is addressed as Charlotte, meet at a railway station on 
their way to attend the burial of one of their former comrades. Some of 
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the women have not seen each other for years, yet they fall easily into 
a familiar conversation, exchanging and sharing memories and news. 
Much of the section is set out as dialogue, sometimes with no indication 
of who the speaker is at any given moment. It barely matters. The 
narrator explains the ease with which the group converses: ‘Entre nous, 
il n’y a pas d’effort à faire, il n’y a pas de contrainte, pas même celle de 
la politesse usuelle. Entre nous, nous sommes nous’ (pp. 193–94). This 
final sentence, ‘Entre nous, nous sommes nous’, emphatically insists on 
the persistence of identity within the group of survivors. The first person 
plural contains and exceeds the first person singular. Each can tell the 
story of the other because, in this haunted community of survivors, each 
story belongs to all of them.
And each death belongs to all of them also. The burial the women are 
attending is that of their comrade Germaine. In an earlier section, when 
Charlotte visits Germaine’s death bed with two others, for a moment 
she is taken back in her mind to Auschwitz and a visit to another dying 
comrade, Sylviane, together with two different companions, Carmen 
and Lulu.8 The scenes of death, their witnesses and the identity of the 
deceased become interchangeable. Delbo writes: 
Je sais que les deux autres qui étaient avec moi ce jour-là, le jour où 
Germaine est morte, n’étaient ni Carmen ni Lulu. C’est uniquement 
parce que nous étions ensemble, Lulu, Carmen et moi, pour dire adieu à 
Sylviane, que je les confonds avec celles qui étaient réellement avec moi 
quand Germaine est morte. (pp. 149–50)
Scenes and identities are overlaid, as later events become confused with 
and substitutable for earlier ones. What happens outside Auschwitz 
merely repeats what happened inside it. The living and the dead merge 
across time. The funeral which the women attend is Germaine’s, but also 
Sylviane’s, and that of so many others, and their own. Each one survives 
with every other, and each dies with every death, along with and in place 
of the other. So, to witness and to recount the death of the other is also 
to tell of one’s own demise and one’s own survival in the living death 
of those who can say, along with Mado, ‘Je suis morte à Auschwitz et 
personne ne le voit’ (p. 66).
Delbo’s use of the first person plural – ‘we’ – forges a community 
across the boundaries of death, trauma and survival. But we should 
not be misled into thinking that the reader – the non-survivor – can 
 8 On Sylviane, see Delbo, Le Convoi du 24 janvier, pp. 273–75.
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be admitted to this community. In Regarding the Pain of Others, 
Susan Sontag writes that ‘No “we” should be taken for granted when 
the subject is looking at other people’s pain’ (p. 6). Delbo freely uses 
the first person plural, but it is as exclusive as it is inclusive.9 The 
non-survivor is addressed as ‘You’, and thereby permanently distanced 
from the community of survivors. ‘You’ and ‘we’ can never understand 
one another. One of the passages which close Une connaissance inutile 
describes the barrier between the survivor and the non-survivor:
Je suis revenue d’entre les morts
et j’ai cru
que cela me donnait le droit
de parler aux autres
et quand je me suis retrouvée en face d’eux




qu’on ne peut pas parler aux autres. (p. 188)
The reader – the non-survivor – is not and cannot be part of the 
community which Delbo forms together with her living and dead 
comrades. In his study of the problematic sense of community in Delbo’s 
Auschwitz et après, Thomas Trezise describes ‘attentiveness to the 
irreducible difference between a survivor of Auschwitz and those not 
directly affected by the Holocaust’ as ‘an ethical prerequisite’ (‘The 
Question of Community’, p. 886).10 Those of us who were not in the 
camps are excluded. The text repeatedly informs us that we can observe 
but not comprehend. Our knowledge is not the survivors’ knowledge. 
What Anne-Lise Stern calls le savoir-déporté is incommensurable with 
 9 For subtle discussion of Delbo’s use of ‘we’, see in particular Trezise, 
Witnessing Witnessing, pp. 106–08.
 10 Trezise’s focus is slightly different from mine in that he is interested in 
the possibility of community between survivors and the ‘you’ to whom Delbo 
sometimes refers, whereas I use the word ‘community’ in the current discussion 
to refer to the group formed by the survivors. In his nuanced and subtle reading 
of parts of Aucun de nous ne reviendra, Trezise suggests that the irreducible 
difference between survivors and non-survivors does not preclude the possibility 
of a form of community which includes both groups: ‘the tension between identi-
fication and estrangement is not a misfortune to be surmounted but a condition 
of community to be maintained’ (‘The Question of Community’, p. 886). See also 
Trezise, Witnessing Witnessing, pp. 104–21.
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what we can know.11 Charlotte and her comrades are both the source 
of the text and the only audience capable of receiving it fully. Indeed, 
we are warned that we are better off not comprehending, since only the 
dead can understand the dead, so that to take a share in their narratives 
would be to forego life. Delbo, the author, may speak in the voice of 
dead others; but that does not entitle the excluded reader to appropriate 
their stories and to respond to their pain as if it were our own. Agamben 
wants to tell us the meaning of the Muselmann’s experience and its 
relevance for the post-Holocaust world; Felman wants to participate in 
the suffering of others and then to reassert her authority by conferring 
significance on it. Delbo, by contrast, issues no invitation to explain or 
to share.
Conclusion
To conclude, I want to warn against the allure of trauma envy, that is, 
the temptation that those of us who witness the testimony of others 
appropriate to ourselves an unmerited, unearned part in the story of 
suffering. It has been argued that vicarious trauma may have socially 
and ethically useful effects;12 but it may also be self-indulgent and 
ethically delusional. Those of us who study and teach emotionally 
gruelling material run the risk of succumbing to the dark glamour of 
vicarious trauma, regarding ourselves as traumatized subjects by proxy. 
When Felman refers to the modern world as ‘post-traumatic’ (‘Education 
and Crisis’, pp. 1, 54), she invites us to extend the scope of trauma by 
making us all survivors and victims. Agamben also, according to Ruth 
Leys, offers a view of the human subject which has the result that ‘a kind 
of traumatic abjection is held to characterize not only all the victims of 
the camps without differentiation but all human life after Auschwitz 
– including those of us who were never there’ (From Guilt to Shame, 
p. 180). The danger of this is that it collapses the necessary distinction 
 11 See Stern, Le Savoir-déporté: camps, histoire, psychanalyse, which is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
 12 For discussion and references, see Kaplan, Trauma Culture, for example 
pp. 39–41, 87–93, 122–25. Kaplan states that, ‘Arguably, being vicariously 
traumatized invites members of a society to confront, rather than conceal, 
catastrophes, and in that way might be useful’; but she goes on to say that ‘On the 
other hand, it might arouse anxiety and trigger defense against further exposure’ 
(p. 87).
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between, for example, those who were in Auschwitz and those who were 
not. Delbo reminds us uncompromisingly that those who survived the 
camps are unintelligible in the terms of those who did not know it at 
first hand. We are not the victims; we do not share or feel their pain. 
Dominick LaCapra insists that ‘a historian or other academic, however 
empathetic a listener he or she may be, may not assume the voice of 
the victim’ (Writing History, p. 98). I would add that he or she may 
not assume the victim’s trauma either. It should be possible to speak 
of these difficult topics with moral urgency, but also analytically and 
with respectful distance. Following Butler, we may not be able to give a 
final account of our life, and even less an account of others’ lives; and 
we have no mandate to assume the pain or decide the meaning of the 
lives and deaths of others. As readers, the best we can do may be to try 
to attend as honourably as possible to the traces of that which remains 
foreign to us.
For the purposes of the current book, what is important about Delbo’s 
writing position in Mesure de nos jours is that it cannot be reproduced, 
emulated or empathetically repossessed by those of us who did not 
experience the camps. Moreover, Delbo does not attempt to find a 
coherent, overarching Story or Meaning which underlies the experiences 
of her speakers. The camps produce a proliferation, sometimes even a 
competition, of stories, calling for a practice of interpretation which 
attends to the detail of each narrative without subsuming it into a final, 
rigid thesis. The next chapter takes this issue a step further: if we cannot 
speak on behalf of others, can we at least recognize and understand their 
pain?
The previous chapter discussed the problem of speaking for others. This 
one turns to the question of how we can speak about others, how we 
can understand what their pain means to them, when it is not commen-
surable with our own. Or even more radically: How can I know that 
someone else is in pain, let alone have any real knowledge of what that 
pain feels like? Wittgenstein answers these questions with breathtaking 
directness. Neither dismissing nor solving the problem, he tells us all 
we can know and all we need to know: ‘If I see someone writhing in 
pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are 
hidden from me’ (Philosophical Investigations, p. 223). I can doubt most 
things if I put my mind to it; and of course I cannot know precisely 
how another’s pain feels. But if I see a woman who has been hit by 
a truck, it would be better to call an ambulance than to consider the 
merits of philosophical scepticism. As Wittgenstein puts it in another 
passage, ‘Just try – in a real case – to doubt someone else’s fear or pain’ 
(Philosophical Investigations, p. 102). We cannot directly share it, but 
we know it when we see it.
The case of trauma and of trauma texts nevertheless complicates the 
recognition of the other’s pain. Wittgenstein refers to suffering which 
is visible (‘I see someone writhing in pain’) and has ‘evident cause’. Its 
source and its signs cannot be misinterpreted: the truck hit the woman 
and she is crying in pain. The causes and symptoms of trauma, however, 
are less obviously manifest and more easily mistakable. This is suggested 
in one of the most frequently quoted passages in trauma studies, where 
Freud describes the survivor of a train crash in Moses and Monotheism:
It may happen that a man who has experienced some frightful accident – 
a railway collision, for instance – leaves the scene of the event apparently 
chapter two
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uninjured. In the course of the next few weeks, however, he develops 
a number of severe psychical and motor symptoms which can only be 
traced to his shock, the concussion or whatever else it was. He now has a 
‘traumatic neurosis’. (p. 309)
Initially at least, the survivor shows no sign of suffering. He walks 
away from the scene of the crash without apparent physical or mental 
damage. There is no visible writhing in agony or unmistakable cause 
that would lead an observer to the conclusion that he is in pain. Yet his 
later behaviour will demonstrate that he is traumatized, and that he is 
prey to an agony which has no demonstrable physical source. Thomas 
Elsaesser neatly summarizes the problem of recognizing trauma: ‘If 
trauma is experienced through its forgetting, its repeated forgetting, 
then, paradoxically, one of the signs of the presence of trauma is the 
absence of all signs of it’ (‘Postmodernism as Mourning Work’, p. 199). 
Trauma isn’t there. This is not to say that it is not real, that it does not 
exist; but its sources and signs are not always immediately manifest as 
in the case of the woman hit by the truck. As Judith Butler suggests in 
Undoing Gender, trauma demands a resourceful practice of reading in 
which ‘One will have to become a reader of the ellipsis, the gap, the 
absence’ (p. 155).1 We have to be prepared to interpret gaps and absences 
as much as explicit statements and obvious clues.
This is where hermeneutics – and what I call here traumatic 
hermeneutics – comes in. Hermeneutics starts from the assumption that 
people and texts do not say only or exactly what they mean. Trauma 
exacerbates and radicalizes the hermeneutic search for what-is-not-
quite-said because the signs which point to it may be totally absent. This 
inaugurates both a pressing need for interpretation and the inevitable 
risk of mis- or over-interpretation. How do we distinguish between signs 
which are absent because there is nothing for them to signify and signs 
which are absent because what they signify is too dark, repressed and 
unknowable to be given manifest form? A person or text which does not 
appear traumatized may be, quite simply, not traumatized; or they may 
be so profoundly traumatized that they cannot acknowledge it. The call 
to interpretation is exhibited very clearly in Freud’s example of the train 
crash survivor, quoted above. The initial absence of signs of suffering is 
followed by what Freud calls ‘symptoms’ which can ‘only be traced to 
his shock’ (my emphasis); and Freud now confidently concludes that ‘He 
now has a “traumatic neurosis”’. Every step in this diagnosis, including 
 1 I am grateful to Avril Tynan for this reference.
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the final unveiling of the name of the illness, involves interpretation. 
Deciding that the man’s behaviour amounts to a set of ‘symptoms’ 
insists on their repetitive and medical nature (When does an action 
become a symptom? How many times does it have to be repeated?); and 
the assurance that the symptoms can only be traced to the train crash 
is questionable even on Freud’s own terms. Moreover, it is in the nature 
of Freudian interpretation that any action, word or dream thought may 
mean more than it seems on first, second or third sight. There are no 
stable criteria for determining what can and what cannot yield further 
meaning if exposed to further interpretive pressure. 
As Laplanche and Pontalis put it, ‘On pourrait caractériser la 
psychanalyse par l’interprétation, c’est-à-dire la mise en évidence du 
sens latent d’un matériel’ (Vocabulaire, p. 207). Psychoanalysis is an art 
of interpretation, with all the risks of error that such an art inevitably 
brings with it. Indeed, Freud has a good claim to be regarded as one of 
the pre-eminent hermeneutic thinkers and practitioners of the twentieth 
century, alongside Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricœur. Although in the 
case of the train crash survivor Freud appears to rush with suspect 
assurance to a final diagnosis (‘He now has a “traumatic neurosis”’), in 
his customary theory and practice the ‘latent sense’ to which Laplanche 
and Pontalis refer is generally more open and elusive, and less readily 
attained. Ricœur, who more than almost everyone appreciated Freud’s 
hermeneutic importance, points out that the Freudian movement from 
the manifest to the latent cannot be regarded as ‘un rapport simple 
entre discours chiffré et discours déchiffré’ (De l’interprétation, p. 99). 
The symptom or the dream are not just coded messages which the 
interpreter decodes in order to restore their true meaning. The language 
of the unconscious operates according to different rules from that of 
the conscious, and one cannot be translated directly into the other. 
We can never be confident that a dream, for example, has been fully, 
properly and finally interpreted (Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 
p. 383), and in any case all psycho-pathological structures regularly have 
more than one meaning (The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 230–31). 
For practical or therapeutic reasons, we may need to bring an interpre-
tation to an end, but we can always start again the next day, exploring 
hitherto neglected details or fresh associations (The Interpretation of 
Dreams, p. 669).
Key to Freudian hermeneutics is what he calls ‘overinterpretation’ 
(Überdeutung in German). Overinterpretation often bears negative 
connotations, suggesting that the interpreter has gone too far, to 
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the point of imposing improbable or implausible meanings on an 
action, utterance or work. Some critics and thinkers have nevertheless 
endeavoured to defend overinterpretation: by overinterpreting, we push 
the boundaries of what can be said, potentially discovering new questions 
to be answered and opening up new fields of enquiry.2 However, this 
is not quite the sense of overinterpretation in Freud. He is aware that 
his readers would be inclined to accuse him of being unnecessarily 
ingenious in some of his dream interpretations, though he adds soberly 
that ‘actual experience would teach them better’ (Interpretation, p. 670). 
Moreover, he argues that overinterpretation in fact belongs to the proper 
process of interpretation. Without it, there is no full understanding: 
‘all neurotic symptoms, and, for that matter, dreams’, he writes, ‘are 
capable of being “over-interpreted” and indeed need to be, if they are 
to be fully understood’ (Interpretation, p. 368; my emphasis). Later in 
The Interpretation of Dreams Freud reinforces the point: 
It is only with the greatest difficulty that the beginner in the business 
of interpreting dreams can be persuaded that his task is not at an end 
when he has a complete interpretation in his hands – an interpretation 
which makes sense, is coherent and throws light upon every element of 
the dream’s contents. For the same dream may perhaps have another 
interpretation as well, an ‘over-interpretation’, which has escaped him. 
(p. 669)
Freud describes a process resembling the Derridean notion of supplemen-
tarity, whereby something is complete and yet can still be augmented. 
Here, he argues that an interpretation can make sense, be coherent and 
elucidate every element of a dream; and yet, although complete, it is 
not finished. This version of overinterpretation entails a conception of 
meaning as layered, so that further layers can always be added or found. 
And this process has no theoretical conclusion, although it may need to 
be curtailed for practical reasons. Even the most exhaustively analysed 
 2 The key quotation to which I find myself repeatedly drawn on this topic is from 
Stanley Cavell: ‘In my experience people worried about reading in, or overinterpre-
tation, or going too far, are, or were, typically afraid of getting started, or reading 
as such, as if afraid that texts – like people, like times and places – mean things 
and moreover mean more than you know. This is accordingly a fear of something 
real, and it may be a healthy fear, that is, a fear of something fearful. […] Still, my 
experience is that most texts, like most lives, are underread, not overread’ (Pursuits 
of Happiness, p. 35). For discussion of the possible gains of overreading, see Culler, 
‘In Defence of Overinterpretation’, and Davis, Critical Excess.
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dream retains a link to the unknown, which ensures that further 
interpretation is always possible:
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream 
which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during 
the work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle of dream-
thoughts which cannot be unravelled and which moreover adds nothing 
to our knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream’s navel, 
the spot where it reaches down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts 
to which we are led by interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, 
have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction 
into the intricate network of our world of thought. It is at some point 
where this meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, 
like a mushroom out of its mycelium. (The Interpretation of Dreams, 
pp. 671–72)
Freudian interpretation is sometimes criticized for being reductive, 
always finding the same sexual content wherever it looks. This passage 
gives the lie to such claims. If the tangle of dream-thoughts cannot be 
unravelled and adds nothing to our knowledge, this does not mean 
that it should be definitively relegated to oblivion. It is a mystery, a 
connection to the unknown, which we do not yet know how to address 
or understand, but which may become approachable by some accident or 
newly discovered association. It is not so much the end of interpretation 
as the guarantee that there is no such end, in principle if not in practice. 
Freud’s discussion here is specifically concerned with the interpre-
tation of dreams. He makes it explicit, though, that his comments are 
equally applicable to literary works (see The Interpretation of Dreams, 
p. 368); and following Ricœur’s lead in modelling the interpretation of 
meaningful action on the hermeneutics of the text, we can extend the 
relevance of Freud’s discussion to other forms of human behaviour.3 
The significance of this for traumatic hermeneutics is twofold: first, 
identifying and interpreting trauma entails – even more than other 
interpretive occasions – looking for what is not there (initially at least, 
the survivor of the train crash shows no signs of trauma, but this does 
not mean that he is not or will not become traumatized); and second, 
insofar as the tangle of (absent) signs of trauma reaches down into 
something unknown, interpretation always invites and even requires 
a further interpretation, an overinterpretation, which adds ever more 
layers of meaning. The rest of this chapter explores these issues through 
 3 See especially the texts collected in Ricœur’s Du texte à l’action.
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examination of some stories and texts which encapsulate the problem of 
traumatic hermeneutics: the sad case of Phineas P. Gage, which is one of 
the starting points of modern neuroscience; and some of the works of the 
Holocaust survivors Jorge Semprun and Charlotte Delbo.
Gage was no longer Gage
In 1848 Phineas P. Gage was a 25-year-old construction foreman of good 
character in charge of a gang laying railroad tracks in Vermont. To 
continue their work, the gang needed to use explosives to break a way 
through the rock. Gage was an expert at this; and one day in September 
1848 he prepared a charge with a specially designed iron bar. But 
something went wrong. Here is Antonio Damasio’s account:
The explosion is so brutal that the entire gang freezes on their feet. 
It takes a few seconds to piece together what is going on. The bang is 
unusual, the rock is intact. Also unusual is the whistling sound, as of a 
rocket hurled at the sky. But this is more than fireworks. It is assault and 
battery. The iron enters Gage’s left cheek, pierces the base of the skull, 
traverses the front of his brain, and exits at high speed through the top 
of his head. The rod has landed more than a hundred feet away, covered 
in blood and brains. Phineas Gage has been thrown to the ground. 
(Descartes’ Error, p. 4)
Astonishingly, Gage survived this accident. Or did he? Was the person 
who survived the accident still Phineas Gage? After two months, apart 
from losing vision in one eye, he seemed to have recovered physically. But 
his character had changed. The temperate, energetic foreman became 
irresponsible, obstinate, profane and capricious. He was unable to hold 
down a steady job, became a circus freak and then died in obscurity at 
the age of 38. He was not the person he had been: ‘Gage was no longer 
Gage’, as his acquaintances observed (Damasio, Descartes’ Error, p. 8). 
He survived, but he was not the person he had been before the accident. 
His character had changed fundamentally. Spelling out the importance 
of the case, Damasio demonstrates how the brain lesion suffered by Gage 
raises issues about what it means to be human:
Gage’s story hinted at an amazing fact: Somehow, there were systems 
in the human brain dedicated more to reasoning than to anything else, 
and in particular to the personal and social dimensions of reasoning. 
The observance of previously acquired social convention and ethical 
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rules could be lost as a result of brain damage, even when neither 
basic intellect nor language seemed compromised. Unwittingly, Gage’s 
example indicated that something in the brain was concerned specifically 
with unique human properties, among them the ability to anticipate 
the future and plan accordingly within a complex social environment; 
the sense of responsibility toward the self and others; and the ability to 
orchestrate one’s survival deliberately, at the command of one’s free will. 
(Descartes’ Error, p. 10)
So this industrial accident turns out to have philosophical significance. 
It raises questions about free will, identity, responsibility and ethics. 
The literal, physical trauma to Gage’s brain seemed to reach deep down 
in to his soul; and in the process, it raised questions about the extent 
and limits of our knowledge. As Damasio puts it, ‘Gage posed more 
questions than he gave answers’ (Descartes’ Error, p. 18). These concern, 
according to Damasio, his very status as a human being: ‘May he be 
described as having free will? Did he have a sense of right and wrong, 
or was he the victim of his new brain design, such that his decisions 
were imposed on him and inevitable? Was he responsible for his acts?’ 
(Descartes’ Error, p. 19).
These are fundamental questions about how the brain works and 
what it means to be human. So far as I am able to judge, neuroscience 
tends to overestimate its ability to answer them. Having shown the 
limitations of nineteenth-century science, Damasio goes on to show 
how modern scientific techniques allow us to understand fully what 
happened to Gage, which parts of his brain/mind were affected, and 
therefore why he became a different person in his post-traumatic years. 
We can now arrive at what Damasio calls ‘certain conclusions’ about 
the extent and consequence of the ‘selective damage to the prefrontal 
cortices of Phineas Gage’s brain’ (Descartes’ Error, p. 33). We know 
what happened and why its consequences were what they were. 
One might wonder, though, whether this account of neuroscience 
overestimates its ability to answer fundamental questions about the 
meaning of human action. By contrast, it is striking that early psycho-
analytic attempts to understand the nature of trauma more subtly 
concede the speculative, interpretive and provisional nature of their 
conclusions and weave it into the fabric of their thought. The psycho-
analytical conception of trauma grew out of the industrial and medical 
concerns of the nineteenth century, and was then forced to refine its 
thinking in the dark light of the First World War (see Luckhurst, The 
Trauma Question, pp. 19–76). The early analysts became intensely 
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preoccupied with victims of shell shock, or what we might now call 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). New questions arise which 
further problematize the identification of the sources of trauma in the 
chronology of the subject. In the case of the train crash, why is it that 
two people sitting side by side, experiencing more or less the same event, 
react totally differently? One shrugs off the event as an unfortunate but 
meaningless accident, and gets on with her life; the other finds himself 
haunted, perhaps years later, by nightmares which repeat the crash over 
and over again. In relation to the war neuroses, why do some suffer from 
debilitating shell shock while others do not, when their experience in the 
trenches is more or less the same? In part, the answer lies in the future, 
through the process of deferred action (Nachträglichkeit), whereby a 
later trigger re-creates the past as traumatic. But the answer also lies in 
the more distant past. Karl Abraham introduces his paper on the war 
neuroses by referring to another accident, this time involving a tram:
I might mention the case of a young girl who met with a slight tram 
accident when she was in the throes of a serious erotic conflict. The 
analysis shows that the accident in a certain measure gave a pretext for 
the outbreak of the neurosis. The symptoms were in connection with the 
conflict in question; the importance of the trauma receded quite into the 
background. I might add that some litigious cases of traumatic neurosis 
which I observed in greater detail all suffered from impotence; this 
disturbance was produced by the accident, but seemed to have its real 
basis in old and unconscious sexual resistances. (Psychoanalysis and the 
War Neuroses, p. 22)
The accident itself is a pretext which requires a subsequent trigger before 
it becomes traumatic. However, the event and the trigger acquire their 
traumatic potential only because of a prior predisposition which lies 
deeper in the past. As Freud says of the German National Army in the 
Great War, it was the ‘condition, and fruitful soil, for the appearance of 
war neuroses’ (‘Introduction’, p. 3). But that is not to say that the war 
was their direct and sole cause. The traumatic event is the actualization 
of a possibility which may lie unrealized in the absence of a further 
accident, this being the trigger which will give it deadly potency. In 
classical psychoanalysis, then, trauma lies in a deep past which has not 
yet been, and in a fractured present which cannot yet be. We may all be 
accidents waiting to happen, or accidents which have already happened 
without our knowledge.
We might wish to debate the rights and wrongs of this account of 
trauma, both in general and in particular cases. A key point, though, 
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is that it can be debated, that it allows for the possibility and even the 
inevitability of reinterpretation, because it concedes its interpretive 
nature. As Ricœur puts it, ‘La psychanalyse est ainsi de bout en bout 
interprétation’ (De l’interprétation, p. 76). The role of the analyst is 
to explore the interplay of meaning and event, sense and nonsense, 
in the construction of a life story. The French philosopher Catherine 
Malabou contrasts this starkly with an approach based in neuroscience. 
Malabou prefaces her book Les Nouveaux Blessés by referring to her 
grandmother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. Her grandmother, 
like Phineas Gage (whose case she also discusses, pp. 46–47), poses a 
fundamental philosophical question about the continuity of identity 
through time. Is the Alzheimer’s sufferer the same person as she was, or 
has a former identity been changed into something new, with diminishing 
connections to a disappearing past? Gage was no longer Gage, we were 
told. The implication of this phrase is that a new being has taken the 
place of the existing one. The guiding idea of Malabou’s book is that 
the ‘new wounded’ of her title are not the victims of some long-buried 
trauma retrievable through interpretation, but are new beings without 
temporal continuity with pre-existing identities, which are now forever 
lost. There is no interplay of meaning and event; instead, there is a 
radical accident which comes entirely from the outside and makes 
permanent changes. What this also means for Malabou is that there is 
no hermeneutics of cerebral trauma because there is no interpretable 
continuity between former and present selves: ‘toute hermeneutique 
[de l’événement] est impossible. […] Les accidents de la cérébralité sont 
des blessures qui déchirent le fil de l’histoire, la mettant hors d’elle, en 
suspendent le cours et demeurent herméneutiquement “irrécupérables”, 
alors que le psychisme continue de vivre’ (Les Nouveaux Blessés, p. 29; 
emphasis original).
Between classical psychoanalysis and this version of neurophi-
losophy, there is a stark division. We have on the one hand a practice 
which embraces its hermeneutic nature, and on the other an open 
declaration of hostility towards hermeneutics: ‘L’ennemi aujourd’hui, 
c’est l’herméneutique’, declares Malabou (Les Nouveaux Blessés, p. 259; 
emphasis original). This division goes together with a fundamental 
difference of approach to the analysis of trauma. For psychoanalysis, 
the traumatic event must be interpreted carefully in the light of earlier 
and later events in the life of a subject so that its meaning as trauma 
can emerge. For Malabou, there is nothing to interpret because trauma 
bears no meaning; it marks the radical, unpredictable, uninterpretable 
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invention of a new subjectivity. To explore this division further, I shall 
now look at works by two Holocaust survivors, Jorge Semprun and 
Charlotte Delbo, who also raise the problems of the interpretation and 
interpretability of trauma.
Semprun and Delbo
By any standards Semprun had a remarkable life. He was born in Spain 
in 1923. His republican family left their homeland and eventually settled 
in France in the 1930s in order to escape the Spanish fascists. During the 
Occupation, Semprun joined the communist resistance, and was captured 
in 1943 and deported to Buchenwald. After the war, he became a leading 
member of the Spanish Communist Party in exile, and wrote an award-
winning, semi-fictionalized account of his deportation, Le Grand Voyage 
(1963), before being expelled from the Party for ideological differences 
in 1964. He then went on to become a novelist, autobiographer, screen-
writer and eventually Minister for Culture in the first Spanish Socialist 
government after the death of General Franco. He died in 2011.
Le Grand Voyage is an astonishing literary debut. It was immediately 
recognized as achieving a unique combination of political and moral 
seriousness with modernist literary techniques. In short, it cut across 
and in its way resolved contemporary French debates which appeared to 
demand a choice between commitment and experimentation in literature. 
Describing the deportation of Resistance fighters to Buchenwald, its 
historical, testimonial importance was unimpugnable; and, adopting 
complex time frames, involving flashbacks and flash-forwards, it also 
brought an intense literary self-knowingness to the treatment of its 
material. What is striking about the book is that it is not yet – though it 
is almost – a trauma text. What I mean by this is that, while it describes 
terrible things, those things do not quite entail a wholesale collapse of 
the narrator or author’s ability to recall, recount and comprehend what 
is happening. The particular tension of Le Grand Voyage comes from 
the first-person narrator’s continued assertions of command over his 
experience and his text, coupled with the spectre of a possibility that his 
self-assurance is on the verge of falling apart. 
There is an important historical point here about the first French 
accounts of deportation and the experience of the concentration camps. 
The earliest works to appear were written by communist deportees, 
such as David Rousset in L’Univers concentrationnaire and Robert 
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Antelme in L’Espèce humaine. These works describe awful, unimag-
inable experiences which are nevertheless not traumatic in the sense of 
radically undermining beliefs and identity. The things that happened to 
their authors were certainly terrible; but they made sense within their 
established world view: if you are opposed to fascism, and you take 
arms against it, then it is not all surprising if the fascists do bad things 
to you when they capture you. There are traces of this kind of reasoning 
in Semprun’s Le Grand Voyage: the account of the deportation to 
Buchenwald and early experiences there is harrowing, but the narrator 
remains confident to a significant extent, even to the point of irritating 
arrogance. When he wrote the work, Semprun was still a communist 
insider. His political beliefs provided him with a framework in which his 
experiences could be processed and understood. They made sense within 
a conceptual system which ensured that they remained intelligible, 
possessable and bearable.
That system would not survive long. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One 
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich was published in France in 1963, 
shortly after Semprun completed Le Grand Voyage. In a political climate 
still heavily influenced by communism, the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s 
work implicitly encouraged comparison between the Nazi camps and 
the Soviet Gulags. It undermined the moral authority of communist 
opponents to Nazism, suggesting that the regime in whose name they 
were struggling may have been no better than the one they were fighting 
against. Semprun’s experience becomes traumatic at the point where 
the political framework which had made it intelligible was no longer 
tenable for him. As he wrote in Quel beau dimanche! in 1980, his later 
account of his time in Buchenwald, the sense of his experience changed 
retrospectively. It became traumatic not, or not only, because of its 
inherent nature, but because of an enforced revision of the context in 
which it was understood: 
Tout mon récit dans le Grand Voyage s’articulait silencieusement, sans 
en faire état, sans en faire un plat ni des gorges chaudes, à une vision 
communiste du monde. Toute la vérité de mon témoignage avait pour 
référence implicite, mais contraignante, l’horizon d’une société désaliénée: 
une société sans classes où les camps eussent été inconcevables. Toute la 
vérité de mon témoignage baignait dans les huiles saintes de cette bonne 
conscience latente. Mais l’horizon du communisme n’était pas celui 
de la société sans classes. L’horizon du communisme, incontournable, 
était celui du Goulag. Du coup, toute la vérité de mon livre devenait 
mensongère. (pp. 384–85)
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Semprun’s account of his transformed relation to his earlier 
experience fits well with the classical psychoanalytic model of trauma 
as something occurring in a deep past, but not becoming traumatic 
until it is awoken, triggered, by events which may occur decades later. 
To put it schematically, the experience of Buchenwald was terrible but 
not yet traumatic for Semprun in 1963, 18 years after the liberation 
of the camp. He was still a committed communist and he had not 
read Solzhenitsyn. His persecution by the Nazis had purpose, value 
and meaning because it made sense in the context of his political 
convictions. In 1964, having read Solzhenitsyn and been expelled from 
the Communist Party, the past became traumatic because its meaning 
had been abruptly transformed. The truth of his earlier testimony 
became a lie. His destiny and his testimony now change. From being 
a communist militant actively involved in the clandestine fight against 
fascism, he will now become an author and public witness to the 
trials, tribulations and failures of the political left in twentieth-century 
Europe. Is this the realization of what he could have been all along, or 
the invention of a new identity, utterly transformed by the encounter 
with trauma? Rather than answering this straightaway, I want to 
place Semprun’s experience alongside the work of another Holocaust 
survivor, Charlotte Delbo.
In the literature of Holocaust memory, Charlotte Delbo is one of the 
few authors who is as fascinating, brilliant, technically sophisticated, 
demanding and finally humane as Semprun. Like Semprun, Delbo was 
captured and deported for working in the communist French Resistance. 
Set in Auschwitz, the first volume of her trilogy Auschwitz et après 
poses the problem of survival in the most brutal terms possible. It is 
entitled Aucun de nous ne reviendra. In a banally literal sense, the 
certainty expressed in this title turns out to be thankfully misplaced: the 
fact that she is writing the volume is material proof that she has in fact 
returned. Return is possible. Yet the title poses the question of whether 
return does in fact occur. Can one come back from this place called 
Auschwitz, is the person who returns the same person who went away? 
One of the questions which dominate Delbo’s work, like Semprun’s, is 
the meaning and possibility of return; and what this also concerns is 
the relation between a before and an after, between the subject who 
went away and the subject who comes back. Are they the same, or at 
least joined together in a temporal continuity, or are they forever torn 
apart, thrown into a new temporality? To return to my refrain, is Gage 
still Gage, is Semprun still Semprun, is Delbo still Delbo? Does the 
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traumatized subject rediscover something more ancient, or does she 
experience something terribly new?
As discussed in the previous chapter, the third volume of Auschwitz 
et après, Mesure de nos jours, describes the post-war lives of some of 
those who returned from the camps. The opening section is entitled ‘Le 
Retour’, posing once again the question of what it means, whether it is 
possible, to return from Auschwitz. The section on the character given the 
name ‘Loulou’ is particularly interesting here. Loulou is a male deportee 
whom his former comrades are seeking for the 20-year anniversary of 
the liberation of the camps. A week before the anniversary, he is found 
and his story reconstructed. When he returned in June 1945, the whole 
world he knew had disappeared. His family were gone, their home 
occupied by strangers. Without money or a place to say, he is arrested; 
without a good explanation of how he came to be where he is, he is taken 
to be suffering from amnesia and interned in a lunatic asylum. Although 
there seems to be nothing particularly wrong with him, he stays there 
for 20 years and grows fat. When his former comrades find him, they 
eventually recognize him and he recognizes them. He is who he was; 
and yet his world is changed, utterly changed. He has lost his notion of 
time; his memory is intact, but his experience is not his own: ‘Autrement, 
il se souvient de tout. Il s’en souvient peut-être mieux que toi ou moi – 
pour lui le passé est bien plus proche que pour nous –, seulement il a 
l’impression que ce n’est pas à lui que c’est arrivé. Il a un passé qui n’est 
pas le sien, pour ainsi dire’ (Mesure de nos jours, p. 133).
Continuity with the past is preserved while, paradoxically, also 
being completely broken. Delbo’s work suggests that there is something 
incommensurable between the before and the after; an absolute divide 
now separates them. This is magnificently described in one of the 
fragments which ends the second volume of Auschwitz et après, Une 
connaissance inutile:
Je reviens d’un autre monde
dans ce monde
que je n’avais pas quitté









chaque jour un peu plus
je remeurs
la mort de tous ceux qui sont morts




je ne sais plus
quand je rêve
et quand
je ne rêve pas. (pp. 183–84)
The subject has both returned and not returned; she is both alive and 
dead, dying again, in the impossible verb ‘je remeurs’, used doubly 
impossibly because here it is transitive: she dies, and she (re-)dies the 
deaths of others. The disjunction is made palpable in the coexistence 
of two temporal frames: a past which cannot be escaped, so that the 
present does not exist except as the continual re-enactment of something 
lying in the past, and a present which has now lost all contact with 
a pre-traumatic reality. In the Freudian model, the traumatic event is 
traumatic insofar as it revives potential meanings which lie deeper in 
the past. Delbo’s work suggests something closer to Malabou’s interpre-
tation of neuroscience, because in Loulou’s case, trauma appears as an 
absolute end and an absolute beginning. The subject who returns is now 
irrevocably cut off from the subject who went away.
In trauma studies, Cathy Caruth’s notion of unclaimed experience has 
now become more or less canonical. This refers to the trauma victim’s 
sense that her experience is not her own, that it has not (yet?) been 
integrated into her life and her life story. It would be easy enough to 
push the story of Delbo’s Loulou into this model, given that (as already 
quoted) we are told that ‘il a l’impression que ce n’est pas à lui que c’est 
arrivé. Il a un passé qui n’est pas le sien, pour ainsi dire’ (Mesure de nos 
jours, p. 133). This looks like classic ‘unclaimed experience’, but there 
is a crucial difference. ‘Unclaimed experience’ suggests that trauma 
is waiting to be claimed, that it can be claimed, made one’s own and 
integrated into a meaningful narrative. What Delbo suggests is that, 
on the contrary, no such integration is available. Experience is both 
unclaimed and unclaimable, because the life story of the traumatized 
subject has been radically, irreversibly broken. The before and the after 
have been torn apart.
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Wittgenstein may be right that it is difficult to doubt the pain of 
others when we are called on to witness it. This, though, does not 
make the work of interpreting another’s pain any easier. Suffering has 
a story; it is part of a world of meaning(s) – albeit often ambiguous, 
conflicted or elusive meaning(s) – which appears tantalizingly in the 
interplay between what is said and what is not said in life narratives 
and fictions. The paradox of trauma is that it may interrupt or even 
utterly break the sequence of a story because it does not belong to it in 
any way, it may come completely from the outside; but it is also part of 
the sequence which it interrupts, or at least it can always be reread as 
part of that sequence. This is why Malabou is wrong to say that there is 
no hermeneutics of trauma. There certainly is; and indeed she provides 
one of the terms of its fraught hermeneutics by problematizing the link 
between continuity and discontinuity, for example as we have seen it in 
the writings of Semprun and Delbo. Traumatic hermeneutics does not 
provide final answers but, on the contrary, allows a practice of reading 
and understanding which has no definitive criteria for determining when 
interpretation slides into overinterpretation. 
On this issue Freud is more subtle than his revisionists and detractors. 
Once the meaning of a dream narrative has become clear, he insists that 
the analyst needs to start again (The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 231); 
full meaning can be achieved only by overinterpretation (p. 383), though 
this means that it is never full enough. What is already full can always 
be filled further. As Freud puts it, ‘it is in fact never possible to be sure 
that a dream has been completely interpreted. Even if the solution seems 
satisfactory and without gaps, the possibility always remains that the 
dream may have yet another meaning’ (The Interpretation of Dreams, 
p. 383). Freud wants satisfactory solutions while knowing full well that 
there is always more to be said; and what he says of dreams here can be 
extended to other forms – all forms, I suggest – of text and narrative. 
The constraints of time, energy, human finitude and mortality may 
ensure that we cannot and should not carry on indefinitely trying to 
tease out further strands of meaning; but in principle the limitlessness of 
semantic possibility and the interminability of hermeneutic endeavour 
mean that even the fullest, most convincing interpretation can be 
succeeded, supplemented or contradicted by ever more overinterpre-
tations and over-overinterpretations.
Of course, the time comes when we have to stop. Before ending this 
chapter, though, I want to add another term to the discussion, and that 
is ‘responsibility’. In a widely quoted passage, Semprun wrote that the 
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story of the concentration camps must be ‘un récit illimité, probablement 
interminable, illuminé – clôturé aussi, bien entendu – par cette possibilité 
de se poursuivre à l’infini’ (L’Ecriture ou la vie, pp. 23–24). That must 
be as true of the interpretation of the story as it is of the story itself. 
But what of my responsibility as a reader and interpreter? By ‘responsi-
bility’, I mean my ability to respond (‘response-ability’, as Felman puts 
it; ‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 200) to the work, but also my moral responsi-
bility for it, and for my reading of it. How can we justify interpreting 
and overinterpreting the pain of others, when what it may be thought 
to require most pressingly is acknowledgement? It would be foolish and 
wrong to give an easy answer to this. My provisional suggestion is that 
it may be better to give continuing, respectful and caring attention to the 
stories of pain – even at the risk of overreading – than to think that we 
have understood them once and for all.
Trauma, war, hermeneutics
The difficulty of interpreting trauma comes from the realization that it 
is not necessarily manifest in testimony or text. It may be least traumatic 
when it is most openly expressed and most traumatic when it goes unsaid, 
covertly inflecting utterances without becoming explicit. The central 
argument of the current book is that, in this respect, the Second World 
War epitomizes the hermeneutic problem of trauma. In his brilliant and 
influential essay ‘The Storyteller’, Walter Benjamin maintained that the 
First World War gave rise to a crisis in narrative because words could 
no longer do justice to the suffering of those who experienced it. But at 
least – we might argue – in the case of the First World War there was still 
a story to be told, even if no one knew how to tell it: that is, there was 
a significant degree of common ground which meant that the untellable 
story of the war was at least a shared untellable story. Of course, this is 
only relatively true, and could never be more than that; but it has been 
plausibly suggested that a significant difference between the first and the 
second world wars is that the second takes to a more extreme level the 
incommensurability of experience, so that to understand one person’s 
experience in the light of another’s becomes ever harder. Not only is the 
story of the war untellable, but perhaps there isn’t even a story to tell. 
That does not mean that the war isn’t present, all the time, serving as 
a motor for stories and thought precisely because it offers no particular 
insight or content.
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The French thinkers and writers who lived through the Second World 
War were an extraordinary generation. They established nothing short 
of a Golden Age, during which French literature and philosophy would 
achieve massive international recognition inside and outside academia. 
But the Golden Age was tarnished by the memory of war. For that 
brilliant generation of writers, the war was a ubiquitous presence, even 
and especially when it was not their explicit subject. Two among them – 
Sartre and Beauvoir – emerged from the war as the leading writers and 
intellectuals of their generation, and the next chapter turns to the traces 
of war in some of their writings.

section b
Writing the War:  
Sartre, Beauvoir, Camus

Que signifie au juste le mot guerre? Il y a un mois, 
quand il a été imprimé en grosses lettres dans les 
journaux, c’était une horreur informe, quelque chose 
de confus, mais de plein. Maintenant, ce n’est nulle 
part, ni rien. Je me sens détendue et vague, j’attends, 
je ne sais pas quoi. 
(Beauvoir, La Force d’âge, p. 461, quoting  
a journal entry written on 3 October 1939)1
‘Jamais nous n’avons été plus libres que sous l’occupation allemande’ 
(Situations, III, p. 11). This was Sartre’s provocative summary of the 
Occupation shortly after the liberation of Paris in August 1944. If 
we do not progress any further into the article of which it is the first 
sentence, ‘La République du silence’, we might suspect that for Sartre 
and his friends, and by extension perhaps for French people in general, 
the Occupation was not so bad after all. Indeed, with a degree of 
provocation to match Sartre’s, the historian and novelist Gilbert Joseph 
has argued that Sartre and Beauvoir had, as the title of his book (to 
which the title of this chapter refers) puts it, une si douce occupation. 
According to Joseph, Sartre and Beauvoir’s Resistance activities never 
got beyond talk, and they were careful not to put themselves in real 
danger. They spent the Occupation pursuing their literary careers and 
sexual conquests, cementing their intellectual credentials and enjoying 
a high time. If some of their wartime writings (such as Sartre’s play 
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Les Mouches and Beauvoir’s novel Le Sang des autres) and some of 
their post-war statements implied support for and maybe even active 
participation in the Resistance, this was all part of their self-serving 
self-mythologization. Joseph reports that on one occasion he asked 
the historian of the Resistance, Henri Noguères, why his monumental 
five-volume Histoire de la Résistance en France never mentions Sartre, 
only to be told bluntly: ‘Parce que Sartre n’a jamais été un résistant’ 
(Une si douce occupation, p. 366).2 In a subsequent letter, Noguères 
underscored his earlier statement: ‘Je maintiens qu’en une vingtaine 
d’années consacrées à des recherches et des travaux sur l’histoire de 
la Résistance en France, je n’ai jamais rencontré Sartre ou Beauvoir’ 
(quoted in Une si douce occupation, p. 366).
Joseph’s account has been criticized on a number of grounds, ranging 
from factual inaccuracy to wilful misinterpretation.3 In this chapter I 
aim neither to dismiss it out of hand nor to endorse it. Regarding Sartre’s 
description of the Occupation as a period of unprecedented freedom, 
we do not have to read far into ‘La République du silence’ (reprinted 
in Situations, III) to discover that this freedom is neither as agreeable 
nor as counter-intuitive as the initial statement might lead us to believe. 
In the second sentence Sartre refers to French civilians’ loss of rights 
and the mass deportation of workers, Jews and political prisoners. 
The French were nevertheless free, in Sartre’s sense, insofar as the 
Occupation confronted them with the human condition stripped down 
to essentials, in constant proximity to death. French men and women 
had to decide for themselves who they were or who they aspired to be: 
‘Et le choix que chacun faisait de lui-même était authentique puisqu’il 
se faisait en présence de la mort, puisqu’il aurait toujours pu s’exprimer 
sous la forme “Plutôt la mort que …”’ (Situations, III, p. 12). Through 
oppression, the human subject could discover freedom in its existential, 
existentialist sense.
This position concords with the view of freedom elaborated by Sartre 
in his major philosophical work of the Occupation period, L’Être et le 
néant (1943). Because it was published under the censorship regime of 
 2 Joseph refers to the original five-volume edition, which was subsequently 
reissued in a ten-volume revised and expanded edition.
 3 LaMarca, for example, comments of the book that it ‘cannot be judged as 
completely reliable and definitely not as unbiased’ (‘Guilt and the War Within’, 
p. 40), citing in support a mistake about the date of the birth of Camus’s twin 
children.
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the Occupation, the book could not refer explicitly to the Second World 
War or the German presence in France. Nevertheless, it is no great leap 
to suggest that its historical context to some extent informs Sartre’s 
insistence that the essential aspect of human relations is conflict rather 
than fellowship (p. 481). And if Sartre does not specifically mention 
the war against the Germans, he does discuss war; indeed, I suggest 
that he plays on the ambiguity of the French la guerre, which can refer 
both to war in general and the specific war which would inevitably be 
on the minds of his first readers. In the section of the work devoted 
to freedom and responsibility, Sartre argues that (the) war is a human 
situation for which we must take total responsibility. The war is mine, 
and in choosing it, in deciding not to reject it, for example by suicide 
or desertion, I choose myself and the person I want to be: ‘vivre cette 
guerre, c’est me choisir par mon choix de moi-même’ (L’Etre et le néant, 
p. 613). In typically uncompromising style, Sartre declares that ‘On a 
la guerre qu’on mérite’ (L’Etre et le néant, p. 614) – a phrase which is 
echoed both in his Carnets de la drôle de guerre (pp. 161–62) and his 
novel La Mort dans l’âme (p. 95). Sartre insists that the subject is free 
even – perhaps especially – in times of war, even though its freedom 
brings with it a terrible burden of responsibility:
Ainsi, totalement libre, indiscernable de la période dont j’ai choisi d’être 
le sens, aussi profondément responsable de la guerre que si je l’avais 
moi-même déclarée, ne pouvant rien vivre sans l’intégrer à ma situation, 
m’y engager tout entier et la marquer de mon sceau, je dois être sans 
remords ni regrets comme je suis sans excuse, car, dès l’instant de mon 
surgissement à l’être, je porte le poids du monde à moi tout seul, sans que 
rien ni personne ne puisse l’alléger. (L’Etre et le néant, p. 614; emphasis 
original)
In this dense sentence, the subject appears to be totally free, choosing 
the sense of itself and its period even if it could do nothing to prevent the 
war and, by implication, the Occupation. Atlas-like, I bear the whole 
world on my shoulders; but this weight does not inevitably crush me. 
Sartre says that if I am without excuse, I should also be without remorse 
or regret. This terrible freedom and this total responsibility at least leave 
me immune from accusations about past mistakes or misdemeanours. I 
can turn my back on everything except my freedom and responsibility. 
I can find a liveable accommodation with the harsh reality of war.
Sartre’s argument in this section of L’Être et le néant anticipates what 
he would say in the later article ‘La République du silence’. There is, 
however, one striking difference. In the passage from L’Être et le néant, 
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Sartre repeatedly uses the first person singular. Forms of the first person 
occur 11 times in the sentence quoted above, and Sartre draws attention 
to it through the emphasis on ‘ma situation’. ‘La République du silence’, 
by contrast, opens with the first person plural: ‘Jamais nous n’avons 
été plus libres que sous l’occupation allemande’ (emphasis added). The 
heroic solitary subject has been subsumed into the collective experience; 
rather than speaking just on its own behalf, it speaks for all. The first 
person plural refers to the inhabitants of occupied France as distinct 
from those who lived in unoccupied countries. Sartre gives his readers 
an account and an interpretive framework for their own experience. In 
terms of Ricœur’s hermeneutics, he provides them with the means to 
configure and reconfigure what they had lived through. What explains 
or justifies this shift from the isolated first person to the collective plural? 
‘La République du silence’ itself raises this issue explicitly. Sartre says 
that 35 million people were affected by the Occupation: ‘Comment parler 
en leur nom à tous? Les petites villes, les grands centres industriels, les 
campagnes ont connu des sorts différents’ (Situations, III, p. 17). At this 
point Sartre poses, but does not decisively resolve, the question discussed 
in Chapter 1: who has the right to speak on behalf of others, and more 
specifically to unify the disparate experiences of a population which 
included résistants, collaborators and the morally indifferent? I shall 
return later in the current chapter to the problems raised by this passage 
from the first person singular to the first person plural.
What did you do during the war?
So what did Sartre and Beauvoir do during the war? One answer to the 
question is that they wrote; indeed, they wrote a very great deal. Their 
writings included conventional literary and philosophical works: Sartre 
worked on the Chemins de la liberté sequence of novels, wrote the plays 
Les Mouches and Huis clos, and published his philosophical magnum 
opus L’Être et le néant; Beauvoir published her first novel, L’Invitée, and 
wrote her second, Le Sang des autres, as well as the philosophical essay 
Pyrrhus et Cinéas. They also wrote other, voluminous texts not meant 
initially for public dissemination, but some of which are now available, 
such as Sartre’s Carnets de la drôle de guerre and Lettres au Castor, and 
Beauvoir’s Journal de guerre and Lettres à Sartre. Before the war, Sartre 
was the reasonably well-known author of the novel La Nausée, the short 
story collection Le Mur and some philosophical essays; Beauvoir was an 
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obscure philosophy teacher. By the end of the war, Sartre was one of the 
leading writers and thinkers in contemporary France, and Beauvoir had 
established herself as an important novelist and intellectual. After the 
war, they would continue to write about the period in both fictional and 
autobiographical form, notably in Sartre’s novel La Mort dans l’âme 
and Beauvoir’s La Force de l’âge, the second volume of the autobio-
graphical series begun with Mémoires d’une jeune fille rangée. 
In literary terms, the war was a fantastic opportunity for Sartre and 
Beauvoir: it gave them lots to write about. If this formulation sounds 
unnecessarily cynical, there is some justification for it in the texts which 
Sartre and Beauvoir produced during and about this period. Sartre’s 
Carnets de la drôle de guerre is remarkable for its near total lack of 
any sense of the danger of war. He writes and writes and writes, and 
to be honest sometimes it is not very interesting. The same could be 
said of Beauvoir’s Journal de guerre. The historical circumstances may 
have been momentous, but the day-to-day experience was banal. Sartre 
was eventually taken as a prisoner of war. Beauvoir was anxious and 
anguished about his fate, though actually life in the POW camp doesn’t 
seem to have been a bad experience for him. He made friends and wrote 
a play, Bariona, and was then freed because of his poor eyesight, which 
allowed him to claim that he was not a combatant.4 Back in Paris, he 
attempted to set up a Resistance group under the name Socialisme et 
liberté, but not much really happened. In occupied France, Sartre and 
Beauvoir devoted themselves to their careers: Sartre’s L’Être et le néant 
would become the key work of French existentialism, and the plays Les 
Mouches and Huis clos consolidated his position as a literary author, 
while Beauvoir worked on her novels L’Invitée and Le Sang des autres. 
Although they despised the collaborationist Vichy regime and suffered 
from cold and hunger, there is no evidence that they were actively, 
seriously involved in the armed Resistance. Their works certainly refer 
to the war, directly or indirectly: L’Invitée concludes with a murder 
by gassing while Le Sang des autres openly espouses the cause of the 
Resistance; L’Être et le néant places conflict at the heart of the human 
condition and Les Mouches depicts the violent overthrow of tyranny. 
But there is something safely literary about this. No one really dies.
Towards the end of the Occupation, as Beauvoir recounts it in La 
Force de l’âge, she and Sartre were warned – by Camus – that they 
 4 For a short account of Sartre’s time as a POW, see Martin, The Boxer and the 
Goalkeeper, pp. 176–79.
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should move from their current residences. So they stayed for a while 
with the writer Michel Leiris and his wife. As Beauvoir puts it, ‘c’était 
charmant de séjourner à Paris chez des amis’ (p. 674; emphasis added). 
It was charming. Beauvoir’s choice of word here is remarkable. This 
account omits any sense of fear or danger. The war appears as a mild 
inconvenience because it forces one to move house. But let’s look on 
the bright side: at least one can have a lovely time by staying with one’s 
charming friends. All in all, the Occupation doesn’t sound too bad.
So what changed?
A commonplace of French writing during and about the ‘drôle de guerre’ 
– the period between the declaration of war in September 1939 and the 
outbreak of serious fighting on the Western front in May 1940 – is the 
sense that war is everywhere and nowhere; it changes everything and is 
yet somehow invisible, not real. The so-called ‘phoney war’ doesn’t quite 
exist, even though it dominates every moment of the lives of those called 
up (like Sartre) and those who longed for them to return (like Beauvoir). 
We know we are at war, but where do we see it? Early in his Carnets 
de la drôle de guerre, Sartre writes that ‘La guerre n’a jamais été plus 
insaisissable que ces jours-ci. Elle me manque, car enfin, si elle n’existe 
pas, qu’est-ce que je fous ici?’ (p. 35). The phrase ‘Elle me manque’ is 
quite shocking: it would be better, Sartre suggests, if the war were more 
palpable, more violent, more deadly, so that conscripts such as Private 
Sartre could really believe that something were actually happening. They 
might even die. Anticipating Ricœur (see Chapter 6), Sartre describes the 
war as a kind of enforced sabbatical or even a premature retirement: ‘je 
suis entièrement libre et parfaitement seul: c’est une retraite’ (p. 35). 
And yet, this near-invisible war will leave nothing untouched. It 
marked the beginning of a process involving experiences as a POW 
and in occupied France which would see Sartre turn from an individ-
ualist anarchist into the committed public intellectual who has not 
been matched in France before or since. His pre-war novel La Nausée 
caustically mocked the delusions of politicized humanism; his post-war 
work Qu’est-que la littérature? became the most infamous manifesto of 
commitment. So the experience of war changed Sartre definitively. His 
Carnets de la drôle de guerre refer to the ‘rupture entre [sa] vie passée et 
[sa] vie présente’ (p. 383); and this ‘rupture’ has as much to do with his 
attitudes and beliefs as with his everyday routines. In her retrospective 
Sartre and Beauvoir 55
memoir La Force de l’âge, Beauvoir also stresses that the war marked an 
irreversible change in her life. She summarizes the war years as a time 
when everything was transformed: 
non seulement la guerre avait changé mes rapports à tout, mais elle avait 
tout changé: les ciels de Paris et les villages de Bretagne, la bouche des 
femmes, les yeux des enfants. Après juin 1940, je ne reconnus plus les 
choses, ni les gens, ni les heures, ni les lieux, ni moi-même. (p. 684)
Nothing can be the same again. The beliefs which sustained the pre-war 
world have been swept aside: ‘la violence était déchaînée et l’injustice, 
la bêtise, le scandale, l’horreur. La victoire même n’allait pas renverser 
le temps et ressusciter un ordre provisoirement dérangé; elle ouvrait une 
nouvelle époque: l’après-guerre’ (La Force d’âge, p. 684).
This presents an image of the war as an absolute turning point. It is 
perhaps surprising, then, that the text which announces this is itself so 
placid. It bears none of the structural, semantic or grammatical signs 
which might mark it out as a trauma text (such as those discussed in 
the following chapter, in relation to Camus’s L’Etranger). In relative 
tranquillity, Beauvoir reflects on her life and its meaning. And although 
she claims that nothing could be the same again, actually the balance she 
draws is quite complacent. The Liberation saw her established as a major 
literary and intellectual figure: ‘mes espoirs triomphaient’ (La Force 
d’âge, p. 685). Even when she endeavours to look at the bleaker side, she 
is surprisingly sanguine and self-congratulatory: ‘je me rétablissais dans 
le bonheur; tant de coups reçus: aucun ne m’avait fracassée. Je survivais, 
et même j’étais indemne’ (La Force d’âge, p. 686). Beauvoir presents 
herself as simultaneously completely changed and utterly untouched 
(‘j’étais indemne’) by the experience of the war. What Beauvoir reflects 
here is, I suggest, the paradox of the Second World War: it affects every 
aspect of life, yet it is also absent, intangible; everything is changed, yet 
nothing changes. Beauvoir emerges from it a different person, but also 
indemne, more confident in herself than ever.
The texts of Beauvoir and Sartre give some credibility to the accusation 
that the Occupation was, for them, rather gentle. Their situation and 
their texts can be contrasted with those of two other major post-war 
figures, Marguerite Duras and Robert Altelme, who were married at 
the time of the war. There are some parallels between the experiences of 
the two couples. Just as Beauvoir was separated from Sartre during the 
phoney war and his period as a POW, Duras was separated from Antelme 
when he was deported to Buchenwald as a member of the Resistance. All 
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of them wrote extensively about their respective experiences: after the 
war, Antelme published L’Espèce humaine, one of the earliest and most 
important French accounts of life and death in the concentration camps. 
In 1985 Duras in turn published La Douleur (supplemented in 2006 by 
her Cahiers de la guerre et autres textes), which recounts her anguish as 
she awaited news of her husband’s fate, and his eventual return. Duras 
was separated from Antelme as Beauvoir was separated from Sartre. But 
the differences in their experiences and their texts are as important as the 
parallels. While Sartre had what was relatively speaking a danger-free 
time in the phoney war and as a POW, Antelme was deported as a 
member of the Resistance and came close to death; and while Beauvoir’s 
concern for Sartre is evident in her Journal de guerre and La Force de 
l’âge, it does not approach the palpable anguish of Duras’s La Douleur.
Moreover, the issue of intelligibility further illustrates the difference 
between the two couples. Both Sartre and Beauvoir refer to the difficulty 
of explaining life during the Occupation to those who did not live 
through it. In Beauvoir’s account, when Sartre returned from the POW 
camp, they had difficulty understanding each other’s experiences: ‘il 
arrivait d’un monde que j’imaginais aussi mal qu’il imaginait mal celui 
où je vivais depuis des mois, et nous avions l’impression de ne pas parler 
tout à fait le même langage’ (La Force d’âge, p. 548). Sartre echoes 
this problem of communication in his article ‘Paris sous l’Occupation’, 
in which he refers to the difficulty of describing the experience of 
incarceration and then Occupation to those who have not lived through 
it: ‘Je rentrais de captivité et l’on m’interrogeait sur la vie des prisonniers: 
comment faire sentir l’atmosphère des camps à ceux qui n’y avaient 
pas vécu? […] Aujourd’hui, je me trouve devant un problème analogue: 
comment faire saisir ce que fut l’occupation aux habitants des pays qui 
sont restés libres?’ (Situations, III, p. 16). For both Beauvoir and Sartre, 
the problem of communicating unfamiliar experiences proves difficult, 
but not insurmountable. With creative effort from the narrator and good 
will from the listener, the gulf in understanding can be overcome. By 
contrast, in the Preface to L’Espèce humaine, Antelme describes a much 
more fundamental disruption of narratability and comprehensibility 
experienced by himself and fellow deportees: 
Nous voulions parler, être entendus enfin. […] Et dès les premiers jours 
cependant, il nous paraissait impossible de combler la distance que nous 
découvrions entre le langage dont nous disposions et cette expérience 
que, pour la plupart, nous étions encore en train de poursuivre dans notre 
corps. […] A peine commencions-nous à raconter, que nous suffoquions. 
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A nous-mêmes, ce que nous avions à dire commençait alors à nous 
paraître inimaginable. (p. 9; emphasis original)
Here, Antelme powerfully expresses a double impossibility: first, the 
chasm between the deportees and their potential listeners is too great 
to be overcome; and second, crucially, the horror of the experience 
occasions a crisis in self-belief. The survivor’s own experience becomes 
unimaginable, unintelligible to himself. His testimony, his past, no 
longer belong to him, as if they had not really happened. Beauvoir’s 
and Sartre’s cautious acknowledgement of the difficulty of communi-
cating experience is radicalized by Antelme and other survivors into a 
fundamental crisis of narrative, witnessing and subjective integrity. But 
then, what they lived through in the concentration camps was far more 
extreme than the shortages and cold sometimes suffered by unpersecuted 
gentiles in occupied Paris.
Where’s the trauma?
The wartime writings of Sartre and Beauvoir and their post-war works 
which refer to the war traverse and describe traumatic times, but they are 
not what would normally be called ‘trauma texts’. They are too syntac-
tically and structurally placid, too secure in their writing positions. 
They are thus quite unlike, for example, Camus’s L’Etranger which – I 
shall suggest in the next chapter – can be described as a trauma text, 
immersed in the experience of defeat and humiliation, even if it never 
once openly refers to the war. Writing, for Sartre and Beauvoir, is an act 
of witnessing, and it is also an act of resistance against trauma rather 
than an engagement with it. In La Force de l’âge, Beauvoir describes 
how, during some of the darkest days of the war when she had no news 
of Sartre, she stopped working on her first novel. Returning to writing 
represents a defiant affirmation of meaning in life and literature: 
Je décidai de me remettre à écrire: il me semblait que c’était un acte de foi, 
un acte d’espoir. Rien n’autorisait à penser que l’Allemagne serait vaincue 
[…]. Mais je fis une espèce de pari: qu’importaient les heures vainement 
passées à écrire, si demain tout sombrait? Si jamais le monde, ma vie, la 
littérature reprenaient un sens, je me reprocherais les mois, les années 
perdus à ne rien faire. (La Force d’âge, pp. 536–37)
Literature is on the side of values and sense: by writing, Beauvoir holds 
out the hope that Germany will be beaten and Sartre will return, 
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even if all the available evidence suggests the contrary. The despairing 
senselessness of trauma is lived in silence; writing, for Beauvoir, bears 
witness to the conviction that meaning and hope are still possible.
Writing, then, is the opposite of despair. One might say that it is 
disavowal in the Freudian sense: acknowledging unspeakable suffering 
without surrendering to it or perhaps even confronting it. This is not 
to say that there is no real trauma in the actual lives of the authors. 
Nothing gives us the right to say definitively that Beauvoir suffered 
less as she waited for Sartre than Duras did as she waited for Antelme. 
Duras’s La Douleur is a trauma text because it enters into the experience 
without restraint or apology, letting it seep into every aspect of its 
textual and thematic existence. By contrast, the formal and emotional 
poise of Beauvoir’s writing indicates a determination not to succumb 
to trauma and the attendant collapse of meaning, values and selfhood. 
Nevertheless, it is important to the argument of this book that trauma, 
and specifically the trauma of war, sometimes needs to be read in the 
less palpable traces it leaves behind, in a text’s reticence, for example: in 
what it lets us see despite itself, as it were.
An instance where this may be seen is provided by an episode to which 
Beauvoir refers briefly, almost casually, in La Force d’âge. Before and 
during the first part of the war, Beauvoir made her living as a teacher, 
first in Rouen and then in Paris. However, after 12 years of teaching, she 
notes, ‘Mes classes m’amusaient moins que par le passé’ (p. 617). In June 
1943, she was relieved of her teaching duties after the mother of a former 
pupil made a complaint about her. In Beauvoir’s account, the complaint 
came about because she had supported the young woman, here named 
Lise,5 in her decision not to marry a wealthy boyfriend, whom she did not 
love, and to live instead with another man. This is what Beauvoir tells us:
La mère de Lise, furieuse que sa fille eût laissé échapper un parti 
avantageux et qu’elle vécut avec Bourla, m’enjoignit d’user de mon 
influence pour la renvoyer à son premier amoureux; sur mon refus, elle 
m’accusa de détournement de mineure. Avant-guerre, l’affaire n’eût pas 
eu de suite; avec la clique d’Abel Bonnard, il en alla autrement; à la fin de 
l’année scolaire, la directrice au menton bleu me signifia que j’étais exclue 
de l’Université. (p. 617)
A footnote informs us that Beauvoir’s right to teach was restored after 
the Liberation, but that she did not return to the profession (by this 
 5 Biographers refer to her as Nathalie (or Natasha) Sorokine.
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time she could support herself by other means). In the main text, she 
comments that she was not ‘fâchée de briser avec une vieille routine’ 
(p. 617). She was, after all – as she has informed us – enjoying her profes-
sional obligations less than she had (‘Mes classes m’amusaient moins’); 
and she reassures us that she soon got a job working for the radio, 
without quite knowing how it happened: ‘Je ne sais par quel truchement 
j’obtins une situation de “metteuse en ondes”’ (p. 617). And that’s the 
end of the matter. 
Even biographers sympathetic to Beauvoir concede that her account of 
events is incomplete to say the least. Deidre Bair describes it as ‘evasive’ 
(Simone de Beauvoir, p. 279). Danièle Sallenave agrees that Beauvoir 
gives ‘une version peut-être édulcorée des faits’ (Castor de guerre, 
p. 269). She also points out how Beauvoir astutely suggests that there 
was a political dimension to her professional downfall. Before the war, 
Beauvoir says, the accusation would have gone no further. Her dismissal 
(persecution?) during the war makes her a victim of the Occupation, as 
if she were being hounded by Nazi occupiers and collaborators. Abel 
Bonnard, to whom she refers here, was a minor writer with fascist 
tendencies who became Minister of Education under the Vichy regime. 
So, in Beauvoir’s version of events, she was guilty only of giving good 
advice to a young woman who did not wish to marry someone she did 
not love; the case would not have been pursued had the Nazis not been 
in power; she was exonerated after the war; and she was not particularly 
bothered because she did not wish to continue her teaching career in any 
case. It is almost as if her dismissal were a welcome occurrence.
Although the biographers Bair and Sallenave observe that Beauvoir’s 
account is manipulative and deficient, they do not worry much about 
the darker side of this incident. The more sensationalist biographer 
Carole Seymour-Jones is less guarded in confronting the underlying 
issue: Beauvoir had a sexual relationship with her former pupil, and 
she provocatively describes Beauvoir’s interest as ‘paedophile in nature’ 
(A Dangerous Liaison, p. 274). But even Seymour-Jones passes over the 
episode quickly, spending only two pages on it. To modern ears, now 
that we know more about the appalling extent to which prestigious 
figures have used their position to exploit, abuse and silence underage 
victims, I wonder whether this whole episode needs to be revisited. Was 
Beauvoir the victim of a malicious mother and a collaborationist regime, 
or an abuser of minors and a sexual predator who used her position as a 
teacher to seduce young girls, and then to procure them for her friends? 
Although Beauvoir passes over the episode in a single, relatively short 
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paragraph, Gilbert Joseph devotes 25 pages to it in his highly critical 
Une si douce occupation, quoting at length from relevant documents 
held in the Archives du rectorat de Paris (pp. 197–222). These documents 
show that the investigation into Beauvoir extended over 18 months; 
and far from taking the dismissal as lightly as she implies, Beauvoir 
wrote a letter formally protesting against the decision and insisting on 
her innocence (quoted in Une si douce occupation, p. 222). Another 
interesting issue arises from these documents. In Beauvoir’s account, 
the mother of her friend Lise accuses her of ‘détournement de mineure’. 
It is important to note that this is not a sexual crime in itself, though 
behind it may be a hint at the sexual relations between Beauvoir and her 
former pupil. ‘Détournement de mineur(e)’ refers more specifically to the 
crime of removing a minor – who might have passed the age of sexual 
consent but not of civil majority – from the orbit of those who have legal 
authority over him or her, such as the parents. In this case, it is likely 
that the man with whom Lise was living, Bourla, would have been more 
guilty of ‘détournement de mineure’ than Beauvoir. The documents 
quoted by Joseph show that the accusation was actually ‘excitation d’une 
mineure à la débauche’, a rather different matter which, if proven in a 
court of law, could have led to Beauvoir’s imprisonment. The allegation 
here is that Beauvoir had sexual relations with Nathalie Sorokine and 
encouraged her to sleep with her male friends. This was vigorously 
denied by Nathalie and Beauvoir, and by Sartre and Jacques Bost, who 
was Beauvoir’s lover at the time.6 Even so, Gilbert Gidel, the Rector of 
the University of Paris, concluded from the enquiry that Beauvoir and 
Sartre were not morally fit to teach in secondary education, and wrote 
to the Ministry of Education requesting their dismissal. Beauvoir was 
informed on 23 June 1943 that she had been relieved of her functions, 
though no action seems to have been taken against Sartre.
My point here is not to retry a case in which the rights and wrongs are 
complex. Nathalie Sorokine was 20 at the time of the initial complaint: 
legally still a minor, but certainly no longer a child. Sartre, Beauvoir 
and their friends unquestionably lied to protect themselves, but they 
presumably did not believe that they had any debt of truthfulness to 
the collaborationist authorities which were pursuing them. What I want 
to stress, though, is the disparity between Beauvoir’s brief, sanguine 
narrative of the episode and the much longer account given by Joseph 
 6 When questioned in the course of the enquiry, Bost nevertheless insisted that 
he had never been Beauvoir’s lover. See Joseph, Une si douce occupation, p. 215.
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with the support of archive documents. Beauvoir makes light of the 
episode, hints at an element of political persecution, misremembers (on 
a generous reading) the nature of the accusation and seems relatively 
pleased to have been dismissed from her teaching job so that she can 
develop other interests, and ultimately secure her literary career. The 
documents quoted by Joseph suggest that, lurking behind Beauvoir’s 
almost cheerful text is something potentially much more dangerous: the 
accusation was more serious, the enquiry was protracted and it could 
have resulted in imprisonment; this in turn could have brought Beauvoir 
to the attention of the occupying German forces, with potentially 
horrifying consequences.
In this instance, the availability of other versions of the episode allow 
us to measure the gap between the said and the unsaid in Beauvoir’s text. 
This will not always be possible, but it nevertheless allows a provisional 
conclusion which will be important throughout this book. The calm 
surface of Beauvoir’s short narrative covers over something potentially 
far more disturbed and disturbing, which we can nevertheless glimpse 
with some effort. The text contains the concealed but legible traces of a 
story it does not tell.
Whose war is it anyway?
Sartre and Beauvoir would apparently sometimes complete each other’s 
sentences, as if they were one person in two bodies; and it is tempting 
to write of them as if they were a single entity, though of course they 
were not. Although they lived through much of the Occupation in 
close proximity to one another, sharing opinions, food and lovers, the 
meaning of the period is not the same for both of them. In literary terms, 
it marked the beginning of Beauvoir’s career as a successful novelist, 
with the publication of her first novel, L’Invitée, and the completion of 
her second, Le Sang des autres. In a sense, it marked the end of Sartre’s 
career as a novelist. It is true that he continued to work on his Chemins 
de la liberté cycle during and after the war, publishing L’Âge de raison 
and Le Sursis in 1945, and the final completed volume La Mort dans 
l’âme in 1949.7 But it is striking that La Mort dans l’âme ends with the 
German attack on France in 1940 and the first experiences of French 
 7 On the history of the composition of the cycle, see Grell, ‘Les Chemins de la 
liberté’ de Sartre.
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prisoners of war. Sartre would continue for a while to work on what 
would have been the fourth volume of the cycle, which would take his 
characters into the later war years and the Occupation, but he would 
never complete it or, for that matter, any other work of prose fiction. For 
Sartre, the novel ends when the war begins.
Something of this sense of an ending can be seen in the last appearance 
of Sartre’s principal character, Mathieu, in the final lines of the first and 
longest part of La Mort dans l’âme. Through three volumes, Mathieu 
has expostulated and postured, and resolutely failed to achieve any kind 
of meaningful freedom. Now, with the Germans approaching, rather 
than surrender or attempt escape, he takes arms in a stance that appears 
to be both murderous and suicidal (though in the unfinished fourth 
volume of the cycle we discover that, against all odds, he would in fact 
survive). Mathieu’s desire to kill does not come from any patriotic urge 
to defend his country. For years, his acts have been futile, stolen from 
him, mere gestures at freedom; now, he can accomplish something 
definitive: ‘Il avait appuyé sur la gâchette et, pour une fois, quelque 
chose était arrivé. “Quelque chose de définitif”, pensa-t-il, en riant de 
plus belle’ (La Mort dans l’âme, p. 236). In killing a man, he kills Man, 
destroys a world in which he was a failure, and appears likely to bring 
his own life to an end. As we see him for the last time, he believes he 
has finally achieved freedom: ‘Il tira: il était pur, il était tout-puissant, il 
était libre’ (p. 245). Here, Sartre’s character, his novel and his career as a 
novelist reach a point where they have not much further to go.
The war allows Mathieu to become free. The statement that ‘il était 
libre’ might remind us of Sartre’s claim, quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, that the Occupation allowed ‘us’ (‘nous’) – presumably the 
French people – to realize an unprecedented freedom. This returns us 
to the question of who this ‘we’, this collective totality, can be, and who 
can speak on its behalf. For the author of ‘La République du silence’, 
the experience of the French people during the Occupation is difficult 
to understand and recount, yet nevertheless intelligible and recountable; 
it is not the same for everyone in every part of France, and yet to a 
significant degree it is shared. And Sartre, as its pre-eminent interpreter 
and mouthpiece, can write of ‘us’ because he speaks on behalf of all, or 
at least of most. It is as if he wanted to rival even De Gaulle as the voice 
of the French nation.
Mathieu, though, is free but alone as he disappears from Sartre’s 
novel. There is no sense here that he acts, shoots or thinks on behalf 
of a settled or potential collectivity. On the contrary, the novel hints 
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that the war cannot be about ‘us’ and ‘them’ because there is no ‘us’: 
‘Mathieu bâilla: il regardait tristement les types noyés dans l’ombre; il 
murmura: “Nous”. Mais ça ne prenait plus: il était seul’ (La Mort dans 
l’âme, p. 116). Later, Mathieu’s isolation is further underscored: ‘Tu ne 
fais rien comme tout le monde, poursuivit Longin. Même quand tu te 
soûles, ce n’est pas comme nous’ (p. 143). If there is a ‘nous’, Mathieu is 
not part of it. He may or may not be free at the end, but in no sense is he 
free with others, alongside others, and entitled to speak or act on their 
behalf. Moreover, the very form of the novel reinforces the separateness 
of the main characters and the incommensurability of their experiences 
of the war. It recounts scenes from a number of lives united in time but 
by little else. Everyone has his or her own war. No overarching purpose 
and no authoritative voice come to unite the strands of the narrative into 
a meaningful whole. Sartre’s last novel gives us stories but no Story, no 
final or even provisional interpretation that could justify the secure use 
of the first person plural.
We can see in the writings of Sartre and Beauvoir a tense enactment 
of the endeavour to make sense of the war. They want to witness for 
themselves and to speak for others, to tell their own stories as if they 
know and command their meaning. Yet alongside community there is 
separation; alongside freedom there is oppression. No story quite holds; 
other stories peep or burst out, changing any meaning into something 
quite different. Was Beauvoir the victim of persecution by an angry 
mother and collaborationist authorities, or an abuser of the young who 
escaped lightly? Is Mathieu free, or still futile? Does the Occupation 
bring us together or pull us apart? Does the war change everything, or 
leave everything pretty much as it was? And did Sartre and Beauvoir 
have, in the end, a very gentle Occupation? My current answer to this 
question is: yes and no. Sartre sums it up nicely, referring to the daily 
experience of horror: ‘Me comprendra-t-on si je dis à la fois qu’elle était 
intolérable et que nous nous accommodions fort bien?’ (Situations, III, 
p. 24). It was intolerable, and entirely tolerable. What is perhaps most 
impressive about the texts of Sartre and Beauvoir during this period is 
their willingness to bear witness to, and to inhabit, their own contra-
dictions, and the contradictions of the Occupation.
In more general terms, this might mean that recounting one’s past 
entails interminably creating and recreating a life story which by its 
nature can be narrated in innumerable ways. Paul Ricœur’s notion 
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of ‘identité narrative’ is instructive here.1 Ricœur suggests that both 
individual and communal identities – insofar as we can know them – 
entail narrative. In telling stories about our lives and the histories of our 
communities, we tease out their potential sense and coherence. Central 
to this view is the acceptance that narrative identities are never stable, 
fixed, definitive and flawless. On the contrary, ‘l’histoire d’une vie ne 
cesse d’être refigurée par toutes les histoires véridiques ou fictives qu’un 
sujet raconte sur lui-même. Cette refiguration fait de la vie elle-même 
un tissu d’histoires racontées’ (Temps et récit III, p. 356). The stories 
which individuals or communities tell about themselves may contradict 
one another and change over time. The disputed legacy of the Second 
World War in France, and cases such as those of Sartre and Beauvoir, 
give abundant evidence of such inherent instability. Lucidity consists 
in acknowledging and trying to analyse the conditions, causes and 
consequences of the ambiguities and contradictions borne by the stories 
that mean the most to us. That may be a lifelong undertaking for us as 
subjects, citizens and readers.
 1 See in particular Ricœur, Temps et récit III, pp. 355–59.
L’Etranger was published in 1942. I begin the current chapter with this 
bald fact not because it will come as a surprise to anyone, but because 
it has not been sufficiently discussed. Camus’s first novel was published 
in occupied Paris. It is not set in mainland France, and it makes no 
reference to the war. However, it is hardly controversial to suggest that 
other French works produced during the Occupation period comment 
on the war even when they do not – cannot – mention it directly. Marcel 
Carné’s film Les Visiteurs du soir (1942) depicts a medieval city visited by 
the Devil, and with very little effort the work can be regarded as a study 
in how a population responds to the temptation of evil. Henri-Georges 
Clouzot’s great film Le Corbeau (1943) depicts a small town thrown 
into panic by a spate of poison pen letters. Even if the precise political 
position of the film is a matter of dispute, no one doubts that this 
situation evokes the letters of denunciation which were terrifyingly 
commonplace in occupied France. And Jean-Paul Sartre’s play Les 
Mouches (1943), showing the decision to oppose tyranny with violence, 
so obviously alludes to the wartime situation of occupied France that it 
is almost embarrassing to mention it. The war is not explicitly present 
in any of these works; yet it would be perverse to suggest that it did not 
influence them profoundly.
Camus initially conceived and began work on the novel that would 
become L’Etranger shortly before the outbreak of war. He had abandoned 
work on another novel, La Mort heureuse (which would be published 
posthumously in 1971), in February 1939. In July 1939, while still living 
in Algeria, he announced that he would soon begin work on his next 
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project. In March 1940, he moved to Paris and worked intensely on the 
new novel. France had been at war with Germany since the previous 
September, but serious hostilities had not yet broken out. On 1 May 
1940, he wrote to his future wife Francine that he had finished a draft 
of the novel. Within days Germany would begin its major assault on 
Western Europe, leading to the French surrender on 22 June. Camus 
continued to work on his manuscript in occupied France and then back 
in Algeria, writing the date February 1941 at the end of the best surviving 
manuscript. It is likely that he made further changes, in particular in the 
light of comments made by André Malraux, before publication in May 
1942.2 L’Etranger is not and could not be a novel about the war. Yet its 
gestation, drafting and revision were precisely contemporary with the 
period leading to the outbreak of war, the phoney war of September 
1939 to May 1940, the invasion of France, the French capitulation and 
the Occupation. Moreover, much of the work on the novel was done 
while Camus was living in France immediately before and then during 
the Occupation.
Even though Camus was in Algeria when the war broke out, he felt 
immediately concerned by it.3 Despite his pacifism he attempted to 
enlist but was turned down on health grounds. One of the entries in his 
Carnets begins simply: ‘Septembre 39. La guerre’ (Œuvres complètes 
II, p. 884); and the following pages return repeatedly to the war and 
its significance. One entry, partly quoted in the Introduction to this 
book, is particularly interesting: ‘La guerre a éclaté. Où est la guerre? 
En dehors des nouvelles qu’il faut croire et des affiches qu’il faut lire, où 
trouver les signes de l’absurde événement?’ (p. 844). Camus immediately 
recognizes the war as an instantiation of the Absurd. Most importantly, 
it is both unmissable and invisible; it is everywhere, but no sign of it is 
to be seen. Camus concludes: ‘Mais pour aujourd’hui on éprouve que 
le commencement des guerres est semblable aux débuts de la paix: le 
monde et le cœur les ignorent’ (p. 884). So the war has begun but it 
has not yet made its mark on the world and the human heart; or, to be 
more precise, the way it has made its mark is by a curious experience 
of its absence, a sense that the world does not yet know how to register 
this enormous event. The witness does not yet know how to see what 
is massively present to him. This is, I want to suggest, how the war 
 2 Further details are given in Camus’s Œuvres complètes I, pp. 1244–45.
 3 For a biographical account of Camus’s actions during the early days of the 
war, see Todd, Albert Camus, pp. 279–99.
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impinges on the novel Camus was writing when the war broke out. Even 
if it is never mentioned, the war is part of L’Etranger. My argument is not 
that it recounts the early stages of the war and the Occupation, but that 
it accompanies them. It registers the massive emotional disaster of the 
war through the story of a lone killer, set far from the French mainland.
It is surprising that the wartime context of L’Etranger has received 
so little comment. The predominant readings of the novel have been 
existential or, more recently, postcolonial. For the former, the historical 
context of the novel’s publication is not relevant because, even if Camus’s 
ideas may have been formed by his historical circumstances, the novel 
is concerned with man’s position in the universe. Sartre’s brilliant 
‘Explication de L’Etranger’ remains the key study here. Writing in 1943, 
and setting the interpretive agenda for readers of Camus for years to 
come, Sartre begins by referring to the context of occupied France. The 
novel, he says, has been heralded as ‘le meilleur livre depuis l’armistice’, 
depicting the sunlit world of Algeria rather than the Parisian ‘aigre 
printemps sans charbon’ (Situations, I, p. 120). Sartre’s point is that, 
although it was published in occupied France, the novel should precisely 
not be read in that context because it depicts an alternative world, which 
is not beset by the restrictions and shortages of the Occupation. The 
novel, in this account, is not about the war. It is about man’s situation in 
an absurd, godless universe. 
In part in the wake of the posthumous publication of Camus’s 
unfinished novel Le Premier Homme in 1994, much recent criticism 
has concentrated on colonial and postcolonial issues raised by Camus’s 
work. Whereas in the Sartrean reading it is the existential situation of 
man which weighs most heavily on the novel, in this reading it is the 
colonial context. Conor Cruise O’Brien and Edward Said have both 
suggested that L’Etranger is tacitly informed by the colonial discourses 
of the time.4 In their accounts of the novel the fact that Meursault is 
tried for killing an Arab suggests a faith in the fairness of the French 
justice system which far from accurately reflects the state of affairs in 
colonial Algeria: ‘by suggesting that the court is impartial between Arab 
and Frenchman, [the novel] implicitly denies the colonial reality and 
sustains the colonial fiction’ (O’Brien, Camus, p. 23). In this reading it 
becomes immensely significant that it is an Arab, moreover an unnamed 
and unspeaking Arab, whom Meursault murders on the beach. Virtually 
the only thing we know about him is his racial identity. He belongs to a 
 4 See O’Brien, Camus and Said, Culture and Imperialism.
Traces of War68
group who look at Meursault and his white friends threateningly, ‘à leur 
manière’ (L’Etranger, in Œuvres complètes I, p. 169). In this perspective, 
L’Etranger looks to be more about simmering violence in Algeria in the 
years before the War of Independence than it does about man’s position 
in a senseless universe. This is not to deny the context of the Second 
World War. The most important sustained contribution to the postco-
lonial interpretation of Camus’s career and work, David Carroll’s Albert 
Camus the Algerian, links the injustices of French colonial Algeria, as 
depicted in L’Etranger, to those of Vichy France (pp. 28, 37). However, 
insisting on Camus as a specifically Algerian, or French Algerian, 
writer refocuses the interpretation of his work onto its colonial and 
postcolonial relevance. Rather than reflecting the timeless existential 
condition of man or the contemporary reality of occupied France, 
Camus’s L’Etranger can now be seen to register the growing racial 
tensions in colonial Algeria and to anticipate the War of Independence 
which would break out in 1954.
The postcolonial reading of Camus’s work effectively changes the 
framework though which L’Etranger may be read. It also in part deflects 
interest from that novel onto some of Camus’s later works, especially 
the short stories of L’Exil et le royaume and the posthumous Le Premier 
Homme, which were written during the Algerian War of Independence. 
For critics, these works also have the advantage that to date they have been 
less extensively interpreted than Camus’s first novel; the publication of Le 
Premier Homme in 1994 provided an invaluable new source of study which 
has been very welcome in the academic world. It is pretty hard, perhaps 
impossible, to find anything new to say about L’Etranger itself. In 1992 
Adele King wondered, ‘Is it possible to find any incident, sentence, even 
detail [in the novel] that has not been subjected to some critical analysis?’ 
(Introduction to Camus’s ‘L’Etranger’, p. 12). The difficulty of saying 
anything new about the novel is reflected in The Cambridge Companion 
to Camus, edited by Edward Hughes. Chapters are devoted to Camus’s 
life, formative influences, his thought, theatre and journalism, his quarrel 
with Sartre, and to his works L’Envers et l’endroit, La Peste, La Chute 
and Le Premier Homme. There are numerous references to L’Etranger 
throughout, but only one of the 14 chapters is partially devoted to the 
novel. It is as if Camus’s most infamous work has now been exhausted, 
even for the purposes of a textbook which aims to give a comprehensive 
account of his life, work and continuing relevance.
The current chapter makes two core suggestions. The first is that the 
wartime context in which L’Etranger was completed and published has 
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been wrongly neglected. In occupied Paris in 1942, the chief German 
censor, Gerhard Müller, allowed the publication of the novel because he 
regarded it as apolitical. The existential reading inaugurated by Sartre 
confirms this insofar as it puts the novel’s philosophical significance 
above its political resonance; and the postcolonial reading tends to focus 
on how the novel anticipates the Algerian War of Independence rather 
than how it relates to the more immediate context of the Second World 
War. It is nevertheless important to recall some basic facts, even if it is 
not obvious how they should be interpreted. The novel revolves around 
a murder committed by a white Frenchman. We are repeatedly reminded 
that his victim belongs to a different ethnic group. Indeed, this is nearly 
the only thing we know about the man whom Meursault kills. While this 
was being depicted, in 1942, the Nazis were formulating the policy of 
the ‘Final Solution’, following which white Europeans would set about 
the systematic murder of victims belonging to different ethnic groups. 
Moreover, only a couple of months after the publication of L’Etranger, 
white Frenchmen would officiate in the notorious Rafle du Vel’ d’Hiv, 
thereby participating in a genocidal crime of which Meursault’s murder 
of an Arab is a mere foreshadow. And we should also not forget that 
the sunlit Algeria in which L’Etranger is set was by no means a world 
separate from the war. Although it was not occupied by the Germans, it 
was governed by the collaborationist Vichy regime until its invasion by 
Allied forces in late 1942. The anti-Semitic legislation which affected the 
free zone was also valid in Algeria. When Pétain revoked the Crémieux 
decree in 1940, Algerian Jews were denied the French citizenship to 
which they had been entitled since 1870. Jews were excluded from 
administrative positions and many other professions; their property was 
confiscated and eventually they were excluded from public education; 
and some were interned in concentration and labour camps. They 
were probably only saved from a far worse fate by the Allied invasion. 
Meanwhile, the Arabs had never enjoyed the French citizenship granted 
to the Jews in the nineteenth century, and which would be restored to 
them in 1943. Killing an anonymous Arab in Algeria is a small-scale 
enactment of the widespread race crimes being perpetrated and prepared 
in Europe at the time when L’Etranger was published.
My second suggestion is that the way to find fresh insight into 
Camus’s novel may not, for the time being, be to trawl it internally but to 
find new texts with which to juxtapose it. This chapter asks the question 
of what it means to regard L’Etranger as a novel about the Second World 
War. The text itself is utterly silent about this. Yet the war is absolutely 
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vital to the Camus’s self-(re)invention in the early 1940s. As Carroll puts 
it, the war made of Camus ‘the living symbol of the young, politically 
committed writer who had risked his life in the struggle against racism 
and oppression and challenged existing social norms and values in his 
editorials, novels, and plays’ (Albert Camus the Algerian, p. 7). And yet 
there is no reference in his greatest work, L’Etranger, to the war which 
dominated the defining period in his life. This is not to say, though, 
that the novel has nothing to say about its context. In order to tease out 
what this might be, I want to look first of all at a text which explicitly 
confronts the meaning of war for Camus during the Occupation, namely 
his Lettres à un ami allemand. 
Lettres à un ami allemand
Camus’s Lettres à un ami allemand consists of four texts which take 
the form of open letters written during the war by a Frenchman to a 
former German friend who has now embraced Nazism. Dated July 
1943, December 1943 and April 1944 respectively, the first three were 
published in clandestine newspapers during the Occupation. The fourth, 
dated July 1944, was published after the Liberation, when Camus was 
revealed to be the author of the letters. The interest of Lettres à un 
ami allemand lies partly in what the four texts show about Camus’s 
attitude to the war and in particular to the use of violence, and about 
the evolution of his ethical thinking in the years between Le Mythe 
de Sisyphe (1942) and L’Homme révolté (1951). The philosophy of the 
Absurd developed in Le Mythe de Sisyphe leads to an ethical impasse 
because it can envisage no overarching framework to regulate the lives of 
all citizens. The later work attempts to think beyond that impasse by the 
appeal to solidarity and collective revolt summarized in Camus’s revised 
cogito, ‘Je me révolte, donc nous sommes’ (L’Homme révolté, in Œuvres 
complètes III, p. 79). Revolt establishes a new collectivity. Lettres à un 
ami allemand is an intermediary text in which Camus can be seen to 
be striving towards the ideas which would be developed in L’Homme 
révolté. As John Foley puts it, the letters ‘[display] a conscious effort, 
motivated by the experiences of occupation and resistance, to move 
beyond a discussion of the absurd itself to a discussion of the possibility 
of ethics’ (Albert Camus, p. 33). The most recent editor of the letters, 
Maurice Weyembergh, concurs that they show Camus’s thought in a 
state of transition: 
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Dans le parcours de Camus, les Lettres marquent à la fois le passage du 
pacifisme à l’engagement dans la lutte, le passage de l’individualisme 
extrême à la découverte du destin commun, de l’absurde à l’au-delà de 
l’absurde, de l’amoralisme du ‘tout est permis’ individuel ou politique à 
l’affirmation de valeurs morales communes. (‘Note sur le texte’, Camus, 
Œuvres complètes I, p. 1131)5
The implied relationship between the author of the letters and his 
German addressee is that they were friends before the war, and shared 
many of the same ideas. Those ideas might approximately be identified 
with those of the author of Le Mythe de Sisyphe: there is no objective 
truth or universal values which rule over the chaos of existence; the 
world has no inherent meaning, purpose or structure; man’s desire for 
order will always be frustrated. The author’s aim is not to refute these 
ideas, but to show that they might lead to fundamentally different 
commitments and actions: 
Vous n’avez jamais cru au sens de ce monde et vous en avez tiré l’idée 
que tout était équivalent et que le bien et le mal se définissait selon qu’on 
le voulait. Vous avez supposé qu’en l’absence de toute morale humaine 
ou divine les seules valeurs étaient celles qui régissaient le monde 
animal, c’est-à-dire la violence et la ruse. (Lettres, in Œuvres complètes 
II, p. 26)
Believing that cruelty and injustice are at the foundation of a 
meaningless world, the German addressee has embraced aggressive 
German nationalism. The author of the letters concedes that, at the time 
of their friendship, he thought in much the same way: ‘Et à la vérité, 
moi qui croyais penser comme vous, je ne voyais guère d’argument 
à vous opposer, sinon un goût violent de la justice qui, pour finir, 
me paraissait aussi peu raisonné que la plus soudaine des passions’ 
(p. 26). This sentence introduces the minimal but crucial difference 
between the author and the addressee. The Frenchman does not offer 
an argument against the German’s convictions. Instead, he counters 
it with his craving for justice, while conceding that there is nothing 
rational, reasoned, objective or compelling about it. Equally, it is no less 
rational and compelling than the moral despair to which the German 
has succumbed. Starting from an acknowledgement of the Absurd, the 
 5 It is important to recall that Camus’s letters were not written as a single 
text. There is an evolution from one to the next, as Camus shows an increasing 
confidence in imminent victory. Nevertheless, the attitudes and rhetoric discussed 
here are consistent across the four letters.
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Frenchman develops a form of humanist pan-Europeanism grounded in 
solidarity, revolt and a refusal to consent to injustice: 
Vous le voyez, d’un même principe nous avons tiré des morales différentes. 
[…] Je continue à croire que ce monde n’a pas de sens supérieur. Mais je 
sais que quelque chose en lui a du sens et c’est l’homme, parce qu’il est le 
seul être à exiger d’en avoir. Ce monde a du moins la vérité de l’homme 
et notre tâche est de lui donner ses raisons contre le destin lui-même. 
(pp. 26–27)
A key point here is the author’s insistence that, although there is no 
Meaning (‘sens supérieur’), not everything is equally meaningless. As the 
Frenchman puts it in the second letter, ‘Si rien n’avait du sens, vous seriez 
dans le vrai. Mais il y a quelque chose qui garde du sens’ (p. 15). What is 
at stake, for the Frenchman, is the need to rescue some shards of meaning 
from the abyss of meaninglessness. In this endeavour, it is of the utmost 
importance that the war itself is not treated as simply a random event in 
a senseless sequence of random events. On the contrary, it appears in the 
letters as both a bearer and a producer of meaning. In the first letter, the 
author considers the French defeat of 1940. Rather than explaining it in 
military terms by reference to the superior German forces and tactics, he 
describes the French as not yet intellectually prepared for victory: ‘C’est 
pourquoi nous avons commencé par la défaite, préoccupés que nous 
étions, pendant que vous vous jetiez sur nous, de définir en nos cœurs si 
le bon droit était pour nous’ (p. 11). Before they could fight effectively, 
the French had to wrestle with their own beliefs and values. In the second 
letter, the significance of this period of reflection and self-interrogation is 
developed further. The war appears not as something imposed from the 
outside; rather, the Frenchman writes, ‘C’est la guerre [que notre peuple] 
s’est donnée à lui-même, qu’il n’a pas reçue de gouvernements imbéciles 
ou lâches, celle où il s’est retrouvé et où il lutte pour une certaine idée 
qu’il s’est faite de lui-même’ (pp. 18–19). The French are ‘défenseurs de 
l’esprit’ (p. 19), and for them the war becomes a Hegelian dialectical 
struggle. The author does not underplay the danger represented by the 
Germans, and the hardship, despair and death which will be required 
to defeat them. At the same time, the Germans are strangely irrelevant. 
What is really at issue in the war appears to be something much bigger: 
the self-recognition and self-(re)discovery of the spirit as it unfurls in the 
history of Europe.
The Germans will be defeated militarily because they have already 
been defeated intellectually, spiritually and ethically. This is the 
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conclusion which flows from the author’s apparently casual insistence 
that ‘il y a quelque chose qui garde du sens’ (p. 15). It also underpins the 
confidence sustained throughout the letters. What might most surprise 
a reader of L’Etranger in Lettres à un ami allemand is the author’s 
comfortable, exultant, jubilatory certainty. He knows the truth and he 
does not doubt his ability to tell it: ‘je vous dois de vous éclairer,’ he 
tells his misguided addressee (p. 10), and he recognizes that he writes 
‘sur le ton de la certitude’ (p. 14). Throughout, his sense of intellectual 
and ethical superiority is unshakeable. He positions himself as a patient, 
slightly exasperated teacher who knows better than his stubborn pupil. 
Misunderstanding is possible, but it is not the inevitable condition of 
humankind. Moreover, the first person singular who writes to a former 
friend rapidly becomes a first person plural, as the author speaks in the 
voice of truth on behalf of all right-minded citizens: ‘Mais, pour finir, 
c’est nous qui avions raison’ (p. 16). Camus’s use of the first person 
plural is similar to Sartre’s, as discussed in the previous chapter: it entails 
arrogating the right to speak on behalf of the collective. And the shift 
from je to nous also, crucially, anticipates the cogito of Camus’s cycle of 
revolt, according to which ‘Je me révolte, donc nous sommes’.
In the Lettres à un ami allemand there are, to be sure, traces of the 
more sceptical attitudes found elsewhere in Camus’s work. In his 1944 
article on Brice Parain, ‘Sur une philosophie de l’expression’, Camus 
wonders ‘si notre langage n’est pas mensonge au moment même où nous 
croyons dire vrai’, and whether, rather than binding humans together 
in shared communication, ‘le langage n’exprime pas, pour finir, la 
solitude définitive de l’homme dans un monde muet’ (Œuvres complètes 
I, pp. 901–02). This anxiety surfaces for a moment at the beginning of 
the third letter, when the author concedes that ‘nous ne donnions pas 
le même sens aux mêmes mots, nous ne parlons plus la même langue’ 
(Lettres, p. 21). When the same words have different meanings to 
different people, the author’s command of his medium is put at risk. But 
here, linguistic anarchy is quickly dismissed. Misunderstanding turns out 
to be contingent and provisional, as the Frenchman quickly resumes his 
more confident, pedagogical role. A further problem which may unsettle 
the author’s intellectual dominance is his similarity to Jean-Baptiste 
Clamence, the narrator of Camus’s final completed novel La Chute. 
Clamence’s verbal self-confidence aims to mystify as much as to explain; 
and La Chute is similar to Lettres à un ami allemand because in neither 
work do we get to hear the replies of the fictional addressees. Perhaps the 
author of the letters sounds a bit too much like Clamence for comfort. 
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However, I do not wish to dwell on these issues. The wartime context of 
the letters justifies their polemical lack of self-doubt. And in the letters 
war appears as an event which bears meaning and which positively 
contributes to the production of further meaning. It is something to be 
understood and explained. The reflection to which it gives rise reinforces 
the subject’s self-confidence in its own speaking position. Moreover, the 
community and its values emerge stronger from the ordeal which it has 
undergone. Although Camus’s text does not neglect the misery of war, it 
also hints at its benefits for subjectivity, society and ethics.
L’Etranger
It is hard to believe that the same man wrote both Lettres à un ami 
allemand and L’Etranger. The narrator of L’Etranger could not be more 
unlike his counterpart in the letters. From the famous first paragraph, 
he reveals himself as someone whose command of reality is limited: 
‘Aujourd’hui, maman est morte. Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas’ 
(p. 141). Moreover, ‘Cela ne veut rien dire’ (p. 141), whatever ‘cela’ might 
be: the death of the mother, the words of commiseration on the telegram 
which announces it, or the text we are just beginning to read. 
My suggestion here is that L’Etranger is as much a response to the 
war as Lettres à un ami allemand. The novel does not describe, analyse 
or even refer to the war in any way, but that is not to say that it does 
not register it deeply. In order to argue this further, I need to invoke 
modern trauma studies. Trauma, as it is now commonly understood, is 
often traumatic to the damaged subject because it is not fully available 
to consciousness: it dominates and obsesses precisely insofar as it is 
forgotten, repressed, excluded from the conscious mind. The less we see 
it, the more it is there. As discussed in Chapter 2, the problem this poses 
for the interpretation of cultural products such as literature and film is 
that we are left looking for traces of what is not explicitly present. The 
task for the interpreter is to give a plausible account of how something 
which is not explicit in a text is nevertheless importantly present in it. 
For the moment, we might retain the point that, even if L’Etranger does 
not allude to the war and the humiliating French defeat of 1940 in any 
way, this does not mean that these factors do not determine the text to 
a fundamental degree.
One issue which impedes the depiction of L’Etranger as a trauma 
text – and which, I will suggest, the novel in turn problematizes – is 
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that of belatedness, or what Freud calls Nachträglichkeit. In classical 
trauma theory derived from Freud and his nineteenth-century medical 
predecessors, the enigma of trauma resides in the gap between event and 
symptom. The traumatic event seems, initially at least, to leave the subject 
physically and emotionally undamaged. It is only later – sometimes 
much later – that trauma becomes manifest. Chapter 2 referred to the 
much-quoted passage from Freud’s Moses and Monotheism in which 
a man walks away from a train crash apparently in good health, but 
subsequently begins to show signs that he has not escaped unscathed. 
Trauma is not experienced at the moment of the crash. It comes 
about only retrospectively, after a period of incubation or triggered by 
some subsequent event which transforms its significance. The notion of 
belatedness (Nachträglichkeit) refers to this phenomenon in which the 
traumatic experience is not experienced as traumatic at the time of its 
occurrence. It becomes traumatic in the light of what comes after it. 
In terms of the representation of the Second World War, the notion 
of belatedness should suggest that the most traumatized accounts 
would appear some time after the event, rather than in its immediate 
aftermath. There is certainly evidence to support this. Some of the best 
known and most important first-hand accounts of the concentration 
camps in French did not appear immediately after the war. Works 
such as Elie Wiesel’s La Nuit, Jorge Semprun’s Le Grand Voyage and 
Charlotte Delbo’s Aucun de nous ne reviendra demanded an incubation 
period before their authors were ready to finalize and to release them. 
Works published in the immediate post-war period exhibit distress 
but not trauma, insofar as trauma entails the obstruction of narrative 
and understanding. David Rousset’s L’Univers concentrationnaire and 
Robert Antelme’s L’Espèce humaine certainly do not overlook the 
suffering of the camp prisoners, but they are not trauma texts as such 
because in both the camps and the experience of them make sense 
to a significant degree. As committed anti-fascists, both Rousset and 
Antelme fully understand why their enemies treated them so badly. The 
experience of the camps is awful, but it does not entail a traumatizing 
subversion of their existing world view and sense of self. The key point 
is that trauma strikes belatedly, in the light of more recent occurrences 
and experiences. Initially, the experience of horror appears still to make 
sense, so it is not perceived as traumatic. It becomes traumatic only 
later, when the sense which it appeared to make begins to dissipate. 
Meaning protects against trauma, but the protection it offers may 
crumble over time.
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Henry Rousso’s now canonical account of the phases of the Vichy 
syndrome supports this suggestion that the war becomes traumatic 
in French representations only belatedly. After an initial period of 
what, using psychoanalytical vocabulary, he calls ‘mourning’, Rousso 
describes France as entering into a period of repression, from 1954 to 
1971. This does not mean that the memory of war was simply erased. 
Rather, the meanings of war – its potential as a source of multifarious, 
radically opposed meanings – was simplified. Although there were of 
course numerous dissenting voices, a unified vision prevailed, bringing 
the French people together through the myth of résistancialisme. This 
story of a nation united in resistance to the evil invaders kept the more 
problematic reality of Occupation at arm’s length. The memory and 
representation of the war became problematic only later, when this 
unifying discourse began to break down, in part in the wake of the new 
crisis of May 1968. One trauma provokes the awakening and reinterpre-
tation of another. The initial denial of trauma lays the ground for its 
subsequent devastating irruption.
All of this is to say that, according to this classic account, L’Etranger 
should not be a trauma text: it is too close to the initial traumatic 
event to register an impact which should become effective only later. 
The jubilatory command of meaning in Lettres à un ami allemand fits 
the scheme much better. Writing in 1943 and 1944, Camus displays a 
confidence that history bears meaning even in its darkest moments. And 
yet, L’Etranger suggests otherwise. Some of its most striking features can 
now be understood as characterizing the literature of trauma: 
•	 Unsettled	chronology.	Although	the	events	of	L’Etranger unfold in a linear 
manner, Meursault’s chronological position in relation to the narrative is 
impossible to pin down. The first word of the novel is ‘Aujourd’hui’, yet 
the text cannot consistently be explained either as interior monologue or 
a journal. The second paragraph of the novel uses the future tense (‘Je 
prendrai l’autobus à 2 heures’) whereas the third uses the past tense (‘J’ai 
pris l’autobus à 2 heures’) (p. 141). The narrator’s position in time slips 
from one paragraph to the next. He is in the midst of events, but also 
floating strangely above them, as if his story is searching to find a proper 
chronology which is never settled.
•	 The	 subject’s	 detachment	 from	 his	 own	 emotional	 life.	 Meursault’s	
emotional detachment is such that his story barely seems to be his own. 
He appears to be unmoved by his mother’s death, he is willing to marry 
Marie even though he says he does not love her and he kills a man 
without regret. When asked by Marie if he loves her, he replies ‘qu’il me 
semblait que non’ (p. 161), and later that ‘je ne pouvais rien savoir sur ce 
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point’ (p. 165). This sense of detachment reaches its peak at his trial. He 
listens with interest, but is surprised when his lawyer uses the first person 
to refer to Meursault’s acts: ‘Moi, j’ai pensé que c’était m’écarter encore 
de l’affaire, me réduire à zéro et, en un certain sens, se substituer à moi’ 
(p. 201). It is as if he is a spectator to his own life rather than an agent in 
it. His emotions are not available to him.
•	 Events	seem	disconnected	and	lacking	in	meaning.	Meursault	attends	his	
mother’s funeral, takes a lover and kills a man. The issue at Meursault’s 
trial, as for the reader of the novel, is to establish whether or not there 
is any connection between these separate events. Is there a link between 
drinking coffee over your mother’s corpse and failing to show remorse 
over a violent crime? The paratactic style of the novel exacerbates the 
problem for the reader. Sentences are juxtaposed without the explanatory 
conjunctions which would establish the causal connections between them. 
As Sartre puts it in ‘Explication de L’Etranger’, ‘on évite toutes les liaisons 
causales, qui introduiraient dans le récit un embryon d’explication et 
qui mettraient entre les instants un ordre différent de la succession 
pure’ (Situations, I, p. 143). Each sentence is an island of meaning 
with unspecified, perhaps ungraspable, connections to what precedes or 
follows.
•	 The	compulsion	to	repeat.	Meursault’s	words	are	minimal	but	repetitive.	
The novel is constructed around repeated deaths: the mother’s shortly 
before it begins, the Arab’s at its centre and Meursault’s (presumably) 
shortly after its ending. The novel’s central, impenetrable enigma is the 
question of why Meursault continues to fire into the already dead body 
of his victim, shooting him five times in total. This is never adequately 
explained, as if the repetition of the murder impedes and replaces proper 
understanding. Meursault must keep on killing his victim precisely 
because his own actions make no sense to him. But such an interpretation 
of repetition may betray a critical desire to find meaning where there 
is none, as the novel suggests. Most insistently, Meursault repeats his 
refusal, unwillingness or inability to speak. Variants of ‘Je n’ai rien dit’ 
and ‘je n’ai rien répondu’ recur throughout the text; and this absence of 
response – the spoken declaration of withheld speech – is associated with 
an absence of meaning. ‘Cela ne veut rien dire,’ Meursault tells us in the 
first paragraph (p. 141); when asked by Marie if he loves her, he insists 
that ‘cela ne voulait rien dire’ (p. 161). What is pressingly repeated here is 
the senselessness of repetition itself, as the text both describes and enacts 
an encounter with a world without value or meaning.
•	 The	 damaged	 social	 bond.	The	novel	 describes	 a	world	without	 social	
cohesion. Human relations are devoid of friendship or love. Meursault 
desires Marie but does not seem particularly fond of her; Raymond beats 
his lover and Salamano beats his dog; the police are brutal, the judges are 
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bombastic zealots and the courts are depicted as Kafkaesque travesties. 
The epitome of the isolated human subject is the ‘femme automate’ who 
appears to be more of a robot than a human being. Individuals are mere 
ciphers, each substitutable by others: ‘Le chien de Salamano valait autant 
que sa femme. La petite femme automatique était aussi coupable que la 
Parisienne que Masson avait épousée ou que Marie qui avait envie que je 
l’épouse. Qu’importait que Raymond fût mon copain autant que Céleste 
qui valait mieux que lui? Qu’importait que Marie donnât aujourd’hui sa 
bouche à un nouveau Meursault?’ (p. 212). The final sentence of the novel 
says that the only way for Meursault to feel less alone is for the spectators 
at his execution to greet him ‘avec des cris de haine’ (p. 213). The only 
conceivable emotion which would bind individuals together is hatred.
L’Etranger depicts a world which has lost its moral bearings, where 
communication falters and individual subjects are isolated and detached 
from the meaning of their own lives, powerless and lacking agency. Even 
at the crucial moment when Meursault shoots the Arab, he describes 
the event as something which happens to him rather than an act which 
he determines: ‘Je ne sentais plus que les cymbales du soleil sur mon 
front et, indistinctement, le glaive éclatant jailli du couteau toujours 
en face de moi. […] La gâchette a cédé, j’ai touché le ventre poli de la 
crosse et c’est là, dans le bruit à la fois sec et assourdissant, que tout 
a commencé’ (pp. 175–76). The novel both describes and embodies 
a massive breakdown of sense. It withholds answers, never allowing 
its reader access to an elusive core of truth. And it points towards a 
post-traumatic aesthetics and a post-traumatic subjectivity which are 
indelibly marked by a catastrophic collapse of meaning. Catherine 
Malabou does not refer to Meursault directly in her description of 
the post-traumatic subject, but her account of alienation and apathy 
resonates strikingly with aspects of L’Etranger:
Quand un traumatisme survient, c’est toute la potentialité affective qui 
se voit touchée, la tristesse n’est même plus possible; le patient tombe 
en deçà de la tristesse, dans un état d’apathie qui n’est plus joyeux ni 
désespéré. C’est alors à sa propre survie qu’il devient indifférent. A celle 
des autres aussi. L’indifférence au meurtre ne s’explique pas autrement. 
(Ontologie de l’accident, p. 31)
It would be as mistaken to explain this post-traumatic collapse solely 
in relation to the Second World War as it would be to overlook the link 
altogether. Meursault’s race crime is an enactment in miniature of the 
crimes being prepared and perpetrated in Europe at the same time. His 
crime, like those of the European anti-Semites, is possible only because 
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the moral compass which might have prevented it has been smashed. If, 
then, it is plausible to read L’Etranger as a traumatized response to war, 
it is striking how different it is from Lettres à un ami allemand. Despite 
the death and injustice caused by war, the letters reassure their readers 
– indeed, they insist – that meaning is intact; the rational subject retains 
its sovereignty; a certain idea of France and of Europe has not been 
destroyed; justice and morality are still possible; and the community 
will emerge strengthened in its values once the enemy has met its certain 
defeat. The war may be awful, but it is not traumatic in the sense 
of undermining the foundations of subjectivity, community, ethics and 
communication. L’Etranger, by contrast, depicts an irrevocably broken 
world where there would appear to be no prospect of solidarity and little 
point in resistance. Of course, we are dealing with quite different kinds 
of text here. As a novel published in occupied France, L’Etranger could 
not openly deal with the war; and as clandestine journalism aiming to 
rally and hearten their readers, the letters could not afford the rampant 
scepticism of Camus’s first novel. But this does not, I suggest, fully explain 
the differences between the two texts. Camus’s journalistic polemic is a 
necessary accompaniment to and disavowal of his novel. Neither he nor 
his compatriots could allow themselves to succumb to the traumatic 
collapse of meaning instantiated in L’Etranger. If there were to be a future 
for the subject, for France and for ethics, the persistent doubts of the 
novel had to be drowned out by the confidence of the letters.
In terms of classical trauma theory, it is important that L’Etranger 
comes before the Lettres à un ami allemand. The notion of belatedness 
would predict that the traumatic corrosion of subjectivity and sense 
should come after a period of incubation. The achievement of Camus’s 
novel is that it registers the blunt senselessness of history with striking 
immediacy. Without referring directly to the war, it captures its 
violent intensity together with the accompanying sense of subjective 
powerlessness and incommunicability. Rousso’s ‘Vichy syndrome’ 
describes a period after the war when the most painful aspects of it 
were forgotten, before they would return to haunt the French people. 
The implicit and perhaps necessary disavowal of the blunt senselessness 
of L’Etranger in Camus’s later Lettres à un ami allemand suggests that 
repression had already begun before the war was over. L’Etranger bears 
an insight that the letters cannot allow themselves to acknowledge: 
something has happened which will have enduring consequences on 
sense, subjectivity and community. Meursault is a post-traumatic being, 
unaware even of the causes and extent of his own damaged subjectivity.
The previous chapter suggested that Camus’s first novel, L’Etranger, is 
informed by the tragedy of a war which it never once mentions. This 
chapter examines problems of interpretation and ethics in two later 
works in which reference to the war is either widely taken for granted 
(La Peste) or explicit (La Chute). Camus emerged from the Second 
World War as an established author, after the publication of L’Etranger 
and his philosophical essay Le Mythe de Sisyphe and the staging of his 
plays Caligula and Le Malentendu; and, more than Sartre and Beauvoir, 
his association with the Resistance was strong because of his work on 
the clandestine newspaper Combat. So he had a claim to both artistic 
and moral credentials. The ethical question for post-war, post-Absurdist 
Camus is how to move beyond the impasse of L’Etranger, in which one 
man kills another in part because he can see no good reason not to. His 
second novel, La Peste, on which he had begun work during the war, was 
published in 1947, and marked a new phase in both his writing and his 
ethical thinking. The move from individual isolation to solidarity and 
collective revolt would later be theorized in his book L’Homme révolté, 
leading to his bitter split from his one-time friends Sartre and Beauvoir, 
and to competing visions of him as the champion of even-handed 
moderation or an emblem of ineffective liberalism. In Debarati Sanyal’s 
words, Camus has been ‘either celebrated as an exemplary witness 
to the atrocities of the century or denounced as an accomplice of 
an imperialist imaginary’ (Memory and Complicity, pp. 57–58).1 This 
 1 Sanyal’s discussion of La Peste and La Chute in Memory and Complicity 
was published later than earlier versions of the material in this chapter, and I find 
many points of concordance with her searching readings, especially regarding 
chapter five
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problem of interpreting his overall stature and achievement is matched 
by difficulties of restricting the sense of his most important works. In 
this chapter I want to suggest that the textual complexities of his two 
major post-war novels, La Peste and La Chute, frustrate the attempt to 
identify his writing confidently with any settled position.
La Peste does not mention the Second World War any more than 
L’Etranger; yet the assumption that Camus’s novel, set in the Algerian 
city of Oran, implicitly refers to the mainland French experience of 
Occupation was quickly accepted, and has remained so ever since its 
publication. Roger Quilliot’s analysis of the triple sens of the novel 
(as account of a plague, as description of the Occupation and as a 
metaphysical study) summarizes a consensus which still commands 
support (see La Mer et les prisons, pp. 168–70). Even the polemics of 
the 1940s and 1950s dealt mainly with the evaluation of the novel rather 
than its interpretation. Both sides of the argument seemed in agreement 
over the meaning of the work, and differed only in their attitudes to 
that meaning. Camus himself encouraged the reading of his novel which 
linked it to the experience of the Occupation. In 1955, responding to 
a dissenting article by Roland Barthes, Camus insisted on his right as 
author to control the reception of his work:
Bien entendu, tous les commentaires sont légitimes, dans la critique de 
bonne foi, et il est en même temps possible et significatif de s’aventurer 
aussi loin que vous le faites. Mais il me semble qu’il y a dans toute œuvre 
des évidences dont l’auteur a le droit de se réclamer pour indiquer au 
moins dans quelles limites le commentaire peut se déployer. (‘Lettre à 
Roland Barthes’, in Œuvres complètes II, pp. 285–86)
Camus is trying here, and largely failing, to steer a course between the 
Scylla of critical anarchy and the Charybdis of authorial dogmatism. 
Barthes, Camus suggests, has the right to publish his article, but he was 
wrong in his reading; all commentaries are legitimate, but some are 
more legitimate than others. Camus adds that La Peste can be read ‘sur 
plusieurs portées’, but that its ‘contenu évident’ is the struggle against 
Nazism (Œuvres complètes II, p. 286); and describing the evolution from 
L’Etranger to La Peste he adopts a polemical firmness which contrasts 
strangely with the hesitations and precautions of the narrator of his 
own novel: ‘Comparée à L’Etranger, La Peste marque, sans discussion 
the importance of history coupled with the difficulty of pinning it down. Sanyal’s 
reading also brings in the importance of the Algerian context, which is vital but 
beyond the scope of the current book.
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possible, le passage d’une attitude de révolte solitaire à la reconnaissance 
d’une communauté dont il faut partager les luttes’ (Œuvres complètes II, 
p. 286; emphasis added).
Camus’s exchange with Barthes gives an insight into the author’s 
attempts to apply the hermeneutic brake to a text which, eight years 
after its publication, was escaping him. His desire to place constraints 
on the reception of his work can be explained in part by historical and 
biographical determinants. In 1947, when La Peste was published, an 
existentialist ethics seemed both urgent and possible; Sartre was still 
working on the posthumously published Cahiers pour une morale 
promised in the final sentence of L’Etre et le néant. Moral and political 
controversies created unfavorable ground for decadent aestheticism. 
Camus’s novel indicates his desire to participate in the debate. But by 
1955 Camus was feeling wounded and misunderstood; and Barthes’s 
article gave him the opportunity both to defend himself and to reappro-
priate his earlier work. Yet today, the terms of ethical debate having 
changed, La Peste may be more interesting for what remains unresolved 
in and by the novel than for the particular clarities which Camus wished 
to foreground. In what follows, I focus on some difficulties of reading 
posed by the novel and their ethical resonance. 
Interpreting La Peste
The epigraph to La Peste, taken from the preface to the third volume 
of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, serves as an invitation to interpret: ‘Il est 
aussi raisonnable de représenter une espèce d’emprisonnement par une 
autre que de représenter n’importe quelle chose qui existe réellement par 
quelque chose qui n’existe pas’ (La Peste, in Œuvres complètes II, p. 33). 
We are warned or informed that what follows needs to be interpreted. 
The literal meaning of the work does not exhaust its potential to signify. 
This is in itself banal. The fundamental question is not whether the 
novel can be read in a variety of ways (it clearly can), but whether the 
potential meanings can be exhausted, totalized and reconciled.
The invitation to interpret is taken up within the text itself with 
the appearance of the rats in Oran. This gives rise to considerable, but 
inconclusive, hermeneutic activity. Rieux’s initial observation that ‘ce 
rat n’était pas à sa place’ (p. 38) leads him to consider its presence as 
‘bizarre’ (p. 38); for the concierge, on the other hand, it constitutes a 
‘scandale’ (p. 38) and can only be explained as a practical joke: ‘Bref, 
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il s’agissait d’une farce’ (p. 38). According to the old asthmatic, the 
appearance of the rats is due to hunger: ‘c’est la faim!’ (p. 39); and Rieux 
discovers that ‘tout le quartier parlait des rats’ (p. 39). Rambert declares 
that ‘cela m’intéresse’ (p. 42) and is echoed by Tarrou, who describes 
the appearance of the rats as ‘une curieuse chose’: ‘Mais je trouve cela 
intéressant, oui, positivement intéressant’ (p. 42). Initially, Rieux pays 
little attention to the rats. When asked by his wife: ‘Qu’est-ce que 
c’est que cette histoire de rats?’ (p. 40), he replies: ‘Je ne sais pas. C’est 
bizarre, mais cela passera’ (p. 40). To Judge Othon’s enquiry about the 
rats, he replies that ‘ce n’est rien’ (p. 41). Rieux’s mother seems equally 
unconcerned: ‘Ce sont des choses qui arrivent’ (p. 43).
It is possible to read the varied reactions to the rats in the opening 
pages of the novel as a mise en abyme of reading itself, oscillating 
between sanguine indifference and the tendency to naturalize the 
unfamiliar by accommodating it to expected patterns; and the service 
de dératisation that Rieux calls upon (see p. 43) corresponds to the 
desire to disambiguate the text, to rid it of its troubling enigmas as 
the city must be rid of its rats. The rats eventually disappear, but the 
need for interpretation persists. In key passages, the text picks up the 
invitation to interpret made in the epigraph and signals that the story of 
the plague should not be understood only in literal terms. In particular, 
this purpose is served by the discussions between Rieux and Tarrou, 
Paneloux’s two sermons and some of the narrator’s interventions. These 
passages indicate that the hermeneutic activity set in motion by the 
appearance of the rats continues even when they are no longer present 
in Oran or the text. They can be seen as attempts both to extend and to 
restrict the interpretation of the novel as a whole, since they illustrate the 
presence of non-literal meanings while placing controllable parameters 
on them.
La Peste can be understood, then, as the endeavour to put the rat 
back in its place, that is, to control the disturbance of meaning, by 
understanding, explaining and overcoming its unwarranted appearance, 
in short by making out of it a narrative which will lead to the rats’ 
expulsion (albeit, as the final sentence of the novel concedes, their 
provisional expulsion) from a now properly tidied textual space. The 
rats need to be interpreted (see Davis, ‘Interpreting La Peste’); and in the 
current chapter I want to add that they are something to be interpreted 
ethically. They represent a residue or semantic excess through which 
the questions of ethical choice and action are posed. Yet the novel 
shows, and to some extent epitomizes, the failure to respond adequately. 
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Tidiness is preferred to mess, even if the imposition of narrative order 
comes at the cost of simplification and repression. The novel can be read 
as an act of containment, in which what is at stake is how to eradicate 
the threat of the unwanted other. 
La Peste oscillates between a sense that no interpretation or ethical 
choice can have guaranteed precedence over any other and an endeavour 
nevertheless to establish some sort of hierarchy of options: it is better to 
face up to the truth than to avoid it, better to call things by their name 
than to lie, better to resist the plague than to consent to it. The hesitation 
between a potentially dizzying insecurity and actually reassuring 
stability has been reproduced in critical readings of the novel, which 
have often conceded its openness only in order then to tie it down 
to relative interpretive certainties.2 John Krapp’s ‘Time and Ethics in 
Albert Camus’s The Plague’ illustrates this in discussion of the novel’s 
ethical ambiguities, as it ends up confirming a critical consensus which 
it purports to contest. Contrary to those who see the novel as a more or 
less disguised sermon about solidarity and revolt, Krapp finds in it ‘a 
vital moral dialogue among competing ethical positions’ in which ‘no 
single ethical position is permitted to dominate the others’ (‘Time and 
Ethics’, pp. 655, 662).3 Even so, Rieux’s views are given particular weight. 
His moral voice ‘successfully promotes solidarity through an experience 
of shared, material conditions and serves as an ethical position that 
resonates compellingly in the text’s moral dialogue’ (‘Time and Ethics’, 
p. 668; emphasis added).4 So the novel establishes a dialogue in which no 
voice dominates others, yet one character’s viewpoint is more successful 
and more compelling than those which disagree with it. Krapp concludes: 
‘While no single voice ever obviates all its competition in a moral dialogue 
[…] some moral voices are nevertheless more potent, more persuasive, 
than others’ (‘Time and Ethics’, p. 669). No one is absolutely right, but 
some characters are more right than others, and Rieux is more right than 
anyone else. The dialogue that the novel was supposed to stage in fact 
turns out to be pretty much settled in advance, and readers have only to 
allow themselves dutifully to be compelled and persuaded.
 2 For discussion of this, see Davis, ‘Interpreting La Peste’, especially pp. 125–27.
 3 A revised version of the article is published in Krapp, An Aesthetics of 
Morality, pp. 70–98. 
 4 The revised version of Krapp’s article slightly tones down the claims made 
here: the word ‘compellingly’ is omitted from the quoted passage; see Krapp, An 
Aesthetics of Morality, p. 90.
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This tension between pinning down the novel to a particular reading 
and conceding its resistance to interpretive certainty emerges in a 
different form in Shoshana Felman’s provocative and brilliant discussion 
of the novel in her and Dori Laub’s Testimony: Crises of Witnessing 
in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History. Felman describes La Peste 
as ‘a transparent allegory for the massive death inflicted by the Second 
World War and for the trauma of a Europe “quarantined” by German 
occupation and desperately struggling against the overwhelming 
deadliness of Nazism’ (‘Education and Crisis’, p. 8). She goes on to 
identify the plague even more specifically with the Holocaust, bringing 
out the resonance of some passages and issues in the novel, such as the 
link between the quarantine camps and the Nazi concentration camps 
and the difficulty of bearing witness to unprecedented, unspeakable 
trauma. This reading, like Krapp’s, gives particular authority to Rieux; 
and, like Krapp, Felman also overlooks problems arising from his dual 
position as character and narrator. Subsequently in Testimony (as will 
be discussed in the second half of this chapter) Felman goes on to show 
how La Chute would later dramatize the disintegration of the integrity 
and authority of the witness. Felman seems not to discern that this 
disintegration can already be observed in the earlier novel, emerging 
for example through Rieux’s unexplained decision to mask the fact 
that he is the novel’s narrator until its closing pages. Felman does, 
however, acknowledge at the end of her chapter on La Peste that there 
is an element in the novel which does not fit easily with its status as ‘a 
transparent allegory’. The scene at the end of the text where Cottard 
shoots at the crowd is ‘a residue of violence and madness’ and an 
‘incongruent episode’ which is not accounted for in Rieux’s testimony; it 
represents the ‘residue of a radical and self-subversive question’ (‘Camus’ 
The Fall’, p. 118) about the ability of the doctor’s testimony to exhaust 
the lesson of the plague and of the novel that describes it. Rieux wants 
to speak for all, but he does not speak for everyone. The central issue in 
the current discussion of La Peste concerns the extent and significance 
of the ‘residue’ which Felman recognizes, and which the critical heritage 
has tended to tidy away. Perhaps, if the mess is removed too quickly, 
something is lost which might have been worth preserving.
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Camus and Hegel
The rejection of mess in La Peste can be related to the repudiation 
of otherness in Camus’s ethics and aesthetics. The stakes of Camus’s 
thinking in these areas are shown up through his hostility towards 
Hegel, to whom (I shall suggest) he is nevertheless closer than he 
might appreciate. In his chapter on Hegel in L’Homme révolté, Camus 
describes the dialectic of the master and slave as a struggle to destroy 
the other which has played an important role in the development of both 
modern nihilism and left-wing totalitarianism (see Œuvres complètes 
III, pp. 174–87). The Hegelian battle for supremacy takes place in a 
world without transcendence, so that there are no values other than the 
norms of the given historical moment. Each consciousness seeks to be 
recognized in order to be complete, so it attempts to impose itself upon 
other consciousnesses and thereby gain acceptance as a master among 
slaves. To be triumphant, consciousness must be ready to kill or to be 
killed, so that the search for recognition is a life and death struggle. 
Each consciousness wants the death of the other, even if the other’s 
death would curtail her ability to recognize my ascendancy over her. 
According to Camus, Hegel’s nihilist heirs aspired to become masters of 
their own lives by killing and dying outside society’s laws; his Marxist 
heirs sought to overcome the masters by revolutionary means, justifying 
killing by the ends it served. In both cases, Hegel is the godfather of 
violence.
Camus’s account of Hegel clearly owes a great deal to the anthropo-
logical interpretation promoted in the 1930s by Alexandre Kojève and 
echoed in the conflict of consciousnesses described in Sartre’s L’Etre et 
le néant and the existentialist ethics of Beauvoir’s Pyrrhus et Cinéas.5 
Camus concedes that the reading of Hegel which takes the German 
philosopher to be justifying murder and death overlooks important 
aspects of his work. Even so, Camus’s own discussion of Hegel does 
little to correct partial and schematic misreadings. It is true that Hegel 
describes consciousness as engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the 
other, staking its own life and seeking the death of its opponent; but only 
in a very literal reading is this tantamount to endorsing killing and dying 
 5 For Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, see Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de 
Hegel. Kojève’s lectures, delivered in Paris between 1933 and 1939, were attended 
by some of the most promising young intellectuals of the day, and influenced a 
generation of French thinkers.
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(see Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 113–14). Moreover, by insisting solely 
on the negation of the other, Camus neglects the central point of the 
Hegelian dialectic, which is to negate and to conserve at the same time. 
In Hegel’s account, self-consciousness is both affirmed and changed 
through its encounter with the other: 
First, it must proceed to supersede the other independent being in order 
thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in 
so doing it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself. 
This ambiguous supersession of its ambiguous otherness is equally an 
ambiguous return into itself. For first, through the supersession, it 
receives back its own self, because, by superseding its otherness, it again 
becomes equal to itself; but secondly, the other self-consciousness equally 
gives it back again to itself, for it saw itself in the other, but supersedes 
this being of itself in the other and thus lets the other again go free. 
(Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 111; emphasis original)
Self-consciousness returns to itself as other; it does not overcome 
otherness so much as find itself changed by the encounter with it. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy explains, ‘Soi est précisément sans retour à soi, soi ne 
devient pas ce qu’il est déjà: devenir: c’est être hors de soi – mais pour 
autant que ce dehors, cette ex-position, est l’être même du sujet’ (Hegel, 
p. 86; emphasis original). Self-consciousness comes to know itself by 
venturing outside itself and then returning to itself transformed by its 
expedition. So the encounter with the other is a self-loss which is also a 
self-discovery. Fundamentally bound up with the other’s desire and the 
desire for the other, the struggle of consciousnesses is not a justification 
of violence; rather, it is, as Nancy provocatively puts it, the reality of love 
(Hegel, p. 93).
Camus’s interpretation of Hegel overlooks the extent to which 
otherness is necessary to the operation of the dialectic; and although 
he condemns the destruction of alterity in the actions of Hegel’s nihilist 
and Marxist heirs, Camus strikingly reproduces this destruction in 
his conception of solidarity, which subsumes the whole of humanity 
in a seamless unity.6 Moreover, the endeavour to tidy and to unify is 
reproduced in Camus’s aesthetics as formulated in L’Homme révolté and 
to some extent instantiated in La Peste; and here again the comparison 
with Hegel is informative. Hegel’s aesthetics entail an excursion into 
 6 For further discussion of the denial of otherness in L’Homme révolté and 
other texts by Camus, see Davis, Ethical Issues in Twentieth-Century French 
Fiction, pp. 64–85.
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otherness, which may seem initially unwelcome but which turns out to 
play a positive role in mankind’s self-production. In his Introductory 
Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel describes man’s aim ‘to strip the outer 
world of its stubborn foreignness’, and in the process to produce and to 
recognize himself (p. 36). Art is a means of achieving this, and as such 
its role is akin to that of thought. In art, the mind ventures outside itself 
into the external, material world, and by exploring what lies outside 
itself it undergoes what Hegel calls ‘an alienation from itself towards the 
sensuous’ (Introductory Lectures, p. 15). But the mind then recognizes 
itself in its alienation and is restored to itself. This is not a self-forgetting 
or surrender of the self; rather, in art, that which is other than the self 
is comprehended and brought back to the self, so that consciousness 
recognizes itself better and differently. This entails neither a simple 
negation nor a blunt denial of the world’s messy otherness. Rather, 
alienation contributes to the work of self-production and self-possession. 
As in the struggle for recognition by other consciousnesses, the journey 
into otherness is indispensable. In L’Homme révolté, Camus describes 
the artist’s relation to the external world as more ambivalent. Creation 
is ‘exigence d’unité et refus du monde’ (Œuvres complètes III, p. 278); 
fiction implies ‘une sorte de refus du monde’, even though this refusal 
can never be ‘une simple fuite’ (p. 284). Unable to escape or negate the 
world entirely, the artist instead corrects it, turning life into destiny: 
‘Voici donc un monde imaginaire, mais créé par la correction de celui-ci, 
un monde où la douleur peut, si elle le veut, durer jusqu’à la mort, où 
les passions ne sont jamais distraites, où les êtres sont livrés à l’idée fixe 
et toujours présents les uns aux autres’ (p. 288). In this corrected world, 
‘l’homme peut régner et connaître enfin’ (p. 280).
In the aesthetics of revolt described in L’Homme révolté, the world is 
not negated but its otherness is cleansed from it. Everything about it which 
resists our desires is transformed so that love and grief, for example, do 
not diminish with the passing of time. This corrected creation resembles 
the tidied world to which aspects of La Peste aspire. When Rieux takes 
a night-time swim with Tarrou, they occupy for a moment a world 
entirely cleansed of otherness. They swim ‘dans le même rythme’, ‘avec 
la même cadence et la même vigueur’, and they share ‘le même cœur’ 
(Œuvres complètes II, pp. 212–13). The hostility of the external world 
and the impenetrability of other selves have been temporarily overcome. 
The repeated use of ‘même’ insists that there is no trace of difference 
or conflict here. This is nothing like the Hegelian model of alienation 
and self-recovery because otherness has disappeared rather than being 
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dialectically superseded. The rest of this discussion questions whether La 
Peste aims more generally for the triumph of sameness achieved briefly in 
Rieux and Tarrou’s night swim, or whether it preserves, perhaps despite 
itself, some trace of the other’s messy presence.
Cleaning up the rats
Rieux’s initial discovery of a rat raises from the very beginning of the 
novel much of what is at stake here, so it is worth quoting the paragraph 
in full:
Le matin du 16 avril, le docteur Bernard Rieux sortit de son cabinet et 
buta sur un rat mort, au milieu du palier. Sur le moment, il écarta la 
bête sans y prendre garde et descendit l’escalier. Mais, arrivé dans la rue, 
la pensée lui vint que ce rat n’était pas à sa place et il retourna sur ses 
pas pour avertir le concierge. Devant la réaction du vieux M. Michel, 
il sentit mieux ce que sa découverte avait d’insolite. La présence de ce 
rat mort lui avait paru seulement bizarre tandis que, pour le concierge, 
elle constituait un scandale. La position de ce dernier était d’ailleurs 
catégorique: il n’y avait pas de rats dans la maison. Le docteur eut beau 
l’assurer qu’il y en avait un sur le palier du premier étage, et probablement 
mort, la conviction de M. Michel restait entière. Il n’y avait pas de rats 
dans la maison, il fallait donc qu’on eût apporté celui-ci du dehors. Bref, 
il s’agissait d’une farce. (p. 38)
From the beginning, the rat is a curious and paradoxical beast. Rieux 
initially pays scant attention to it and the concierge denies its existence 
(‘il n’y avait pas de rats dans la maison’). It is nevertheless, as I have 
suggested, something which calls for interpretation. It is ‘insolite’ or 
‘bizarre’, or perhaps more significantly, ‘un scandale’ or ‘une farce’. 
The paragraph even wavers over whether or not it is dead. At first it 
is described confidently as ‘un rat mort’, but a few lines later it is only 
‘probablement mort’. Are we to assume that the narrator has changed 
his mind, and that having at first decided it was dead he now thinks 
it may be only asleep, wounded or resting? Even Rieux’s view that ‘ce 
rat n’était pas à sa place’ calls for explanation. Rieux seems to believe 
that rats have their place, and that they should stay there; and wherever 
such a place might be, it certainly isn’t on the landing outside his office. 
Moreover, the phrase ‘ce rat n’était pas à sa place’ echoes the opening 
sentences of the novel: ‘Les curieux événements qui font le sujet de cette 
chronique se sont produits en 194., à Oran. De l’avis général, ils n’y 
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étaient pas à leur place, sortant un peu de l’ordinaire’ (p. 35). The events 
described in the novel, like the rat on the landing, are not where they 
should be. But then again, what is the proper place for curious events 
to occur? Like the rats, they are out of place as soon as they become 
conspicuous. As long as they remain unseen, they need not trouble the 
course of the everyday world.
Rieux’s first response on seeing the rat is to brush it aside: ‘il écarta 
la bête sans y prendre garde’. Rieux’s action is then reproduced by the 
attitude of the concierge who, Rieux’s testimony notwithstanding, is 
categorical that ‘il n’y avait pas de rats dans la maison’; or alternatively, 
‘il fallait donc qu’on eût apporté celui-ci du dehors. Bref, il s’agissait 
d’une farce’. The suggestion of a logical process conveyed by the word 
donc is misleading here, since the inference that the rat had been brought 
in from outside flatly contradicts the insistence that there is no rat at all. 
At the very least, for his reasoning to make sense the concierge would 
have to concede that there might, after all, be a rat in the building, 
contrary to his refusal to countenance such a possibility. But in any case, 
he is following the dictates of his desire rather than rational reflection. 
Adopting a version of what is known in French as le raisonnement du 
chaudron,7 the concierge mounts incompatible defences: it’s a scandal 
that there is a rat in the building; there are no rats in the building; the 
rat in the building was brought there by someone as a practical joke. The 
point is not the truth or falsehood of any of these claims; rather, each of 
them serves the same purpose, which is to deny that the concierge could 
have any responsibility for the rodent’s presence. The rat constitutes 
a potential reproach for not doing his job properly, so he denies its 
potential significance to him by all available means. Like Rieux, in his 
way he pushes it aside.
The rat is out of place, and as such it demands to be explained 
and thereby tidied away. Yet this opening paragraph to the narrative 
itself exhibits some of the untidiness which the rat represents, with its 
 7 The raisonnement du chaudron is described by Freud: ‘A. borrowed a copper 
kettle from B. and after he had returned it was sued by B. because the kettle 
now had a big hole in it which made it unusable. His defence was: “First, I never 
borrowed a kettle from B. at all; secondly, the kettle had a hole in it already when 
I got it from him; and thirdly, I gave him back the kettle undamaged”’ (Jokes and 
their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 100). Freud observes that each of the defences 
is valid in itself but that taken together they contradict one another. From the 
standpoint of the unconscious, this mutual exclusion is irrelevant, because in the 
unconscious contradictory thoughts do not cancel each other out. 
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contradiction, denial and resistance. So what we have here is an early 
instance of the text representing the endeavour to dismiss the rat while 
itself becoming a vehicle for the intractable messiness which it figures. 
The following pages reproduce this process, as dead and dying rats 
appear throughout Oran and become the talking point of the whole city. 
The service de dératisation is called upon to get rid of them, but the 
more they are countered, the more they proliferate:
Le matin, dans les faubourgs, on les trouvait étalés à même le ruisseau, 
une petite fleur de sang sur le museau pointu, les uns gonflés et putrides, 
les autres raidis et les moustaches encore dressées. […] Nettoyée à l’aube 
de ses bêtes mortes, la ville les retrouvait peu à peu, de plus en plus 
nombreuses, pendant la journée. […] On eût dit que la terre même où 
étaient plantées nos maisons se purgeait de son chargement d’humeurs, 
qu’elle laissait monter à la surface des furoncles et des sanies qui, 
jusqu’ici, la travaillait intérieurement. (p. 44)
At moments, the description of the dying rats is starkly realistic; yet there 
is also the persistent implication in the text that some sort of elemental 
or even moral significance lies behind their appearance. So the rats are 
not just rats; they are bearers of meaning, though no one can quite settle 
what that meaning might be. Despite all attempts to clear them away, 
they keep on returning because they embody something which resists 
and defeats physical or intellectual attempts to be rid of them defini-
tively; until, that is, they disappear as abruptly and as senselessly as they 
had appeared: ‘Mais, le lendemain, l’agence annonça que le phénomène 
avait cessé brutalement et que le service de dératisation n’avait collecté 
qu’une quantité négligeable de rats morts. La ville respira’ (p. 45). My 
suggestion here is that the rats represent the residue to which Felman 
refers in her chapter on La Peste, which might also be conceived as an 
excess of meaning or the messiness of the real which will not be cleared 
away. Felman seems to think that the residue in Camus’s novel is quite 
restricted in extent, and that the rats can be explained in terms of the 
overall allegorical framework; I would argue that, on the contrary, the 
residue is much more widespread. If the rats disappear from the novel 
after its early stages, it is not because the challenge to security and 
authority has been overcome, but because it is now all-pervasive. The 
rats’ thematic presence is no longer necessary.
Rieux’s rejection of residue is made explicit in his first encounter with 
the journalist Rambert. Rambert asks Rieux for information about the 
living conditions of Arabs, but Rieux is unwilling to help:
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Mais il [Rieux] voulait savoir, avant d’aller plus loin, si le journaliste 
pouvait dire la vérité.
— Certes, dit l’autre.
— Je veux dire: pouvez-vous porter condamnation totale?
— Totale, non, il faut bien le dire. Mais je suppose que cette condam-
nation serait sans fondement.
Doucement, Rieux dit qu’en effet une pareille condamnation serait 
sans fondement, mais qu’en posant cette question, il cherchait seulement 
à savoir si le témoignage de Rambert pouvait ou non être sans réserves.
— Je n’admets que les témoignages sans réserves. Je ne soutiendrai 
donc pas le vôtre de mes renseignements.
— C’est le langage de Saint-Just, dit le journaliste en souriant.
Rieux dit sans élever le ton qu’il n’en savait rien, mais que c’était 
le langage d’un homme lassé du monde où il vivait, ayant pourtant le 
goût de ses semblables et décidé à refuser, pour sa part, l’injustice et les 
concessions. (p. 41)
Rieux’s language is uncompromising. Telling the truth means being 
able to make a total condemnation, even if it isn’t justified in the 
circumstances. Only testimony ‘sans réserves’ is acceptable to him, and 
concessions are rejected. We might be inclined to see this passage as 
evidence of Rieux’s stoical honesty, yet Rambert’s comparison of him 
to Saint-Just is telling. Rieux is as categorical as the concierge when 
the latter denies that there can be rats in his building. Curiously, for 
someone who does not appear to believe in absolutes, Rieux insists 
on the whole truth or nothing at all. He will not help Rambert if the 
journalist does not have total freedom of expression. Despite the fact 
that he does not condemn others, for example when Rambert is eager to 
escape from Oran rather than to join in the struggle against the plague, 
Rieux implicitly claims for himself a position of moral authority. This is 
replicated in his role as narrator. From the opening sentence he asserts 
for his text the objectivity of a chronicle; he subsumes the voices of 
others when he takes upon himself the right to speak ‘au nom de tous’ 
(p. 81), and he brings the experiences and words of disparate characters 
such as Tarrou, Paneloux, Grand and Cottard into a narrative which 
leaves him with the final word. The novel’s polyphony is in the end 
contained in the discourse of a single authoritative narrator. Rather 
than what he calls Tarrou’s ‘écarts de langage ou de pensée’ (p. 51), he 
insists on clarity, resoluteness and a simple moral principle: ‘L’essentiel 
était de bien faire son métier’ (p. 62). In his hands, the whole narrative 
can be read as reproducing the concierge’s denial of the incommodious 
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rat. Having spoken the truth and done his duty, he presides over a neatly 
tidied text: there are no rats in Oran.
And yet, Tarrou’s ‘écarts de langage ou de pensée’ are also the stuff 
of La Peste. To put it another way, the novel is made up as much by 
mess, approximation, residue and equivocation as it is by the effort to 
clear them away. The inconsistencies of the concierge’s raisonnement du 
chaudron (there are no rats in the building/the rat in the building was 
put there as a joke) are reproduced in its treatment of some of its central 
themes. These are not so much antinomies in the strict sense as instances 
of how the text’s clarities appear less clear when placed alongside one 
another:
(i) It is important to stand up for the truth8/sometimes no one can be 
sure what the truth is.9
(ii) Some things are known for certain (two and two are four, for 
example)10/the state of our knowledge is uncertain.11
(iii) People should speak clearly and call things by their name12/human 
language is ambiguous and inadequate to the task of self-expression.13
(iv) Some responses to the plague are preferable to others14/no one has 
a secure basis on which to condemn other people’s decisions and 
beliefs.15
 8 ‘Je n’admets que les témoignages sans réserves’ (p. 41); ‘Rieux répondit qu’il 
n’avait pas décrit un syndrome, il avait décrit ce qu’il avait vu’ (p. 68); ‘lui, Rieux, 
croyait être sur le chemin de la vérité, en luttant contre la création telle qu’elle 
était’(p. 121).
 9 ‘C’était la peste et ce n’était pas elle. Depuis quelque temps d’ailleurs, elle 
semblait prendre plaisir à dérouter les diagnostics’ (p. 195); ‘Mais en matière de 
peste, leurs connaissances étaient à peu près nulles’ (p. 106).
 10 ‘La question est de savoir si deux et deux, oui ou non, font quatre. Pour ceux 
de nos concitoyens qui risquaient alors leur vie, ils avaient à décider si, oui ou non, 
ils étaient dans la peste et si, oui ou non, il fallait lutter contre elle’ (p. 125).
 11 ‘Mais il est vrai que nous avons encore tout à apprendre à ce sujet’ (p. 123).
 12 ‘[J]’ai compris que tout le malheur des hommes venait de ce qu’ils ne tenaient 
pas un langage clair’ (p. 210); ‘Il faut appeler les choses par leur nom’ (p. 62).
 13 ‘Pendant des semaines, nous fûmes réduits alors à recommencer la même 
lettre, à recopier les mêmes renseignements et les mêmes appels, si bien qu’au bout 
d’un certain temps, les mots qui d’abord étaient sortis tout saignants de notre cœur 
se vidaient de leur sens’ (p. 80).
 14 ‘Plus exactement, la terreur lui [Cottard] paraît alors moins lourde à porter 
que s’il y était tout seul. C’est en cela qu’il a tort’ (p. 170).
 15 ‘Il ne faut pas juger. […] Si vous pouvez vous tirer de cette affaire, j’en serai 
profondément heureux’ (p. 93).
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(v) There are no heroes16/some people are more heroic than others.17
(vi) On balance, there is more to admire in people than to despise18/on 
balance, people are selfish, ignorant and have short memories.19
(vii) Everyone should join in the struggle to defeat the plague20/the plague 
cannot be defeated.21
Sometimes these inconsistencies can be seen only when different parts 
of the text are juxtaposed. Sometimes, though, they emerge through 
the text’s readiness to display the validity of contrary views, as when 
the narrator argues that ‘Les hommes sont plutôt bons que mauvais’ 
(p. 124). He precedes his statement by acknowledging the opinion that 
‘la méchanceté et l’indifférence sont des moteurs bien plus fréquents 
dans les actions de l’homme’. Although this is immediately qualified as 
‘une idée que le narrateur ne partage pas’, it is nevertheless expressed 
and held before the reader as a tenable view, and one which receives a 
certain amount of support from the text. It is made clear, for example, 
that the actions of the ‘formations sanitaires’ are by no means typical of 
the people of Oran, and that the story of the plague should also tell of the 
black market, violence and rioting. The text becomes a space in which 
 16 ‘C’est pourquoi le narrateur ne se fera pas le chantre trop éloquent de la 
volonté et d’un héroïsme auquel il n’attache qu’une importance raisonnable’ 
(p. 124).
 17 ‘[S]’il faut absolument qu’il y en ait un [héros] dans cette histoire, le narrateur 
propose justement ce héros insignifiant et effacé [Grand]’ (p. 128); ‘Ce qui 
m’intéresse, c’est d’être un homme’ (p. 211).
 18 ‘[I]l y a dans les hommes plus de choses à admirer que de choses à mépriser’ 
(p. 248).
 19 ‘Car ces couples ravis, étroitement ajustés et avares de paroles, affirmaient 
au milieu du tumulte, avec tout le triomphe et l’injustice du bonheur, que la peste 
était finie et que la terreur avait fait son temps. Ils niaient tranquillement, contre 
toute évidence, que nous ayons jamais connu ce monde insensé où le meurtre d’un 
homme était aussi quotidien que celui des mouches, cette sauvagerie bien définie, 
ce délire calculé, cet emprisonnement qui apportait avec lui une affreuse liberté à 
l’égard de tout ce qui n’était pas le présent, cette odeur de mort qui stupéfiait tous 
ceux qu’elle ne tuait pas, ils niaient enfin que nous ayons été ce peuple abasourdi 
dont tous les jours une partie entassée dans la gueule d’un four s’évaporait en 
fumées grasses, pendant que l’autre, chargée des chaînes de l’impuissance et de la 
peur, attendait son tour’ (p. 240).
 20 ‘[I]l fallait faire ce qu’il fallait pour lutter contre elle [la maladie]’ (p. 124); ‘Il 
n’y avait pour cela qu’un seul moyen qui était de combattre la peste’ (p. 125).
 21 ‘Mais j’imagine alors ce que doit être cette peste pour vous. — Oui, dit Rieux. 
Une interminable défaite’ (p. 122).
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opinion and counter-opinion, evidence and counter-evidence, are held 
together in strange proximity. One side of the argument may be given 
greater emphasis, but its contrary persists as an unrefuted alternative.
To observe this coexistence of contraries in the text entails an 
attentiveness to its frailty and unevenness, an acknowledgement of 
the weakness of some of the arguments which are deployed within 
it, and an awareness of its hesitations and unresolved contradictions. 
These sometimes appear in brief moments which can be all too easily 
overlooked, as when Rieux and Grand discuss the naming of the plague:
— Allons, dit Rieux, il faut peut-être se décider à appeler cette maladie 
par son nom. Jusqu’à présent, nous avons piétiné. Mais venez avec moi, je 
dois aller au laboratoire.
— Oui, oui, disait Grand en descendant l’escalier derrière le docteur. Il 
faut appeler les choses par leur nom. Mais quel est ce nom?
— Je ne puis vous le dire, et d’ailleurs cela ne vous serait pas utile.
— Vous voyez, sourit l’employé. Ce n’est pas si facile. (p. 62)
This exchange reflects the view shared by Tarrou and Rieux that people 
should speak clearly and use appropriate language rather than words 
which distort or mask reality. Here, though, the apparently unques-
tionable dictum ‘Il faut appeler les choses par leur nom’ comes adrift. 
Rieux’s reply to Grand’s enquiry about the name of the plague (‘Je ne 
puis vous le dire, et d’ailleurs cela ne vous serait pas utile’) is opaque. 
Why can’t he tell Grand the name? Has he been forbidden to do so, or 
does he not know it? On what authority does he insist that knowing the 
name would not be useful to Grand, and in any case why would its lack 
of usefulness constitute a reason for withholding it? Rieux wants to call 
things by their name, but then refuses to do just that with only cursory 
explanation. Moreover, this exchange echoes the central interpretive 
tension of La Peste as a whole: the text makes clear from its epigraph that 
its account of the plague should not be read (only) literally; but, in that 
case, quite what is named by the plague remains open to inconclusive 
speculation. The book’s very title constitutes a call for interpretation. 
Like Rieux, it promises to give a name to things, but then teases or 
frustrates us by hinting that the proper name is withheld or unavailable.
The point here is that the drive in the novel for simplicity and clarity 
never succeeds in overcoming a contrary drive towards ambiguity and 
uncertainty. Even an aphoristic slogan such as ‘L’essentiel était de bien 
faire son métier’ (p. 62) delivers less than it might seem. In its context, 
it may refer only to Rieux’s resolve to do his best as a doctor (‘son 
métier’ = his job); yet it also has the appearance of a more general 
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axiom (‘son métier’ = one’s job). But then the injunction that everyone 
should endeavour to do their job well is both relatively uncontroversial 
and functionally meaningless. It might urge us to solidarity in the fight 
against the plague, or it might encourage us to the most fascistic social 
conformism. So when it seems to be at its most confident in stating 
simple truths, the text risks saying nothing at all, or nothing that can 
be readily understood in an unambiguous way. This is particularly the 
case when the narrator formulates axioms for moral behaviour. Refusing 
to make heroes out of the members of the ‘formations sanitaires’, the 
narrator suggests that their function was to show the citizens of Oran 
how to act in a time of plague: ‘puisque la maladie était là, il fallait faire 
ce qu’il fallait faire pour lutter contre elle’ (p. 124). It is hard to argue 
against such a statement because, while apparently offering a moral 
principle, it actually says next to nothing. The tautological ‘il fallait faire 
ce qu’il fallait faire’ asserts that there are duties and obligations, but says 
nothing about what they might be. 
La Peste begins with things (events, rats) which are not in their place. 
From its opening pages, it is driven by the desire to put things back in 
order, to explain and clear away the enigma of the rats’ emergence into 
a tidy world. But the mess returns with a vengeance: ‘Sur les trottoirs, 
il arrivait aussi à plus d’un promeneur nocturne de sentir sous son pied 
la masse élastique d’un cadavre encore frais’ (p. 44). This reflects the 
experience of reading the novel. The drive for clarity, for a meaningful 
space not infested by ambiguous vermin, founders when not even the 
simplest things can be formulated without some trace of hesitation or 
uncertainty. So it might be true that ‘il fallait faire ce qu’il fallait faire’, 
but this does little to help us understand what it is that ‘il fallait faire’.
Messy ethics
The ethical problem posed by La Peste concerns the tension between the 
drive for order (settled principles, secure knowledge) and the residual 
messiness that won’t quite go away. This can be elucidated by what, in 
ethics, is sometimes called the theory of prima facie duties, developed in 
the 1920s and 1930s by W.D. Ross.22 This theory attempts to cope with 
 22 See Ross, The Right and the Good, and Foundations of Ethics. For excellent 
overviews of Ross’s ideas, see Stratton-Lake, Introduction to The Right and the 
Good, pp. ix–lviii, and Dancy, ‘An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties’.
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the fact that, as Jonathan Dancy summarizes the situation, ‘in ethics 
everything is pretty messy’ (‘An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties’, p. 219). 
The theory of prima facie duties denies that there is any single overriding 
ethical principle which commands all others or from which they can 
be derived. Kant’s categorical imperative is an explicit target here, as 
it endeavours to establish a law able to resolve any moral conundrum. 
Instead, according to the theory of prima facie duties, there are a number 
of possibly conflicting duties that we should try to follow: to help others, 
to keep our promises, not to lie, to repay acts of kindness, to avoid harm 
and to promote wellbeing, and so on.23 None of these duties is inherently 
more or less important than any of the others, as Dancy explains: 
There is no general ranking of the different types of prima facie duties, 
and since different moral principles express different prima facie duties, 
there is no general ranking of moral principles. There is just a shapeless 
list of them, which is no more than a list of the things that make a moral 
difference, a difference to what we should do. (‘An Ethic of Prima Facie 
Duties’, p. 221)
In Kantian ethics, if something is wrong it is always wrong; it can never 
be right to tell a lie, for example. In the theory of prima facie duties, it 
will usually be wrong to lie, but sometimes it will be right.24 In actual 
situations, different duties may be in conflict with one another, and the 
theory of prima facie duties offers no principle for resolving decisively 
which course of action should be taken in such cases. Rather than being 
offered a device for cleaning up the mess, we are left to confront it anew 
each time.
In La Peste, Rieux and Tarrou are barely confronted with the necessity 
of making difficult ethical choices because their duty seems immediately 
apparent to them. Rieux knows exactly what to do from the beginning: 
‘Là était la certitude, dans le travail de tous les jours’ (p. 62). Similarly, 
Tarrou, who claims to ‘tout connaître de la vie’ (p. 123), shows no sign 
of doubt or hesitancy when he risks his life by setting up the ‘formations 
sanitaires’. Because they have no real decisions to make, or at least 
because they do not give much indication that decision-making is 
difficult, Rieux and Tarrou are ethically the least interesting characters 
 23 For Ross’s division of the prima facie duties, for which he does not claim 
completeness or finality, see The Right and the Good, pp. 21–22. 
 24 See for example Ross, Foundations of Ethics: ‘our answer will sometimes 
be “yes” and sometimes be “no”, so that we cannot maintain with Kant that it is 
always wrong to tell a lie or break a promise’ (p. 134; emphasis original).
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in the novel. They encounter little of the moral risk which is inherent 
in Ross’s theory of prima facie duties. Rambert and Paneloux are more 
interesting because they are forced to decide between conflicting values: 
Rambert’s desire to be with someone he loves is at odds with the duty to 
combat (and to not risk spreading) the plague; Paneloux’s horror at the 
suffering caused by the plague sits uneasily with his belief that it is the 
will of God. They both ultimately decide to work with the ‘formations 
sanitaires’, but their commitment to the struggle does not derive from 
the secure, unwavering resolution represented by Rieux and Tarrou. 
Moreover, the presence of Cottard in the novel ensures the survival of 
a minor yet important counter-voice to its more dominant certainties. 
Rather than joining in a perhaps futile attempt to eradicate the plague, 
he revels in the new disorder it creates and finds in it a kind of freedom. 
He may be wrong in the eyes of the sanctimonious duo Rieux and Tarrou 
but, if nothing else, his choices show the persistence of judgements other 
than theirs.
The circumstances surrounding the death of Judge Othon’s son give 
perhaps the best example from La Peste of the conflicting duties which 
have to be negotiated in the process of decision-making. In consideration 
of whether or not to treat the boy with an experimental serum, the duty 
of beneficence (to do good to others, to foster their well-being) is in 
conflict with the duty of non-maleficence (to do no harm to others): the 
serum may do harm in order to do good (to save the boy’s life); but if 
it does not work it will have done harm with no compensatory positive 
result. In the event the boy’s death is delayed and his agony prolonged. 
When Othon expresses the hope that his son did not suffer too much, 
a further element is brought into play: should one tell the truth, or save 
the judge’s pain by lying? Tarrou chooses compassion over honesty: 
‘Non, dit Tarrou, non, il n’a vraiment pas souffert’ (p. 201). The episode 
shows that the difficulty of ethical decision-making may not come from 
a lack of principles so much as from a surfeit of them. What is missing 
is a ready-made means of ranking them in order of importance, so that 
there is no shortcut or easy solution to taking a decision. This effectively 
evacuates knowledge from ethics, as Dancy explains Ross’s argument: 
Ross wants to say that we often know for certain what our prima facie 
duties are, but we can never know what our duty proper is. Put another 
way, this means that we have certain knowledge of moral principles, but 
no knowledge of what we ought overall to do in any actual situation. 
(p. 223)
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Rieux endeavours to clear up the messiness of ethics, producing a unified 
discourse governed by knowledge and certainty (or a least by a high 
degree of self-confidence) with a fixed hierarchy of moral responses. 
La Peste as a whole is complicit with this aspiration for tidiness, yet it 
never entirely frees itself of its uncertainties, as it strains for a clarity and 
simplicity it cannot achieve; and through its hesitations, inconsistencies 
and equivocations it poses before its reader the possibility of a more 
fraught, ambiguous and risky ethics, a messy ethics to contend with a 
conflicted text and a messy world.
Camus’s notion of art as the correction of reality fails to appreciate that 
something of value may be lost when the world is unified and rendered 
coherent. La Peste seems both to know and not to know that order is 
not the only thing we want. The novel struggles against itself, wanting 
to clarify and to disambiguate, to call things by their proper name, but 
also stumbling at every stage, finding strangeness and ambiguity seeping 
into its fabric. Earlier, we saw that Camus criticizes Hegel for endorsing 
the negation of otherness, even while the elimination of the world’s 
intractability remains the aspiration of his own aesthetics. Yet Camus’s 
achievement in La Peste turns out to be more Hegelian than his theory 
insofar as, however reluctantly, it lingers over the traces of that which 
resists recuperation to a tidy, totalizing perspective. Contrary to what 
Camus seems to think, Hegel’s dialectic needs otherness to maintain 
its vigour; Camus himself may not want otherness, but his novel shows 
that it will not and should not readily be dispensed with. And this has 
important implications for the ethical significance of the work. Through 
its tensions and ambiguities, it allows one to suspect that ethics might 
do best to make accommodations with mess rather than to seek ways of 
clearing it away. The clutter of our lives, our relationships and our world 
may after all be what is most precious in them.
Witnessing trauma in La Chute
The ‘messy ethics’ of La Peste are, I would suggest, one of the most 
powerful, deceptively placid ethical statements to emerge from the 
Second World War, and certainly a rival for the never-completed ethics 
announced by Sartre at the end of L’Etre et le néant and the two 
philosophical volumes published by Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cinéas and 
Pour une morale de l’ambiguité. And Camus is more interesting when 
immersed in the self-contesting, self-undermining domain of ethical 
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mess than in the role of the dour moralist of moderation in which he 
is sometimes cast. After L’Etranger and La Peste, La Chute is the third 
great fictional publication of Camus’s lifetime, and unapologetically 
inhabits a semantic and moral world where nothing can be taken for 
what it seems. Its interest in the context of the Second World War, 
and in particular in relation to trauma studies, has been demonstrated 
in important texts by Shoshana Felman and Dominick LaCapra.25 La 
Chute refers explicitly to the killing of Jews during the Second World 
War and it revolves around questions of memory, narratorial reliability 
and the entanglement of personal and collective histories. The rest 
of this chapter examines the issues of trauma and witnessing in La 
Chute principally by analysing Felman’s essay ‘Camus’ The Fall, or the 
Betrayal of the Witness’,26 which appears as a chapter in her and Dori 
Laub’s Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, 
and History. Felman’s discussion of La Chute is exemplary both as a 
committed reading and as an instance of how Camus’s novel entices 
its readers into the pitfalls of misreading. What interests me here is the 
ways in which the novel both encourages and resists Felman’s reading, 
implicating her – as it has perhaps implicated all its best readers – in a 
complex interplay of blindness and insight through which the text itself 
remains stubbornly opaque. Felman’s interpretation of La Chute tells 
about the nature of reading in general and about the specific difficulties 
of producing a persuasive, comprehensive reading of Camus’s most 
wilfully disorientating novel.
Felman makes an irresistible case for relating La Chute to the 
problems of witnessing and representation raised, in particular but not 
uniquely, by the Holocaust. The invitation to read the novel in the dark 
light of the Holocaust is issued in its opening pages when Clamence tells 
his interlocutor that he lives in the former Jewish quarter of Amsterdam. 
 25 LaCapra’s chapter on La Chute in his History and Memory after Auschwitz, 
entitled ‘Rereading Camus’s The Fall after Auschwitz and with Algeria’, is in part 
an engagement with Felman’s reading of the novel in her ‘Camus’ The Fall, or the 
Betrayal of the Witness’. LaCapra makes a number of criticisms of Felman, some 
of which are more persuasive than others. I do not think it is correct, for example, 
that Felman identifies Clamence with Camus, as LaCapra claims (pp. 74–76). On 
some points, though, LaCapra’s criticisms are well made. Later notes comment on 
some aspects of LaCapra’s reading of Felman and La Chute.
 26 I use the title of Felman’s chapter as it appears on the contents page of her and 
Laub’s Testimony. A slightly different title is used at the head of the chapter itself: 
‘The Betrayal of the Witness: Camus’ The Fall’.
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This establishes Amsterdam, and Europe more generally, and the text of 
La Chute, as spaces which are marked by an indelible crime:
Moi, j’habite le quartier juif, ou ce qui s’appelait ainsi jusqu’au moment 
où les frères hitlériens y ont fait de la place. Quel lessivage! Soixante-
quinze mille juifs déportés ou assassinés, c’est le nettoyage par le vide. 
J’admire cette application, cette méthodique patience! Quand on n’a pas 
de caractère, il faut bien se donner une méthode. Ici, elle a fait merveille, 
sans contredit, et j’habite sur les lieux d’un des plus grands crimes de 
l’histoire. (La Chute, in Œuvres complètes III, p. 701)
Although there is no reason to believe that Clamence is directly or 
indirectly a victim of the Holocaust, he can readily be seen as suffering 
the effects of some kind of trauma, acting out an experience which is 
not fully recalled and assimilated. This could explain, for example, his 
sense of doubleness and falseness, his dissociation from his own acts, his 
sense that he is playing a game or performing a role, and the oscillations 
between forgetting and partial remembering which recur throughout his 
narrative. It might also help to explain the self-consciously unreliable 
nature of his narrative. As Cathy Caruth explains, trauma narratives 
almost invariably raise the question of their own truth: ‘The problem [of 
truth] arises not only in regard to those who listen to the traumatized, not 
knowing how to establish the reality of their hallucinations and dreams; 
it occurs rather and most disturbingly often within the very knowledge 
and experience of the traumatized themselves’ (‘Introduction’, p. 5). 
Clamence anticipates Caruth’s analysis when he describes his time in a 
German prison camp: ‘Je sais ce que vous pensez: il est bien difficile de 
démêler le vrai du faux dans ce que je raconte. Je confesse que vous avez 
raison. Moi-même …’ (p. 752).
So Clamence looks like or can be made to look like a victim of trauma. 
One of the many questions that remain unresolved in the text concerns 
the origin of this trauma: is it actually his own, buried and irretrievable 
in the flood of words that pour from him, or does he arrogate for himself 
the status of victim which little in his prehistory might justify? He may 
be an example of what LaCapra calls ‘the posttraumatic cynicism of 
the implicated bystander’, unsettled by events but evading them though 
‘a false, ironic façade and a discourse of suspect indirection’ (History 
and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 76). La Chute is undoubtedly about 
trauma, but whose trauma does it (fail to) register? 
It is not difficult, then, to make a case for the relevance of La Chute 
to trauma studies; but is this enough to support the importance accorded 
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to the Holocaust in Felman’s reading of the novel? In a sentence from his 
‘Prière d’insérer’ to which I shall return, Camus warns that Clamence 
holds up a mirror to his listener and his readers: ‘Le miroir dans lequel 
il se regarde, il finit par le tendre aux autres’ (p. 771). Clamence’s 
endeavour is to give an image of his interlocutor rather than to engage 
in an act of pure confession or self-revelation. What is crucial here is the 
operation of transference through which the narrator’s story becomes 
implicated in the story of the listener, and vice versa, to the point that 
it becomes impossible to say what comes from one and what from the 
other. The mirror reflects back the eye of the beholder. My suggestion 
here is that this transferential relation between narrator and interlocutor 
is reproduced in Felman’s relation, and perhaps the relation of any 
attentive reader, to La Chute.27 The novel gives its readers an occasion 
for self-formulation, but something of the work’s elusive core is missed 
in the process.
The woman on the bridge
At what is almost exactly the mid-point of La Chute, Clamence offers 
us what appears to be a key to his ambiguous and confusing narrative 
when he tells of an incident on a bridge over the Seine. According 
to Clamence, this incident lies ‘au centre de [sa] mémoire’ and it is, 
he says, his ‘découverte essentielle’ (p. 728). Felman’s chapter on La 
Chute begins with this episode and returns to it repeatedly. In her 
summary, Felman describes how ‘the narrator was the chance witness 
 27 LaCapra raises the question of the transferential relation between critic and 
object of study by underlining the link between Felman’s reading of La Chute and 
her discussion of Paul de Man in the preceding chapter of Testimony. The chapter 
on La Chute is, he suggests, heavily inflected by Felman’s transferential investment 
in de Man, with whom, he claims, ‘Felman herself remains bound or even identified 
in a process of arrested mourning’ (History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 75). 
I do not intend to discuss the links between the chapters on de Man and La Chute 
or to speculate on psychological issues which do not concern me. My focus is on 
Felman’s reading of La Chute in all its brilliance and, as I suggest, its blind spots. 
It is nevertheless of interest that LaCapra suggests how one of the key issues of La 
Chute – the transferential imbrication of self and other – spills over into the critic’s 
relation to the novel and her use of it in her broader intellectual project. The same 
is no doubt true of LaCapra’s reading of the novel and my own, in ways that I am 
not able to elucidate.
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of a suicide: a woman he had just passed by suddenly jumped off the 
bridge into the Seine’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 165). Clamence continues 
on his way, informs no one of what he has witnessed and does not read 
the following days’ newspapers. The event becomes what Felman calls 
‘a missed encounter with reality, an encounter whose elusiveness cannot 
be owned and yet whose impact can no longer be erased’ (‘Camus’ The 
Fall’, p. 167). This scene prompts Felman to draw a contrast between La 
Chute and Camus’s previous novel La Peste, which she had analysed in 
an earlier chapter of Testimony. In La Peste a narrator records the events 
he had witnessed for himself, adopting a secure, relatively reliable and 
conventional testimonial stance; in La Chute, on the other hand, ‘the 
event is witnessed insofar as it is not experienced, insofar as it is literally 
missed’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 168; emphasis original). In the later novel, 
the witness and his narrative disintegrate. The incident on the bridge 
becomes the novel’s ‘primal scene’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, pp. 187, 193–94), 
in which something unrepresentable is recalled and avoided. Evoking 
the Holocaust, it entails a failure of witnessing; more fundamentally, 
it suggests the impossibility of giving a historical narrative of ‘an event 
without a witness, an event eliminating its own witness’ (‘Camus’ The 
Fall’, p. 200).
Paying careful attention to textual detail, Felman draws out the 
importance of the Holocaust and the problem of historical testimony 
to La Chute. There are nevertheless signs that Camus’s text is being 
enlisted to support a reading which it does not fully endorse. The 
woman’s suicide on the bridge is central to Felman’s interpretation, but 
one might question whether the event should actually be understood as 
a suicide. In Clamence’s account, he sees a woman on the bridge, walks 
past her and then, when he is about a hundred metres away, he hears 
the sound of ‘un corps qui s’abat sur l’eau’ followed by ‘un cri, plusieurs 
fois répété, qui descendait lui aussi le fleuve, puis s’éteignit brusquement’ 
(p. 728). He does not turn around, so he sees neither the fall itself nor 
whatever or whoever is the source of the ‘cri’. Most readers, like Felman, 
simply assume that the woman has taken her own life, but we should be 
aware that this is, precisely, an assumption which the text allows but 
does not confirm. LaCapra observes quite rightly that there is no textual 
evidence to support the claim that the woman jumped from the bridge 
and committed suicide (History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 78). 
She might have fallen by accident or someone might have pushed her; or, 
since Clamence has walked some distance away from her, it may have 
been someone else entirely who jumped into the water.
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La Chute teases its addressee and its reader by its partial revelations, 
which allow us to make assumptions without realizing we are doing so.28 
The strength of Felman’s reading lies not in her avoidance of assumptions 
but in her willingness to take the gains of her assumptions as far as she 
can. It might be argued that Felman’s reading does not actually depend 
on the interpretation of the incident on the bridge as a suicide. Since 
she relates the unwitnessed event on the bridge to the Holocaust and to 
what she calls ‘the space of the annihilation of the Other’ (‘Camus’ The 
Fall’, p. 189), it might actually strengthen her argument to keep open the 
possibility that the woman was pushed rather than taking it for granted 
that she jumped. The primal scene would then become the scene of a 
murder, which would resonate better with genocidal echoes in the novel. 
However, even if the insistence on suicide does not serve the overall 
reading of La Chute particularly well, it is symptomatic of a tendency in 
Felman’s chapter to pin down Camus’s novel more confidently than the 
text itself allows. She tells us what La Chute is ‘profoundly all about’ 
(p. 184) and what is ‘the real subject of the novel’ (p. 189) even though 
the work slyly resists any such hermeneutic dominance. Just as Clamence 
fails to witness the fall from the bridge, any reader who claims to have 
penetrated the novel’s inner core risks failing to witness La Chute in all 
its unsettling ambiguity.
Camus versus Sartre
In the central sections of her chapter ‘Camus’ The Fall, or the Betrayal 
of the Witness’, Felman revisits the quarrel between Sartre and Camus 
which began with the controversy over Camus’s L’Homme révolté and 
 28 LaCapra attempts to avoid an assumption routinely made by readers when 
he questions the gender of Clamence’s interlocutor: ‘One tends to assume that 
Clamence’s interlocutor is a man. It would be interesting to speculate how The Fall 
and one’s reading of it would be transformed if one imagined the interlocutor to 
be a woman’ (History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 90; emphasis added). The 
proposed thought experiment is indeed an interesting one, but it is certainly not 
an assumption to identify the interlocutor as male. In only the third word of the 
text, Clamence addresses him as monsieur (‘Puis-je, monsieur, vous proposer mes 
services, sans risquer d’être importun?’, p. 697). Since there is no indication that 
the interlocutor is either surprised or offended by this address, it is reasonable for 
readers to take for granted that he is a man. Where Felman may assume too much, 
LaCapra may be trying to find ambiguity where there is none.
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caused a definitive split between the two great post-war intellectuals. 
Felman’s account of the quarrel revolves around the witnessing/failure to 
witness dichotomy which motors her reading of La Chute, and which she 
regards as the central concern of Camus’s novel. In Felman’s version of 
events, Camus spoke out against the Stalinist concentration camps, but 
Sartre kept silent about them and can therefore be portrayed as having 
‘betrayed the testimonial task […] since he chose not to acknowledge 
Russian concentration camps and not to look at history from hell’ 
(‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 186). Sartre, then, is guilty of the failure of 
testimony which Camus diagnoses in La Chute: he colludes in silencing 
both the victim and the witness of atrocity.
Felman’s account of the differences between Camus and Sartre is 
rather thin on historical context, lacking in detail about the moral and 
political issues involved, and surprisingly unproblematized in its condem-
nation of Sartre as witness-traitor. Narratives of the Camus-Sartre 
controversy tend, even today, to be written from strongly partisan 
perspectives, so it is not easy to get an impartial account of what actually 
happened. It is nevertheless hard to justify the claim that Sartre ‘chose 
not to acknowledge Russian concentration camps’. Towards the end of 
1949, Sartre’s journal Les Temps modernes was preparing to publish 
and analyse Soviet documents which showed the abuse of human 
rights in the Soviet Union. However, in November their publication 
was pre-empted in Le Figaro littéraire by the Buchenwald survivor and 
former communist David Rousset, who denounced the Soviet labour 
camps and compared them to Nazi concentration camps.29 Rousset’s 
article immediately gave rise to what Sartre regarded as a concerted 
right-wing condemnation of the Soviet Union which focused only on 
its shortcomings and simultaneously distracted from repressive acts 
perpetrated elsewhere in the world. The January 1950 edition of Les 
Temps modernes published an article entitled ‘Les Jours de notre vie’ 
which had been written by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and which Sartre 
co-signed in a show of political and editorial solidarity.30 The article 
 29 See Rousset, ‘Au secours des déportés dans les camps soviétiques: Un appel de 
David Rousset aux anciens déportés des camps nazis’.
 30 For discussion of the circumstances surrounding this article, see Birchall, 
Sartre against Stalinism, pp. 109–19. Birchall writes: ‘It is clear that Sartre’s 
position was open to some criticism, and that it lacked clarity. But it is also clear 
that he openly and unambiguously condemned the Russian labour camps, and 
that nothing he said was likely to bring comfort or assistance to the defenders of 
Stalinism’ (p. 112).
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denounces the Soviet concentrationary system whilst also condemning 
the hypocrisy of those who attack human rights abuses in a communist 
country but say nothing about no less flagrant abuses in Greece, Spain 
and colonized countries, or about the unjust condition of black citizens 
in the US. Sartre might be accused of failing to make a full-blooded 
attack on the Soviet Union, but by co-signing Merleau-Ponty’s article he 
certainly clears himself of the charge that he refused to acknowledge the 
existence of Soviet concentration camps. Quite the opposite, he was one 
of the first to bring them to the attention of the French public, however 
difficult that was for his political allegiances at the time.31
Felman does not refer to these circumstances. They make it difficult 
to sustain her distinction between Sartre’s betrayal of the duty to bear 
witness and Camus’s valiant resistance to prevailing political pressures. 
She seems to need Sartre’s failure as a contrast to the accomplishments of 
Camus’s novel. The distortion of Sartre that this involves becomes most 
significant when she goes on to claim that his failure to acknowledge the 
existence of the Soviet camps is matched by his failure to acknowledge 
the Holocaust in his Réflexions sur la question juive (1946). Like the 
Western allies who refused to register the magnitude of the destruction 
of the European Jews during and after the Second World War, Sartre 
allegedly draws a shroud of silence over the issue in his book: 
It is doubtless no coincidence if, even in his militant dismantling of the 
ideology of anti-Semitism in the magnanimous, momentous book he 
publishes immediately after the war, Sartre still unwittingly continues to 
maintain the Allies’ silence and to look away from hell: Réflexions sur 
la question juive, published in 1946, launches a war on anti-Semites and 
defends the Jews against their venom, but neglects to mention, even in 
one word, the Holocaust. (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 191)
As if taking his cue from Felman, LaCapra makes the same allegation in 
his comparison of Camus and Sartre:
Albert Camus’s 1956 novel The Fall (La Chute) seems especially 
remarkable as a case in which a major postwar intellectual and writer 
attempted to address the Holocaust. Even Sartre, Camus’s principal 
contender for the role of intellectual guide in France and elsewhere in the 
West, said virtually nothing about the specific nature of the Holocaust 
and its bearing on the Jews. In his well-known postwar study, Antisemite 
 31 See Beauvoir’s account of this incident in La Force des choses, I, pp. 277–82. 
On the split between Sartre and Camus, see also Aronson, Camus and Sartre, and 
Forsdick, ‘Camus and Sartre: The Great Quarrel’.
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and Jew [the English-language title of Réflexions sur la question juive], 
Sartre did not even mention the Holocaust. (History and Memory after 
Auschwitz, p. 4)
Both Felman and LaCapra contrast Sartre’s failure to mention the 
Holocaust with Camus’s attempt to register its impact. This distinction 
underlies and justifies their praise for Camus’s endeavour in La Chute. 
It is, however, simply untrue to say that Sartre fails to mention the 
Holocaust in Réflexions sur la question juive, except in the most trivial 
sense that he does not use the word itself.32 Sartre’s book is a virulent, 
uncompromising attack on French anti-Semitism, and in particular on 
French complicity in the deportation of Jews during the Second World 
War. The very first sentence of the book condemns those who are in 
favour of solving the problem of Jewish elements in society ‘en les 
exterminant tous’ (p. 7), a phrase which undoubtedly and unmistakably 
alludes to the German extermination camps. Later Sartre refers to 
Majdanek, the camp on the outskirts of Lublin where 59,000 Jews died; 
and he describes the plight of the Jews who escaped murder during the 
war:
Aujourd’hui33 ceux d’entre eux [les Juifs] que les Allemands n’ont pas 
déportés ou assassinés parviennent à rentrer chez eux. Beaucoup furent 
parmi les résistants de la première heure; d’autres ont un fils, un cousin 
dans l’Armée Leclerc. La France entière se réjouit ou fraternise dans les 
rues, les luttes sociales semblent provisoirement oubliées; les journaux 
consacrent des colonnes entières aux prisonniers de guerre, aux déportés. 
Va-t-on parler des Juifs? Va-t-on saluer le retour parmi nous des rescapés; 
va-t-on donner une pensée à ceux qui sont morts dans les chambres à gaz 
de Lublin? Pas un mot. Pas une ligne dans les quotidiens. C’est qu’il ne 
faut pas irriter les antisémites. Plus que jamais la France a besoin d’union. 
Les journalistes bien intentionnés vous disent: ‘dans l’intérêt même des 
Juifs, il ne faut pas trop parler d’eux en ce moment’. Pendant quatre ans, 
la Société française a vécu sans eux, il convient de ne pas trop signaler 
leur réapparition. (p. 86)
 32 Indeed, it would have been surprising if Sartre had used the word ‘Holocaust’, 
since it was not yet commonly used to refer to the murder of the European Jews 
at the time he was writing Réflexions sur la question juive. On the same basis, 
seminal testimonial works such as David Rousset’s L’Univers concentrationnaire 
(1946) and Robert Antelme’s L’Espèce humaine (1947) could also be accused of not 
mentioning the Holocaust, even though they discuss the concentration camps in 
great detail.
 33 A footnote specifies that Sartre wrote this in October 1944.
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It is tempting to conclude, simply, that Felman and LaCapra had 
not (re)read Réflexions sur la question juive to check the accuracy of 
their claim that Sartre fails to mention the Holocaust. What is striking 
in Felman’s case, though, is that the point Sartre makes here precisely 
anticipates Felman’s criticism of ‘the protracted postwar silence on 
the Holocaust of both the European and the American intellectuals’ 
(‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 191). Felman ranks Sartre among those who 
engaged in a ‘conspiracy of silence’ (p. 192), though the above quotation 
shows that on the contrary he denounced the conspiracy from its 
earliest days. Felman’s failure to recognize Sartre as a precursor of her 
own argument looks, then, more like a necessary blind spot than a 
simple error of reading. She does not acknowledge the evidence which 
contradicts her construction of a robust opposition between Sartre and 
Camus. Later in this chapter we shall see further instances of her failure 
to register material which might call her interpretation into question.
Failures and radical failures
Felman’s discussion of La Chute is built around oppositions: between 
the confidence in the witness of La Peste and the disruption of witnessing 
in La Chute, and between Sartre’s betrayal of the duty of the witness and 
Camus’s refusal to abdicate that duty. While she roundly criticizes those 
who fail to bear witness, one of Felman’s aims is also to problematize the 
very opposition between witnessing and not witnessing. The importance 
of La Chute in this context lies in the fact that it does not merely recount 
a failure of witnessing; it recounts a radical failure of witnessing. 
Radical is an important word in Felman’s vocabulary: La Chute shows 
how the Holocaust consisted in ‘a radical failure of witnessing’ (p. 194); 
the novel ‘enacts the Holocaust as a radical failure of representation’ 
(p. 197; emphasis original); modern narrative and art as exemplified by 
La Chute bear testimony ‘to the radical historical crisis in witnessing 
the Holocaust has opened up’ (p. 201; emphasis original).
What is the difference between a failure of witnessing and a radical 
failure of witnessing? To say that witnessing has merely failed implies 
that it might have succeeded. Events could have been experienced and 
represented in a fully adequate manner. A radical failure of witnessing, 
on the other hand, undercuts the very possibility of being present to and 
making present the experience of trauma. Although Sartre is accused 
of betraying his testimonial responsibility, it turns out that he had little 
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prospect of actually fulfilling it either, at least according to what Felman 
discovers in her account of La Chute. The novel revolves around a 
radical failure which is also an impossibility: La Chute ‘inscribes the 
Holocaust as the impossible historical narrative of an event without 
a witness, an event eliminating its own witness’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, 
p. 200); and it becomes ‘the very writing of the impossibility of writing 
history’ (p. 200), partaking of the ‘historical impossibility of writing a 
historical narration of the Holocaust’ (p. 201).
Felman observes what appears to be a contingent failure of witnessing 
and then raises the stakes of this incident by arguing that it marks the 
radical impossibility of narration and representation. The process of 
generalization is precisely anticipated in La Chute. Clamence’s role as 
judge-penitent consists in turning his sense of his own shortcomings into 
a declaration of universal guilt. Clamence knows this to be a rhetorical 
device which eases his sense of personal failure and serves to entrap the 
unwitting other. Felman reproduces Clamence’s generalizing impulse 
while divesting it of its knowingly deceptive irony. In her reading, the 
missed encounter between Clamence and the woman signals what now 
becomes an insurmountable situation: ‘Rather, with the chance of rescue 
missed through a missed historical encounter with the real, the event 
seems to consist in the missing of salvation and, henceforth, in its radical 
historical and philosophical impossibility’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 177; 
emphasis original).
So Clamence’s failure escalates into a universal condition. This reading 
nevertheless omits the clear indication in Camus’s text that Clamence’s 
failure to witness the event entails deliberate choice rather than historical 
or philosophical compulsion. In his initial response he loses control of 
his movements: ‘Je voulus courir et je ne bougeai pas. Je tremblais, je 
crois de froid et de saisissement. Je me disais qu’il fallait faire vite et je 
sentais une faiblesse irrésistible envahir mon corps’ (La Chute, in Œuvres 
complètes III, p. 728). His subsequent actions, though, are entirely under 
his control: ‘Puis, à petits pas, sous la pluie, je m’éloignai. Je ne prévins 
personne. […] Ni le lendemain, ni les jours qui suivirent, je n’ai lu les 
journaux’ (p. 729). He could have turned around; at the very least, he 
could have informed the police or read the newspapers. This suggests 
that although the fall from the bridge is unwitnessed, it is not theoret-
ically unwitnessable. Clamence does not rescue the woman or achieve 
his own salvation; and his final words in the novel indicate that he would 
not wish to be tested again. But this does not inevitably turn his failure 
into Felman’s ‘radical historical and philosophical impossibility’. Indeed, 
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such a reading risks absolving him of any responsibility for his failure: if 
salvation is impossible, he cannot be blamed for giving up on it.
Felman, then, makes Camus’s text bear a burden of meaning which it 
only partly supports. The minimal distortion of the text has significant 
interpretive consequences, as can be seen in Felman’s discussion of 
another passage from the novel. Towards the end of his first meeting 
with his interlocutor, Clamence compares the concentric canals of 
Amsterdam to the circles of hell in Dante’s Inferno:
Quand on arrive de l’extérieur, à mesure qu’on passe ces cercles, la vie, 
et donc ses crimes, devient plus épaisse, plus obscure. Ici, nous sommes 
dans le dernier cercle. Les cercle des … Ah! Vous savez cela? Diable, vous 
devenez plus difficile à classer. Mais vous comprenez alors pourquoi je 
puis dire que le centre des choses est ici, bien que nous nous trouvions à 
l’extrémité du continent. (pp. 702–03)
Noting that Clamence is interrupted or interrupts himself as he speaks, 
Felman observes that ‘The last circle of hell remains unnamed’ (‘Camus’ 
The Fall’, p. 186). Felman then goes on speculatively to link the 
concentric canals with the concentrationary universe, and to suggest 
that the German concentration camps, ‘like the innermost circle of hell, 
are implicitly at the center of the novel: a center that remains, as such, 
unspeakable’ (pp. 188–89; emphasis added).
In Felman’s account, the final circle of hell is at first ‘unnamed’; it then 
becomes ‘unspeakable’. This transition replicates the move of turning 
Clamence’s failure of witnessing into a radical failure marking the 
impossibility of historical narration. However, once again this slightly 
but significantly distorts Camus’s text. Clamence does not name the final 
circle, not because he cannot but because he does not need to. In fact, the 
final circle of Dante’s hell is the circle of traitors. The interlocutor already 
knows this, and perhaps the reader is presumed to know it as well (even 
if in practice some of us must consult the notes to compensate for our 
ignorance). By identifying the final circle with the concentration camps, 
Felman puts the Jewish victims of crime at the centre of hell; Camus’s 
novel in fact follows Dante in putting traitors at the centre of hell. They 
are not named here, but they are entirely nameable. The traitors evoked 
here could be the bystanders, such as Clamence, who look on, or look 
away, while others are suffering, and thereby share some of the guilt of 
the perpetrators of crime. LaCapra astutely suggests that:
the idea that The Fall attests to a collapse of witnessing obscures the 
possibility that the text may be read more pointedly as a critique of the 
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position of the bystander, a position that Clamence occupies when he 
fails to come to the assistance of the woman who falls into the Seine. 
(History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 76)
This suggests that the novel may not be solely or primarily about the 
radical failure of witnessing; rather, it is concerned with the betrayal of 
the responsibility to others by those who knew what was happening but 
took no action.
The primal scene
When Clamence does not name the final circle of hell, there is a gap in 
the text that Felman fills in. In doing so, she attempts to disambiguate 
a work that continues to frustrate any demand for clarity. This occurs 
again in the designation of the episode on the bridge as the novel’s 
‘primal scene’: ‘In some ways, it is the suicide scene which could be 
thought of as the center of the narrative, a sort of primal scene around 
which the narrative’s concentric movement keeps precisely turning and 
returning’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 187). Later, Clamence’s ‘radical failure 
of witnessing’ when the woman jumps or falls off the bridge evokes 
a parallel with the Holocaust: ‘The Holocaust in Western history 
functions, thus, in much the same way as a primal scene functions in 
psychoanalysis. It is a witnessing that cannot be made present to itself, 
present to consciousness’ (‘Camus’ The Fall’, p. 194; emphasis original). 
Clamence’s failure to witness the woman’s death is thus his, the novel’s 
and everyone’s failure to witness the Holocaust, an event which both 
must, and cannot, be witnessed. In Felman’s argument, the attempt in 
La Chute to deal with the problems of post-Holocaust narrative, histori-
ography and testimony is established in large part through this link 
between the Holocaust and the scene on the bridge.
Felman’s references to the psychoanalytical primal scene give pause 
for thought, since analysts and critics from Freud onwards have accepted 
that the role and status of the primal scene are problematic. As Peter 
Brooks has demonstrated, Freud’s case study of the Wolf Man (‘From 
the History of an Infantile Neurosis’) is fascinatingly equivocal on this 
issue. Freud considers a number of problems regarding the primal scene. 
Is its effect delayed, or retrospectively constructed? Is it a genuinely 
witnessed event or the phantasy of the patient, or even of the analyst? 
In the first draft of the case study, written in 1914, Freud argues for 
the historical reality of the primal scene. However, in a passage added 
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in 1918 he reverses this view and suggests instead that the child’s 
‘memory’ of seeing its parents engaged in intercourse may be a displaced 
recollection of seeing copulating animals (‘From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis’, p. 292). The primal scene may in fact be a primal 
phantasy, or even part of our phylogenetic inheritance. Freud concludes, 
provisionally, that there are no clear answers to the questions he asks 
(p. 295). In analysing this passage, Brooks contrasts the neat solutions 
discovered by Sherlock Holmes with Freud’s layered, self-questioning 
text which offers ‘a proliferation of narratives with no ultimate points 
of fixity’ (Reading for the Plot, p. 278). The narrative of the primal 
scene raises as many questions as it answers. To some extent, Felman 
acknowledges this by insisting that the Holocaust as primal scene 
‘cannot be made present to itself, present to consciousness’ (‘Camus’ The 
Fall’, p. 194). But even to identify the primal scene as the Holocaust pins 
it down to a historical reality, however ungraspable and unrepresentable 
that reality might be. I take it for granted that while Freud considers that 
the primal scene may never have occurred, Felman would have no truck 
with the arguments of the Holocaust deniers. 
Brooks describes how Freud’s case study entails ‘suspicion and 
conjecture, a structure of indeterminacy which can offer only a 
framework of narrative possibilities rather than a clearly specifiable 
plot’ (p. 275). My suggestion here is that this description is equally 
appropriate for Camus’s La Chute. The novel holds open the prospect of 
solutions to its raging ambiguities, such as the one suggested by Felman, 
in which there is a significant equivalence between the scene on the 
bridge and the Holocaust; but La Chute is too fluid and self-questioning 
to allow any final resolution of its pervading secretiveness. Regarding 
the scene on the bridge, for example, we might ask how much its status 
as primal scene actually explains. Clamence certainly describes it as his 
essential discovery, but it may be a screen memory or an invention. It 
certainly may be associated with the Holocaust: the novel refers to the 
deportation and murder of the Jews of Amsterdam, and to Buchenwald 
(p. 733). But it also alludes to other atrocities or global problems such 
as the murder of the innocents at the birth of Christ, the detonation of 
the first hydrogen bomb in 1952 or France’s difficult colonial situation. 
Other incidents in Clamence’s personal biography may also have as 
much or as little explanatory power as the incident on the bridge, for 
example when he is publicly humiliated in the incident at the traffic 
lights, when he is unsettled by the sound of laughter, when he believes 
he sees a body floating in the sea or when he is in an internment camp in 
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Africa. Each of these may be connected to the others, or they may have 
no link; one may be the central event in his life, or each may be a screen 
for something unnamed. Clamence himself pours scorn on the reduction 
of human actions to single motives: ‘Ils [les hommes] croient toujours 
qu’on se suicide pour une raison. Mais on peut très bien se suicider 
pour deux raisons’ (p. 731). In Clamence’s view and in his narrative, 
everything is or may be at least double, and in any case nothing is what 
it seems. Any attempt to disambiguate the novel is a search for solutions 
that the text doggedly refuses to provide.34
The missing mirror
Felman brilliantly demonstrates the relevance of La Chute to modern 
trauma studies. However, the price to be paid for this is a neglect of 
those aspects of the novel that do not readily fit in with her interpre-
tation. To draw attention to Felman’s blind spots is not to discredit her 
argument, but to show how the text’s resistance to exhaustive interpretive 
dominance may help us to understand the nature of this particular 
work’s commitment to ambiguity. There are some things that Felman 
misses. In terms of the interdependence of blindness and insight, an 
 34 LaCapra differs from Felman in his account of the role of the Holocaust in 
La Chute, but his explanation serves equally to pin down the novel’s elusiveness. 
Camus’s turn to the Holocaust may be read, according to LaCapra, ‘as functioning 
to displace or even obscure the problem of the Algerian war and his response to it’ 
(History and Memory after Auschwitz, p. 89). So the Holocaust is a kind of screen 
in the novel, deflecting attention from a more pressing reality: the Algerian war 
and Camus’s inability to work through his ambivalence towards the demand for 
Algerian independence. It is not certain, though, that reference to the Holocaust in 
La Chute actually obscures the Algerian war, as LaCapra twice suggests (pp. 73, 
89). To any reader of Camus’s previous works, the absence of Algeria in the novel 
is glaringly obvious, so that the War of Independence is ever-present even if it is not 
mentioned. The year of La Chute’s publication, 1956, also saw the release of Alain 
Resnais’s documentary on the German concentration camps, Nuit et brouillard. 
It is perfectly clear – though never made explicit in the film – that for Resnais to 
depict the Holocaust was also to refer to the Algerian war, however problematic 
the link might be. I would suggest that the same is true in La Chute, which refers 
to Algeria only once (p. 754). The novel does not obscure the Algerian situation; 
rather, that situation is constantly evoked by its literal absence, as a source of pain 
and perplexity. For trenchant discussion, see Sanyal, Memory and Complicity, 
especially pp. 83–98.
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especially intriguing instance when she quotes Camus’s ‘Prière d’insérer’ 
to the novel. Rather than referring directly to the original text, Felman 
quotes from its translation in Herbert Lottmann’s biography of Camus. 
Here is the passage as it appears in Felman’s chapter:
The man who speaks in The Fall delivers himself of a calculated 
confession. Exiled in Amsterdam in a city of canals and cold light, where 
he plays the hermit and the prophet, this former attorney waits for willing 
listeners … Thus he hastens to try himself but he does so so as to better 
judge others.
Where does the confession begin, where is the accusation? Is the 
man who speaks in this book putting himself on trial, or his era? Is he a 
particular case, or the man of the day? A sole truth, in any case, in this 
studied play of mirrors: pain, and what it promises. (‘Camus’ The Fall’, 
p. 173, quoting Lottmann, Albert Camus, p. 593)
It is already surprising that Felman chooses to quote Lottmann’s text 
rather than the original. In fact, though, Felman does not even accurately 
reproduce Lottmann’s text. Lottmann quotes the ‘Prière d’insérer’ in its 
entirety, whereas Felman omits two sentences. The first omission is 
signalled by the ellipsis in the above passage, which at least shows the 
reader that something is missing. The omission of the second sentence is 
not marked in any way, so that readers unfamiliar with the original text 
might reasonably assume that nothing had been left out. This second 
omission occurs at the end of the second paragraph, where Camus 
draws attention to the deceptive nature of Clamence’s self-portrait: ‘Le 
miroir dans lequel il se regarde, il finit par le tendre aux autres’ (‘Prière 
d’insérer’, in Œuvres complètes III, p. 771).
What Felman fails to see here, as if she literally could not see it, is the 
text’s designation of itself as a mirror pointed outwards to its reader. 
Clamence’s confession is calculated so that it tells us more about his 
interlocutor than it does about himself. The text warns us that it offers 
little that we can rely on. Instead, it gives us chaotic material which we 
partially ignore in order to find in it what we can recognize as our own. 
If the reader fails to see the mirror, it is because she is looking straight 
into it and seeing herself reflected back. Felman omits the text’s knowing 
indication that what we will find in it is our own image. 
Felman is entirely persuasive in showing how La Chute resonates 
with themes that can be traced to the Holocaust. And yet in her desire 
to make this its profound subject, she underplays its reluctance to yield 
its final secrets. As Sanyal argues, La Chute is now ‘canonically read 
and taught as a meditation on the Shoah’, and yet it ‘resists any singular 
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historicization of its eddying figures’ (Memory and Complicity, pp. 83, 
85). The novel refuses to be quite the work Felman wanted it to be. 
Perhaps, though, there is no alternative to such acts of partial misreading 
if we are to find anything useable in a work such as this, which revels 
in its proficiency to confuse. La Chute certainly bears what look to 
be unmistakable signs of trauma; but the real or fantasized source 
of that trauma is never reliably revealed. Instead of confronting his 
singular failures, Clamence finds too easy comfort in an unwarranted 
generalization of his own situation. In a nice formulation, Caruth says 
that literary language ‘defies, even as it claims, our understanding’ 
(Unclaimed Experience, p. 5). La Chute exemplifies this to an extreme 
degree. It may be that its secrets are inscrutable; or it may be that in fact 
it has nothing to hide, except the unnerving confidence that it knows 
more about its readers than they know about themselves.

section c
Prisoners of War  
Give Philosophy Lessons

The chapters in the previous section discussed how war is a lingering and 
also problematic reference point in the works of those who lived through 
it. How it should be understood, represented and emotionally processed 
remains unresolved. Just as trauma is all the more disturbing when it 
goes unnamed in a life or text, the Second World War inflects post-war 
experience and writings when it is not explicitly present. The chapters 
in this section discuss three men – Emmanuel Levinas, Paul Ricœur and 
Louis Althusser – who in many respects were very different from one 
another. Levinas was Jewish, and is best known for his work in ethics; 
Ricœur was Christian, and is best known for his work in hermeneutics 
and narrative theory; and Althusser was a Marxist, and is probably best 
remembered today for killing his wife. Yet all three have in common that 
they spent most of the Second World War as prisoners of war. When 
they returned from captivity they were profoundly changed; and each of 
them would go on to rank among the key thinkers of their generation. 
The issue here is: where are the traces of war in their post-war thinking 
and writing? I begin with the case of Paul Ricœur.
Whose life story is it anyway?
Ricœur was born in to a Protestant family in 1913. His father was killed 
only two years later in the First World War, so war played a defining part 
in his life from its earliest stages.1 He proved to be a brilliant student and 
 1 For further details of Ricœur’s biography, see Reagan, Paul Ricœur: His Life 






was on the verge of an academic career when he was conscripted in 1939, 
despite his pacifist convictions. He was taken prisoner in 1940 and spent 
the rest of the war as a POW. After the war he resumed his academic 
career, establishing himself as one of the most prolific and influential 
philosophers of the twentieth century. At a time when hermeneutics 
was out of fashion and largely misunderstood in France, his work in the 
area made him one of the world’s leading thinkers in the philosophy of 
interpretation, rivalled only (perhaps) by Heidegger and Gadamer. His 
astonishingly wide-ranging writings dealt with virtually every area of 
importance in philosophy; and he also wrote hugely important work on 
narrative and its role in the construction of the self. This aspect of his 
work is particularly relevant here, as I want to discuss how it relates to 
Ricœur’s account of his own time as a prisoner of war.
For Ricœur, as for other important philosophers of narrative, such 
as Arendt, Cavarero, Kristeva and MacIntyre, telling stories about our 
lives is one of the most fundamental aspects of the lives about which we 
tell stories. The three volumes of Ricœur’s monumental Temps et récit 
establish narrative as a means of organizing the chaos of experience into 
the order of sense. Plot, or emplotment (la mise en intrigue), is conceived 
as a basic human need and reality. Through plots, we reconfigure what 
Ricœur calls ‘notre expérience temporelle confuse, informe et, à la limite, 
muette’ (Temps et récit, I, p. 13). Experience is confused, ambiguous, 
maybe even wordless. Through emplotment, we give it form and meaning. 
For Ricœur, this entails a suspension of the distinction between truth 
and falsehood because plots do not exist objectively in the natural, 
observable world; but emplotment also brings with it a restoration of 
referentiality, because the stories we tell about our lives nevertheless 
tie them back to the real people we really are. Stories may not be ‘true’ 
in any simplistic sense; but without them, there is nothing true we can 
say about ourselves. To put it slightly differently, the stories we tell may 
create a part of the truth even if they are not uniquely true. This can be 
linked to what Ricœur calls ‘narrative identity’ (l’identité narrative). 
Towards the end of the nearly one thousand pages of the three volumes 
of Temps et récit, Ricœur tells us that ‘l’histoire d’une vie ne cesse 
d’être refigurée par toutes les histoires véridiques ou fictives qu’un sujet 
raconte sur lui-même. Cette refiguration fait de la vie elle-même un tissu 
d’histoires racontées’ (III, p. 356). Narrative identity is identity insofar as 
it is available to us. There is no fixed, eternal, immutable essence of the 
self either inside or outside language, only an ongoing self-construction 
through the unstable, changeable autobiographical, autofictional stories 
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we tell to ourselves and others. Narrative identity is always unfinished, in 
process and subject to radical dispute and revision. Judith Butler echoes 
Ricœur’s analysis in her account of her own self-narrations: 
I would have to say that I can tell the story of my origin and I can even 
tell it again and again, in several ways. But the story of my origin I tell is 
not one for which I am accountable, and it cannot establish my account-
ability. At least, let’s hope not, since, over wine usually, I tell it in various 
ways and the accounts are not always consistent with one another. Indeed, 
it may be that to have an origin means precisely to have several different 
versions of the origin – I take it that this is part of what Nietzsche meant 
by the operation of genealogy. Any one of those is a possible narrative, 
but of no single one can I say with certainty that it alone is true. (Giving 
an Account of Oneself, pp. 37–38)
In relation to Ricœur, I take this to mean that the plots which inform 
the narratives of our lives are always largely preinterpreted, because they 
omit or give form to the contradictory disorder of experience; but while 
their form pre-inscribes how we should interpret the story, it also allows, 
at a deep structural level, for the possibility of different narrativizations. 
Narrative, here, is hermeneutic because it implies meaning but does 
not impose it, suggesting avenues of interpretation without foreclosing 
others. In other words, narrative identity is always unfinished, in process 
and subject to radical revision.2
So what does this mean for Ricœur’s own self-narrative, and in 
particular his account of his experience of the Second World War? In 
1995 Ricœur published, first in English then in the original French, 
an essay in intellectual autobiography which makes up the largest 
part of his book Réflexion faite. The essay includes a short account 
of his wartime experiences. The account begins with a one-sentence 
summary of the years from 1939 to 1945: ‘Je fus tour à tour civil 
mobilisé, puis combattant vacant, enfin combattant vaincu et officier 
prisonnier’ (p. 20). This minimal account of events constitutes a plot 
of sorts, though as a summary of six years of a person’s life it is 
surprisingly rapid. The sentence is followed by a paragraph which 
describes Ricœur’s five years as a prisoner of war. It begins with a brief 
overview of those five years: ‘La captivité passée dans différents camps 
de Poméranie fut l’occasion d’une expérience humaine extraordinaire: 
vie quotidienne, interminablement partagée avec des milliers d’hommes, 
 2 For penetrating analysis of narrative hermeneutics, see Brockmeier and 
Meretoja, ‘Understanding Narrative Hermeneutics’.
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culture d’amitiés intenses, rythme régulier d’un enseignement improvisé, 
lecture inentravée des livres disponibles dans le camp’ (p. 21). Ricœur 
goes on to describe how, as a prisoner of war, he studied the works of 
Karl Jaspers, which would later lead to his first book, jointly written 
with fellow prisoner Mikel Dufrenne. He also read Heidegger, began 
work on a translation of Husserl’s Ideen I and ran courses which later 
developed into his Philosophie de la volonté. Ricœur refers to this period 
as his ‘retraite forcée de cinq ans’ (p. 21), echoing words we have already 
seen in Sartre’s Carnets de guerre. At the end of the paragraph, he gives 
a single-sentence summary of his five years of captivity: ‘Ces années 
de captivité furent ainsi fort fructueuses tant au point de vue humain 
qu’intellectuel’ (p. 21). And that’s all he says. The following paragraph 
refers to his return from captivity, the joyous rediscovery of his family 
(including a daughter born during the war whom he had never met) and 
his first years of post-war teaching.
Ricœur’s account of his five years as a prisoner of war surprises both 
for its brevity and its placidity. There is no obvious trace of trauma 
here. In fact, in most respects, captivity appears to have been a positive 
experience. Ricœur emphasizes friendship, teaching and the possibility 
of uninterrupted study. For an aspiring scholar, the ‘retraite forcée’ of 
the camp sounds remarkably like an extended sabbatical. It laid the 
foundation for his future success, with his work on Jaspers, Husserl 
and the philosophy of will. The paragraph begins by referring to ‘une 
expérience humaine extraordinaire’ and concludes by describing the 
years as ‘fort fructueuses’. It all sounds quite pleasant, almost enviable. 
We might recall Beauvoir’s comment that it was ‘charmant’ (La Force de 
l’âge, p. 674) to escape from Paris and stay with friends in the troubled 
days of the Liberation.
Those of us trained in the hermeneutics of suspicion might nevertheless 
already be wondering what may be concealed behind Ricœur’s sanguine 
account of captivity. Can it really have been so unambiguously enriching? 
What happened to the experience of cold, hunger, deprivation, brutality, 
fear of death, loss of freedom and separation from one’s loved ones with 
which we are familiar from other wartime narratives? Could it really 
have been such a rich, humanly rewarding and intellectually stimulating 
period for Ricœur? What aren’t we being told?
The fact that there is, as I have said, no obvious trace of trauma here 
does not mean that there are no signs of profound disturbance beneath 
the calm surface of Ricœur’s self-narrative. Indeed, the context in which 
Ricœur recounts his years as a POW – if not his explicit self-analysis 
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– places the Second World War in a sequence of terrible losses. Only 
a few pages earlier, he had referred in parenthesis to the deaths of his 
parents: 
Orphelin de père et de mère (ma mère était morte peu après ma naissance 
et mon père, professeur d’anglais au lycée de Valence, avait été tué en 1915 
au début de la Première Guerre mondiale), j’avais été élevé à Rennes, avec 
ma sœur un peu plus âgée que moi, par mes grands-parents paternels et 
par une tante, sœur cadette de onze ans de mon père et restée célibataire. 
(Réflexion faite, p. 13)
It feels as if too much information is crammed into this sentence, 
and in particular into the parenthesis: why mention that the aunt 
remained unmarried, how did the mother die and what were the lasting 
consequences of being orphaned so early? Like Camus, whose father 
died in 1914 as a result of wounds suffered in the Battle of the Marne, 
Ricœur’s life is blighted almost before it had begun by the events of 
the Great War. Moreover, the parenthesis in which he refers to the 
deaths of both his parents is suspicious for its brevity: we might wonder 
whether its almost casual tone serves to mask a deeper sense of personal 
catastrophe. The context suggests that perhaps also the tragedy of the 
First World War is reawakened by the events of the Second. Moreover, 
war becomes the intellectual grid through which Ricœur understands 
his own development in his early years as a student of philosophy, 
dealing with the competing demands of rational enquiry and Christian 
belief: ‘j’appris à mener, d’armistice en armistice, une guerre intestine 
entre la foi et la raison, comme on disait alors’ (Réflexion faite, p. 15). 
Forged in the period between two armistices (1918 and 1940), Ricœur’s 
identity becomes the site of an unfinished, unresolved war.
This sense that the war and its catastrophic losses are not over, that 
they continue to form the developing intellectual who would become 
a world famous philosopher, is intensified by a further loss. Ricœur’s 
father had died for his country in 1915; but Ricœur would subsequently 
lose faith in the cause for which his father sacrificed his life: 
la découverte précoce – vers les onze-douze ans, de l’injustice du Traité 
de Versailles avait brutalement inversé les sens de la mort de mon père 
tué sur le front en 1915; privée de l’auréole réparatrice de la juste guerre et 
de la victoire sans tache, cette mort s’avérait mort pour rien. (Réflexion 
faite, pp. 18–19)3 
 3 See also Ricœur’s comments in an interview with Charles Reagan: ‘it was not 
[my father’s] loss as such which was the shock, but the meaning which it was given 
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In this account, the father dies – as it were – for a second time: the first 
death is his literal demise; the second is the perhaps even more traumatic 
collapse of the moral framework which gave sense to his actual loss. 
Ricœur becomes a pacifist, and his father dies again. Moreover, further 
personal disasters are not far off, as Ricœur shows with what is, once 
again, suspect understatement: ‘Je n’oublie pas non plus que plusieurs 
deuils – la mort de mes grands-parents qui m’avaient élevé et, plus cruelle 
encore, celle de ma sœur Alice, emporté par la tuberculose – avaient 
déposé au préalable la marque du momento mori sur la réussite sociale 
et le bonheur familial’ (Réflexion faite, pp. 19–20). A few lines later, 
Ricœur describes how ‘La guerre [le] surprit’ (p. 20). In the context, 
though, the war hardly comes as a surprise, partly because we as readers 
know full well it is on the horizon, and partly because it appears in this 
account as merely another in a series of personal catastrophes presented 
with casual, perhaps self-protective rapidity.
So one aspect of Ricœur’s self-narration is the hint that events in 
his personal biography conceal an element of trauma even if it remains 
unexplored or underexplored. But there is another dimension to what 
is not said here. Ricœur’s short account of his five years as a prisoner 
of war was published, as I have said, in English and French in 1995. 
A couple of years earlier, a philosophy teacher named Robert Lévy 
had discovered three articles which were attributed to Ricœur but 
not included in his official bibliography. They had been published in 
1941 in a collaborationist journal entitled L’Unité française. There is 
no suggestion that in these articles Ricœur said anything that could 
reasonably be construed as pro-fascist or anti-Semitic. Nevertheless, 
here was evidence that, during the first year or so of his captivity, Ricœur 
had lectured on behalf of the ‘Cercle Pétain’, which supported Marshal 
Pétain’s policy of collaboration with the Nazi occupiers. Copies of the 
articles attributed to Ricœur were sent to him; and in 1994, he submitted 
a paper to the historian Henry Rousso, in Rousso’s role as president of 
the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent, responding to the articles and 
explaining his position.4 Ricœur insisted that he knew nothing about 
the publication of the articles in L’Unité française before he was made 
aware of them in the 1990s. Of the three articles, one was taken out of 
by my family. That is, that he had died for a just cause and, even though dead, he 
was a member of the victorious army. It was this conviction that was shattered all 
at once when I was ten or twelve years old’ (Reagan, Paul Ricœur, p. 126).
 4 See Ricœur, ‘Note sur certaines “Paroles de prisonniers”’.
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context from a journal originally published in 1936; in relation to the 
other two, Ricœur could not say exactly what was genuinely his own 
work. Of one, he said that he was ‘incapable d’y démêler [sa] propre 
contribution’. And of the other, although he did not deny some part in 
it, he insisted categorically that it was published without his knowledge 
or consent: ‘je déclare ne pouvoir assurer que ce texte n’a été ni coupé, ni 
surchargé, ni en aucune façon manipulé: de toutes façons, je ne l’ai pas 
publié’ (emphasis original).
The stress on publié is significant here. Many years after the war, 
Ricœur could not be sure exactly what he had or had not written; but he 
was adamant that he had not authorized publication of the material in 
question. It is as if authorization to publish is as important to authorship 
as the actual drafting. One only becomes an author, in the sense of a 
subject responsible for the text which appear under one’s name, at the 
point where one assents to publication. Ricœur did not deny having 
been a member of the Cercle Pétain for a period or having lectured in 
support of its beliefs; but he did not accept responsibility as author of 
two of the texts in question. He did not recognize what was and was 
not from his own hand, and he stated that he had neither known nor 
approved of their publication. In fact, it seems that the articles attributed 
to Ricœur and other prisoners were published from notes brought back 
from captivity by a fellow POW who was himself pro-collaborationist; it 
remains unclear to what extent the articles contained reliable quotations 
from the attributed authors and to what extent they were deliberately 
or inadvertently altered. Even so, admitting to his temporary allegiance 
to Pétainist policies, Ricœur went on to explain why someone from 
his background, belonging to the socialist, antimilitarist, pacifist left 
could for a period have supported Pétain. In part, he felt guilty for 
the possibility that his own beliefs had to some extent contributed to 
the disastrous French defeat of 1940. He conceded the same point in 
an interview with Charles Reagan: ‘When I was a prisoner of war in 
1940, I felt guilty for this defeat, thinking that my pacifism during the 
preceding years was, in large part, responsible for the failure of France 
to sufficiently rearm itself in the face of German rearmament’ (Reagan, 
Paul Ricœur, p. 127). This sense of guilt underlies his Pétainist period, 
for which he expressed shame and regret. 
It is important to be clear: in my view, Ricœur’s account of this episode 
is dignified and persuasive. There certainly remain some unresolved 
questions. His criticism of the failed democracy of the Third Republic 
began before the Second World War, so it could be – and has been 
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– suggested that he was pre-inclined to support the Pétainist National 
Revolution before the defeat of 1940; and it is not certain quite when 
his allegiance to the Cercle Pétain began and ended. But Ricœur’s lack 
of precision on these matters, more than half a century later, is not 
particularly surprising. I have long admired Ricœur both as a man and 
as a thinker, and I do not respect him any less for knowing that, for a 
period, he held views that he would later come to regret.5
And yet, it still seems odd that, a year after giving an account 
of his Pétainist period to Henry Rousso, Ricœur completely omitted 
any reference to it in a document intended for more public dissemi-
nation. This context encourages the sense that Ricœur’s account of 
his experience as a prisoner of war is only one possible configuration 
of events. In Réflexion faite, Ricœur makes his time as a POW sound 
like a surprisingly positive period in his life. We might suspect that his 
experiences could have been narrated very differently. Moreover, and 
this is the real intellectual crux of the current discussion, the view of 
the text as subject to quite different interpretations and narrativizations 
from the one foregrounded by its author-narrator is precisely in line with 
the hermeneutic theory which Ricœur himself would develop throughout 
his mature work. In his discussions of literary interpretation, Ricœur 
adamantly, consistently and persuasively argues that texts should not be 
understood as the partially realized instantiation of authorial intentions 
or desires. In the important article, ‘Le Modèle du texte: l’action sensée 
considérée comme un texte’ (in Du texte à l’action, pp. 183–211), for 
example, he argues that: 
la carrière du texte s’échappe à l’horizon fini vécu par son auteur. Ce que 
dit le texte importe davantage que ce que l’auteur a voulu dire; désormais 
toute exégèse déploie ses procédures au sein de la circonscription de 
signification qui a rompu ses amarres avec la psychologie de son auteur. 
(p. 187)
 5 More surprising (or disappointing), perhaps, is the reticence of biographers 
in discussing the episode. Reagan touches upon Pétainist sympathies among 
the POWs, but does not discuss the extent of Ricœurs’s involvement (see Paul 
Ricœur, p. 10). Dosse discusses the period at greater length, but explains Ricœur’s 
involvement only in general terms. Ricœur himself did not seek to deny the episode, 
even if he was reticent and cautious in reference to it. See for example La Critique 
et la conviction: ‘Je dois à la vérité de dire que, jusqu’en 1941, j’avais été séduit, avec 
d’autres – la propagande était massive –, par certains aspects du pétainisme. […] 
Mais je regrette mon erreur de jugement, pendant la première année’ (pp. 31–32). 
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And Ricœur concludes that ‘seule l’interprétation est le “remède” à la 
faiblesse du discours que son auteur ne peut plus “sauver”’ (p. 188). 
In Ricœur’s account, discourse needs interpretation; and interpre-
tation cannot be bounded by what authors wanted, meant or thought 
they meant. And this must be as true of autobiographical works as it 
is of overtly fictional ones. I may have a strong investment in believing 
that the story of my life, as I tell it, is the truest possible version 
but, hermeneutically speaking, I have no justification for any such 
belief. Others may understand me better than I understand myself; 
and the stories others tell about me may be more true, or at least more 
compelling, more persuasive, than the ones I tell about myself. Ricœur 
concedes this or, to be more precise, he draws attention to it, he insists 
on it, in the second paragraph of the main text of Réflexion faite: 
‘j’admets bien volontiers que la reconstruction que j’entreprends de 
mon développement intellectuel n’a pas plus d’autorité que telle autre 
effectuée par un biographe autre que moi-même’ (p. 12). This could not 
be clearer: an author does not know more about himself or his text than 
a reader; an autobiographer’s configuration of his life story should not 
be regarded as truer than that of a biographer. And as Ricœur insists 
elsewhere, a life story is never fixed. It can be recounted in different, 
sometimes contradictory ways: ‘de même qu’il est possible de composer 
plusieurs intrigues au sujet des mêmes incidents (lesquels, de même coup, 
ne méritent plus d’être appelés les mêmes événements), de même il est 
toujours possible de tramer sur sa propre vie des intrigues différentes, 
voire opposées’ (Temps et récit, III, p. 358). We can never assume that the 
narration of a life is definitive and finished. 
In Ricœur’s account of his wartime experiences, there is a discom-
forting tension between the acknowledgement that other ways of 
configuring the narrative are possible, and a palpable desire to direct 
the interpretation of the autobiographical subject’s life story. In general 
terms, I would hazard to say that texts contain within themselves 
instructions about how they wish to be read. I stress how they wish to be 
read, not how they must be read. Such instructions appear, for example, 
both explicitly in the text’s self-interpretation and through effects of 
juxtaposition. In the current case, Ricœur’s narrative of the war years 
stresses that they were ‘fruitful’ (fructueuses). The surrounding context 
implies his moral credentials in this period. The preceding paragraphs 
refer to the death of his father in the First World War, the later intensi-
fication of this loss by his realization of the injustice of the Versailles 
Treaty and his subsequent commitment as a Christian pacifist socialist. 
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The following paragraph describes his joyous rediscovery of his family 
in 1945, and his employment at the Collège Cévenol, which, we are 
reminded, had sheltered numerous Jewish children during the war. The 
understanding urged upon us by these juxtapositions is that Ricœur was 
a man of clear moral principles and integrity, and that his work at an 
institution which saved Jewish lives is of a piece with such integrity.
In this instance, Ricœur wants to underline positive aspects of the 
war years, the continuity of his moral principles despite changing 
political positions and the survival through the war of human, humane 
values. However, Ricœur’s own hermeneutic positions, as echoed at 
the beginning of Réflexion faite, allow equal priority to be given to 
different readings. In the context of what has now become public about 
his involvement in the Cercle Pétain, an alternative version of events 
is possible, in which the foregrounded account is partial and evasive, 
emphasizing the continuity of Ricœur’s principles and values rather 
than the suffering and compromised realities of the war. Ricœur argues, 
decisively in my view, that we do not own our life stories, that the way we 
emplot our life narratives entails a creation of meaning and order which 
is always subject to revision and reconfiguration. The story of our lives 
is important and real, but also unfinished and liable to radical reinter-
pretation and retelling. Yet, entirely understandably, while arguing this, 
Ricœur does not want to relinquish interpretive control of his own life 
narrative. He wants his war years, and those preceding and following 
them, to be a story of positive achievement, the survival of what is good 
in the human spirit and reconciliation with a traumatic past.
Towards an ethics of reconciliation
What does this have to do with Ricœur’s thought? As in subsequent 
chapters which discuss Althusser and Levinas, there is no question here 
of asserting a direct, causal link between what Ricœur experienced 
in the 1930s and 1940s and what he thought from the 1950s onwards. 
I nevertheless want to suggest that the issues which are at stake in 
Ricœur’s brief narrative of his time as a POW reverberate through his 
later thought and writing. The great themes of Ricœur’s thought all have 
direct relevance to the questions raised by his account of the war years, 
even if they do not broach them directly: history, time, truth, narrative, 
the configuration of the self, forgetfulness, amnesty and forgiveness. 
The war helps delimit an agenda for Ricœur’s post-war thought, and 
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that of post-war French philosophy more broadly. And the urgency of 
interpreting the meaning of conflict becomes specifically for Ricœur 
the need to understand the conflict of interpretations. Le Conflit des 
interprétations is the title of Ricœur’s 1969 collection of hermeneutic 
essays. French poststructuralism was vitiated by a surprising misunder-
standing of hermeneutics, which it tended to characterize naively and 
simplistically as the belief in a single and recoverable sense. If the 
poststructuralists had read Ricœur with even the minimum care, they 
would have known that this is a complete falsification of the hermeneutic 
tradition. Conflict, or the undecidability of competing interpretations, 
is at the heart of hermeneutics, and particularly of Ricœur’s version of 
it. His great work of 1965, De l’interprétation – a work which has a 
compelling claim to be the most important contribution to hermeneutics 
written in French in the twentieth century – turns this conflict into war: 
Ricœur refers to ‘la guerre des herméneutiques’ (p. 50). War, I want to 
suggest, has permeated the very fabric of his thought. It is what Ricœur 
experiences, as a Christian, socialist, pacifist subject who spent five years 
as a prisoner of war; and it is also what defines, at the most fundamental 
level, what it means to be a post-war philosopher, and specifically a 
philosopher of hermeneutics. Thinking is conflict; hermeneutics is war.
But there is another twist here. Ricœur’s De l’interprétation is well 
known for its brilliant, instructive distinction between two competing 
approaches to interpretation. On the one hand, we have interpretation 
as the restoration of sense. Its purpose is to discover what the author 
and the text properly mean, what their message to us might be. On the 
other hand, we have the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, most importantly 
represented by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, which looks for unques-
tioned, occluded and denied meanings behind the intended messages 
conveyed by authors and texts. This is hermeneutics at war with itself. 
So what is our job as readers and interpreters: to find out what the 
text really means, or to uncover what it didn’t know it meant? The key 
point for Ricœur is not to dwell on this conflict, but to overcome it. 
In his account, the apparent conflict within hermeneutics is resolved 
when one gets rid of the notion of a single, stable consciousness which 
regulates the meaning of a work. Once that is jettisoned, we can find 
‘l’unité profonde’ (De l’interprétation, p. 61) of the two superficially 
opposed hermeneutics. Both are engaged in a search for meaning, which 
is understood now as inherently open and ambiguous. At the risk of 
appearing reductive, we might observe that this appeal to unity recalls 
the underlying, doomed and ultimately disastrous aspiration of Pétain’s 
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collaborationist politics after the defeat of 1940: the journal in which 
the wartime articles attributed to Ricœur were published was, after all, 
entitled L’Unité française.
This attempt to bring together conflicting positions is absolutely 
fundamental to Ricœur’s manner of thought and writing. The number 
and length of the books he published borders on being incompre-
hensible, without even considering the range of authors and topics he 
discusses. It is as if he wanted to omit no one and nothing, to bring 
everything together not so much in a grand synthesis as in a peaceful 
dialogue. This can be briefly illustrated with reference to the article ‘Le 
Modèle du texte’, which has already been quoted. Just in terms of its 
breadth of reference, it is impressive. Among others, Ricœur refers to 
great European thinkers (Kant, Hegel), representatives of the German 
hermeneutic tradition (Schleiermacher, Dilthey), Anglo-American 
speech act theorists (Austin, Searle), specialists in linguistics (Saussure, 
Hjelmslev, Benveniste, Chomsky) and structuralists (Lévi-Strauss). At no 
point does he give a sense that there might be irreconcilable differences 
between these thinkers and positions. Everyone can be brought together 
in a generous, all-encompassing discourse.
The references to E.D. Hirsch are particularly striking in this 
endeavour to find agreement. In his work on literary theory, Hirsch 
is associated more than anyone with the re-establishment of authorial 
intention as a regulative principle for literary interpretation. Against the 
prevailing view represented (very differently) by Wimsatt and Beardsley 
for the American New Critics and by Barthes for French structuralists and 
poststructuralists, Hirsch insists that the author is ‘the only compelling 
normative principle that could lend validity to an interpretation’ (Validity, 
p. 5). As we have seen, this is entirely contrary to Ricœur’s view. In the 
latter’s hermeneutics, the text is interesting precisely because it escapes 
the author’s horizon. Yet when Ricœur refers to Hirsch in ‘Le Modèle du 
texte’, one might get the impression that they are in complete agreement 
on fundamental questions. Ricœur endorses Hirsch’s insistence that 
‘il n’existe pas de règle pour faire de bonnes conjectures. Mais il y a 
des méthodes pour valider les conjectures’ (Du texte à l’action, p. 200, 
quoting Hirsch, Validity, p. 25). And later, referring to the procedures of 
validation by which we might test our interpretive guesses, he writes: ‘je 
tiens comme Hirsch que [les procédures de validation] se rapprochent 
plus d’une logique de la probabilité que d’une logique de la vérification 
empirique’ (Du texte à l’action, p. 205; emphasis added). ‘Je tiens comme 
Hirsch’: this is striking not because Ricœur doesn’t agree with Hirsch 
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on this particular issue, but because he has endeavoured to find an issue 
on which he does agree with him in the face of so much underlying, 
fundamental disagreement. Rhetorically at least, Ricœur has succeeded 
in drawing even Hirsch into the consensual fold of his all-encompassing 
discourse.
At the level of argument, this quest for the compatibility of 
incompatibles is mirrored throughout ‘Le Modèle du texte’. The article 
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between structuralism 
and hermeneutics. The two are typically seen as fundamentally different 
in approach and aim: the first looks for general underlying structures, 
the second searches for particular meanings. Ricœur chooses Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myth to analyse the structuralist procedure. 
Lévi-Strauss describes mythèmes, which are the minimal units which 
can be combined to produce myths, in the same way that phonemes 
can be combined to produce words and sentences. This process is 
supposed to be anything but interpretive. Conceding this point, Ricœur 
nevertheless argues that structuralist analysis is a starting point not 
a conclusion: ‘En fait, nul ne s’en tient à une conception des mythes 
et des récits aussi formelle qu’une algèbre d’unités constitutives’ (Du 
texte à l’action, p. 212). Even for the arch structuralist Lévi-Strauss, 
mythemes bear meaning and reference; they are vehicles for reflections 
on birth and death, blindness and lucidity, sexuality and truth. Using 
the hermeneutic terms explanation and understanding, Ricœur now 
demonstrates that structural analysis turns out to be in the service 
of hermeneutic understanding. It is, he suggests, ‘un stade – un stade 
nécessaire – entre une interprétation naïve et une interprétation érudite, 
entre une interprétation de surface et une interprétation en profondeur’ 
(Du texte à l’action, p. 213). This is why hermeneutics is better described 
as a benign arc than as a vicious circle: structural analysis is a vital tool 
which furthers the aims of critical depth-interpretation. Understanding 
requires explanation; hermeneutics requires structural analysis. Any 
opposition between them is merely apparent, as they belong to the 
same intellectual endeavour to promote the human search for meaning. 
And the whole discussion is conducted with such charm, generosity 
and intellectual comprehensiveness that no one need feel offended or 
excluded. Everyone and everything gets to be part of the great debate.
Ricœur’s aim is to find the common ground between apparently 
conflicting positions. It turns out that the conflict of interpretations is 
not really a conflict. Rather, it bears witness to a generous, productive 
multiplicity. And I want to suggest here that this search for common 
Traces of War132
ground is absolutely fundamental to Ricœur’s thought and writing, 
because he insists on the possibility of dialogue and reconciliation between 
apparently competing approaches. The consistent impetus of Ricœur’s 
astonishingly voluminous, wide-ranging work – I would say its defining 
energy – is to refuse the choice between thinkers and movements which 
seem incompatible: at an individual level between, for example, Gadamer 
and Habermas; at a more general level between continental philosophy 
and analytic philosophy; phenomenology and hermeneutics; phenom-
enology and structuralism; structuralism and hermeneutics; narratology 
and hermeneutics; the hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of 
suspicion. In all these cases, it turns out that differences, conflicts, are 
apparent rather than real. They can be overcome once we learn how to 
look at them properly. Conflict can be resolved once we understand that 
it is a mode of unacknowledged agreement.
Although Ricœur is perhaps best known as the theorist of the conflict 
of interpretations and the war of hermeneutics, his thought is driven by 
the search for the underlying agreement between manifestly warring 
positions. As he repeatedly, crucially, insists, the circle of hermeneutics 
is not vicious; it is better described as an arc or a spiral. By traversing it, 
we end up somewhere different from and better than where we started. 
Once they are understood from this generous, overarching philosophical 
perspective, war isn’t war, conflict isn’t conflict. The violence of interpre-
tation isn’t so violent after all; differences can be reconciled. Ricœur’s 
endeavour of thought is to create complex contexts in which we do not 
have to choose between positions which might seem to be in conflict. But 
perhaps this covers over stark choices too readily. In relation to Ricœur’s 
account of his wartime years, it really does matter – more than Ricœur 
wanted to concede – whether what is most important is that it affirms 
the warm, life-enhancing human experience of captivity or evades 
the compromises, errors and misjudgements that were also part of it. 
Sometimes perhaps conflicts really are conflicts; incompatibles really are 
incompatible. Sometimes perhaps you do have to choose.
Hermeneutics entails the realization that texts and people do not say 
or know exactly what they mean or everything that they mean. More 
compellingly than anyone else, Ricœur argued that the consequence of 
this is that authors cannot close down the meaning of their works and that 
lives can always be narrated differently. His brief references to his own 
experiences during the war exemplify these points dramatically. Ricœur 
certainly does not exhaust and cannot control the sense of his own 
self-narrative, however much – contrary to his own theoretical positions 
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– he might have found it desirable to do so. Indeed, I have suggested that 
the tantalizing, unsatisfactory nature of his short account may actually 
raise suspicion, drawing the alert reader’s attention to the possibility that 
something remains unsaid. Because of the loss of his father in the First 
World War, a loss compounded and made more disturbing by Ricœur’s 
later sense that his father had died for a misguided cause, war was part 
of Ricœur’s thinking well before the Second World War, as he dealt 
with the conflict between reason and faith in philosophy, and between 
pacifism and rising fascism in politics. After the Second World War, I 
have suggested, this reference to conflict – and, crucially, the conviction 
in the possibility of its resolution – remained a vital, driving component 
in his mature work. War haunts Ricœur’s life, his texts and his thought 
even when it is not mentioned. In the next chapter, I shall suggest that 
the same can be said of two other great philosophers of the post-war 
period who also spent the war as POWs: Louis Althusser and Emmanuel 
Levinas. Their thought is certainly not the same as Ricœur’s, and their 
experiences were not the same; but all three of them share an ongoing, 
unredeemable investment in the past that will not pass.
I begin this chapter with two apparently unrelated facts. In 1961 
the naturalized French philosopher of Lithuanian descent Emmanuel 
Levinas published Totalité et infini, a book which one might plausibly 
claim to be the single most important work of ethics to appear in 
France in the twentieth century. On 16 November 1980 Louis Althusser, 
the leading Marxist philosopher of his generation, strangled his wife 
Hélène. I say ‘strangled’ rather than ‘murdered’ because Althusser was 
never charged or tried for any crime relating to the incident. Instead, 
he was judged to be not legally responsible for his acts on the grounds 
of mental health. Most of the remaining decade of his life was spent in 
psychiatric institutions.
What is the link between Levinas’s book and Althusser’s act? There 
certainly does not appear to be much in common between a work of 
philosophical ethics and a fatal assault. Nevertheless, Levinas and 
Althusser are connected by at least one important biographical factor: 
both of them spent more or less all of the Second World War in German 
prisoner of war camps. Levinas had the good fortune to be mobilized 
at the beginning of the war, then taken prisoner early in the hostilities 
in 1940, and held in various POW camps until 1945. To call this ‘good 
fortune’ may appear to be in poor taste, to say the very least. But 
Levinas was a Jew of Eastern European origin, and if he hadn’t been 
a member of the French army at the time of his capture, instead of 
spending the war in a military prisoner of war camp, he would almost 
certainly have been arrested on racial grounds, deported and murdered 
in a death camp, like many of his family. So one might say that being 
a prisoner of war saved his life.
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June 1940 and spent most of the next five years in POW camps, mainly 
Stalag XA. It is not a matter here of using their five years of captivity to 
explain what the two great philosophers subsequently said, wrote, did 
or thought. But those years did either cause, or consolidate or crystallize 
fundamental changes in who they were. Before the war, Levinas was 
acquiring a reputation as a leading exponent of phenomenology in the 
wake of Husserl and Heidegger; after the war he made a decisive turn to 
ethics which would entail a partial, but never total, renunciation of his 
pre-war loyalties, especially to Heidegger. Before the war Althusser was 
a member of the Catholic Jeunesse Etudiante Chrétienne movement; by 
the time of his release from captivity, a process had begun which would 
lead him to become a Marxist and member of the French Communist 
Party. My suggestion here is that in the post-war writings of both 
these great thinkers, the war is something which is partially, discreetly 
narrated, and that it also informs and underpins their work even and 
especially when it is not mentioned. One of the central themes of the 
current book is that not mentioning the war is one means of ensuring 
that the war is never quite forgotten.
Levinas at war
Levinas says little about the experience of being a prisoner of war 
between 1940 and 1945. Even the posthumous publication of his Carnets 
de captivité and some other texts about the experiences of captivity in 
2009 tell us little about what it was really like for him. One short text 
which refers to his time as a POW has garnered significant attention. 
In ‘Nom d’un chien ou le droit naturel’, first published in 1975, Levinas 
discusses some biblical references to dogs. This leads to the recollection 
of his time as a POW working in a detail of 70 fellow Jewish prisoners. 
The French uniform they were wearing when they were captured saved 
them from the worst excesses of Nazi persecution: their status as serving 
soldiers afforded them some protection. Even so, for German onlookers, 
they were barely human: ‘Nous n’étions qu’une quasi-humanité, une 
bande de singes’ (Difficile liberté, p. 215). But then, for a few weeks a 
stray dog, nicknamed Bobby, accompanied them as they set off for work 
and returned in the evening, ‘sautillant et aboyant gaiement’ (p. 216). 
The consolation of Bobby’s presence was that the dog recognized and 
reaffirmed the prisoners’ humanity: ‘Pour lui – c’était incontestable – 
nous fûmes des hommes’ (p. 216).
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Levinas’s account of this encounter with Bobby has provoked a 
great deal of discussion about the relation between the human and 
the animal in his thinking. The underlying question here is whether 
animals may have the status of other or whether this position of 
privilege and vulnerability is reserved only for humans; but however 
one answers this question, we learn very little from the anecdote about 
the experience of imprisonment beyond the unsurprising implication 
that it was pretty awful. And we learn nothing about the impact of the 
war on Levinas’s own life and thought. In his short self-presentation in 
the article ‘Signature’ he refers only fleetingly to his ‘longue captivité en 
Allemagne’ (Difficile liberté, p. 405). Nevertheless, in a much-quoted, 
single-sentence paragraph from this text, Levinas suggests that the 
war is the central event in his biography: ‘Elle [i.e. his biography] est 
dominée par le pressentiment et le souvenir de l’horreur nazie’ (Difficile 
liberté, p. 406). This says everything and nothing. It tells us that Nazism 
dominated his life; but Levinas says no more than that. The laconic, 
elliptical style demands of us that we use his encounter with Nazism 
as an important lens for interpreting everything that came before and 
after, but it gives us no real guidance as to what this might really mean. 
A similar provocation to interpret is announced at the beginning of 
Levinas’s great work of 1974, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence. 
The book is dedicated to the memory of victims of Nazism and to other 
victims of hatred. Then, a few lines of text in Hebrew, and therefore 
in a language which only a very small proportion of the text’s readers 
will be able to understand, give the names of some of Levinas’s family 
members who were murdered during the war. So far as I can see, the 
rest of the book says nothing about the specific experience of the Second 
World War; yet this opening dedication invites us, almost insistently, to 
consider Levinas’s ethics as a response to the war.
As observed in relation to other authors in previous chapters, 
Levinas’s writing and thought suggest that the war is everywhere and 
nowhere. It is barely mentioned as an explicit, specific theme, while also 
being designated as crucial to the person and the thinker that Levinas 
would go on to be, and to the texts that he would produce. Sam Girgus 
underlines the importance of the war for Levinas: ‘The general trauma 
that the world suffered during the war and the Holocaust undoubtedly 
was internalized in Levinas’s own thought and feelings and became a 
permanent part of his being, influencing all aspects of his experience’ 
(Levinas and the Cinema of Redemption, p. 1). In more detail, Robert 
Eaglestone has argued that ‘The Holocaust saturates Levinas’s work’ 
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(The Holocaust and the Postmodern, p. 266), even though he rarely 
refers to it directly: it is present implicitly in his themes (sharing soup 
and bread as ethical acts as opposed to hatred and persecution), his 
aims (to establish a space of ethical possibility despite the knowledge 
of human cruelty), and in his philosophical practice, which explores 
ambivalence and doubleness in language which is ambivalent and double 
(for full discussion see Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern, 
pp. 249–78). The Holocaust is rarely directly discussed by Levinas, but 
Eaglestone shows it to be at the centre of his thinking.
If Levinas is taciturn when it comes to discussing his own experiences 
of the Second World War, he has more to say about war in general, 
particularly in Totalité et infini. From the second paragraph of Levinas’s 
major work, the Preface inaugurates a strange and opaque reflection 
on war. This begins with a question which appears on the surface to 
be rhetorical, but may not be: ‘La lucidité – ouverture de l’esprit sur le 
vrai – ne consiste-t-elle pas à entrevoir la possibilité permanente de la 
guerre?’ (p. 5). This echoes the Hobbesian characterization of human 
existence as the war of all against all, or the Sartrean designation 
of human reality (discussed in Chapter 3) as essentially grounded in 
conflict. But the interrogative form is more teasing than affirmative: 
it cannot be easy for the reader to know at this stage whether we are 
expected to reply yes or no to Levinas’s question. The following sentence 
is a little clearer, but only a little: ‘L’état de guerre suspend la morale; 
il dépouille les institutions et les obligations éternelles de leur éternité 
et dès lors, annule, dans le provisoire, les inconditionnels impératifs’ 
(p. 5). It looks here as if what Levinas means by la morale is a form of 
Kantian ethics which insists on unconditional, unchanging categorical 
laws of ethical conduct. War makes a joke out of ethics, says Levinas: 
‘Elle la rend dérisoire’ (p. 5). I don’t want to simplify this extraordinarily 
bewildering opening to what will go on to be an extraordinarily difficult 
book.1 Levinas’s opening gambit seems to be to propose that war poses 
a challenge to universalist ethics, that is, the belief in absolute rights 
and wrongs. But the difficulty of defining quite what it is that Levinas 
is saying raises a fundamental problem of voice: in this opening passage 
it is, and it will continue to be, hazardous and perhaps impossible to 
distinguish assertion from irony. No author has yet emerged to take 
 1 I might add as an aside that some years ago I wrote what purported to be an 
Introduction to Levinas. Looking back at his work now, I don’t know how I dared 
to write such a book, since I find myself utterly at sea here.
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responsibility for what is being said; indeed, it is not yet clear quite what 
has been said and what has been set up as a position to be undermined 
later. The tension here is encapsulated in the suggestion that uncondi-
tional imperatives might be provisionally suspended by war. Well, no 
they can’t. If they are unconditional, they cannot be suspended; if they 
can be suspended, they are not unconditional. Either Kant’s categorical 
imperative applies to all situations, including war, or it is not categorical. 
Either it is always wrong to kill, or it is sometimes wrong to kill, but it 
cannot be sometimes always wrong to kill or always sometimes wrong to 
kill. I see no middle way here. Even so, Levinas’s strange textual universe 
takes us to a place where impossible positions nevertheless begin to 
appear possible.
To disentangle all the threads of this unsettling reflection – even if 
it were theoretically possible – would take more time and brilliance 
than is available to me. All I can say for the time being is that war 
is a key reference point which seems to throw established positions 
and meanings into turmoil, including fixed ethical points and even 
the philosophical subject’s ability to formulate any proposition with 
confidence and clarity. ‘War’ is a signifier which destabilizes everything 
else, semantically and ethically. As soon as it appears, the authorial 
subject is scattered, no longer knowing how to formulate its contra-
dictory, self-contesting insights. Later in Totalité et infini, war appears 
again as something which is of course empirically terrible, but also 
philosophically welcome because it shatters the imperialism of the 
Same: ‘Seuls les êtres capables de guerre peuvent s’élever à la paix. 
La guerre comme la paix suppose des êtres structurés autrement que 
comme parties d’une totalité’ (p. 245). In war, my adversary transcends 
me, makes me realize that the world is not mine alone, that I share it 
with beings which experience it differently, which do not comply with 
my vision and understanding. We do not all bear witness to the same 
meaning in a single, coherent totality. War, then, is the discovery of 
otherness, and in Levinas’s ethics that must be a positive achievement. 
So without war there is no peace, no ethics and no justice. We should 
perhaps almost be grateful for war because it makes us understand that 
otherness exists and therefore that justice might be possible.
The ambiguity of violence in all this lies in the fact that it both 
acknowledges and seeks to annihilate the transcendence of my enemy. 
Violence is the very form of the Levinasian paradox of the ‘relation sans 
relation’ (Totalité et infini, p. 79): I am bound to you in my desire to 
annihilate you. As Levinas puts it, ‘La violence ne porte que sur un être 
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à la fois saisissable et échappant à toute prise’ (Totalité et infini, p. 246). 
This directly picks up Levinas’s reflection on murder. Murder is, Levinas 
knows, an everyday occurrence; he calls it ‘Cet incident le plus banal 
de l’histoire humaine’ (Totalité et infini, p. 217). And yet this historical 
banality is also an ethical impossibility. When I kill, what is it that I aim 
to destroy? Levinas’s answer is that what I want to destroy is the other’s 
transcendence, which is revealed to me through what he calls le visage, 
the face. ‘Autrui est le seul être que je peux vouloir tuer’, insists Levinas 
(Totalité et infini, p. 216). What I want to kill is the other or, to be more 
exact, the otherness of the other. But that is precisely what I cannot kill. 
Murder is banal but also, in Levinas’s argument, impossible: I can kill 
you, but I cannot kill that within you which makes me want to kill you, 
that is, your transcendence, your otherness. Murder happens all the 
time, but it never achieves its true goal, which is to eliminate everything 
from the world which escapes me.
What emerges from this dizzying reflection on war, violence and 
murder is a tension between the knowledge that killing takes place 
and the disavowal of that knowledge. I can kill, but I cannot kill that 
which I want to kill; I can kill the other, but I cannot kill her otherness. 
Murder happens, and it always fails. Levinas dedicates Autrement 
qu’être to the victims of anti-Semitism, and then constructs an ethics 
according to which murder never achieves its aims, philosophically if not 
empirically. His thought is torn between the terrible knowledge that the 
Holocaust happened and an ethical aspiration to designate murder, and 
pre-eminently mass murder, as an inevitable failure. The Other survives, 
even if countless others do not. When the war occurs as a signifier in 
these oblique texts, it signals a semantic and ethical disturbance. Values 
and meanings are horribly damaged, so that even the text’s propositional 
capacity appears to be impaired. Readers might sometimes wonder why 
Levinas doesn’t state more clearly what he thinks; I would suggest in 
response that his texts do not know what it is they want to say.
Post-war Althusser
The possibility and impossibility of murder brings us back to Althusser. 
I will get to his narrative of the death of his wife in a moment, but I 
want to talk first about Althusser’s experience of the war. I will risk 
the claim that he didn’t speak about the war, and that he never stopped 
speaking about it. The basis of this claim is the disparity between what 
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he published in his lifetime and works which appeared after his death. 
His Journal de captivité, published in 1992, runs to over 350 pages. In 
the same year, two autobiographical texts were also published: Les Faits, 
written in 1976, and L’Avenir dure longtemps, written in 1985. Both 
these works contain narratives of Althusser’s experiences as a prisoner 
of war. Both accounts are characterized by a rapid, almost light-hearted 
tone. The later version refers to the terrible conditions in which the 
prisoners were kept, particularly during the first year, with insufficient 
food and forced labour in temperatures of -40 degrees (L’Avenir, p. 118). 
Yet the prevailing sense of the experience appears to be positive and 
untraumatic. This is Althusser’s summary of the experience:
Mais de fait, je dois reconnaître que je me suis plutôt très bien installé 
dans la captivité (un véritable confort, car une véritable sécurité sous la 
garde des sentinelles allemandes et des barbelés): sans nul souci de mes 
parents, et j’avoue que j’ai même trouvé dans cette vie fraternelle, parmi 
de vrais hommes, de quoi la supporter comme une vie facile, heureuse car 
bien protégée. […] [J]e m’y sentais en sécurité, protégé de tout danger par 
la captivité même. (L’Avenir, pp. 125–26)
Despite the hunger, cold and forced labour, Althusser describes life 
in the camp as ‘fraternelle’, ‘facile’ and ‘heureuse’. This echoes Ricœur’s 
rapid narrative of his five years as a prisoner of war, discussed in the 
previous chapter, which he characterizes as his ‘retraite forcée de cinq 
années’ (Réflexion faite, p. 21). All in all, it doesn’t sound too bad, and 
certainly not traumatic. 
In Althusser’s accounts of his captivity, one episode stands out as 
being of particular importance. This concerns his escape, or rather his 
non-escape, from the POW camp. He realizes that the problem with 
escaping is that, as soon as a prisoner is discovered to be missing, the local 
army and police immediately dedicate all their forces to recapturing him. 
The solution is simply to hide in the camp for an initial period, fed and 
protected by comrades; then, after three or four weeks, you can simply 
walk out of the camp, secure in the knowledge that the intense search 
for you will have died down. Having dreamt up this idea, Althusser 
concludes that he no longer had the need to act on it: ‘En somme j’avais 
trouvé le moyen de m’évader du camp sans en sortir! Et donc de rester en 
captivité pour y échapper!’ (L’Avenir, p. 126; emphasis original). Althusser 
is aware of the broader resonance of this. It is linked to his later critical 
attitude towards the Communist Party, which allowed him to remain 
within it despite his dissident views (L’Avenir, p. 127). He acknowledges 
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that captivity suits him; he finds a way of escaping from the camp while 
remaining within it, of distancing himself from the Communist Party 
without leaving it. This in turn relates to his concept of ideology as 
something which inevitably contains us even as we analyse and criticize 
its workings. As Warren Montag puts it in a recent book, for Althusser 
ideology is ‘a necessary and inescapable by-product that accompanies 
and indeed envelops the activities required for the continued existence 
of a society’ (Althusser and his Contemporaries, p. 110). The use of 
the word inescapable is significant. Ideology holds us just as surely as 
a prison camp. Like it or not, we stay inside; and actually we probably 
prefer it that way. And this desire for and comfort in imprisonment can 
also be linked to Althusser’s years of incarceration, at the end of his life, 
in mental institutions. In the wake of Hélène’s death he can be seen as 
rediscovering, recreating the reassurance, the suspension of responsi-
bility, found earlier in the experience of captivity in Stalag XA.
This brings us to the death of Hélène. I said earlier that Althusser 
wrote two extended autobiographical works, Les Faits in 1976 and 
L’Avenir dure longtemps in 1985, both published posthumously in the 
same volume in 1992. It is striking that the volume is given the title 
L’Avenir dure longtemps and, in a reversal of chronological order, that 
the later text appears first, and as the principal part of the book. It is as 
if the later account supersedes, replaces and almost makes redundant 
the earlier version. The explanation for this would appear to be that Les 
Faits was written before the strangling of Hélène¸ whereas L’Avenir dure 
longtemps was written after it. It describes Hélène’s death and meditates 
at length upon it. Given that the great period of Althusserian Marxism 
has now passed, if you know anything about him it is probably that he 
killed his wife rather than having any familiarity with his notions of 
interpellation, Ideological State Apparatuses or symptomatic reading. 
So L’Avenir dure longtemps is foregrounded as the principal account of 
Althusser’s life and illnesses because it is the one which incorporates the 
best-remembered moment of his existence: the killing of Hélène. The 
text begins with an account of Hélène’s death, and it’s that account I 
want to focus on now.
An introductory paragraph to L’Avenir dure longtemps concludes: 
‘Voici la scène du meurtre telle que je l’ai vécue’ (p. 33). Althusser refers 
here to the strangling as a murder, even though, as I have said, he was 
never charged with any such crime. The next paragraph begins abruptly: 
‘Soudain, je suis debout, en robe de chambre, au pied de mon lit dans mon 
appartement de l’École normale’ (p. 33). Here we have something much 
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more like a trauma narrative than Althusser’s or even Levinas’s accounts 
of their period as POWs: there is no cause or effect, no beginning 
or background, no smooth chronology which explains the origins and 
meaning of the event. This ‘Soudain’ recurs a few paragraphs later: ‘Et 
soudain je suis frappé de terreur: ses yeux sont interminablement fixes et 
surtout voici qu’un bref bout de langue repose, insolite et paisible, entre 
ses dents et ses lèvres’ (p. 34). Rather than a coherent, joined-up narrative, 
we are given a succession of disconnected moments. In fact, if we had not 
been forewarned that this was a murder scene, at first it might appear to 
be something quite different. One November morning, the speaker is in 
his dressing gown, as is his wife Hélène. She is facing him on the bed, her 
feet resting on the floor, and he is massaging her: ‘Agenouillé tout près 
d’elle, je suis en train de lui masser le cou’ (p. 33). The text insists at first 
that this is a massage: forms of the verb masser recur five times within 
two paragraphs. There is something gentle, even loving about the scene. 
The massage could be a husband’s caring response to his wife’s migraine, 
for example, or perhaps a prelude to sex. What could be nicer, on a dark 
winter morning, than a massage from the man who loves you?
However, if this starts well, it is because it is going to end badly. 
Abruptly, any affectionate, intimate or erotic implications of the massage 
scene disappear: ‘Mais, c’est le devant de son cou que je masse’ (p. 33). 
Rather than gently massaging the back of Hélène’s neck, Althusser is 
pressing his thumbs against her throat. The various forms of the verb 
masser, to massage, are now replaced by forms of étrangler, to strangle. 
In fact, the five uses of masser are exactly matched by the five subsequent 
uses of étrangler. Three of them are in the same paragraph:
Certes j’ai déjà vu des morts, mais de ma vie je n’ai vu le visage d’une 
étranglée. Et pourtant je sais que c’est une étranglée. Mais comment? Je 
me redresse et hurle: j’ai étranglé Hélène. (p. 34)
The two remaining uses repeat the final words of this paragraph: ‘j’ai 
étranglé Hélène’. The massage has become a killing.
This opening sequence in L’Avenir dure longtemps meets the 
expectations we might have of a trauma narrative, which Althusser’s 
accounts of imprisonment during the war noticeably lack. Impressions 
and perceptions succeed one another without explanation and causal 
links. Things happen, meanings change. A tender act becomes a violent 
one.
What does this have to do with the war? Well, at a pivotal moment 
in his account of this scene, Althusser makes a surprising, apparently 
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irrelevant reference to his period as a prisoner of war. He tells us that he 
had often massaged Hélène. How did he know how to give a massage? 
He tells that he had learned how to do it in his POW camp: ‘j’en 
avais appris la technique d’un camarade de captivité, le petit Cler, un 
footballeur professionnel, expert en tout’ (p. 33). In Althusser’s account 
of Hélène’s death, this is the single sentence which I find most perplexing. 
Its importance is highlighted because this is the precise moment in the 
account where tenderness turns to violence. The next sentence marks the 
shift with the word ‘Mais’: ‘Mais cette fois c’est le devant de son cou que 
je masse’ (p. 33). Why does Althusser want to tell us, at this key moment 
in his account, when, and from whom, he learned the art of massage? 
Surely that is what matters least in this brutal scene.
I have been able to discover virtually nothing about the footballer 
to whom Althusser refers here. Cler is mentioned on one subsequent 
occasion in L’Avenir dure longtemps and once in Les Faits, but not at all 
in Althusser’s Journal de captivité, so far as I can see. Louis Cler was 
captain of the football team AS Cannes, and the winning goal scorer on 
the only occasion that team has won the Coupe de France, in 1932. After 
that, he seems to have dropped out of history, emerging only briefly as 
a reference in Althusser’s final, violent encounter with his wife. Cler, 
Althusser tells us, was a professional footballer who was ‘expert en 
tout’. The use of ‘tout’ here is perhaps surprising. Cler was not just a 
cup-winning captain and goal scorer, and someone who could teach you 
how to give an effective massage, but an expert at everything. Maybe 
he also mastered the fine art of killing a wife by pressing one’s thumbs 
against her throat? In any case, he appears to be an enviable figure, 
almost a role model, because he possesses the talents and virtues which 
Althusser perhaps perceived himself to be lacking.
On the occasions when Althusser refers to the footballer, he uses 
only his surname, Cler. He does not mention that Cler’s first name, like 
Althusser’s own, was Louis. It is a common enough first name for the 
coincidence to be unremarkable. We might nevertheless wonder whether 
there is some significance – perhaps an element of identification – in the 
fact that Althusser refers to Cler in the middle of his account of Hélène’s 
death but does not reveal that their first names were the same. It may be 
important in this context that Louis is, for Althusser, a heavily charged 
name. This is because of another wartime story, this time related to the 
First World War. In a passage from L’Avenir dure longtemps, Althusser 
recounts how, before the Great War, his mother became engaged to a 
young man by the name of Louis Althusser. Louis was killed at Verdun, 
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and his mother entered into a disastrous marriage with his older brother, 
giving the name Louis to her son when he was born in October 1918. 
The second Louis Althusser comes to regard himself as an impostor, 
a second-rate substitute for the true love of his mother’s life. This 
imposture is epitomized in the name Louis, in which Althusser sees an 
affirmation, oui, which is not his, and an alien presence, lui, which robs 
him of his own being (p. 57). The name constantly reminds him of his 
failure to achieve a satisfactory identity. In consequence, he describes 
Louis curtly as ‘un prénom que très longtemps, j’eus littéralement en 
horreur’ (p. 56). In this context, it is tempting to see some significance 
in the absence of reference to the fact that Cler, his companion in the 
Second World War, shared the detested forename which Althusser was 
given because of events in the First World War. 
Another factor links Althusser to Cler, even though initially it might 
appear to separate them. In his own account, as discussed above, 
Althusser never tried to escape from his POW camp, being satisfied 
to have devised a scheme whereby he could appear to escape without 
ever actually leaving. On both of the two other occasions he refers 
to Cler, once in L’Avenir dure longtemps and once in Les Faits, the 
footballer is described as a serial escapee. Cler wants to get out while 
Althusser wants to stay put. Yet the fact that Cler escaped several times 
and was captured each time ensures that he remained a prisoner while 
endeavouring to escape. In a parenthesis, Althusser recounts how Cler 
escaped four times; he was captured on the Swiss border, which he 
had crossed but then inadvertently crossed again, back into Germany 
(p. 350). So he escaped but then returned to the place of his captivity. 
This, it seems to me, is not much different, in effect if not in intention, 
from Althusser’s plan to escape without escaping by remaining hidden 
within the camp. And it also evokes again Althusser’s ‘revolving door’ 
theory of ideology which dooms us to return to the place we thought we 
were leaving behind us. There is no escape from ideology, and no escape 
from the camps. Moreover, captivity – in ideology or in a camp – may 
be preferable to freedom, as the subject colludes in his subjection; ‘je m’y 
sentais en sécurité’, as Althusser says of Stalag XA (L’Avenir, p. 126).
My point here is that there is more to the reference to Cler in the 
account of Hélène’s death than Althusser cares to spell out. There is at 
the very least some level of identification between Cler the footballer 
and expert in massage and Althusser the strangler. And as he becomes 
a killer, Althusser reaches back to his time as a prisoner of war, and 
to what he learnt in the camp. Perhaps what he learnt was a lesson in 
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violence, persecution and senselessness which his actual account of 
imprisonment noticeably elides, which his career as a political thinker 
and activist would seek to disavow, and which brutally re-emerges at 
the moment when he kills his wife. There is no escape from the camps; 
and by killing Hélène, Althusser replicates Cler’s action of crossing the 
border back into Germany. He would be institutionalized for most of 
the rest of his life.
Afterlives of Levinas and Althusser
The lives and thought of Althusser and Levinas, and of their contempo-
raries, were decisively marked by the war. The publication of Totalité 
et infini and the killing of Hélène stand under the long shadow of the 
experience of captivity, though finding the connection requires patient 
teasing out of clues scattered through their works.
In Levinas’s case, his ethical project can be seen as an attempt to turn 
the historical reality of the war, and the Holocaust in particular, into an 
ethical impossibility. War, or violence, is not, Levinas insists, ‘le premier 
événement de la rencontre’ (Totalité et infini, p. 218). War presupposes 
the possibility of peace. The original encounter with the Other reveals to 
me both its vulnerability (the physical resistance which it opposes to me is 
practically nil) and its indestructibility (I can destroy others, in the sense 
of other people, but not the Other who is the true object of my violence). 
The first step towards peaceful coexistence is an acknowledgement of 
the Other’s inaugural utterance, which is, according to Levinas, the 
phrase ‘tu ne commettras pas de meurtre’ (Totalité et infini, p. 217), 
Thou shalt not kill. The French form of this is important for Levinas’s 
understanding of the prohibition of murder. The founding communi-
cative act does not transmit an order or a duty, as in the German sollen. 
The future tense in the French version of the commandment is more 
factual: you will not kill, because the Other cannot be killed. Your 
violence fails, it is pointless, you are always already dispossessed of the 
world, and you might as well accept it. In the face of the Other, the self 
sees a command and an appeal, both of which urge it towards peace, 
justice and responsibility. I recognize in the Other, using the biblical 
formula frequently repeated by Levinas, the widow, the orphan and the 
stranger, who calls for respect and care rather than hostility. The ‘first 
event of the encounter’ is not violence, but the enriching possibility of an 
ethical community based upon the acceptance of alterity.
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For Levinas, the discovery of the Other is ethical from its very first 
moment. And in his version of the encounter between self and Other, I 
respond with respect, not violence. However, I do not find in Levinas’s 
writing any compelling reason why the self should respond to the 
interpellation of the Other with respect, why peace is more fundamental 
than war or why violence is merely a derivative, secondary response. 
Eaglestone makes the point succinctly: ‘One cannot prove logically that 
Good and peace underlies Evil and war, one can only believe it: this is 
both the strength and weakness of Levinas’s work’ (The Holocaust and 
the Postmodern, p. 271). The belief that peace is prior to violence is an act 
of faith or hope rather than a provable reality. Levinas writes in Totalité 
et infini that the effort of his book consists in showing how the discovery 
of alterity makes murder impossible (p. 38); but he also acknowledges 
that ‘L’impossibilité de tuer n’est pas réelle, elle est morale’ (Difficile 
liberté, p. 23). So the impossibility of killing the Other does not deny the 
reality of murder and genocide. ‘Car, en réalité, le meurtre est possible’, 
as Levinas curtly explains (Difficile liberté, p. 23). The invulnerability 
of the Other, in some abstract theoretical sense, does not stop murder 
from occurring in real encounters between human subjects, nor does it 
prevent the Holocaust and other atrocities. Levinas’s ethics rely upon a 
simple core narrative for which no factual, empirical claims are made: 
the self encounters the Other in an ethical utopia, and peace reigns.
In Sartre’s version of the same minimal narrative and the reading 
of Hegel which lies behind it, the encounter of self and Other erupts 
immediately into violence. The fundamental relation between conscious-
nesses is conflict, as each seeks recognition by – and, if necessary, the 
death of – the other. In comparison with this bleak description of war as 
endemic in human relations, Levinas’s version of the encounter appears 
as a hopeful fantasy scenario, an enabling ethical narrative in which 
the Holocaust could not have taken place. The future tense of ‘tu ne 
commettras pas de meurtre’ acquires a predictive force. It expresses 
a hope as much as a commandment: the Other should and will be 
preserved, genocide is impossible – if only morally. Levinas’s account of 
the encounter can be read, then, as a disavowal of the Holocaust, in the 
psychoanalytical sense: it blots it out, denies that it can have taken place, 
while also commemorating the traumatic event which founds and tears 
asunder the fantasy. These alternating rhythms of ethical optimism and 
the knowledge of real atrocity perhaps explain why, when the Holocaust 
does break through to the explicit level of the text, it does so with an 
urgency all the more shocking for having been kept at bay. This can 
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be seen, for example, in Levinas’s breathless, distraught account of the 
twentieth century:
Siècle qui en trente ans a connu deux guerres mondiales, les totalitarismes 
de droite et de gauche, hitlérisme et stalinisme, Hiroshima, le goulag, 
les génocides d’Auschwitz et du Cambodge. Siècle qui s’achève dans la 
hantise du retour de tout ce que ces noms barbares signifient. Souffrance 
et mal imposés de façon délibérée, mais qu’aucune raison ne limitait dans 
l’exaspération de la raison devenue politique et détachée de toute éthique.
Que parmi ces événements, l’Holocauste du peuple juif sous le règne 
de Hitler nous paraisse le paradigme de cette souffrance humaine gratuite 
où le mal apparut dans son horreur diabolique, n’est peut-être pas 
un sentiment subjectif. La disproportion entre la souffrance et toute 
théodicée se montra à Auschwitz avec une clarté qui crève les yeux. (Entre 
nous, pp. 114–15)
For Levinas, the Holocaust provokes thought and impedes it (Entre 
nous, p. 115). His work echoes the Holocaust in its terminology and in 
the traumatized textuality of his writing. It also disavows its founding 
trauma through the utopian scenario of an ethical encounter in which 
otherness is respected and peace maintained. Murder is banal but also 
impossible in this account. Levinas’s ethics teach us that we can harm 
others, but not the Other who is the real target of our violence. This isn’t 
much use to Hélène, who died at her husband’s hands. 
As for Louis Cler, the little footballer, expert in everything, who 
taught Althusser the art of massage and never quite succeeded in 
escaping from captivity despite his repeated attempts: he deserves a final 
mention. Cler died in 1950, as the result of an illness contracted while he 
was a prisoner of war.2 So, despite his best efforts to escape, even the end 
of the war did not release him from the Stalag.
 2 Information given at <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Cler> [accessed 
11/08/2017].
Comment admettre la guerre?
(Levinas, Œuvres 3, p. 39)
The previous chapter discussed how the Second World War and the 
Holocaust echo through Levinas’s post-war writing even though he 
mentions them only sparingly. ‘Levinas’s philosophy is one of the 
cinders of the Holocaust’, as Eaglestone puts it (The Holocaust and 
the Postmodern, p. 255). Levinas’s texts do not theorize or seek to 
explain the Holocaust, but they bear its terrible imprint. This chapter 
brings together two issues in the understanding of Levinas’s work: 
his reticence about the Second World War, and his much-discussed 
hostility to art. These issues come together because his posthumous 
archive gave unexpected evidence that he aspired to be a novelist 
even while condemning the mystifications of art; and, moreover, that 
the novels he attempted to write were concerned, precisely, with the 
experience of war.
In a nutshell, Emmanuel Levinas, perhaps the greatest philosopher 
of ethics in twentieth-century France, wanted to be a novelist. The 
publication of the third volume of his Œuvres in 2013 reveals that he 
drafted substantial fragments of two novels, both concerned with the 
experience of the Second World War, entitled (perhaps) Éros and La 
Dame de chez Wepler.1 A number of questions immediately spring to 
mind. Why did he begin these novels, and why did he abandon them? 
 1 The title Levinas intended to give to the longest of the two fragments is 
unclear. For discussion, see Calin and Chalier, ‘Préface’, in Levinas, Carnets de 
captivité et autres inédits, in Œuvres 1, p. 15. For simplicity, I refer to the fragment 
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And why, to those of us who have been concerned with Levinas’s work, 
is this so surprising?
There are a number of reasons why it should not be surprising. 
Literature played an important part in Levinas’s education and intellectual 
development. Studying the dark metaphysical investigations contained 
in Dostoevsky’s novels as a child in his native Lithuania initially awoke 
his interest in philosophy.2 Moreover, Levinas’s early work on phenom-
enology suggested at least the possibility of a link between philosophy 
and literature. Levinas was instrumental in introducing Husserlian 
phenomenology into France, first with his thesis Théorie de l’intuition 
dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (1930) and then with his translation 
of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931), undertaken with Gabrielle 
Peiffer. Phenomenology, with its interest in the sensory experience of 
the material world, readily lends itself to fictional exploration, as Sartre 
had magnificently demonstrated in his novel La Nausée (1938). So the 
phenomenologist and the novelist are predisposed to be close allies. 
Levinas certainly entertained literary ambitions in his early years. After 
his death in 1995 it was discovered that he had carefully preserved a 
large body of poetry which he had written in Russian as an adolescent 
and young adult. His mature philosophical work abounds with literary 
allusions; and his Carnets de captivité, published in the first volume of 
his Œuvres complètes, show that, during his five years as a prisoner of 
War between 1940 and 1945 – years which were crucial to his personal 
and intellectual development – literature was constantly on his mind. 
His Carnets quote from, discuss or refer to, among others, Claudel, 
Ariosto, Dostoevsky, Proust, Balzac, Vigny, Rabelais, Tolstoy, Ibsen, 
Giraudoux, Baudelaire, Gide, Zola, Hugo, Céline, Montherlant, Conan 
Doyle, Dickens, Nerval, Goethe, Lamartine, Mallarmé, Bloy, Corneille, 
Racine, Poe, Lawrence and Shakespeare.
Literature, then, was Levinas’s natural habitat; and for French-
language philosophers of his generation, there was no necessary 
opposition between philosophy and literature. The philosopher Henri 
Bergson had won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927; and even 
before the publication of L’Etre et le néant in 1943, Sartre had already 
established himself as an enviable model of the philosopher-novelist who 
could navigate with ease between literary and philosophical worlds. 
Levinas saw himself in similar terms. In an entry in his Carnets de 
captivité, he anticipates three strands to his future work:
 2 See Poirié, Emmanuel Levinas: qui êtes-vous?, pp. 69–70.
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Mon œuvre à faire:
Philosophique: 1) L’être et le néant




 1) Triste opulence
 2) L’irréalité et l’amour
Critique:
 Proust
(Carnets de captivité, p. 74)
This indicates that, for Levinas the POW, there is no inevitable choice 
to be made between literature and philosophy. The Carnets refer to 
Triste opulence (the alternative title to Éros) and La Dame de chez 
Wepler, suggesting that both novels were already on his mind during 
his captivity. The third volume of his Œuvres gives both versions 
continues and versions génétiques of the surviving fragments of the two 
novels, which were found among Levinas’s papers after his death. The 
longest text, that of Éros, focuses on a character named Paul Rondeau, 
beginning during the phoney war, and progressing through the defeat 
of France, captivity and liberation. Different names are used, and it is 
unclear whether the author was undecided over what name to give his 
protagonist or whether different characters are involved. In the shorter 
fragment, La Dame de chez Wepler, a character named Simon (or 
Roland) Riberat spends an evening in Paris before being sent to the front 
in May 1940. The manuscripts of both fragments are heavily corrected, 
leaving multiple inconsistencies, ambiguities, illegible passages and 
unexplained elements. There is no precise indication as to when these 
drafts were written or revised. Significantly, though, there is evidence 
that Levinas continued working on Éros at least until the early 1960s, 
during the period when he was finalizing what would become one of his 
most important philosophical works, and perhaps his defining book, 
Totalité et infini (1961).3
There is, then, plenty of scope for future research here. A number of 
important questions have hardly begun to be addressed:4
 3 This dating is possible because Levinas recycled printed paper which 
sometimes referred to forthcoming meetings. See Éros, littérature et philosophie, 
p. 62.
 4 Initial work on Levinas’s wartime and war-related inédits was begun at a 
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1) First, there is a series of chronological and biographical questions. 
The evidence here is thin. Éros ends with the return of a POW to 
Paris after five years’ imprisonment; there is reason to believe that 
Levinas was still working on the novel until the late 1950s and early 
1960s. So on a minimal estimation, his work on the novel began 
during the 1940s and lasted at least until 1960. When did he begin, 
and when and why did he stop? Further investigation of Levinas’s 
unpublished archive may shed more light on these matters.
2) Second, there is the question of the relation between these literary 
fragments and Levinas’s philosophical trajectory. It is well known 
that Levinas published little original philosophical work from 
the late 1940s until 1961. Even so, during this period he lectured 
regularly at Jean Wahl’s Collège philosophique; and he was 
developing the ideas which would culminate in Totalité et infini 
while also, in all likelihood, continuing to envisage a literary strand 
to his future career.5 The ideas on sex and love in the two novel 
fragments do not simply repeat material from Le Temps et l’autre 
(1947) and Totalité et infini (1961), but nor are they separate from 
them.
3) Third, what is the status of literary fiction in Levinas’s œuvre and his 
self-understanding? What are the differences and the intersections 
which join and separate a literary project from a philosophical one? 
In the passage from the Carnets de captivité quoted above, Levinas 
suggests that philosophy, literature and criticism were distinct but 
intertwined aspects of the same career plan. In his mature writing, 
there is still an element of criticism, but overt literary aspirations 
would disappear altogether, and all else would be overwhelmed by 
Levinas’s growing, unstoppable momentum as a philosopher.
It is the third of these questions with which I am primarily concerned 
here. The publication of Levinas’s novel fragments was so surprising 
because to associate Levinas with fiction now seems absurd. It is true 
that many of us have pondered over what a Levinasian approach to 
literature might be; but we have done this in the knowledge that it had 
to be attempted, to some extent at least, despite what Levinas said about 
literature rather than because of it. In the words of Jill Robbins, ‘Levinas 
speaks very rarely about the literary, and when he does it is almost always 
conference held in 2010. See Cohen-Levinas (ed.), Levinas et l’expérience de la 
captivité.
 5 Levinas’s unpublished lectures at the Collège philosophique are now available 
in Parole et silence et autres conférences inédites, in Œuvres 2.
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in dismissive terms’ (Altered Reading, p. 39).6 The stumbling block for 
literary scholars inspired by Levinas and aspiring to be Levinasian is the 
article he published in Les Temps modernes in 1948, ‘La Réalité et son 
ombre’. The article attacks the mystification propagated by art; yet it 
was written – it now appears – during a period when Levinas still had 
ambitions to be an author of fiction.
Fiction as mystification
The author of ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ has a low view of art. Les Temps 
modernes, founded in 1945, became one of the principal outlets of Sartre 
and Beauvoir’s conception of the committed artist and intellectual. But 
Levinas’s article pays no lip service to the artist’s witting or unwitting 
commitment; nor is there a Heideggerian celebration of the world-
revealing capability of the prestigious art work. Art is depicted, on the 
contrary, as ignorant, irresponsible and immoral. It creates a shadow 
world which bewitches and confuses. Only the critic can redeem this 
mad, boundless, borderless world by restoring it to the intelligible order 
of the self-possessed mind:
La critique, en interprétant, choisira et limitera. Mais si, comme choix, elle 
demeure en deçà du monde qui s’est fixé dans l’art, elle l’aura réintroduit 
dans le monde intelligible où elle se tient et qui est la vraie patrie de 
l’esprit. […] L’interprétation de la critique parle en pleine possession de 
soi, franchement, par le concept qui est comme le muscle de l’esprit. (‘La 
Réalité et son ombre’, in Les Imprévus de l’histoire, pp. 147–48) 
The critic does not enter fully and recklessly into the enigmatic, 
equivocal world of the art work, but chooses instead to interpret, limit 
and restrict so that order and intelligibility are reinstated. The problem 
for Levinasian-minded critics is that, in this account, the art work 
absolutely does not provide the occasion for a (good) encounter with 
alterity. A number of strategies have been adopted in order to argue 
that, in one way or another, Levinas did not mean what he says here. 
Levinas may have said it, but his work as a whole does not endorse it. 
His later philosophical texts are full of literary references, suggesting 
 6 On Levinas’s relation to literature, see also Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism: 
Reading after Levinas, pp. 98–128; and Davis, After Poststructuralism: Reading, 
Stories and Theory, pp. 81–102.
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that his hostility to art was not as extreme as he presents it in ‘La Réalité 
et son ombre’; or other essays, for example on Proust, Agnon, Celan or 
Jabès, are much more sympathetic to art and its ethical potential.7 In Le 
Temps et l’autre, Levinas even suggests at one point that the whole of 
philosophy may be contained in the works of Shakespeare (p. 60). One 
way or another, a Levinasian art criticism is made possible by following 
the spirit of his work as a whole rather than the letter of ‘La Réalité et 
son ombre’.
Another way of neutralizing the force of Levinas’s essay is to suggest 
that its attack is on art rather than literature in particular.8 This is not 
the case. Although Levinas refers through much of the essay to art, some 
passages refer specifically to literary fiction. He describes, for example, 
how characters in novels become ‘êtres enfermés, prisonniers’ (p. 140). 
They are seen from the outside, denied freedom, bound to the endless 
repetition of the same gestures. It may be no coincidence that Levinas 
refers here to Proust’s La Prisonnière, the volume of À la recherche du 
temps perdu in which Marcel effectively imprisons Albertine in order 
to control her actions and proclivities more effectively; and, with the 
memory of his own five years of captivity no doubt still in his mind, 
the passage may invite a link between the prisoner of war and the 
character in Proust’s novel. Both are subjects without freedom, their 
inherent otherness suppressed. Levinas’s essay implicitly distinguishes 
between two forms of limitation, or indeed simplification: one good, 
and one bad. The bad limitation is what happens in fiction, which locks 
the free subject into a fixed destiny; the good limitation is achieved in 
philosophical criticism, which cuts through the equivocations of art to 
reassert the authority of the self-possessed mind over material which 
resists it. The false order of the novel is bad; the schematizing order of 
the intellect is good.
Levinas does make one concession to literature when, in the final 
paragraph of his essay, he describes a trend in modern writing:
La littérature moderne, décriée pour son intellectualisme et qui remonte 
d’ailleurs à Shakespeare, au Molière du Don Juan [sic], à Goethe, à 
Dostoïevski – manifeste certainement une conscience de plus en plus nette 
de cette insuffisance foncière de l’idolâtrie artistique. Par cet intellectu-
alisme l’artiste refuse d’être artiste seulement: non pas parce qu’il veut 
 7 See the essays collected in Levinas’s Noms propres.
 8 See for example Cohen-Levinas, ‘L’Instant littéraire et la condition d’otage: 
Levinas, Proust et la signification corporelle du temps’, p. 62.
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défendre une thèse ou une cause, mais parce qu’il a besoin d’interpréter 
lui-même ses mythes. (‘La Réalité et son ombre’, p. 148)
This concession is at best double-edged, however. Modern literature 
may show signs of breaking from idolatry, but it does so precisely 
insofar as the artist ceases to be (just) an artist: ‘l’artiste refuse d’être 
artiste seulement’. In other words, to become a good novelist, you 
should stop being (just) a novelist and start interpreting your own 
stories, lifting them out of the morass of the equivocal into the light 
of the concept. The good novelist is good to the extent that s/he is no 
longer a novelist.
No one (so far as I know) agrees with or is persuaded by Levinas’s 
argument in ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ (which is far from clear in any 
case). So why do we remain concerned by it? If Levinas had sunk into 
honourable obscurity after 1948, we would certainly not be bothering 
with the essay now. But because he became such a major figure in 
post-war ethics, his condemnation of art stands as a conundrum 
worth confronting, particularly when many of us are involved with 
considering what ethical criticism (and especially Levinasian ethical 
criticism) might entail. In the present context, Levinas’s essay becomes 
even more problematic when we bear in mind that, during the precise 
period when he was condemning the mystificatory simplifications of 
fiction – its collusion with the imprisonment of the subject – we 
now know that Levinas himself was considering and actively working 
towards a career as a novelist. Levinas implicitly condemns his own 
literary ambitions. There is, he tells us, ‘quelque chose de méchant et 
d’égoïste et de lâche dans la jouissance artistique. Il y a des époques où 
l’on peut en avoir honte, comme de festoyer en pleine peste’ (‘La Réalité 
et son ombre’, p. 146). Artists and their audiences should be ashamed 
of themselves and recognize their social unacceptability. In Levinas’s 
words, ‘Le poète s’exile lui-même de la cité’ (‘La Réalité et son ombre’, 
p. 146). There is no need for the poet to be banished from the city, as 
in Plato’s Republic; if s/he has any moral conscience or sense of civic 
responsibility, s/he will leave of his or her own accord. The year 1948 
is not the moment, Levinas suggests, to waste one’s time irresponsibly 
in composing literature. So what kind of novels was Levinas planning 
to write at this most unpropitious moment?
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Towards a practice of fiction
Éros can be divided into three distinct parts. In the first, a character 
named Rondeau is called up to active service and then taken prisoner 
in the German offensive of June 1940. The second section, beginning 
in spring 1942, describes scenes from captivity, involving a character 
named Tromel, or later Tramuel. In the third section, a character named 
Jean-Paul arrives back in Paris after five years’ absence, presumably 
because he has been a prisoner of war. There is no indication of whether 
Rondeau, Tromel, Tramuel and Jean-Paul are meant to be the same 
person, their author being provisionally undecided about his name, or 
whether they are supposed to be quite separate characters. La Dame de 
chez Wepler is more focused. In May 1940, Simon (or perhaps Roland) 
Riberat has been called to the front, three weeks after the internment 
of his wife on grounds of mental health. Spending an evening in Paris, 
he recalls an occasion some years earlier when he was attracted to a 
high-class prostitute but did not consummate his desire for her. His 
search for sex is curtailed when he unexpectedly encounters a junior 
employee from his office and spends time discussing work matters with 
him and his family.
Both these sketches share relatively precise dating which situates 
them in relation to the Second World War. In the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, one might risk the suggestion that there is something 
about the war which both provokes Levinas’s experiment in fiction and 
stands in the way of its completion. One of the most interesting features 
of Éros and La Dame de chez Wepler is that they reflect on war, on the 
experience of war and on the inability to experience it, the impossibility 
of assimilating it to the subject’s familiar world. ‘Comment admettre la 
guerre?’, asks the narrator of Éros (Œuvres 3, p. 39). This goes beyond 
suggesting that the war was unnecessary and avoidable; it also implies 
that it threatens fundamental world views. The use of nous in the 
following lines is particularly significant. It draws both the narrator and 
the reader into the situation; and, at a biographical level, we might recall 
that Levinas had been a naturalized Frenchman since 1931, and that, 
at the time of his capture in June 1940, he was defending his adopted 
homeland in French uniform:9
 9 As discussed in the previous chapter, serving in the army at the time of the 
French defeat probably saved Levinas’s life. He spent the rest of the war as a POW 
whereas, as a civilian, he risked being stripped of his citizenship, arrested, deported 
and murdered like other naturalized French Jews.
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Nous ne manquions pas seulement de chars, d’avions et de plans d’état-
major. Malgré la proximité de la guerre de 14 qui avait tué des millions 
d’hommes mais pas une habitude, il nous manquait la perception 
même de la guerre. Celle de 14 devait être la dernière guerre, même 
les plus réalistes, les plus hostiles aux rêveries pacifistes, le croyaient 
inconsciemment. (Œuvres 3, p. 39)
The Great War of 1914–1918 led to innumerable deaths, but it did not 
destroy ‘une habitude’. In other words, France survived, diminished but 
intact in its beliefs and its way of life. The war to end all wars killed 
individuals, but not the world to which they belonged and in which they 
believed. The opening pages of Éros contain a hymn of praise to a stable, 
immutable France capable of surviving anything that might befall it: 
‘Qu’est-ce que la France? Une immense stabilité. Toutes les formes de la 
vie arrivées à leur plénitude comme des fruits éternellement mûrs dans 
un verger miraculeux. Perfection d’un peuple sédentaire purifiée de tout 
souvenir de l’existence nomade’ (Œuvres 3, p. 38).
No less a figure than Jean-Luc Nancy has suspected these and 
following lines of embodying a Hugolian fantasy of a France that was 
fixed in time, belief and ideology.10 They might also remind us of De 
Gaulle’s invention, in his speech of 25 August 1944 marking the liberation 
of Paris, of the myth of ‘la France éternelle’: a timeless, unchanging 
entity unified in its struggle against Nazism. Crucially, though, what 
Levinas’s fragment narrates is the collapse of this myth: it turns out to 
be illusory, as the war shatters the deep conviction in an unchanging, 
unchangeable idea of France. The opening line of Éros declares that 
‘En somme le front se stabilise’ (Œuvres 3, p. 37); but this turns out to 
be disastrously untrue: ‘Depuis trois semaines le front ne se stabilisait 
pas. La vieille terre de France est devenue du sable mouvant. Le pied 
n’arrivait à trouver nulle part un point d’appui. L’ennemi s’infiltrait à 
travers les crevasses invisibles du sol’ (p. 37). Continuity and order are 
falling apart in what is called ‘ce bouleversement du cadre même de la 
réalité’ (p. 37). What is occurring here is more than a military defeat. 
It is the collapse of the framework though which the world could be 
known and experienced. Rondeau’s exposure to the fog of war and 
captivity illustrates this. He is a successful, respectable married man 
with three children, ‘ce chef-d’œuvre de la création que l’on appelle 
 10 See Nancy, ‘Éros, le roman d’Emmanuel Levinas?’, p. 111. Nancy also 
provides an introduction to Levinas’s literary work in ‘Préface: “L’intrigue littéraire 
de Levinas”’.
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le Français moyen’ (p. 39), whose life makes perfect sense: ‘Jusqu’à 
présent il trouvait des casiers pour ranger les choses qu’il voyait et des 
mots qu’il entendait’ (p. 42). But, ‘Depuis le 10 mai, Rondeau flairait le 
chaos’ (p. 39). All of a sudden, the world he knew no longer exists: ‘il a 
eu pour la première fois l’impression que la France sur laquelle reposait 
toute son humanité toute sa dignité, cette France dans laquelle la réalité 
s’ordonnait et se tenait que la France se défaisait’ (p. 42).
What is at stake in this war and in this text is the epistemological, 
experiential, ontological and moral status of reality itself. The war 
threatens not only lives, but also every framework within which those 
lives can be lived and understood. What, though, has actually changed? 
At the end of Éros, Jean-Paul returns to Paris after five years’ absence 
and finds it pretty much as he left it: ‘Jean-Paul avait l’impression d’avoir 
rouvert un vieux volume de son enfance. […] Les choses se dessinaient 
dans leur stabilité impassible’ (p. 54). Everything has changed; nothing 
has changed. The war is an event, not just an occurrence, because 
it affects everything while allowing the appearance that everything 
remains just as it was.
La Dame de chez Wepler revolves around the same tension between 
order and disorder, freedom and (welcome) constraint. Soon to be 
sent to the front, Riberat spends an evening in Paris. He recalls an 
occasion three years earlier when he glimpsed and desired a woman 
he presumed to be a high-class prostitute, but did nothing about it for 
sensible financial reasons. Now, though, he feels a sense of liberation. 
Twice alluding to Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, he feels that ‘tout 
est permis’ (pp. 122, 123). Normal rules and normal considerations are 
suspended. Desire has been let out of the bag. To put it crudely, Riberat 
sets out in search of sex on the eve of his call-up which, he knows, 
may lead to his death. So he can now seek pleasure without conscience 
and without consequences: ‘Riberat se sentit une jeunesse immorale, 
le pouvoir d’agir sans souffrir des contrecoups, le don des plaisirs 
sans mauvaise conscience’ (p. 122). In the event, though, (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) the prostitute he glimpsed three years previously is no 
longer to be found at the same location. As desire flows freely, let loose 
in the streets of pre-Occupation Paris, Riberat is called back to order 
when he is addressed by a junior employee from the office where he 
works. He abruptly returns to a familiar, safer world:
On a parlé affaires de bureau, collègues mobilisés, progrès accomplis 
par l’œuvre. […] Le chaos où Riberat se sentait jusqu’alors se dissiper 
s’évanouit. Une forme solide le revêtit de nouveau. […] Maintenant, il 
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pourra rentrer, se coucher, lire au lit avant de s’endormir un poème de 
Leconte de Lisle. […] Une douce tristesse l’envahit. Il pensa à sa femme, 
à la France, à lui-même si joliment détaché des choses, mais ayant tout de 
même une modeste fonction sociale et militaire à son petit poste. Ah qu’il 
était doux de se sentir encadré et intégré, aller quelque part. (pp. 126–27)
Riberat might die at the front; but this now seems to be a small price 
to pay if his death makes sense. Order has won out over chaos. Riberat 
can return to his habits, play his modest role in his little post and die if 
necessary. It is all worthwhile, he feels, if the ‘cadre’ has been restored 
(‘il était doux de se sentir encadré et intégré’), giving him back a sense of 
belonging and direction.
As in Éros, war represents a radical, catastrophic disruption of an 
ordered, familiar, intelligible world. La Dame de chez Wepler adds to 
this an association with madness. The first sentence of the text states 
abruptly that ‘La femme de Simon était folle’ (p. 117). Before she was 
diagnosed as insane, Riberat had endeavoured to maintain his wife’s 
secure place in a world which made sense to him. The second paragraph 
opposes his wife’s ‘extravagances’, ‘idées bizarres’ or ‘excentricités’ with 
his own faltering ‘raisonnement’; there should be a ‘frontière’ separating 
sanity from madness; and even though the wife is ‘bouleversée’, she 
is provisionally contained within ‘le cadre de la maison familiale’; the 
couple are still engaged in ‘un jeu où il existe des règles, porteur de toute 
la dignité d’une Madame Simon’ (p. 117). The problem with madness 
is that it crosses frontiers, breaks frameworks and ignores rules. The 
quick transition from Madame Simon’s madness to the context of war 
in Levinas’s fragment suggests a link between them. Both pose the 
problem of an existence in which the norms of the familiar world no 
longer apply, with all the accompanying terror and exhilaration. Amidst 
all this, Riberat’s freedom is double-edged: it is both a freedom from the 
constraints which he has accepted in the peacetime, conjugal world, but 
also a freedom to return to the familiar, known and knowable world 
from which the proximity to insanity had estranged him: ‘Voici que 
de nouveau un arbre devenait un arbre sans équivoque, sans parenté 
avec ce qui n’est pas un arbre, le pain simplement comestible, le soleil 
brûlant, les femmes désirables …’ (p. 118). At last, a tree is just a tree 
again. Compared to the insanity of his wife, the madness of war seems 
intelligible and appealing: ‘[la guerre] faisait désormais partie des choses 
définies’ (p. 118).
Both Éros and La Dame de chez Wepler contrast an ordered, 
intelligible world with an alluring, disturbing chaos in which ‘tout est 
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permis’. The allusion to Dostoevsky is important here. The possibility 
that, in a valueless world, everything is permitted worries Levinas just 
as it worried Camus during the same period.11 If there is no moral order, 
no divine or rational sense to the world, then how do we tell right from 
wrong? Camus would try to deal with this problem by evoking the values 
of revolt and solidarity; Levinas would resist it with his insistence on 
the subject’s limitless responsibility to the Other. What is fascinating 
about fiction, for Levinas at least, is that it gives licence to explore the 
dizzying, terrifying moment when ‘tout est permis’: the moral rules and 
intellectual frameworks have vanished. In Éros, war entails not only 
the anecdotal ‘malheurs des êtres’ but, much more significantly, ‘ce 
bouleversement du cadre même de la réalité’ (p. 37). In La Dame de chez 
Wepler the madness of Riberat’s wife confronts him with ‘un vide peuplé 
de fantômes, de mots, de semblants de pensée’ (p. 117). Philosophically 
speaking, the issue here is epistemological and ontological: the world 
of peace and sanity is stable and assured, knowable because it bows to 
concepts which constitute its sense. Madness and war force the subject 
to glimpse an incompatible (dis)order in which there are no fixed points.
The terms in which Levinas’s two novel fragments conceive madness 
and (the madness of) war irresistibly evoke the characterization of 
art in ‘La Réalité et son ombre’. In his article Levinas condemns art 
because it creates a shadow world which stands outside the order of 
knowledge, and which mimics and undermines the world we recognize. 
Only the critic can redeem art by limiting it and making it once more 
intelligible. The different roles assigned in ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ to 
the critic and the artist are replicated in the fragments by the opposition 
between the breakdown of order and the desire for its restitution. The 
crucial difference is that Éros and La Dame de chez Wepler know that 
the limiting schemas applied by the Levinasian critic are false, and even 
violently so, because they tell a lie about the real, preferring bourgeois 
bad faith to an encounter with radical mystery.
I would risk the suggestion here that Levinas’s experiments in fiction 
were curtailed in part because they embody an insight which the 
Levinas of ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ was anxiously resisting, namely 
the suspicion that the disorder envisaged by the literary author may be 
more true, more fundamental and more compelling than the limiting 
 11 See for example, Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942), in Œuvres complètes I, 
p. 266, where Camus famously insists that ‘Tout est permis ne signifie pas que rien 
n’est défendu’.
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order found by the critic. At the same time, Levinas may have found a 
way of resolving this tension by incorporating the novelist’s exploration 
of chaotic otherness into the texture of philosophy itself. It is likely 
that Levinas finally gave up his literary ambitions in the 1960s, perhaps 
because his astonishing first philosophical masterpiece, Totalité et infini, 
began to find means of overcoming the choice between the shadow-
world of art and the conceptual clarity expected of philosophy.
Philosophy and/at war
Totalité et infini was the culmination of Levinas’s philosophical work 
during the 1940s and 1950s. My suggestion here is that it is also the 
culmination of his literary work undertaken during the same period. His 
two attempts at fiction both revolve around the war and the difficulty of 
making sense of it as it throws into doubt the subject’s understanding 
of its own experience. This is an issue for both fiction and philosophy; 
accordingly, it is not long before war makes its appearance in Totalité 
et infini. The previous chapter attempted to show that war appears in 
the opening words of Totalité et infini as a key reference point which 
throws everything else into turmoil, including fixed ethical positions 
and even the philosophical subject’s ability to formulate any proposition 
with confidence and clarity. War destabilizes everything, semantically 
and ethically; it is both a signifier of damage and a damaged signifier, 
unsettled and unsettling. As soon as it is mentioned, the authorial 
subject is scattered, no longer knowing how to formulate its contra-
dictory, self-contesting insights.
Another way of putting this is to say that war condemns writing to the 
status of fiction. It disturbs the hegemony of reason and the distinction 
between art and philosophy. When Levinas states that war ‘projette 
d’avance son ombre sur les actes des hommes’ (Totalité et infini, p. 5), the 
use of the word ombre evokes ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ and its condem-
nation of art. In that essay, art is described as ‘l’événement même de 
l’obscurcissement, une tombée de la nuit, un envahissement de l’ombre’ 
(p. 126). Art suspends knowledge and belongs to an ontological order 
quite separate from the reign of reason. Éros, La Dame de chez Wepler 
and finally Totalité et infini suggest that the same can be said of war, 
and perhaps also of ethics. Art creates and inhabits a shadow world; war 
sheds darkness on the meaning of human acts; and now philosophy too 
must inhabit the obscure, ambiguous places where knowledge no longer 
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holds sway. If fiction is for Levinas, as Jean-Luc Nancy insists, a relation 
with mystery,12 then from now on, philosophy will also occupy the place 
of fiction as a space of encounter with the unknown.
Levinas has become, perhaps, a little too familiar. Terms such as le 
visage, the face-to-face, the il y a and the ethical encounter with alterity 
have been made into useable concepts which roll off the tongue, separated 
now from the strange textual universe in which they originated. With so 
many introductions available, you don’t need to read Levinas to know 
what he thinks. The great gain brought by the publication of Levinas’s 
two novel fragments is that they restore an unfamiliar Levinas, one 
whose thought and writing have not yet been settled, simplified and 
assimilated. In the century before Levinas began work on his novels, 
Nietzsche expressed astonishment that Socrates, his great philosophical 
opponent, had turned to music at the end of his life (see The Birth of 
Tragedy, pp. 79–80). How could Socrates, who had banished the poets 
from the ideal city, himself aspire to be an artist? Perhaps – he nearly 
concedes – Nietzsche has not yet fully understood his implacable enemy. 
And Socrates the musician is akin to Levinas the novelist. The author 
of ‘La Réalité et son ombre’ condemned fiction because it turned living 
human beings into mere prisoners. In Levinas’s fiction, meanwhile, 
characters prefer forms of imprisonment to the radical unknowability 
to which war, and madness, and the madness of war, expose them. If 
Levinas gave up on the project of writing fiction in the narrowest sense, 
his later writing endlessly endeavoured to explore the most unsettling, 
darkest places of human pain and aspiration which are also the domains 
of the novel.
The reference to war, and to the Second World War in particular, 
is vital and intensely problematic in Levinas’s post-war practice. He 
attempts to show that peace is primary, that war is not the true meaning 
of the encounter between self and Other, that murder and a fortiori 
genocide always fail, ethically, in their aim to eradicate alterity. Yet 
his texts are also grounded in the terrible knowledge that murder is an 
everyday occurrence, and that the ethical failure of genocide does not 
outweigh its all-too-literal reality. It is, then, particularly striking that 
he envisaged writing about war in what was for him the self-censored 
medium of literary fiction. Fiction becomes for him a strange space, 
one which he publicly repudiated but privately pursued, as he worked 
on texts that would be unfinished, perhaps unfinishable, and certainly 
 12 Nancy, ‘Éros, le roman d’Emmanuel Levinas?’, pp. 123–24.
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unpublished in his lifetime. Fiction is perhaps for him the ultimate trace 
of war because it is the only place where unspeakable things can finally 
be said.
section d
Surviving, Witnessing  
and Telling Tales

[Q]ui dit quoi à qui, au juste?
(Derrida, Donner la mort, p. 175)
When reading Semprun’s prodigious literary output, it is hard to forget 
his remarkable life, from exile and imprisonment in Buchenwald to 
the clandestine struggle against Franco’s regime, expulsion from the 
Communist Party, success as an author and a period as Minister of 
Culture in post-fascist Spain. His work is almost invariably, irresistibly 
treated as a form of testimonial life writing, tied to his experience, 
especially (though not exclusively) to his experience of Buchenwald, and 
also more broadly to his standing as a pre-eminent witness to European 
history and politics in the twentieth century. To dissociate the man from 
his work might seem, Régis Debray suggests, simply absurd (‘Semprun en 
spirale’, p. 9). Semprun was an extraordinary person whose traumatized 
and resilient engagement with the dense fabric of reality is reflected in 
his writing.
Semprun, then, is one of the great literary witnesses of the twentieth 
century, in particular to the experience and aftermath of the Second 
World War. He is comparable in stature to Elie Wiesel, with whom 
he published the book Se taire est impossible. And, as with Wiesel, 
his fictional output is sometimes overlooked because of the power and 
importance of his personal testimony. The next chapter will examine 
how, in Wiesel’s case, fictional storytelling is integral to his literary 
production even though it sits uneasily with his commitment to bearing 
witness. This chapter examines Semprun’s turn to literature in the 






tense space of witnessing and invention, telling and not telling, exposure 
and reticence.
What can literature do?
To begin, I shall concentrate on two early texts, both produced before 
Semprun’s expulsion from the Communist Party: the semi-fictional 
Le Grand Voyage and his contribution to the symposium ‘Que peut 
la littérature?’ What is at stake in both these texts are the capabilities, 
limits and value of literature at a transitional moment in Semprun’s life 
and career as an author, and at a tense moment in French literary and 
intellectual culture.
In 1964 the French communist student newspaper Clarté organized a 
symposium in Paris with the title ‘Que peut la littérature?’ The aim was 
to encourage discussion of the role of literature in a specifically Western 
European, anti-capitalist context. In schematic terms, the symposium 
set proponents of committed literature, notably Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Simone de Beauvoir, against the champions of avant-garde literary 
experimentation such as Jean Ricardou. Sartre is undoubtedly the senior 
figure and the star of the show, but in 1964 his cultural capital was on 
the wane (though it would rise again during and following the events of 
May 1968). In philosophy, structuralism was replacing existentialism as 
the dominant intellectual force; and in literature, the experimentalism 
of the nouveau roman, associated with Alain Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie 
Sarraute and Michel Butor, was replacing the earnestness of Sartrean 
commitment. So the symposium attempted to confront this critical 
moment in French cultural history. How is the role of literature to be 
understood in a context where commitment and experimentation appear 
to be in dispute over the soul of art?
As a militant communist, Semprun is brought on as an advocate 
of committed literature, but he carefully avoids the polarized terms 
which the debate appears to invite. His initial answer to the question 
‘What can literature do?’ is an abrupt ‘nothing’: ‘la littérature ne peut 
rien. Davantage même: son rôle, sa fonction, son sens, ne s’enracinent 
pas et ne débouchent pas non plus dans un pouvoir quelconque sur la 
société, sur l’histoire’ (Que peut la littérature?, p. 29; emphasis original). 
Semprun goes on to defend formal experimentation in literature against 
Soviet and Chinese communist attempts to shackle it to utilitarian, 
political ends. He welcomes the rise of the nouveau roman as an attempt 
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to question the forms and nature of literature. The twist to his argument 
is that he does not envisage the formal experimentalism of the nouveau 
roman as being in any way incompatible with Marxist commitment; 
on the contrary, he sees the two as intimately bound together. A key 
thread to Semprun’s contribution is the linkage between Marxism and 
literary experimentation. Alluding to the rigid rules of socialist realism, 
he objects to ‘la suppression de tout débat culturel, de toute possibilité 
de contestation, de toute lutte idéoloqique. En somme, le contraire même 
du marxisme’ (Que peut la littérature?, p. 40). He then concludes: ‘Et 
le contraire aussi de la littérature, qui exige tout cela pour vivre’ (Que 
peut la littérature?, p. 40). There is a strict correlation here between 
literature and Marxism, not in doctrine or belief, but in their shared 
commitment to contestation and struggle. Semprun’s Marxism is not 
so much a political credo as a disposition to oppose the status quo; 
and this, once again, ties it to the practice of literature: ‘Le marxisme, 
dans le même mouvement qui le conduit au dépassement de ses propres 
structures dogmatiques, doit retrouver ses véritables voies d’approche 
vers la littérature et la révolution’ (Que peut la littérature?, p. 44). The 
path to literature and the path to revolution are rigorously bound up 
with one another.
This does not mean that Semprun envisages all literature as effectively 
Marxist even when its practitioners have quite different political and 
aesthetic allegiances. Having suggested both that literature has no 
power and that its contestatory impulse is revolutionary, he paints an 
ambivalent picture of its capabilities and its achievement: 
Car le pouvoir de la littérature est immense, mais ambigu. Aussi bien 
mystificateur que démystificateur, dévoilant le monde ou le recouvrant 
de concepts chosifiés. Et ce n’est pas un pouvoir immédiat: il n’est pas en 
prise directe sur les événements, il est toujours en retard, ou en avance sur 
les exigences de la politique. (Que peut la littérature?, p. 44)
Literature may be reactionary or progressive. Moreover, the bourgeoisie 
– a term which Semprun uses with caution, but uses nonetheless – has 
found ways of taming the revolutionary potential of literature. By 
controlling the production and dissemination of culture, by assimilating 
artists and making them representatives of their society rather than 
leaving them as outsiders and opponents, it makes literature an organ of 
power. Semprun refers here to the Nobel Prize, and he is clearly alluding 
to Sartre’s refusal of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1963. Sartre did 
not want to be the Nobel laureate because it would have made of him 
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a consecrated author, officially sanctioned by the agents of the state 
even in his opposition to them. Semprun implicitly approves of Sartre’s 
rejection of the prize because it affirms the potentially revolutionary 
power of art and the artist against the bourgeois establishment’s attempt 
to neutralize them.
Semprun’s conclusion is mixed. Like all social constructs, literature 
has no timeless essence by which it can be defined. It is not inherently 
either reactionary or revolutionary, but it has the potential to be both. 
It may mask the truth, be assimilated by the ruling classes and be in 
league with the dominant ideology; or it may contribute to the struggle 
against the reigning ideology, anticipating different forms of social 
and ethical interrelation. There is no doubt as to which role Semprun 
would like to see it perform. The triumph of the bourgeoisie has been to 
deprive literature of its ‘pouvoir de scandale’ (Que peut la littérature?, 
p. 47). For the bourgeoisie, the real scandal would be the loss of power, 
and in Semprun’s concluding words, ‘Eh bien, camarades, faisons que 
ce scandale arrive’ (p. 47). Literature is revolutionary insofar as it 
contributes to the communist project of overturning the dominance of 
the bourgeoisie; it is reactionary insofar as it fails to challenge the status 
quo.
Throughout his talk, Semprun speaks from a position which he 
identifies as Marxist. His support for formal literary experimen-
tation over the rigidity of socialist realism is, he suggests, a properly 
Marxist position, even if it runs counter to the official positions of 
communist regimes. Semprun’s Marxism is about struggle, contestation 
and renewal rather than dogma and doctrine. In November 1964, his 
failure to tow the party line would lead to his definitive expulsion from 
the Spanish Communist Party. So Semprun speaks as a Marxist, but 
one whose relation to Communist Party orthodoxy would soon be 
questioned, and was perhaps already wavering. His contribution to 
Que peut la littérature? gives a hint of this in his reference to Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. Solzhenitsyn’s 
account of the Soviet Gulags had been published in France in 1963, the 
same year as Le Grand Voyage. In Chapter 2 of this book, I discuss how, 
as Semprun would elaborate in his later memoir Quel beau dimanche!, 
reading the book was deeply troubling because it completely transformed 
his understanding of his deportation to Buchenwald (see Quel Beau 
Dimanche!, pp. 382–85). For the young communist, deportation was 
the price to be paid for opposition to fascism. The liberation of the 
camps represented the victory of communism over fascism, right over 
Testimony/Literature/Fiction 169
wrong: ‘Nous rentrions des camps nazis, nous étions bons, les méchants 
avaient été punis, la Justice et la Raison accompagnaient nos pas’ (Que 
peut la littérature?, p. 37). Knowledge of the Gulag camps destroyed 
that comforting self-conception because the communist system turned 
out also to be a force of oppression, building a camp system in which 
millions of people would die senselessly. One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich shows the Revolution turning bad: ‘Il n’y a plus d’innocence 
possible, après ce récit, pour quelqu’un qui essaie de vivre – réellement 
vivre – à l’intérieur d’une conception marxiste du monde’ (Que peut la 
littérature?, p. 37).1 Semprun still speaks as a Marxist, but one whose 
complacent good conscience has been severely rocked, and who would 
soon find no further place within the official communist movement.
For Semprun, Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich is 
an example of a scandalous, revolutionary text because it challenges the 
most fundamental convictions of its communist reader. This raises the 
question – to which I shall return – of how far Semprun’s own literary 
writing is scandalous in the sense he describes in Que peut la littérature? 
His contribution to the symposium stages a superficially confident yet 
wavering Marxist voice, seeking the revolutionary potential of art in 
formal experimentation but also fearing that literature is toothless and 
reactionary even if, thematically, it embraces social progress. What, 
then, of his own literary work? In 1963 – the year before Que peut la 
littérature? – Semprun had made his literary début with the award-
winning, well-received Le Grand Voyage, a partly fictionalized account 
of his deportation to and arrival in Buchenwald, mixed with memories 
of life before, during and after his time in the camp.
Le Grand Voyage
Le Grand Voyage begins in disorder and confusion: ‘Il y a cet entassement 
des corps dans le wagon, cette lancinante douleur dans le genou droit. 
Les jours, les nuits. Je fais un effort et j’essaye de compter les jours, de 
compter les nuits. Ça m’aidera peut-être à y voir clair’ (p. 11). What is 
happening, who is speaking? There is a pain and there is a knee, but they 
 1 On the importance of this passage for Semprun, see Tidd, Jorge Semprún, 
p. 91. Tidd, like some others, uses the Spanish spelling of Semprun’s name. Here 
and elsewhere in this book I use the spelling without an accent, as it appears on the 
French-language original versions of the works I discuss.
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are as yet impersonal. Neither is associated with a speaking subject. Not 
until the third sentence does an ‘I’ appear, still unnamed. The role of 
this ‘I’ will be to create order out of the opening confusion, to identify 
himself as a reasoning subject who has a body capable of feeling pain 
and a consciousness capable of making sense out of disorder.
It turns out that the narrator, later named as Gérard, is one of 120 
men in a railway wagon on the slow journey to Buchenwald. Soon, 
Gérard will begin a dialogue with one of his companions en route to the 
camp, ‘le gars de Semur’. The text wanders between past, present and 
future until their arrival in Buchenwald, and the companion’s death. A 
short second section, narrated in the third person, describes Gérard’s 
arrival in Buchenwald. On its publication in 1963, Le Grand Voyage 
was acclaimed as one of the first works to deal with the camps in a 
sophisticated literary form, drawing on Proust’s treatment of memory, 
modernist stream of consciousness and the non-linear narratives of the 
contemporary nouveaux romanciers. It was awarded the Prix Formentor 
and the Prix littéraire de la Résistance, and immediately established 
Semprun as a literary figure to be reckoned with. In thematic terms, 
there is nevertheless not much that is new here, and little reason to find 
the work as shocking as Semprun would find One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich. For French readers, the existence and brutality of the camps 
had already been documented from a communist perspective by David 
Rousset in L’Univers concentrationnaire (1946) and Les Jours de notre 
mort (1947), and by Robert Antelme in L’Espèce humaine (1947); Alain 
Resnais’s short documentary film about the camps, Nuit et brouillard, 
had caused controversy in 1956; and aspects of the Jewish experience 
had been described by Elie Wiesel in La Nuit (1958), and widely reported 
because of the Eichmann trial in Israel in 1961. The revelation that the 
camps were terrible and the Nazis were bad is not going to surprise 
anyone; and although the guy from Semur is shocked when Gérard tells 
him about the existence of concentration camps in France, no reader in 
1963 had any excuse for not knowing about them. 
There may be no harm in reminding readers of these things, but there 
is nothing scandalous about them in the sense that Semprun would use 
the term in his later contribution to Que peut la littérature? We should 
recall, though, that in his contribution to that symposium Semprun 
insisted that what makes a work valid for a Marxist, or at least for the 
Marxist he was, is not its content. Content is imposed on writers by 
the world and their personal obsessions, and they can do little about it 
(Que peut la littérature?, p. 31). What makes a work valid as a vehicle 
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of Marxist critique is its formal innovation, its endeavour to find new 
ways of expressing content and thereby to transform the content that 
can be expressed. If Le Grand Voyage tells us little new about the camps, 
the experience of reading it is unlike that occasioned by the sometimes 
deliberately flat, stylistically unadventurous testimonies that preceded it. 
As an author steeped in literary modernism, Semprun takes for granted 
that no neutral, simple narrative access to the truth of experience is 
possible. If we are even to glimpse the reality of the event, it can only 
be through the most painstaking, tortuous formal means. If the truth 
is complex, then so must be the literary forms which endeavour to 
approach it.
Le Grand Voyage shares with contemporary examples of the French 
nouveau roman a deep self-consciousness and reflexivity about the 
possibilities and limits of narrative. It is as much concerned with the 
problems of storytelling, with the difficulty of ordering experience and 
memory into a coherent, meaningful whole, as it is with the specific 
theme of the deportation. Semprun takes for granted that it is impossible 
to separate thematic and formal issues. His text anguishes over its 
ability or inability to turn the memory of deportation into something 
communicable and intelligible. A key factor in this is the status of the 
narrator and his standing in relation to his text. As indicated above, the 
first person emerges in the third sentence of the book to bring clarity and 
order to the depersonalized chaos of sensation. The narrator embraces 
this function with a pedagogic assurance which borders on being 
irritating. He quickly establishes himself as the person who knows, 
understands and explains. The role of the guy from Semur is to be 
his uncomprehending stooge, to whom everything must be explained. 
From the beginning, the narrator asserts control over his narrative, 
insisting that it is up to him to decide what he will and won’t explain, 
what he will and won’t recount (p. 18). He is sovereign over his own 
story: ‘Mais c’est moi qui écris cette histoire et je fais comme je veux’ 
(p. 26). Like Semprun in Que peut la littérature?, the narrator grounds 
his authority in a Marxist understanding of the war, conceived in terms 
of class conflict rather than national enmities. The Germans are not 
essentially either better or worse than the French; both are the products 
of their culture and history. The communist résistant understands full 
well that he is being deported as a direct consequence of his anti-fascist 
beliefs and actions. How are we to overcome the hostilities which lead 
to world war? The narrator has his answer ready to hand: ‘il s’agit tout 
simplement d’instaurer la société sans classes’ (p. 56).
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The narrator appears to be knowing and secure in his values, and 
hence in the values of the text over which he asserts sovereignty. As 
already discussed, in the later work Quel beau dimanche!, Semprun 
would speak more expansively than in Que peut la littérature? about 
how reading Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich 
completely transformed the communist perspective in which Le Grand 
Voyage was written. Semprun’s first book corresponds to ‘une vision 
communiste du monde’ (Quel beau dimanche!, p. 384). That vision was 
severely shaken by the realization that Soviet communism had produced 
the Gulag system. In his later work Semprun renounces the political 
confidence which had underpinned the narrator’s self-assurance in Le 
Grand Voyage. What I want to suggest here is that his self-assurance 
is already palpably crumbling in the earlier text. Le Grand Voyage 
is characterized by a mismatch between the narrator’s insistence on 
narrative and interpretive control and a wayward textual drift which 
presages the collapse of his belief system.
A number of features of Le Grand Voyage support this suggestion. 
First, although the narrator sets himself up as the master of narrative 
and meaning, it is striking that he announces the need for explanations 
but does not ultimately provide them. ‘Faudra que je lui explique’, he 
says (p. 24); or, ‘Il faudra que j’explique tout ça au gars de Semur, bien 
sûr qu’il comprendra’ (p. 46). Or he might be reluctant to explain: ‘Je 
n’ai pas envie de lui expliquer’ (p. 119). Narration and explanation are 
deferred or refused. The narrator clings to his authority to recount 
and understand, but repeatedly fails to deliver. Moreover, there is a 
pressing sense that his text is less under his intentional control than 
he insists. He tells us that he narrates what he wants, as he wants and 
when he wants. The deferral of narrative is justified by the voluntary 
forgetting which the narrator says is necessary before a full recounting 
can take place. But the texture of the work suggests anything other than 
narrative command. It is repetitive and digressive, with disorientating 
leaps between past, present and future. The narrator insists that he alone 
decides what will be recounted and how it will be recounted, but the 
work itself gives the impression that the subject’s control of memory and 
meaning is an illusion. Moreover, the voluntary forgetting of a traumatic 
past which makes survival possible can be interrupted at any moment by 
an experience akin to Proustian involuntary memory, but darker in its 
implications. An act as simple as eating bread with friends can suddenly 
transport the narrator and his text back to the near-starvation of the 
camps (see pp. 148–51). The whole text of Le Grand Voyage, I would 
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venture to suggest, is built around the losing struggle of an embattled 
subject to keep the chaos and trauma of memory at bay.
Referring to an earlier attempt to transcribe his experiences in 
Buchenwald, the narrator says that the book ‘ne servirait qu’à mettre 
en ordre mon passé pour moi-même’ (p. 149). He abandons it because 
he knows that it has no value: ‘je sais déjà qu’il ne vaut rien’ (p. 153). 
The attempt is worthless for two reasons: because it is written only 
for the narrator himself, and because its aim is to create an artificial, 
unsustainable order out of material which resists any such organization. 
Here, Le Grand Voyage designates the project of sense-making as 
doomed to failure, even as its sometimes over-confident narrator insists 
on his authority over his text. Who is this work written for anyway? 
The earlier version, the narrator implies, was written for himself. The 
later version creates a narratee, the guy from Semur, who is the willing 
recipient of the narrator’s superior understanding. Having invented the 
ideal narratee, however, the text also kills him off, leaving the narrator 
with no one capable of successfully completing the bond of storytelling 
which ties speaker to listener in a relation of reciprocal interdependency: 
je pense que c’est moche que le gars de Semur soit mort. Il n’y a plus 
personne à qui je puisse parler de ce voyage. C’est comme si j’avais fait tout 
seul ce voyage. Je suis tout seul, désormais, à me souvenir de ce voyage. La 
solitude de ce voyage va me ronger, qui sait, toute ma vie. (p. 165)
The journey is impossible to forget and impossible to recount, and the 
only person capable of receiving the narrative is dead. The narrator is 
left with an untellable story and a missing narratee.
Le Grand Voyage is constructed around a stark contrast between the 
narrator’s display of moral and epistemological self-confidence and the 
unstable, digressive, repetitive text over which he purports to preside. 
The narrator knows his values and is secure in them; he understands 
what is happening to him, and he explains it to his narratee and reader. 
Yet his narrative control is pressingly at odds with the work we have 
before us, which wanders and jumps to a bewildering, disorientating 
degree. To put it schematically, it is as if an omniscient nineteenth-
century narrator has been cast into a chaotic modernist narrative. The 
resulting blockage is encapsulated in an exchange between Gérard and 
his comrade Michel:
‘Au fait, tu ne m’as encore rien raconté’.
Je sais de quoi il veut parler, mais je ne veux pas savoir. […] Je n’ai pas 
envie de raconter quoi que ce soit.
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‘Raconter?’, je réponds, ‘qu’est-ce qu’il y a à raconter?’
Michel me regarde.
‘Justement’, dit-il, ‘je ne sais pas’.
Je découpe un petit carré de pain, je découpe un petit carré de 
fromage, je mets le pain sous le fromage et je mange. Ensuite, une gorgée 
de vin du pays.
‘Et moi, je ne sais plus ce qu’il y aurait à raconter’.
Michel mange aussi. Ensuite, il demande:
‘Trop de choses, peut-être?’
‘Ou pas assez, pas assez par rapport à ce qu’on ne pourra jamais 
raconter’.
Michel, cette fois, s’étonne.
‘Tu en es sûr?’, dit-il.
‘Non’, je dois reconnaître, ‘peut-être n’était-ce qu’une phrase’. (p. 209)
What we witness here is the whole narrative project in the process of 
breaking down. The narrator has narrated nothing; he does not know 
what there is to recount; he cannot demarcate the lines between what 
can be told and what will never be recounted. The text says too much or 
too little, but never the right amount. Moreover, in relation to Michel, 
the text once again underscores the disappearance of its proper narratee: 
‘maintenant que ce passé revient plus fortement que jamais en mémoire, 
je ne peux plus le raconter à Michel. Je ne sais plus où trouver Michel’ 
(p. 210). Even if there were a story to be told, there is no one to whom it 
can be successfully narrated.
In part, Le Grand Voyage can be read as the story of the dissolution 
of its narrator, together with his authority over his own text; and in this 
respect, it anticipates a future crisis in the Marxist confidence which is 
still affirmed at this stage of Semprun’s literary and political career. The 
most striking indication of this comes at the end of the first and longest 
part of the work. After the terrible journey to Buchenwald, the guy from 
Semur dies. The narrator has lost his friend and listener. As narratee, 
the guy had occupied a vital place in the circuit of communication. 
His death signals more than a temporary breakdown in that circuit 
which might be repaired by the discovery of a substitute narratee. The 
disappearance of the narratee also fatally disrupts the identity of the 
narrator, as Gérard explains: 
J’allonge son cadavre sur le plancher du wagon et c’est comme si je 
déposais ma propre vie passée, tous ls souvenirs qui me relient encore 
au monde d’autrefois. Tout ce que je lui avais raconté, au cours de ces 
journées, de ces nuits interminables […] tout ça qui était ma vie va 
s’évanouir, puisqu’il n’est plus là. (pp. 256–57)
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The death of the other brings with it a transformation of the self, which 
also entails a loss of the speaker’s ability to interpret and to narrate. This 
is dramatically marked in the final sentence-long paragraph of the first 
section of the book: ‘Peut-être avait-il dit: “Ne me laisse pas, Gérard”, 
et Gérard saute sur le quai, dans la lumière aveuglante’ (p. 257). The 
confident first-person narrator has now vanished along with the guy 
from Semur, to be replaced in the short second section of the book by 
a more distant third person, as if something of Gérard’s most intimate 
being has been destroyed by his entry into the world of Buchenwald. 
The work leaves Gérard at a point where the reality of the camps is still 
unknown and unimaginable:
Bientôt, quand ils auront franchi ces quelques centaines de mètres qui 
les séparent encore de la porte monumentale de cet enclos, ça n’aura plus 
de sens de dire de quelque chose, n’importe quoi, que c’est inimaginable, 
mais pour l’instant ils sont encore empêtrés dans les préjugés, les réalités 
d’autrefois, qui rendent impossible l’imagination de ce qui, tout compte 
fait, va se révéler parfaitement réel. (p. 278)
The scandal of literature
Work in trauma studies has accustomed us to the notion that signs of 
trauma may become apparent years after the event or events which 
caused it. During a period of latency, the traumatized subject may 
seem to have survived his or her ordeal relatively unscathed. Only later, 
sometimes much later, does an unsettled past return to corrode the 
present. Moreover, Cathy Caruth (following Freud) argues that latency 
is inherent within traumatic experience: ‘The historical power of trauma 
is not just that the experience is repeated after its forgetting, but that it 
is only in and through its inherent forgetting that it is experienced at all’ 
(Unclaimed Experience, p. 17). It would be a simple matter to use this 
lens as a means of understanding the opposition and interdependence 
of forgetting and remembering, survival and testimony, in Semprun’s 
writing. What is more specifically interesting about his work, though, 
is the suggestion of how relatively untraumatic experiences become 
traumatic retrospectively, when the conceptual frameworks which had 
made them bearable start to fall apart. Part of what is fascinating about 
Le Grand Voyage is that it encapsulates a moment just before trauma 
breaks out. At the time of their deportation and for years after the war, 
Semprun and his communist colleagues retained a political framework 
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which gave their terrible experiences both context and meaning. As 
he wrote Le Grand Voyage, Semprun had not yet fully experienced 
the collapse of that framework, which is reflected in his narrator’s 
intellectual confidence and claim to retain authority over the content 
and meaning of his narrative. At the same time, through its meandering, 
digressive, disorientating textuality and the abrupt disappearance of the 
first-person narrator, the work foreshadows an imminent catastrophe, 
which can be linked to Semprun’s disillusionment with and expulsion 
from the Communist Party. This would be explored more explicitly in 
Semprun’s later memoirs Quel beau dimanche! (1980), L’Ecriture ou la 
vie (1994) and Le Mort qu’il faut (2001), and through the suicides and 
violent deaths which occur in his later fictional works.
In terms of the value and values of literature, this leads to an 
uncertain conclusion. In Que peut la littérature?, Semprun ties literature 
to the scandalous militant project of tearing power from the bourgeoisie. 
The narrator of Le Grand Voyage appears to share this project, as 
he calmly, pedagogically, explains the meaning of the war and the 
existence of the camps to his docile listener, thereby instructing him in 
the ways of Revolution. But the death of the narratee, the text’s loss of 
its first-person narrator and the first glimpse of the unimaginable reality 
of Buchenwald shake the beliefs which underpin literature’s militant 
mission. Moreover, it is important to recall that Semprun’s career as 
a renowned literary author begins only at the point when his political 
convictions are wavering. During the period of his political activity he 
did not write literary works; indeed, he abandoned his initial attempt 
to write about Buchenwald as impossible and worthless. He insists that 
he didn’t write because he did not wish to remember. Recounting the 
past would entail a reawakening of traumatic experiences which his 
political beliefs had succeeded in taming, albeit only temporarily. The 
title of L’Ecriture ou la vie – writing or life – poses the dilemma for the 
traumatized author in stark terms: you can either live or write, but not 
both, because writing takes you back to the sites of death. This resonates 
with the final, desperate, repeated words of Le Grand Voyage: ‘quitter 
le monde des vivants, quitter le monde des vivants’ (Le Grand Voyage, 
p. 279). In 1993, Semprun described why he abandoned his initial plan to 
write about his experiences: 
Il me fallait choisir entre l’écriture et la vie, j’ai choisi cette dernière. 
J’ai choisi une longue cure d’aphasie, d’amnésie délibérée, pour revivre. 
Ou pour survivre. J’ai choisi du même coup l’illusion d’un avenir, par le 
moyen de l’engagement politique, puisque l’engagement dans l’écriture 
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me ramenait à l’enfermement de la mémoire et de la mort. (‘Préface’, 
p. 14)
Writing, recounting, means remembering, which is the contrary of 
survival; living, surviving, requires forgetting. Political commitment 
replaces a literary career rather than underpinning it. In this account, 
literature appears not as an agent of militant action, but as a deadening 
immersion in trauma.
This brings us back to the first response Semprun offers to the 
question ‘What can literature do?’: ‘la littérature ne peut rien’ (Que 
peut la littérature?, p. 29; emphasis original). He specifies that what he 
means by this is that, in the view of some authors, it has no power in 
the public domain, no ethical, political or historical influence. Although 
Semprun goes on to repudiate this opinion, his work perhaps gives it 
plausibility, as it equates literature with a personally disastrous, suicidal 
re-emergence of a traumatic past. An exponent of ethical criticism 
such as Martha Nussbauam takes the opposite view. For her, the best 
literature extends our experience, makes us more open to others and 
refines our empathy. By doing this it brings both private and political 
benefits, and therein lies the value of literature (see Love’s Knowledge, 
p. 47). While even more radically endorsing the potential of literature 
to be a militant force for social change, Semprun also suggests a much 
bleaker view which consigns it to failure: for the author, it is irrecon-
cilable with the wellbeing which only forgetting can confer; the people 
who would truly understand it are dead; and its actual readers may get 
nothing from it which will help them to live. In this account, literature is 
not so much a beneficial encounter with otherness as a dire exposure to 
unfathomable, unspeakable chaos and cruelty.
Le Grand Voyage shows a militant literary project being transformed 
into a record of failure. It is tempting to try to turn this failure into 
a mitigated success, by the process of qui perd gagne (loser wins), as 
Sartre did in his magisterial interpretation of the work of Jean Genet. 
According to Sartre, by refusing to communicate, Genet succeeded in 
communicating the part of incommunicability at the core of human 
beings (Saint Genet, pp. 645–90). His failure is his success. Sartre was 
aware, though, that this entailed a betrayal of Genet (p. 646); and in the 
case of Semprun and other Holocaust authors, I suspect that any such 
recuperation would involve betraying the texts we actually have in front 
of us. Finding value in a text’s enactment of the corrosion of values may 
be a neat rhetorical trick, but it may have more to do with our desire as 
readers for comfort than any genuine encounter with the dark otherness 
Traces of War178
of trauma. Lawrence Langer is persuasive in arguing that we should 
desist from trying to find signs of hope where there are none: 
If we go on using a discourse of consolation about an event [the 
Holocaust] for which there is none, it is partly because old habits of 
language cling like burrs to the pelts of civilization, and partly because 
no full-fledged discourse of ruin, more appropriate to our hapless times, 
has yet emerged. (Admitting the Holocaust, pp. 6–7)
To return to an earlier question, what is actually scandalous about 
a literary achievement such as Semprun’s? For Semprun in Que peut la 
littérature?, the scandal of literature would be its alignment with a revolu-
tionary project. His literary writing, however, depicts the disturbance of 
that project to the point where it becomes impossible, with nothing to 
replace it. It may be that many of the works which matter to us are not 
the ones which cultivate our empathy and refine our moral discernment. 
Semprun says – and resists believing – that literature can do nothing. 
But what is this ‘nothing’? Insofar as literature matters to us, it may be 
because the ‘nothing’ it can achieve still fascinates us, not making us 
better people to any quantifiable or even ascertainable degree, but all 
the same letting us see a world which does not belong to us, which we 
cannot make ours, but which speaks to us in immeasurably unnerving 
ways. As I say this, have I succumbed to the temptation of qui perd 
gagne? That is not for me to say.
Repetition, referentiality and fiction
Semprun is best known as the author of works which are autobio-
graphical in some sense, rooted in the experience and memory of 
war: his first, partly fictional book, Le Grand Voyage, and then what 
Suleiman calls his ‘Buchenwald memoirs’ (Crises of Memory, p. 137), 
Quel beau dimanche! (1980), L’Ecriture ou la vie (1994) and Le Mort 
qu’il faut (2001). These books establish the standing of their author 
as a Buchenwald survivor struggling to represent and to understand 
his personal experience and its broader historical, philosophical and 
political significance. They may incorporate fictional elements. In Le 
Grand Voyage, the narrator is called Gérard rather than Jorge, and 
the ‘gars de Semur’ is not based on a single real person. Even so, 
encouraged by the knowledge that Semprun was known as Gérard in 
the Resistance, critics have generally treated the book as principally 
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testimonial. Semprun’s most self-consciously fictional works are not so 
well known, almost to the point of being neglected. If they are discussed 
at all, it has most commonly been to the extent that they reflect and 
refract Semprun’s more overtly testimonial works and, like them, deal 
with the difficulty of representing and understanding the experience of 
the concentration camps.2
So what is the place of fiction in Semprun’s literary output? A 
much-quoted passage from near the beginning of L’Ecriture ou la vie 
provides a ready answer. Here, Semprun expresses his distinctive view 
on the possibility of narrating the experience of Buchenwald. He rejects 
the claim that it is unnarratable. Everything can be said, so long as 
testimony can become ‘un object artistique, un espace de création. Ou 
de recréation. Seul l’artifice d’un récit maîtrisé parviendra à transmettre 
partiellement la vérité du témoignage’ (p. 23). So narration is possible, 
but it will also be interminable, requiring art and artifice. And it will 
also inevitably entail falling into what Semprun calls ‘la répétition et 
le ressassement’ (L’Ecriture ou la vie, p. 23). This conception of the 
attenuated speakability of experience explains and justifies the most 
characteristic formal features of Semprun’s written style in both his 
novels and testimonial works: it is digressive and repetitive, constantly 
returning to key incidents and episodes, reviewing and renarrating them, 
teasing at language in order to draw out new strands of meaning, and 
flitting restlessly between different periods in time in order to convey the 
multilayered density of experience and memory. Artifice, and therefore 
fiction, further the overall purpose of approaching ever more closely, if 
never definitively fixing, ‘la vérité du témoignage’.
In this account, then, ‘la répétition et le ressassement’ are textual 
devices which serve an identifiable end. What is repeated and endlessly 
reviewed is the truth of testimony, which can be stated only through 
that process of repetition and review. Fiction is justified, perhaps even 
necessary, because there is no simple, direct, natural, artifice-free means 
of communicating the complexity of the real. The key point here is that 
there is something preceding the repetition, something that is repeated: 
a reality which can be narrated even if it is never fully contained in any 
 2 There have nevertheless been some impressive attempts to read Semprun’s 
work in other contexts. See in particular Tynan, ‘Spectres of Patriarchy’, and 
Omlor, Jorge Semprún. Omlor comments that ‘Semprún’s œuvre has too often 
been limited to the testimony of the concentration camps’ (p. 3), and she sets out to 
redress the balance with insightful readings of some of his fictional works. 
Traces of War180
one version. In this chapter I suggest that this only partly explains the 
significance of fiction as it is explored in Semprun’s novels. The view of 
repetition as the repetition of something which precedes it, locatable in 
history and memory, coexists – a little uneasily – with a quite different 
practice, in which what repetition repeats is dispersed and unlocatable. 
And this practice is bound up, as we shall see, with the practice of fiction 
itself, as it is instantiated in some of Semprun’s work.
The question here is: what does repetition repeat? This also raises the 
issue of reference: is there something behind the text which precedes it 
and toward which it gestures, even if it cannot be fully communicated? 
Semprun’s work as an author of fiction began in the 1960s, when the 
literary scene was dominated by the nouveau roman, which opposed 
the tenets of Sartrean committed literature by insisting on the autonomy 
of literature. In this context, what mattered most was the experimental 
adventure of writing rather than the sociopolitical responsibilities of the 
artist. Semprun’s fiction is heavily marked by his sympathy for the aims 
and practices of the nouveaux romanciers; but unlike much of their 
work, it constantly foregrounds the historical and political contexts 
in which it is set. His characters are typically survivors or children of 
the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, or victims of Stalinist 
repression, or exiles from fascist Spain, or some combination of all of 
these. In terms of literary history, Semprun’s achievement as an author 
is that he occupies an intermediary position, negotiating the line – and 
showing that there is no necessary conflict – between formal innovation 
and political relevance.
Semprun’s literary writing appears to be almost ideally suited to 
contemporary trauma studies. If hard-line poststructuralism in the 1960s 
and 1970s can be depicted (more by its opponents than its more nuanced 
supporters) as resolutely textualist and unhistorical, one of the gains 
of trauma studies has been to reinstate the referential function of art. 
Thomas Elsaesser describes trauma theory as ‘[a theory] of recovered 
referentiality’ (‘Postmodernism as Mourning Work’, p. 201). It insists on 
a relation between the world of the text and something which precedes 
and lies outside it, even if that ‘something’ is not immediately available to 
consciousness and representation. According to the key concept of latency 
or deferred action, trauma entails a delayed response; it becomes apparent 
after – sometimes a long time after – the event(s) which inaugurated it. In 
such cases, the trauma may be difficult or even impossible to reconstruct 
and to communicate, but it remains indubitably, incontrovertibly real. 
This point is replicated in what have become the canonical texts of 
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trauma studies. In Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth refers to Freud’s 
account of the railway accident (discussed in Chapter 2 of the current 
book) as showing ‘not only the reality of the violent event but also the 
reality of the way that its violence has not yet been fully known’ (p. 6; 
emphasis added). Discussing Camus’s La Peste, Shoshana Felman suggests 
that ‘the allegory seems to name the vanishing of the event as part of its 
actual historical occurrence’ (‘Camus’ The Plague’, p. 103; emphasis 
original). The founding traumatic event, whatever it might be, is real; 
its absolute, extra-textual reality is vigorously affirmed even if it cannot 
be known or narrated by the traumatized subject. Trauma studies, in 
these key works, entails a kind of mitigated realism: mitigated, because 
the ‘reality’ which lies behind it is never fully available; but realism 
because the actual historical truth of the underlying traumatic event is 
not doubted. Michael Rothberg’s term ‘traumatic realism’ captures this 
conception. The works he discusses, for example by Charlotte Delbo and 
Ruth Klüger, are traumatic insofar as their subject resists direct represen-
tation and may therefore require nonrepresentational, nonreferential 
practices of writing; but they are also realist insofar as they refer to a 
reality which precedes and informs them. Traumatic realism, according 
to Rothberg, shares the modernist distrust of representation, but ‘it 
nevertheless cannot free itself from the claims of mimesis, and it remains 
committed to a project of historical cognition through the mediation of 
culture. The abyss at the heart of trauma entails not only the exile of the 
real but also its insistence’ (Traumatic Realism, p. 140). The Holocaust 
is no less real for being unspeakable.
Freud’s famous account of a child’s fort-da game in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle is an important antecedent to this discussion of the 
loss and recovery of the vanishing referent. Freud observes a child (his 
grandson) repeatedly playing a game in which he discards an object 
and then (sometimes) retrieves it. As he discards it, he utters a sound 
interpreted as the word ‘fort’ (gone); and as he retrieves it, he says ‘da’ 
(there). Freud treats this repetitive behaviour as an enigma to be solved, 
and finally succeeds in finding an explanation which satisfies him: ‘The 
interpretation of the game then became obvious’ (p. 285). The child has 
found a way of mastering his distress when his mother leaves him by 
repeating it in the loss of the object (‘fort’), then rewarding himself with 
the joy of its return (‘da’). As in the versions of trauma studies discussed 
above, a mitigated realism underlies Freud’s analysis of the game. The 
repeated fort-da enacts, negotiates and contains the child’s real distress 
at the mother’s real absence. The game has been understood when what 
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Freud calls its ‘true purpose’ (p. 285) has been uncovered. It does not 
directly express or represent the child’s experience, but it refers to such 
experience in an ultimately interpretable way.
This is not the place to attempt a review of the importance of the 
fort-da game in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle or his subsequent 
thinking, or of the extensive discussion to which it has given rise. I 
will pause only to signal the significance, in the current context, of 
Derrida’s discussion fort-da in La Carte postale. In the repetitiveness 
of the repeated game, Derrida observes something which exceeds its 
final containment by the interpretation in terms of the mother’s absence. 
For Derrida, Freud becomes bound up in the game and its repetition 
by describing it and re-enacting it in his writing practice. Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle plays with discarding (‘fort’) a key element of psycho-
analytical theory – the pleasure principle – while also holding on to 
it (‘da’). Freud ‘répète la répétition de la répétition’ (La Carte postale, 
p. 322). This is not so much the repetition of something specific and 
identifiable in experience (the absence of the mother) as the characteristic 
movement of Freud’s speculative text, constantly wavering between the 
displeasure of loss and the pleasure of return. In this account, what is 
repeated is the gesture and momentum of repetition itself. The drama 
of loss and return described and enacted by Freud’s text cannot be fully 
contained by reference to the temporary absence of the child’s mother. 
So fort-da raises another series of questions about what is lost and 
what comes back. What does it mean to return? Is what comes back the 
same as what went away? Does repetition repeat identity or difference? I 
suggest that, in a nutshell, these are some of the fundamental questions 
raised in Semprun’s writing, and especially his fiction. To take the titles 
of two of his novels, La Deuxième Mort de Ramón Mercader (1969) and 
Netchaïev est de retour (1987), how can Ramón Mercader (the assassin 
of Trotsky) die twice, and how can Nechayev (a long-dead nineteenth-
century Russian anarchist) come back?3 The dead are gone, yet they 
do not die and they return to die again. If the novels answer these 
questions (to a degree), they also dwell incessantly on the twin enigmas 
of repetition and return.
 3 Trotsky’s assassin, Ramón Mercader, did not in fact die until 1978, nearly a 
decade after the publication of Semprun’s novel. The Russian revolutionary Sergey 
Nechayev died in 1882. In this chapter, I use the English version of his name when 
referring to the historical figure, and the French version when referring to the 
character in Semprun’s novel.
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Repetition as revision
In her important reading of Semprun’s Buchenwald memoirs, Suleiman 
refers to Freud’s account of the fort-da game, and distinguishes 
between repetition as a desire for mastery and repetition as a sign of 
the death instinct. This in turn is related to the distinction between 
narrative memory and traumatic memory: the latter (using another set 
of Freudian terms) ‘acts out’ trauma (remaining obsessively trapped 
within its confines) whereas the other entails ‘working through’, moving 
towards (even if never fully achieving) understanding and reconciliation. 
Semprun’s version of repetition is, she argues, more akin to working-
through. In fact, she prefers to call it ‘revision’: ‘a process whereby 
the memory of a traumatic past event is not merely repeated but 
continually reinterpreted in light of the subject’s evolving preoccupations 
and self-understandings’ (Crises of Memory, p. 140). Revision is, she 
says, ‘Semprun’s characteristic signature as a writer’ (Crises of Memory, 
p. 141). This form of repetition permits – indeed it positively thrives 
on – variation and artifice. Examining different accounts of an incident 
which occurred shortly after his arrival at Buchenwald, Suleiman accepts 
differences between them because ‘The witness can be mistaken, even 
though his account is given in good faith […]. A testimony is always, 
necessarily, one incomplete version of an event’ (Crises of Memory, 
p. 152). The use of artifice may seem to threaten the status of the relevant 
works as literal testimony, but Suleiman is nevertheless content that 
‘whatever liberties he may take with positive facts, Semprun reminds us 
that he is incontrovertibly a survivor and a witness’ (Crises of Memory, 
p. 157). And so, Suleiman concludes, ‘continuous revision is the literary 
performance of the working through of trauma, a performance that 
Semprun’s Buchenwald memoirs enact brilliantly’ (Crises of Memory, 
p. 158).
Suleiman’s reading is based explicitly and exclusively on Semprun’s 
testimonial memoirs. The question remains of whether the same can be 
argued of those of Semprun’s works which are presented as novels. Is 
novelistic fiction just an extended version of the ‘artifice’ which Semprun 
judges to be necessary and Suleiman finds acceptable in testimony? 
The novels themselves give plenty of encouragement to interpretation 
in the light of Semprun’s experiences. There is a family resemblance 
between many of his principal characters. They share the same cultural 
and historical references, effortlessly spotting and elaborating on each 
other’s quotations and allusions. Many of them also share aspects of 
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Semprun’s past: Rafael Artigas in L’Algarabie (1981) and Juan Larrea 
in La Montagne blanche (1986), for example, are both Buchenwald 
survivors and writers with Spanish origins. Despite differences between 
them, characters sometimes seem to merge with one another, so that 
after the death of Artigas in L’Algarabie, his friend Carlos finds that he 
is invaded by the private memories of his dead friend.
The novels can, then, be regarded as being populated by Semprun’s 
alter egos, living out the lives and deaths that could have been his 
own. The fact that many of them are killed or commit suicide can also 
be understood through the Freudian lens of acting-out and working-
through. In La Montagne blanche, Juan Larrea kills himself after 
recounting his experiences of Buchenwald. He thereby illustrates the 
alternative posited, and perhaps finally overcome, in L’Ecriture ou la 
vie between forgetting and surviving on the one hand or remembering 
and dying on the other. When Larrea is overwhelmed by his memories 
of Buchenwald, he can no longer carry on living. It is only a small step 
from here to conclude that, if so many of Semprun’s alter egos are 
condemned to die, it may be so that their author can carry on living. 
They die in his place, or perhaps part of him dies with them and their 
death conveys something of the survivor’s sense of never fully returning 
from the camps; but at least for the time being their death allows him to 
continue.4
The temptation to read Semprun’s novels in the light of what is well 
known about their author is strong. Moreover, the relatively small 
body of criticism devoted specifically to the novels effectively relegates 
them to a secondary position in Semprun’s œuvre. Le Grand Voyage 
is a revealing exception. It is usually described as a novel but treated 
as a testimonial text, as if its ‘autobiographical’ element justifies and 
redeems its fictional form. Lawrence Langer, for example, describes 
how ‘Semprun’s survivor-narrator [in Le Grand Voyage] acknowledges 
images rising from the soil of history, not myth, images which he can 
share with his reader’s consciousness, insofar as the reader submits to 
their promptings. But they are literal promptings, not literary ones’ 
(Admitting the Holocaust, p. 120). What matters here is the literal, 
historical truth made available to the reader, which subsists intact 
 4 This reading is encouraged by Semprun in L’Ecriture ou la vie (p. 255), 
when he reveals that Juan Larrea was a pseudonym he had used while involved in 
clandestine work in Franco’s Spain and, at the end of La Montagne blanche, that 
Larrea ‘s’est suicidé, mort à ma place’.
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through the trial of artifice and fiction. Semprun’s later novels are 
generally not discussed at all; or they are mentioned insofar as they 
reflect issues from the memoirs and ignored to the extent that they do 
not. In both testimonial works and novels, Semprun’s ‘real’ subject, this 
implies, is himself: the survivor-witness engaged in history, struggling to 
deal with the aftermath of Buchenwald.
There are certainly strong links between Semprun’s fiction and the 
historical events which marked his life. However, his novels also exhibit 
a tendency to dissociate themselves from reality as we know it. Most 
obviously, L’Algarabie is set in a counterfactual world in which the 
events of May 1968 have resulted in the fragmentation of the French 
state. De Gaulle has been assassinated and parts of Paris are outside 
government control. The novel envisages what may be a possible world, 
but one which the reader knows full well to be false. The liminary note 
in La Deuxième Mort de Ramón Mercader similarly insists that readers 
should make no connection between the fiction and the world we think 
we know: ‘Les événements dont il est question dans ce récit sont tout 
à fait imaginaires. Bien plus: toute coïncidence avec la réalité serait 
non seulement fortuite, mais proprement scandaleuse’ (La Deuxième 
Mort, p. 9; emphasis original). The instruction to the reader could not 
be clearer: do not attempt to tie this fiction to any pre-existing reality. 
Fiction is imaginary not real, artifice not testimony. And yet it is hard to 
escape the sense that Semprun is playing a complex, deadly serious game 
here: how can we not link his novels, populated as they are by characters 
marked by the traumas and tragedies of the twentieth century, to a 
history which we know to be all too true? Insisting that we should not 
make the link between these novels and real events may be an ironic 
means of ensuring that we cannot help but make that link. It may be, as 
Semprun suggests, ‘scandalous’ to see a coincidence between his novels 
and reality, but that may be no bad thing in itself. As we saw earlier in 
this chapter, in his contribution to Que peut la littérature?, he describes 
scandal as precisely what literature should aim to achieve. If we are 
scandalized by his invention of unreal events, then so much the better.
The easier reading of Semprun’s fiction is implicitly realist and autobi-
ographical, autofictional or even ‘autothanatographical’.5 Across these 
variants, the ‘auto-’ remains constant. Semprun’s works are treated as 
being about his own life and death, however much he may fictionalize 
 5 On Semprun’s ‘autothanatographical’ writing, see Tidd, ‘The Infinity of 
Testimony and Dying in Jorge Semprun’s Holocaust Autothanatographies’.
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them. He pushes us in this direction in L’Algarabie, for example, with 
clear hints that Artigas may in fact be none other than Jorge Semprun. 
The kind of reading that this encourages does not – and does not 
attempt to – separate the novels from the presence, however attenuated, 
of their author. In terms of repetition, what is repeated here is the same 
(Semprun, the author), even if the same is complex, fragmented and 
postmodern. It’s all about me, even if ‘me’ cannot be simply narrated. To 
read Semprun’s fiction independently of what we know about him and his 
experience has barely been attempted to any significant degree. Another 
way of putting this is to say that so far critics have shown little interest 
in his fiction as fiction; we are interested in it because, and insofar as, it 
tells us more about the author and his experiences. Semprun’s defence of 
artifice and fiction has been seen, overwhelmingly, only in the context of 
a broader testimonial project. David Carroll’s discussion of Semprun is 
exemplary in this respect, in that it both gives a place to fiction but limits 
that place to its role in the service of testimony; ‘fiction’, Carroll writes, 
‘is not a weapon to be used to assassinate memory but rather a means to 
enrich and complicate it’ (‘The Limits of Representation’, p. 78). Fiction 
plays a part in a literary practice which is understood as primarily, 
fundamentally autobiographical. The text tells us about its author even 
when it does so by indirect means. The critical reception of Semprun is 
a glaring refutation of Barthes’s claim that the Author is dead.
Repetition as repetition
To some extent, Semprun’s novels invite and demand this kind of 
reading. But it is not the only possible reading of his work, and other 
interpretive avenues have hardly begun to be explored. In this section, 
I want to look more closely at Netchaïev est de retour, regarding it as 
an extended reflection on the issues of return and repetition. Netchaïev 
is a detective story which begins with a murder and then uncovers the 
circumstances which led up to it. The specific perpetrators remain 
unnamed, but they are vaguely specified as international terrorists, and 
by the end lots of bad people have been suitably dispatched even if there 
is also some collateral damage. So far, so generic. The novel begins with 
an enigma, which it then sets out to resolve. Its broader resonance comes 
from the linkage of the initial murder to post-1968 terrorist movements, 
and to philosophical and political questions about the measures that 
are justifiable when society is perceived as unjust. This is in turn related 
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to the experience of the Second World War, since all of the principal 
characters have connections to the Resistance and the concentration 
camps, either directly or through their parents. Across the different 
generations, the novel poses searching questions about the difference 
between legitimate resistance and wilful violence: what separates those 
who died in Auschwitz and Buchenwald because they opposed Nazism 
from those who took to terrorism in the wake of the failure of May 1968 
to change society? The strength of the novel, and its moral import, derive 
from its readiness to take this question seriously, without glib answers.
Netchaïev is, then, resolutely rooted in its historical context, adopting 
the form of detective fiction to examine links between the Second 
World War and modern France, and between Resistance violence and 
modern terrorism. Three years before the publication of the novel, 
Didier Daeninckx had used the detective format to similar effect in his 
well-regarded Meurtres pour mémoire (1984), which connects French 
state crimes during the Occupation to the infamous deaths of peacefully 
protesting Algerians in Paris in 1961. What Semprun distinctively adds to 
the political dimension of his work is an element of uncanniness which 
both accompanies and unsettles the realism of the novel. As suggested 
above, this is already implied by the title, Netchaïev est de retour. The 
historical Sergey Nechayev died in 1882, so how can he return? The 
novel explains this impossible return by the fact that Netchaïev was the 
codename of a terrorist, Daniel Laurençon. So it is not the ‘real’ Nechayev 
who returns, but someone who has borrowed his name. Yet Laurençon/
Netchaïev was also believed to be dead. His companions in his terrorist 
cell had decided to abandon their armed struggle in order to return to 
mainstream society. He was condemned to death because he opposed the 
decision to renounce violence, though actually he survived. Years later, 
he also decides to renounce terrorism, and he returns to France in the 
hope of freeing himself from the murderous organization to which he has 
belonged for many years. Strangely, his return is consistently described in 
the novel as a return from death: it is not that he was believed to be dead, 
but that he was dead, and he has come back. Netchaïev dies and returns; 
Laurençon dies and returns. The murder with which the novel begins 
may be explained, but the novel raises further enigmas (echoing those we 
have already seen in relation to Charlotte Delbo): how can the dead come 
back, what is the dividing line between the living and the dead?
These questions are further complicated by the interpenetration of the 
lives, stories and identities of different sets of characters. The terrorist 
group which Laurençon forms with his friends in the wake of May 1968 
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parallels the Resistance group to which his long-dead father and his 
stepfather, Roger Marroux (the detective who investigates the murder 
with which the novel begins), had belonged during the Occupation. 
Within the terrorist group, the four male protagonists share the same 
cultural, political and erotic tastes, as did the Resistance group of the 
earlier generation. Laurençon’s mother slept both with his father, who 
died before his birth as a result of his incarceration in Buchenwald, and 
with Marroux, just as in the later terrorist group Adriana Sponti becomes 
a shared love object. Across generations and across history, the lives 
of each of the characters echoes and repeats the lives of all the others. 
This is not to say that the characters are identical – the novel resists that 
implication – but nor do they have discrete identities separate from one 
another. Each reflects the other without repeating him or her identically.
The repetition-with-difference extends beyond the characters to affect 
the novel as a whole in its aesthetic dimension. This can be seen at a 
small scale through Pierre Quesnoy, the former militant and photog-
rapher who is the first to stumble inadvertently across evidence of 
Laurençon/Netchaïev’s return. One night, Quesnoy is awoken by a 
nightmare in which he participates in the torture of a woman named 
Thérèse, whom he knows to be the writer Marguerite Duras. The 
nightmare evokes memories of his time as a soldier during the Algerian 
War of Independence, when he had been present during the torture of 
Algerian prisoners. It also alludes to his recent reading of Duras’s La 
Douleur, which had been published in 1985. One of the stories in La 
Douleur, entitled ‘Albert des Capitales’, narrates how a character named 
Thérèse presides over the brutal torture of a presumed collaborator. 
In a liminary note, Duras writes: ‘Thérèse c’est moi’ (La Douleur, p, 
134; quoted Netchaïev, p. 95). In an example of Rothberg’s ‘multidi-
rectional memory’, or Silverman’s ‘palimpsestic memory’, an incident 
from the Algerian War reflects one from the Second World War; Duras 
claims that her fiction reflects her life. Quesnoy’s life repeats the fiction 
which repeats the life of another. Moreover, within Duras’s ‘Albert des 
Capitales’, the torturers are themselves victims of torture, as is indicated 
when we are told that they have been imprisoned at Montluc, a prison 
used by the Gestapo during the war.6 The victims become torturers, in 
life and literature; and fiction reflects the life which becomes a fiction 
which in turn reflects the life of another. The first term is lost in a vortex 
 6 See La Douleur: ‘D. en choisit deux qui sont passés par Montluc et qui ont 
dérouillé’ (p. 142).
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of repetition. In this account, repetition does not preserve sameness 
across the vicissitudes of time; rather, it undermines the autonomy of 
self-contained identities by exposing them to a process of replication and 
fragmentation without governing principles.
The appearance of Duras’s La Douleur is by no means the only 
reference to earlier texts in Semprun’s novel. On the contrary, the text 
constantly manifests its debt to other works. If, for example, Netchaïev 
returns from the dead in the figure of Daniel Laurençon, he does so at 
least in part through the mediation of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Demons 
(1872), which is partly inspired by Nechayev, as well as through Albert 
Camus’s L’Homme révolté (1951). Camus’s work discusses Nechayev 
and quotes the passage (albeit in a different translation) which forms 
the epigraph to Part 2 of Semprun’s novel.7 The most important point of 
reference is Paul Nizan’s novel La Conspiration (1938), which describes 
the lives and loves of five would-be revolutionary students in the years 
before the Second World War. Netchaïev est de retour references Nizan’s 
work before it has even properly begun, since it is quoted as an epigraph 
to its first part. It is then quoted again within the opening pages as the 
friendship of two of the principal characters is inaugurated by a joint 
recitation of its first lines (p. 15). Semprun’s novel goes on to refer and 
allude to Nizan’s novel on numerous occasions. It is the ‘livre fétiche’ 
(p. 273) and the ‘livre de chevet’ (p. 311) of the friends. Semprun’s novel 
quotes the description of Lucien Herr from La Conspiration (p. 312, 
quoting La Conspiration, p. 48). One of Semprun’s characters, Marc 
Lilienthal, gives Nizan’s novel to his lover, Fabienne, so that she can 
read it on the plane as she flies to an assignation with him.8 Another 
character quotes it to his lover, changing the name of Nizan’s Catherine 
to Semprun’s Bettina, in order to explain her erotic deficiencies (p. 342, 
quoting La Conspiration, p. 196).
The numerous references to La Conspiration are not just an acknowl-
edgement of an admired book; they also indicate a more fundamental 
reliance on the earlier novel as a source of repetition. One of Semprun’s 
central characters, Elie Silberberg, is a novelist. Marroux suggests to 
 7 Compare the quotations in Albert Camus, L’Homme révolté, in Œuvres 
completes III, p. 198, with Netchaïev, p. 199. Camus’s interest in Nechayev is 
mentioned in Netchaïev, p. 108.
 8 Moreover, Lilienthal’s name recalls that of Rosenthal from La Conspiration: 
one is a valley of lilies (which also alludes to Balzac’s Le Lys dans la vallée), the 
other a valley of roses.
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him that his work is an incessant rewriting of Nizan’s La Conspiration. 
In Nizan’s novel one of the group of five, Pluvinage, betrays his friends 
by revealing the hiding place of a militant sought by the authorities. 
According to Marroux, Silberberg’s novels reproduce this element of 
Nizan’s plot:
C’est toujours, quelles qu’en soient les péripéties, les circonstances, qui 
peuvent varier, l’histoire d’un groupe et d’un traître. D’un traître supposé, 
du moins. Toujours le schéma de La Conspiration, en somme. Mais votre 
Pluvinage est moins déterminé, plus ambigu que chez Nizan. On ne sait 
jamais s’il est vraiment traître. (Netchaïev, p. 216)
In this account of actual or presumed treachery, we have a model of 
repetition with variation; and variation brings with it greater ambiguity. 
In Nizan’s novel there is little doubt that Pluvinage is a traitor. Silberberg 
replicates Nizan’s scheme but holds back from settling the truth or 
falsehood of the allegation of betrayal. Semprun’s novel recalls that 
Nizan himself had been accused of betrayal after he left the Communist 
Party in 1939 (p. 273). Nizan’s novel predicts its author’s own fate, 
which is then repeated again in Silberberg’s novels, which are themselves 
fictional insofar as they do not exist: Silberberg is, after all, a character 
in a novel rather than a real person. 
If Silberberg’s fictional novels repeat Nizan’s real novel, then 
Semprun’s real novel, Netchaïev est de retour, does so as well. Like 
Nizan, Semprun bases his novel on five characters, some of whom are 
students at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and who plot the downfall of 
bourgeois society. Pluvinage’s betrayal is echoed in the more ambiguous 
story of Laurençon/Netchaïev. The latter is at first accused of betrayal 
by the revolutionary group to which he belongs because the others want 
to abandon the armed struggle. When he does not accept this, he must 
be condemned and killed. Later, though, he actually plans to betray the 
revolutionary cause when he decides to give up violence: that is why he 
is hunted by his terrorist associates.
The importance of Nizan’s La Conspiration for Semprun’s Netchaïev 
est de retour is so great that the latter can be regarded as a rewriting of 
the former. Both novels are concerned with five friends who declare war 
on established society, and both entail betrayal. The social, intellectual 
and economic circumstances of the principal characters are similar. 
Semprun’s novel even replicates the casual sexism of Nizan’s. However, 
what is mainly repeated in the later work is not so much the content 
as what is called, in the passage cited above, its ‘schema’, involving 
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characters and plot elements rather than specific intellectual or political 
material. Moreover, this repetition operates both in the relation of 
Netchaïev est de retour to La Conspiration and, internally, within the 
novel itself. The group of five terrorists, of whom one is (doubly) accused 
of betrayal, reflects the history of Laurençon/Netchaiëv’s stepfather, who 
during the Second World War was also a member of a group of friends, 
one of whom was suspected – rightly, as it turned out – of working for 
the Gestapo. The lines separating stories and identities become blurred. 
Repetition here has acquired its own dizzying momentum, coming to 
govern the lives of the characters, their stories and the novel in which 
they are created.
Telling the essential
In relation to the fort-da game analysed by Freud, Derrida suggests that 
what repetition repeats is repetition itself: a movement or momentum 
which endlessly reflects back on itself and in the process propels itself 
forward, removing itself from interpretability in terms of a hidden 
but stable kernel of meaning. In a later discussion Derrida relates this 
absence of a founding, determinable meaning to literature in its broadest 
sense. A literary work, he says, may be 
tout texte confié à l’espace public, relativement lisible ou intelligible, mais 
dont le contenu, le sens, le référent, le signataire ne sont pas des réalités 
pleinement déterminables, des réalités à la fois non-fictives ou pures de 
toute fiction […]. Le lecteur alors sent venir la littérature par la voie 
secrète de ce secret, un secret à la fois gardé et exposé, jalousement scellé 
et ouvert comme une lettre volée. (Donner la mort, pp. 173–75; emphasis 
original)
In this account, the ‘secret’ of literature is not a content to be revealed; 
rather, it is a fundamental relation of self-withholding in relation to its 
source, meaning and destination. As Derrida succinctly puts it in the 
epigraph to this chapter, ‘qui dit quoi à qui, au juste?’ (Donner la mort, 
p. 175).
Given that Semprun was both prolific and loquacious, it may seem 
surprising to describe his fiction as reticent. My point is really that 
the novels leave a sense that something remains unsaid, but that this 
‘something’ cannot be identified simply with a specific experience or 
set of experiences involving, or including, for example, the author’s 
incarceration in Buchenwald. On this point, the intense self-consciousness 
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of Semprun’s writing may be helpful. His fictional novelist, Elie 
Silberberg, incessantly rewrites a text by Nizan, another lapsed revolu-
tionary. His practice tells us something about Semprun’s, as Semprun 
also rewrites Nizan’s novel. What characterizes fiction, in this process, is 
that it does not quite say everything it has to say. Marroux, Laurençon/
Netchaïev’s stepfather, is a detective; his job is to find the truth hidden 
behind ambiguous clues. But hidden truths are not what he expects 
from literary fiction. He encourages Silberberg to write fiction because, 
unlike the essay, the novel does not pass directly to the essential. On 
the contrary, the novel allows variation and obsession; and, referring 
to Hannah Arendt, he insists that no theoretical reflection can have ‘la 
richesse de sens d’une histoire bien racontée’ (Netchaïev, p. 217). The 
role of the novel is not to say the essential, but precisely not to say it, or 
not to say it too soon. In the novel, then, the duty to state the essential 
is overwhelmed by the narrative proliferation of meaning. As Marroux 
discovers at first hand when he tries to speak of his own experience, 
the essential remains unsaid: ‘Ainsi, il n’avait même pas fait allusion 
à l’essentiel. Il aurait fallu remonter trop loin, se perdre dans trop de 
digressions, de chemins de traverse, pour qu’elle comprît de quoi il 
parlait’ (Netchaïev, p. 320). In this version, the essential is not something 
that is gradually revealed through the infinite patience of the storyteller 
and listener; rather, it is something necessarily absent, an ungraspable 
Derridean secret which propels and eludes narration. 
I am not arguing that there is no relation between the historical, 
autobiographical context of Semprun’s more overtly testimonial works 
and his fiction. There obviously is. His characters are, like himself, 
scarred by the experience of the concentration camps and twentieth-
century history more broadly. But to reduce his fiction to its author’s 
experience also misses what is fictional about it. His fiction is unnerving 
and engaging not only because it bears witness to the traumas of the 
last century, but also because it resists explanation purely in terms 
of history and biography. It permits interpretation in the light of the 
author’s identity and experience while also questioning the very notions 
of identity and experience. I would venture to say that this has not yet 
even begun to be explored in any serious way. Semprun’s fiction should 
not and cannot be exhausted by an antiquated realist agenda, however 
much that agenda has been reinvigorated by trauma studies. His novels 
refer to but are not contained by the figure of the Author; they also enact 
a dislocation of meaning which leaves their sense precisely unlocated, 
unlocatable.
Testimonies are not monologues; they cannot take 
place in solitude. The witnesses are talking to 
somebody: to somebody they have been waiting for 
for a long time.
(Laub, ‘Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes  
of Listening’, in Testimony, pp. 70–71;  
emphasis original)
Testimonial literature crystallizes the problems involved in gathering 
together the shards of experience in a communicable tale. Shoshana 
Felman suggests that we now live in an ‘era of testimony’ in which 
‘testimony has become a crucial mode of our relation to events of our 
times – our relation to the traumas of contemporary history: the Second 
World War, the Holocaust, the nuclear bomb, and other war atrocities’ 
(‘Education and Crisis’, p. 5). Testimony, though, is not the promise 
that the sense of experience can easily be restored or conveyed: ‘What a 
testimony does not offer is, however, a completed statement, a totalizable 
account of those events. In the testimony, language is in process and in 
trial, it does not possess itself as a conclusion, as the constatation of a 
verdict or the self-transparency of knowledge’ (‘Education and Crisis’, 
p. 5). In short, testimony becomes a central genre precisely when it is 
perceived as problematic and, at the limit, maybe even impossible.
This chapter deals with the problems of testimony and storytelling 
in the work of Elie Wiesel. Wiesel has become, along with Primo 
Levi, perhaps the world’s best-known witness to the atrocities of the 
Holocaust. Born into a Jewish community in Sighet, Romania, in 1928, 
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he was deported to Auschwitz in 1944 and later to Buchenwald. He saw 
his mother for the last time at the gates of Auschwitz, and was present 
at his father’s death in Buchenwald. After the war, he lived for a while in 
France before moving to the United States and gaining citizenship there. 
He wrote about his experiences, first in Yiddish and then in French, 
which remained his principal literary language until his death in 2016. 
His first French work, La Nuit (1958), is widely read and accepted as one 
of the most important Holocaust testimonies. Wiesel went on to achieve 
high visibility as a writer and human rights campaigner, winning the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1986.
Although Wiesel’s status as a pre-eminent witness to the Holocaust is 
beyond doubt, after La Nuit, and until the later, much longer autobio-
graphical work Tous les fleuves vont à la mer (1994), he actually wrote 
relatively little which directly described the Holocaust. He eloquently 
summarizes a tension at the heart of much Holocaust testimony with his 
pithy epigram, ‘Impossible d’en parler et impossible de ne pas en parler’ 
(Un juif, p. 193). A psychological and moral imperative to bear witness 
runs up against a sense that the Holocaust is beyond language and 
comprehension. What must be said cannot be said. One way for Wiesel 
to deal with this tension is through controlled reticence: he speaks and 
writes of his experiences, but with restraint, frequently reiterating the 
impossibility of communicating atrocity rather than offering detailed 
memories. Disclosing the Holocaust entails repeatedly disclosing its 
inherent unspeakability.
Another way for Wiesel to deal with the tension between the need 
to speak and the impossibility of speaking about the Holocaust is, 
perhaps surprisingly, through the practice of fiction. Wiesel grew up 
in a world of stories stemming from the Hassidic tradition into which 
he was born. But he echoes and endorses Adorno’s dictum according 
to which poetry after Auschwitz is no longer possible, and he extends 
it to include literature and cultural values more broadly: ‘Adorno avait 
peut-être raison. Après Auschwitz, la poésie n’est plus possible. Ni 
la littérature. Ni l’amitié. Ni l’espérance. Ni rien’ (Un juif, p. 202). In 
particular, Wiesel insists that there can be no such thing as Holocaust 
literature: ‘Un roman sur Auschwitz n’est pas un roman, ou bien il n’est 
pas sur Auschwitz. Les deux ne vont pas de pair’ (Elie Wiesel: Qui 
êtes-vous?, p. 49). He is nevertheless the author of a substantial body of 
fiction which is sometimes – despite his own misgivings – categorized as 
Holocaust literature. In fact, consistent with his view that the Holocaust 
lies beyond the scope of the novel, his fiction often describes the prelude 
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to and aftermath of the Holocaust, but only fleetingly evokes the events 
of the Holocaust themselves. So although his novels are undoubtedly 
about the Holocaust in some sense, it is usually present as a kind of 
absent cause. It is anticipated and recalled, but rarely actually depicted. 
Like the signs of trauma discussed in the Introduction, it is everywhere 
and nowhere at the same time.
Bearing witness, for Wiesel, involves a complex constellation of 
telling and not telling, disclosure and reticence, memory, truth, history 
and fiction. The current chapter explores these issues first by discussing 
the case of Moshe the Beadle from La Nuit, and then in relation to two 
of his novels, Le Serment de Kolvillàg (1973) and Un désir fou de danser 
(2006). The first of these enunciates – even if it does not finally embrace 
– a particularly provocative suggestion on the problem of witnessing; 
and the second explores the links between speech, knowledge and 
psychoanalysis in the experience of the Holocaust survivor.
Moshe the Beadle’s story
La Nuit is Wiesel’s first book to be published in French, and Moshe 
(spelt Moché in the French version) is the first character to be named 
in that book. The opening sentence begins: ‘On l’appelait Moché-le-
Bedeau’ (p. 13). It is striking that the book, which has become renowned 
as a Holocaust testimony, opens with this relatively minor character 
rather than with, for example, the narrator’s father, mother or sister, 
all of whom would die in the Holocaust. Moshe is an eccentric figure 
who works in the local synagogue and agrees to teach the Kabbalah 
to Eliezer against his father’s wishes. After the annexation of Sighet by 
Hungary, Moshe is expelled because he is a foreigner, and yet he returns 
a few months later to tell an incredible tale. He recounts how, once in 
Poland, the Jewish deportees were taken from the train and murdered 
by the Gestapo. Moshe escaped because he was thought to be dead. 
Eliezer observes a marked change in Moshe: ‘Ses yeux ne reflétaient plus 
la joie. Il ne chantait plus. Il ne me parlait plus de Dieu ou de Kabbale, 
mais seulement de ce qu’il avait vu’ (p. 16). He has become an exemplary, 
paradigmatic survivor-witness. His transformation, the moral imperative 
which governs his return and the potential disbelief of his audience, 
anticipate what will happen to Eliezer as he becomes the narrator of 
his own experience of atrocity (see Trezise, Witnessing Witnessing, 
p. 200). The insistence that Moshe now speaks only of ‘ce qu’il avait vu’ 
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is echoed later in the text when Eliezer describes the burning of babies’ 
corpses in Auschwitz: ‘Oui, je l’avais vu, de mes yeux vu …’ (p. 42). The 
witness’s key claim – the one which underpins the moral authority of his 
testimony – is that he saw what he describes. Moshe and Eliezer offer a 
straightforward referential contract: we are asked to accept that what 
they depict really happened.
This implicit assertion of the survivor’s testimonial credentials also 
places Moshe and Eliezer in the Jewish tradition of the survivor-
witness who comes back from near-death to tell the tale of misfortune. 
This is exemplified by the biblical Book of Job when, each time that 
a catastrophe befalls Job’s family and property, there is one survivor 
who returns with the words, ‘And I alone have escaped to tell you’. 
Although, rather incredibly, this precise formula is repeated four times 
in the Book of Job, Job unquestioningly believes and accepts the reports 
of catastrophe which are brought to him. Wiesel has commented that, 
for him, this proves that Job cannot have been Jewish, because a Jew 
would question both the verbal coincidence and the series of disasters 
(see Job ou Dieu dans la tempête, p. 59). The problem for Moshe is 
that his audience consists in the kind of sceptical Jew Wiesel describes, 
and as a consequence no one will believe his tale or even listen to it: 
‘Les gens refusaient non seulement de croire à ses histoires mais encore 
de les écouter’ (La Nuit, p. 16). The people of Sighet think that he is 
seeking pity, or that he has gone mad. Even Eliezer comments that he 
did not believe him, but that he felt sorry for him. In the end Moshe 
abandons his vain task of trying to inform and forewarn his fellow Jews: 
‘Même Moché-le-Bedeau s’était tu. Il était las de parler. Il errait dans 
la synagogue ou dans les rues, les yeux baissés, le dos voûté, évitant de 
regarder les gens’ (p. 18).
Moshe’s problem is that he finds no one who will listen to him, and 
in consequence his testimony fails. This suggests the conclusion that 
the success of witnessing depends as much upon the listener as it does 
on the speaker. The place of the listener in the circuit of testimony has 
in fact been one of the cornerstones of trauma studies. In his influential 
chapter ‘Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening’, Dori Laub 
describes how trauma cannot initially be registered by those who fall 
victim to it. Paradoxically, they are not yet witnesses to what they 
have witnessed. It is only through being heard that they can become a 
witness to their own lives. This has the consequence that listening is a 
necessary condition if the act of witnessing is to take place. In Laub’s 
words, ‘the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner 
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of the traumatic event’ (p. 59). As I already indicated in Chapter 1, I find 
the language of ‘ownership’ to be deeply problematic here, and there 
are important ethical issues raised by the ‘participation’ of one person 
in another’s trauma. In the current context, though, the important 
point is the significance of the listener. A key aspect of trauma studies 
has been its insistence on the necessary role of the listener in the act of 
witnessing. For it to succeed, it must be what Trezise, discussing Laub, 
calls a ‘dialogical relation’ (Witnessing Witnessing, p. 16). It cannot be 
understood simply as the transmission of a story or of knowledge which 
pre-exists the verbal performance. It is rather an event in the life of 
both witness and audience. Witnessing requires being witnessed for the 
witness to come into being.
The opening sequence of La Nuit, which focusses on Moshe’s inability 
to forewarn the Jews of Sighet, is of the utmost significance in the book 
and for Wiesel’s own status as witness. This exemplary testimonial 
work begins with an act of witnessing which signally fails. The anxiety 
which haunts the rest of the text as well as perhaps the whole of Wiesel’s 
work and even testimonial writing in general, is that the witness will not 
be heard or heeded. Every witness fears becoming Moshe: the bearer 
of an urgent message which cannot be delivered. Wiesel is associated 
with a conception of the Holocaust as radically unspeakable, as beyond 
language and comprehension. Nevertheless, even if the Holocaust cannot 
ultimately be contained in words, a great deal can be said about it. The 
problem for Moshe is not that his experience is unsayable. It can be 
recounted, but it meets with disbelief because it exceeds the frame of 
intelligibility within which his potential audience is enclosed. The issue 
here, then, is not that the messenger cannot recount his tale, but that 
there is no one capable of listening to it. Before his experience of atrocity, 
the addressee of Moshe’s mystical celebrations is God, the big Other 
who gives sense to everything. The dilemma of the witness comes about 
when there is no big Other, no final guarantor of meaning and justice. 
Who will listen? The witness requires a listener; and without a listener, 
there is no witness. Moshe claims that he has returned to Sighet ‘pour 
vous raconter ma mort’ (p. 17). This summarizes the impossible position 
of the failed witness. One’s own death is precisely what one cannot 
recount. The witness has something to say which cannot be said, and 
which cannot be heard. Again, Eliezer implicitly identifies with Moshe 
when, at the very end of La Nuit he looks in a mirror after the liberation 
of Buchenwald and sees himself as a corpse: ‘Du fond du miroir, un 
cadavre me contemplait. Son regard dans mes yeux ne me quitte plus’ 
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(p. 121). The witness returns to tell the impossible tale of his own death; 
and this tale is impossible not because it cannot be told, but because it 
cannot be heard.
The story of Moshe yields insights into the constitutive role of the 
listener in the circuit of witnessing, and into the inherent anxiety of 
the witness who is painfully aware that testimony might fail to find an 
audience. Wiesel’s endeavour is to avoid becoming Moshe. Yet the ghost 
of Moshe returns and keeps on returning. Indeed, Moshe reappears in 
numerous of Wiesel’s works. In an essay entitled ‘Moshe-le-fou’ Wiesel 
describes how he tried to rid himself of his obsession with Moshe by 
making him a character in one of his books, only to find that he took 
over every other character. His fiction, perhaps, is nothing but the story 
of Moshe: not so much in its overt themes, but in its repeated anxiety 
concerning testimonial failure. And Wiesel considers that his own life 
may be no more than a reflection on Moshe’s: ‘L’idée me vient parfois 
que je ne suis moi-même qu’une erreur, un malentendu: je crois vivre 
ma vie, alors qu’en vérité je ne fais que traduire la sienne’ (Le Chant 
des morts, p. 102). Moshe, then, haunts Wiesel’s writing. Indeed, Wiesel 
describes him as a kind of ghost or living dead man: ‘je le sais mort 
depuis très longtemps […]. Mais il se refuse à l’admettre. Il semble 
abuser de ses privilèges de feu et de mort pour nier les faits’ (Le Chant 
des morts, p. 99). He comes back again and again, representing the 
ever-present possibility that the witness will fail in his task.
However, one of the novels in which Moshe appears – Le Serment de 
Kolvillàg – envisages a radically different view of testimonial obligation: 
in this case, the survivor assumes the difficult task of remaining silent, 
in the endeavour to prevent the repetition of atrocity by refusing to 
recount it.
The discovery of the listener
The opening sentences of Le Serment de Kolvillàg indicate a blunt refusal 
to speak: ‘Je ne parlerai pas, dit le vieillard. Ce que j’ai à le dire, je ne tiens 
pas à le dire’ (p. 9). This is echoed shortly afterwards: ‘Je ne raconterai 
pas, dit le vieillard. Kolvillàg ça ne se raconte pas’ (p. 11). With these 
words we are introduced to a narrator who does not want to narrate; and 
the rest of the novel can be read as a disavowal of its first sentences. If the 
old man kept to his word, there would be no story and no book for us to 
read. Shortly afterwards, when something resembling a narrative appears 
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to begin, it is with the words ‘Il était une fois, il y a longtemps, une petite 
ville’ (p. 9; emphasis original). The formula ‘Il était une fois’ suggests 
that we are reading an invented tale, perhaps a fairy story, but in any case 
something other than a historical or testimonial narrative. We are invited 
to suspend any expectation that what we are reading should be taken as 
literally, referentially true. It’s just a story.
The rest of Wiesel’s novel explores this opening tension between 
a refusal to speak and a willing entry into narrative. Le Serment de 
Kolvillàg is at first a confusing work: different – initially unidentified – 
voices speak; some passages are in italics; and chronology is uncertain. 
Eventually, though, the situation becomes clearer. An aging vagrant 
named Azriel meets and befriends a young man who is on the verge of 
killing himself. Although the young man’s suicidal inclinations are not 
fully explained, they appear to be linked to his parents’ experience of 
the Holocaust, during which his mother lost her son and first husband. 
Azriel decides that the way to save him is by speaking to him: ‘On ne se 
suicide pas au milieu d’une phrase. On ne se suicide pas en parlant ou 
en écoutant’ (p. 19). So he engages his interlocutor by recounting real or 
invented stories. At the same time, he repeatedly alludes to something 
he is not telling, namely the story of Kolvillàg: ‘comment parler de ce 
qui nie la parole? comment exprimer ce qui doit demeurer inarticulé?’ 
(p. 41); ‘L’histoire que j’ai à vous raconter, on m’a défendu de la raconter’ 
(p. 42); ‘je ne suis pas ici pour parler mais pour me taire’ (p. 50).
Although Azriel speaks incessantly, he has a secret of which he will 
not speak. At the end of the first of the three sections of the novel, he 
nevertheless decides to divulge his secret, despite a binding oath which 
he has taken. He does this because it seems to be the only way of saving 
his young interlocutor from suicide; and the secret turns out to be the 
story of Kolvillàg. The remaining two sections of the novel tell that 
story. In the years before the Second World War, a Christian boy goes 
missing in the town of Kolvillàg, which is situated somewhere in Eastern 
or Central Europe. The Christian inhabitants quickly blame the Jewish 
community, and it is increasingly apparent that a pogrom is about to 
occur. Moshe, the local mystic and/or madman, falsely confesses to 
killing the boy in the hope that his self-sacrifice with avert the impending 
slaughter. His actions turn out to be in vain. Allowed to preach in the 
synagogue, Moshe proposes to the Jews of Kolvillàg that, if any of them 
should survive, instead of recounting the story of the pogrom they should 
keep silent about it. The community takes an oath not to bear witness. 
The pogrom occurs, the Jews are murdered and only Azriel escapes. In 
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the final lines of the book, Azriel passes on the story of Kolvillàg to the 
young man. His secret has now finally been revealed, and the burden of 
responsibility has been passed on to the next generation. Moreover, by 
telling the young man the story of Kolvillàg, Azriel has both saved and 
blighted his life: ‘Parce que maintenant, ayant reçu cette histoire, tu n’as 
plus le droit de mourir’ (p. 255; emphasis original). The young man has 
become the witness to the witness. The witness is a moral agent who 
must transmit the story of atrocity; and the witness to the witness is 
put into an analogous situation, being forced to preserve a memory of 
which s/he has been made the depository. The suicidal young man can 
no longer kill himself once he becomes the bearer of a story which it is 
his duty to transmit.
The frame narrative of Le Serment de Kolvillàg appears closely to 
endorse the emphasis that trauma studies has placed on the role of the 
listener. In La Nuit, Moshe’s testimony remains blocked because he 
has no one with whom it can be shared. Le Serment de Kolvillàg, by 
contrast, is all about the invention of a listener who will become witness 
to the witness and in the process make testimony possible. Prior to 
his encounter with the suicidal young man, Azriel will not or cannot 
become the author of his own life story. His story is unblocked by the 
encounter with a secondary witness who becomes its suitable addressee. 
The story becomes possible precisely and only through the meeting 
with someone capable of receiving it; and the addressee becomes the 
vehicle for its continuation. The discovery of the witness to the witness 
is exactly coterminous with the viability of primary witnessing. The 
witness needs, in equal measure, an experience of which to speak and a 
listener capable of hearing it. As trauma studies predicts, the invention 
of the witness coincides with the invention of the witness to the witness. 
And testimony is an event in the life of both the primary witness and the 
secondary witness. The final page of the novel suggests that, once he has 
told his story, Azriel has the right to die; and having heard it and become 
its repository, the young listener now has a duty to live.
Le Serment de Kolvillàg can be read, then, as depicting the invention 
of the witness through the encounter with the listener, the secondary 
witness, who is capable of receiving his story. In this respect, it reproduces 
the psychoanalytical conditions of witnessing powerfully and influen-
tially described by Dori Laub, and followed in later versions of trauma 
studies. And yet, this misses what is most compelling and challenging 
in Wiesel’s novel. Here, the decision to narrate is both a life-changing, 
life-saving unblockage and an act of betrayal.
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The oath of silence
The oath from which Le Serment de Kolvillàg takes its title is sworn 
by the Jews of Kolvillàg as they await a murderous pogrom some time 
before the Second World War. The principal narrator, Azriel, is a boy 
at the time. His father, Shmuel, is the community scribe, and as such 
he keeps and continues the book in which the history and ongoing 
discussions of the community are recorded. Shmuel believes in the 
need to bear witness, to keep a record of what is said and done which 
can be passed on to future generations. The central, second part of the 
novel turns around the opposition between him and Moshe, the local 
madman and mystic. Moshe is an enigmatic, charismatic and disturbing 
figure. His madness and his mysticism are bound up with one another, 
as he shuns everyday life and claims – and is believed – to have special 
powers. He nevertheless takes a wife, out of pity and then perhaps out 
of love, and settles into a more ordinary existence. When the Jewish 
community is threatened because a Christian boy goes missing, giving 
rise to long-standing anti-Semitic accusations of ritual sacrifice practised 
by the Jews, Moshe believes he can avert the impending disaster by 
falsely confessing to the boy’s murder and thereby making himself the 
necessary scapegoat. However, in what is clearly a prefiguration of the 
Holocaust, the lust for Jewish blood will not be appeased so easily. It 
looks as if Moshe’s act was in vain.
Although he is in custody, Moshe gains permission to speak in the 
town synagogue, and this is where he proposes the novel’s titular oath. 
The passage echoes Paneloux’s second sermon in Camus’s La Peste, and it 
is also a dense reflection on the Jewish tradition of testimony. The role of 
human beings, Moshe argues, has always been to survive in order to tell 
the tale of their survival, the ultimate listener here being God. The story 
is always the same, even though it can be recounted in numerous ways:
Les hommes n’ont qu’une histoire à raconter, quoiqu’ils la rapportent de 
mille façons: tortures, persécutions, chasses à l’homme, meurtres rituels, 
terreur collective, cela fait des siècles que ça dure, des siècles que de deux 
côtés les participants jouent les mêmes rôles – et au lieu de parler, Dieu 
écoute, au lieu d’intervenir, de trancher, il attend et ne juge qu’après. […] 
C’est qu’il y a toujours un conteur, un survivant, un témoin pour raviver 
le passé et ressusciter le meurtre sinon les morts. (p. 216)
In Moshe’s account, history is the endless repetition of the same: the 
same hatred, the same accusations, the same murderous outcome. This 
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echoes passages from elsewhere in the novel, for example when we are 
told that ‘C’est une bien vieille fable. Et bien bête. […] Rien n’a changé 
depuis le premier meurtre rituel. C’était le même cadavre qui servait de 
prétexte; on assassinait chaque fois le même enfant pour provoquer les 
mêmes abominations’ (p. 92). There is nothing new about the story of 
Kolvillàg: it has been repeated innumerable times throughout history. 
An important intertext here, once again, is the Book of Job, in which a 
series of disasters occur. Each repeats the previous one with variations 
but with the same sense of inevitable catastrophe. And as in the Book 
of Job, in which each time there is one survivor who escapes to tell the 
tale, someone comes back to speak of what has happened. 
And to whom does the survivor-narrator speak? Moshe suggests 
that the ultimate addressee is God; but the bitterness here is palpable. 
If the survivor’s role is to report to God on the awfulness of the human 
situation, God turns out to be an appalling, indifferent addressee because 
he never responds with decisive action: ‘il attend’. So what is the point 
of bearing witness if nothing changes? The purpose of transmitting 
the memory of atrocity may be to avert its reoccurrence. Yet history 
shows that testimony has always been futile. God does nothing, and 
human beings pursue their murderous path. The pogrom which takes 
place in Kolvillàg repeats previous pogroms and in turn anticipates the 
ultimate pogrom that is the Holocaust; and that in turn anticipates other 
genocides, for example in Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Nothing 
changes; history is an endless repetition of the same; and the different 
narratives of atrocity do not alter its underlying sameness.
To this already bleak account of the moral purpose of witnessing, 
Moshe adds a further radical point: what if recalling and recounting 
atrocity actually contribute to the likelihood of its reoccurrence? Moshe 
describes the tradition in which there is always a survivor-witness who 
miraculously escapes to tell the tale and prevent atrocity from being 
forgotten. But this victory is a hollow one:
Eh! oui, des siècles que ça dure: on nous tue et nous racontons comment; 
on nous pille et nous écrivons comment; on nous humilie, on nous 
opprime, on nous expulse de la société et de l’histoire et nous disons 
comment. […] L’ennemi peut tout faire de nous, mais jamais il ne nous 
fera taire: c’était là notre devise. Le verbe était notre arme, notre bouclier, 
le conte notre radeau de sauvetage. Le verbe, nous le voulions fort, plus 
fort que l’ennemi, plus puissant que la mort. Puisqu’il restera quelqu’un 
pour raconter l’épreuve, c’est que nous l’avons gagné d’avance. Puisque, à 
la fin, il restera quelqu’un pour décrire notre mort, c’est que la mort sera 
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vaincue; c’était là notre conviction profonde, inébranlable. Pourtant … 
(p. 217)
Moshe’s ‘Pourtant …’ marks the point where he will strike a blow 
against this conviction. Telling the story saves no one; indeed, it might 
even make matters worse. The key to Moshe’s argument is the contention 
that ‘La souffrance et l’histoire de la souffrance [sont] liées de manière 
intrinsèque’ (p. 218). Moshe’s disturbing suggestion is that the story 
prolongs what it describes, both as a memory of past suffering and 
a kind of blueprint for the future. It encapsulates and makes explicit 
an aspect of human potential which is then available to be re-enacted 
by later generations. Moshe’s solution, finally accepted by the Jews 
of Sighet, is a simple, definitive attempt to break the circle of atrocity 
through a binding oath: ‘Prenons l’unique décision qui s’impose: nous ne 
témoignerons plus’ (p. 218).
The implication that bearing witness to one’s own story actually 
causes and prolongs suffering runs up against deep-rooted beliefs about 
the value of storytelling in particular and speech in general. The 
much-repeated insistence on the moral duty to bear witness or the 
psychoanalytical ‘talking cure’ both stress the benefits, individually and 
culturally, of trying to formulate the story of pain. Recent theoretical 
interest in the ‘narrative turn’ has also drawn attention to the role 
of storytelling in the necessary and therapeutic process of creating a 
meaning for one’s life.1 As Karen Blixen is quoted as saying, ‘All sorrows 
can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them’ 
(Cavarero, Relating Narratives, p. 2). But reticence bordering on a blunt 
refusal to speak is also part of the survivor-witness’s experience. In one 
of the opening sequences of Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah, Lanzmann 
asks one of the survivors of the Chelmno death camp if it is good to 
speak of his experiences, only to be told through an interpreter that no, 
for him it is not good; the survivor does not speak of his experiences, or 
read books about the Eichmann trial even though he was a witness at it; 
and a strange smile hovers on his lips because, he says, it is better to smile 
than to cry (see Lanzmann, Shoah, p. 27). The endeavour of Lanzmann’s 
monumental film is to elicit the stories of survivors, perpetrators and 
bystanders in the face of their reluctance to bear witness. The stakes 
of Wiesel’s Le Serment de Kolvillàg are, if anything, even more stark. 
Should one bear witness at all, if the duty to testify competes with an 
 1 For discussion, see Meretoja, The Narrative Turn in Fiction and Theory.
Traces of War204
equally compelling duty to keep silent, and if in any case telling the story 
of suffering is part of the problem rather than part of the solution?
In Wiesel’s novel, Azriel decides to tell the story of Kolvillàg. On 
balance, his desire to save his listener by making him the repository of 
the story outweighs his determination to keep to his oath of silence. 
Where Moshe in La Nuit failed to find an audience which would allow 
testimony to take place, Azriel succeeds in inventing himself as witness 
by inventing his listener as the witness to the witness. One could say, 
then, that the novel finally sides with Azriel’s father, the scribe committed 
to the primacy of memory, rather than Moshe, who argues for silence. 
And yet one should bear in mind that Le Serment de Kolvillàg is a novel, 
not a directly testimonial work; moreover, it is a novel which is deeply 
aware of the difficulties and dilemmas of narration, and in particular of 
the problematic distinction between storytelling as part of experience 
and storytelling as the construction of fictions. Azriel is a storyteller, 
and storytelling is part of life; but some of Azriel’s stories are purely 
imagined. Moreover, telling invented stories is precisely a way of not 
telling one’s own: ‘Pour ne pas violer mon serment, je racontais toutes 
sortes d’histoire sauf la mienne: en les inventant, je donnais libre cours 
à mon imagination’ (p. 51). Thus forewarned, we might wonder if the 
story of Kolvillàg is actually told, or merely fitted in to a pre-existing 
pattern of meaning in which each atrocity repeats every other one. At the 
end of his narrative, despite all that he has disclosed, Azriel nevertheless 
says that ‘[l’histoire de Kolvillàg] demeurera secrète’ (p. 254). Telling 
and not telling turn out to be bound up with one another in ways that 
perhaps cannot be disentangled.
At the very least, it is significant that Wiesel’s novel entertains the 
possibility of putting an end to witnessing, even if ultimately the work 
sides with the duty of testimony. The novel, like all of Wiesel’s writing, is 
inhabited by a foreboding of its own futility or impossibility, combined 
with a moral and psychological need to carry on. The genre of the novel 
provides a means of negotiating this difficult position. The fictional 
story of Kolvillàg echoes, but does not quite equate to, the true story 
of Sighet; and it foreshadows without fully entering into the even more 
terrible story of the Holocaust. Something is disclosed, and something 
remains secret.
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Psychoanalysis, trauma and the ‘little secret’
The question of secrecy, of telling and not telling what cannot be told, 
of bearing witness to the truth while insisting that something remains 
unsaid, lies as the core of Wiesel’s aesthetics (for fuller discussion, 
see Davis, Elie Wiesel’s Secretive Texts). In the rest of this chapter I 
want to examine the link between secrecy and knowledge, speaking 
and remaining silent, in relation to Wiesel’s Un désir fou de danser. In 
this late-period novel, a troubled man undertakes a course of psychoa-
nalysis, both rejecting his analyst’s search to uncover hidden secrets 
and yet reluctantly conceding the pertinence of her insights, until the 
course is terminated by the analyst herself. I discuss this alongside Le 
Savoir-déporté: camps, histoire, psychanalyse (2004), a collection of 
texts by the Auschwitz survivor and Lacanian psychoanalyst Anne-Lise 
Stern. What is at stake here is the issue of what it means to know and 
to speak after Auschwitz. Angered by the failure of psychoanalysts to 
heed the effects of the camps on post-war generations, Stern attempts 
to sketch what she calls le savoir-déporté, a mode of knowledge formed 
by the camps rather than a dispassionate interpretation of deportees’ 
experience. I suggest that in Wiesel’s writing there is a fascinated but 
determined resistance to psychoanalysis, whereas Stern’s work enacts a 
resistance within psychoanalysis to the appropriation of the survivor’s 
experience. Coming from very different positions, both Wiesel’s novel 
and Stern’s essays nevertheless converge as they point towards a mode of 
post-traumatic knowing.
The question of what one knows and does not know, says and cannot 
say, is central to recent trauma studies. Yet with some exasperation 
Shoshana Felman has observed a censorious tendency at work in some 
writing on trauma and trauma studies. As she puts it, ‘Why this policing 
of the territory of knowledge?’ (The Juridical Unconscious, p. 181). 
Perhaps she should not be so surprised. As Felman explains, referring to 
the work of Cathy Caruth, ‘the event of trauma destabilizes the security 
of knowledge and strikes at the foundation of the institutional prerog-
atives of what is known’ (p. 181). To respond to trauma is to experience 
as ethically urgent the questions of who knows and what is known, 
of who can speak with authority and what can be communicated in 
intelligible form. In particular, the nature and status of psychoanalytic 
knowledge is at stake here, given the pivotal role that psychoanalysis 
has played in the development of trauma studies. Psychoanalysis has 
sometimes been characterized and caricatured as the pursuit of sexual 
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secrets underlying obsessive behaviour. But trauma, understood as the 
disruption of knowledge, upsets the masterful position of the analyst, 
who was famously described by Lacan as the subject supposed (but only 
supposed) to know. 
It would be hard to overrate the importance of Cathy Caruth’s work 
on the development of psychoanalytically informed trauma studies in 
the humanities. Describing her as the ‘most authoritative, most original 
interdisciplinary theorist’ of the field, Felman usefully summarizes the 
main aspects of her thought in a long footnote to her own book The 
Juridical Unconscious (2002):
(1) Trauma is an essential dimension of historical experience, and its 
analysis provides a new understanding of historical causality;
(2) The aftermath of catastrophic experience is riddled by an enigma 
of survival; the legacy of traumatic experience imposes a reflection 
on, and provides a new type of insight into, the relation between 
destruction and survival;
(3) Because the experience of trauma addresses the Other and demands 
the listening of another, it implies a human and an ethical dimension 
in which the Other receives priority over the self. This ethical 
dimension is tightly related to the question of justice. (pp. 173–74)
Felman concedes, though, that Caruth’s theorization of trauma, which 
is ‘largely recognized and widely cited as canonical’ (p. 175), has been 
severely criticized in some quarters. She goes on to discuss Ruth Leys’s 
Trauma: A Genealogy, describing it as ‘emblematic (symptomatic)’ of 
territorial struggles in academia (Juridical Unconscious, p. 175). In 
her book, Leys takes what she describes as a Foucauldian genealogical 
approach to the study of trauma, tracing the development of the notion 
through the work of Freud and Janet into recent debates around 
post-traumatic stress disorder. The final chapter of Leys’s book is 
devoted to Caruth’s work. There are certainly some questionable moves 
in this chapter. Its opening sentence, for example, describes Caruth’s 
approach as ‘postmodernist’ and ‘poststructuralist’, conflating two terms 
in a way which is at best problematic; and the repeated association of 
Caruth’s views with those of Paul de Man simplifies the complex relation 
between their positions. Even so, much of the chapter is intelligent and 
thoughtful, and it leads to the challenging conclusion that Caruth tends 
to erase the distinction between victims and perpetrators so that even 
Nazis, for example, are turned into victims in a way that we should 
find ethically unacceptable. When she summarizes her findings in her 
Conclusion, Leys’s dislike for Caruth’s work becomes explicit. Leys 
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admits to ‘impatience with the sloppiness of her theoretical arguments; 
in the name of close reading she produces interpretations that are so 
arbitrary, wilful, and tendentious as to forfeit all claim to believability’ 
(Trauma, p. 305).
In The Juridical Unconscious, Felman mounts a staunch defence 
against Leys’s attack on Caruth. Rather than following the detail of her 
argument, I want to point out here that the language she uses is every 
bit as forthright as Leys’s. Felman dislikes the ‘pure verbal violence’ of 
Leys’s book (p. 176), but she herself is not entirely free from denunciatory 
hyperbole. Felman accuses Leys of reducing ‘the momentous stakes 
of trauma to the triviality of academic conflict’ (p. 175); Leys’s book 
is ‘entirely derivative of the insights of those she attacks’ (p. 176); she 
‘almost obsessively’ attributes Caruth’s theories to notions derived from 
Paul de Man (p. 176); and her falsification of Freud is ‘substantive’ and 
‘blatant’ (pp. 177–78). In short, Trauma: A Genealogy is not a very 
good book: ‘What is wrong with this artificial theory? To begin with, its 
barrenness of insight, its lack of human depth, and by its own admission, 
its utter clinical irrelevance’ (The Juridical Unconscious, p. 177). In 
fact, precisely in the passage that Felman goes on to quote, Leys does 
not concede the clinical irrelevance of her work. On the contrary, 
Leys suggests that her dismantling of trauma theory does have clinical 
consequences, insofar as therapists should learn from it not to follow 
theory in their treatments, but to adopt instead ‘an intelligent, humane 
and resourceful pragmatism’ (Trauma, p. 307) towards their patients.
The point here is not to settle the rights and wrongs of this argument; 
rather it is to observe the excessive terms in which it is conducted. These 
go beyond what is customary in academic debate and illustrate how the 
discourse on trauma is infused with a heavy emotional investment on the 
part of its practitioners. The medical overtones of Felman’s references 
to Leys’s book as symptomatic and to almost obsessive aspects of her 
writing cast Leys as a patient to be treated, as if she were as much the 
bearer of trauma as she is its analyst. One feature of this implication 
which is strikingly odd is the extent to which Felman’s stance, like 
Leys’s and indeed Caruth’s, preserves the critic’s position of authority 
over the object of her criticism, implicitly likening it to the role of the 
doctor who diagnoses the ills of her patient with the aim of curing 
them. Trauma appears consistently in trauma studies as unrepresentable 
and as intractable to mastery and conventional knowledge. Even Leys 
concedes on the final page of her book that her argument does not yield 
‘a meta-position from which to assess the messy and intrinsically painful 
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conundrums of the field’ (307). And yet this failure of knowledge – a 
failure at the core of our (in)ability to know the unfathomable strangeness 
of the other – does not, apparently, affect the critic’s knowledge of the 
texts she is reading. The critic knows the text better than it knows itself, 
speaking on its behalf because her insight has priority over its own 
self-understanding. This retention of critical authority in the face of a 
traumatic encounter which might put it in danger is already apparent 
in Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. 
Therein Caruth suggests, for example, that the resonance of a passage 
from Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle ‘exceeds, perhaps, the limits 
of Freud’s conceptual or conscious theory of trauma’ (p. 2), and she 
goes on to demonstrate what Freud’s writing ‘unwittingly’ tells us about 
trauma (p. 4). The critic knows more about the text than it knows 
about itself. Trauma may unsettle knowledge, but the critic nevertheless 
reinstates a position of knowledge in her assumption of authority over 
the textual traces, effects or discourse of trauma. 
This controversy within trauma studies illustrates how the whole 
field of study is suffused by problems of knowledge and authority both 
in arguments between critics and, more importantly, in relation to 
the texts of survivor-victims. Under what conditions, and with what 
necessary precautions, can anyone speak in the place of, on behalf of, 
the other? Such questions become particularly acute when the other in 
question is the survivor or the non-survivor of trauma. In Chapter 1, we 
saw how Giorgio Agamben places this issue at the centre of the ethical 
dilemma raised by talking about the Holocaust. Following Primo Levi, 
he designates the Muselmann (the prisoner who has given up on life) as 
the only true witness, yet he is the witness who, by definition, cannot 
bear witness because he did not survive (Remnants of Auschwitz, 
pp. 33–34, quoting Levi, The Saved and the Drowned, pp. 63–64). How 
can the survivor or the critic speak for the witness who cannot speak 
for himself? Agamben, like Levi and Caruth, attempts to occupy an 
impossible position defined by an intense double bind: we cannot and 
should not speak in the place of others, supplanting their voice with 
ours; but not to speak for them would be reduce them to silence once 
again, to be complicit in their second murder. The work of Wiesel and 
Stern bears directly on these issues. Both speak as survivors who are 
concerned about the status of the survivor’s speech, and about what it 
means to speak for and about those who did not survive. And they both 
investigate the kind of knowledge that an analyst, and pre-eminently a 
psychoanalyst, might have of the traumatized survivor.
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The sane and the mad
Madness is a core theme in Wiesel’s work, as the survivor encounters 
a world drained of sense. The opening pages of La Nuit describe an 
exemplary descent into what some consider to be madness. When 
Moshe the Beadle returns to Sighet to warn the Jews of Nazi atrocities, 
he encounters only disbelief and he is held to be mad (‘Le pauvre, il est 
devenu fou’, p. 17). Those whom we describe as mad, it is suggested, may 
be those who have seen things which exceed what we can understand; 
or, alternatively, Wiesel’s subsequent novels will imply, madness may be 
the only sane response to an unhinged world. The mad are everywhere 
in Wiesel’s fiction, perhaps most insistently in Le Crépuscule, au loin 
(1987), which is set in a lunatic asylum and culminates in an encounter 
with a madman who thinks he is God – unless it is God who thinks he 
is a madman. The novel I want to concentrate on now, Un désir fou de 
danser, alludes to madness in its title, and its opening pages reflect on 
what it means to be mad. Is a madman who knows he is mad really mad? 
In a mad world, isn’t a madman who knows he is mad the only person 
who is sane? The language of madness can be understood only by those 
who bear madness within them, but then everyone is said to have a share 
of madness. So madness is incomprehensible and incommunicable, and 
yet potentially something which may be close to all of us.
From its opening paragraphs, the novel asks how to speak of madness, 
and on what terms it can be known and understood. It also suggests that 
the madman, rather than being someone to whom a pre-existing body of 
clinical knowledge should be applied with the aim of achieving a cure, 
may bear witness to his own kind of knowledge. He may be someone 
who knows something we do not know. The novel recounts scenes from 
a course of psychoanalysis undertaken by a troubled Jewish man named 
Doriel and a Freudian psychoanalyst called Thérèse Goldschmidt. From 
the beginning, there is some mystery over why Doriel has gone to a 
psychoanalyst at all since he is resolutely hostile to psychoanalytic 
methods and insights. He refuses to lie on the couch and resists the 
practice of free association. Moreover, he repeats a well-known set of 
objections to psychoanalytic reductionism: it brings everything back to 
sexuality, looking for dirty little secrets which provide a key to unlock 
the whole psyche; in particular, analysts attempt to find the answer to all 
problems in the child’s relation to its mother. To some extent, Thérèse 
justifies Doriel’s hostility, regarding her patient as a puzzle to be solved 
and constantly probing him about his parents. Doriel insists that his 
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parents and his relationship with them cannot be known by the analyst: 
‘il y a des choses que vous ne comprendrez jamais. Vous n’avez pas vécu 
leur vie, mais moi, je la porte en moi comme une trace de sang. Et leur 
mort comme une brûlure’ (Un désir fou de danser, p. 128). The dead 
inhabit the surviving child not as objects of knowledge but as a wound 
at the core of his life. And yet, Doriel persists with the course of analysis 
until it is ended by the analyst. Indeed, he also concedes that Thérèse’s 
suspicious probing may even lead him to discover the truth about his 
own experience: ‘La thérapeute a vu plus clair en moi que moi-même. 
Au bout de quelques semaines, me guidant par un mot ou un silence, 
elle réussit à me faire redécouvrir la vérité: rien ne s’est passé entre Ruth 
et moi’ (p. 194). The analyst cannot know the truth, but nevertheless 
guides the analysand towards it.
In a brilliant reading of Moshe’s role in La Nuit, Ora Avni has described 
Wiesel’s work as ‘beyond psychoanalysis’: it invalidates any therapeutic 
practice, especially psychoanalysis, which restricts its attempted cures to 
a suffering individual because the wounds Wiesel describes are historical 
and cultural (see ‘Beyond Psychoanalysis’). Un désir fou de danser does 
not entirely repudiate psychoanalysis, however, even though the novel is 
constructed around a fundamental ambivalence towards psychoanalytic 
knowledge. Doriel resists psychoanalysis but is also drawn to it, rejecting 
its shafts of insight while exposing himself to them. Moreover, psychoa-
nalysis appears to be most pertinent to Doriel on precisely the issue over 
whose single-minded obsession he objects most vehemently: the question 
of the mother. During the Second World War, Doriel’s mother had been 
a heroine of the Polish Resistance. While Doriel and his father were in 
hiding, his mother was able to move around more freely because of her 
Aryan appearance. The image Doriel gives of her is highly idealized: 
‘Blonde, belle et robuste, l’œil gris perçant, munie de sa carte d’identité 
aryenne, elle suscitait l’admiration de ses camarades par son audace. 
Volontaire pour les missions les plus dangereuses, elle avait fini par être 
en quelque sorte la garante de leur succès’ (pp. 143–44). Yet this ideali-
zation is also double-edged: in order to be the much-lauded heroine of 
the Resistance, the mother also had to abandon her child, seeing him 
only on rare, furtive visits. Moreover, as the analysis progresses, Doriel 
begins to remember forgotten or repressed episodes from his past that 
suggest his mother may have had an affair with a fellow member of the 
Resistance. So she is both idealized heroine and a sordid adulteress who 
is guilty of abandoning her child and endangering the happy family 
unit. It seems that for all his hostility towards it, psychoanalysis has 
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nevertheless led Doriel to the true explanation for the shipwreck of his 
life: ‘Mais la véritable explication, découvre Doriel avec stupéfaction, 
ce serait ce soupçon inavoué, jamais formulé, qui lentement, implaca-
blement, l’aurait enfermé dans l’ascèse du célibat, le condamnant à la 
solitude et aux désordres de la pensée’ (p. 267).
At this point, though, something surprising happens. It remains 
unclear whether Doriel has expressed these thoughts out loud. Even so, 
Thérèse responds as if she has heard them; and rather than seeing in them 
the confirmation of her psychoanalytic premises, she is non-committal 
in her appraisal: ‘C’est possible, dit la doctoresse alors que le silence s’est 
installé’ (p. 267). When the analyst hears what her analysand thought 
she wanted to hear, it turns out that she is less pleased than he expected 
to find that the mother is at the source of his woes. It is not after all 
definitively true, only possible. Roles seem now to have switched. 
Doriel expresses what elsewhere in the novel are depicted as parodically 
reductive psychoanalytic views while the analyst distances herself from 
them. Thérèse, it appears, did not wish merely to confirm what she 
was deemed already to know, but positively to discover something new. 
For all the ambivalent hostility shown towards psychoanalysis in Un 
désir fou de danser, the novel also stages a less reductive account of 
psychoanalytic reductionism. Perhaps Thérèse has something to learn 
from her insane or traumatized analysand. On this issue, Stern’s Le 
Savoir-déporté provides a context for understanding how the victim’s 
knowledge realigns the relationship between analyst and analysand.
Stern and deported knowledge
In a curious example of the power of the letter, Anne-Lise Stern’s very 
name seemed to predestine her to become a psychoanalyst: she is, after 
all, psych-Anne-Lise. She was born in 1921 in Berlin.2 In 1933, on Hitler’s 
rise to power in Germany, her socialist parents escaped with their 
daughter to France, where they became citizens in 1938. Stern began to 
study medicine, and, equipped with false papers, in 1944 she moved to 
Paris where she was denounced as a Jew and arrested on 1 April. She 
 2 The information on Stern’s life and career is taken from Fresco and Leibovici, 
‘Une vie à l’œuvre’. For discussion of Stern’s essays and her relation to contem-
porary French psychoanalysis, see Dorland, ‘Psychoanalysis After Auschwitz? The 
“Deported Knowledge” of Anne-Lise Stern’.
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was deported to Auschwitz, and subsequently to Bergen-Belsen and 
Theresienstadt, before returning to France in June 1945. In the 1950s, she 
took a course of psychoanalysis with Jacques Lacan and subsequently 
became, on her own account, the only Lacanian analyst who was also 
a deportee (Le Savoir-déporté, p. 113). Her relation to psychoanalytic 
practice in France is a complex one. If Wiesel’s novel dramatizes the 
analysand’s resistance to psychoanalysis, Stern diagnoses a resistance 
within psychoanalysis to the trauma of deportation. As she describes 
it, in the years following the war analysts had simply not understood 
how Auschwitz imposed a fundamental change in the relation between 
themselves and their analysands. They continued to treat deportees as 
objects or documents to be understood dispassionately, sheltering behind 
the familiar comfort of the ‘vilains petits secrets’ (p. 190) originating in 
Oedipal family dramas. Analysts had failed to grasp the fact that the 
new primal scene for modern humanity is the gas chamber (Le Savoir-
déporté, p. 152); and the patient now is psychoanalysis itself, because its 
position of knowing neutrality is no longer viable. The reaction to Bruno 
Bettelheim is symptomatic of the failure within psychoanalytic circles to 
understand the complexity of the new situation. As a survivor, he was 
himself a traumatized subject; in consequence, his views were considered 
to be untrustworthy; his knowledge was impugned by his own position 
as victim. It was still inconceivable that the traumatized subject could 
have something valid to say outside the established structures of psycho-
analytic theory.
This resistance within psychoanalysis to the significance of Auschwitz 
for its own practices does not, however, mean that for Stern it is a lost 
cause. It is both impossible and necessary: ‘Je propose donc à la réflexion 
cette formule logique: peut-on être psychanalyste en ayant été déporté(é) à 
Auschwitz? La réponse est non. Peut-on, aujourd’hui, être psychanalyste 
sans cela? La réponse est encore non’ (p. 192). The deportee cannot be 
an analyst, yet only the deportee can become an analyst. The point here 
is not that no one other than deportees should now be able to practise 
psychoanalysis. Rather, it is that the whole psychoanalytic process is 
affected, including the relationship between analyst and analysand, as 
well as the kind of knowledge that the former can have of the latter. At 
this point, Stern’s allegiance specifically to Lacanian analysis becomes 
explicable. In her account, it is Lacanian analysis which most boldly 
carries the scar of the Holocaust into the core of the analytic relation. 
The Lacanian analyst does not look for the dirty little secrets which 
would confirm a pre-established body of doctrine. Countering Primo 
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Levi’s suggestion that psychoanalytic knowledge is irrelevant to the 
experience of deportees, Stern defends Lacan: ‘Je pense: l’enseignement 
de Lacan tient, devant cette critique. Il tient car par tout cela il s’est 
laissé enseigner (“Ce sont mes analysants qui m’enseignent”)’ (p. 223; 
emphasis original).3 Here, the question for the analyst is not ‘What do I 
know about the deportee?’, but rather ‘What does the deportee know?’
The deportee’s knowledge is what Stern calls le savoir-deporté, which 
is both the knowledge of the deportee and knowledge which is deported, 
carried away, returning as something other than itself. It describes 
the survivor’s speaking position as an act of witnessing before it is an 
analysable utterance: 
Que sommes-nous? que suis-je? demande-t-il. Chaque sujet-déporté, 
réellement, témoigne de ça, de cette loque qu’il a été, qu’ont été les autres 
autour de lui, qu’il était destiné à devenir. Le savoir-déporté, c’est ça, 
savoir sur le déchet, la loque. Mais quand il en parle, en témoigne, il ne 
l’est plus. (108)
It is not surprising that Stern says next to nothing about the content of 
this knowledge, since it is not primarily something to be paraphrased or 
summarized. She distances herself from thinkers such as Agamben and 
Felman, and from psychoanalysts who impose a ready-made conceptual 
framework onto survivors’ experience, not because they are necessarily 
wrong, but because in her view they risk missing the essential point, 
which is that for the survivor to speak of being a rag (‘la loque’) or a 
wreck is to be less of one. The unsurpassed achievement here is Claude 
Lanzmann’s film Shoah (1985), which listens attentively to survivors 
rather than seeking to explain or to understand them. What the survivor 
knows is inscribed more in her senses than in any theoretical framework: 
‘Nous autres, à Birkenau, nous en avons tout de même un peu vu, 
beaucoup entendu et encore plus senti. Avec le nez. Nous, femmes de 
Birkenau, nous avions, réellement, le nez dessus, tout le temps, sur cette 
 3 Stern quotes (selectively) from the French translation of Levi’s The Drowned 
and the Saved: ‘I do not believe that psychoanalysts (who have pounced upon our 
tangles with professional avidity) are competent to explain this impulse [to speak]. 
Their knowledge was built up and tested “outside”, in the world that, for the sake 
of simplicity, we call civilian: it traces its phenomenology and tries to explain it; 
it studies its deviations and tries to heal them. Their interpretations, even those 
of someone like Bruno Bettelheim who went through the trials of the Lager, seem 
to me approximate and simplified, as if someone wished to apply the theorems of 
plain geometry to the solution of spheric triangles’ (pp. 64–65).
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odeur de grillé mélangé à notre propre puanteur’ (Le Savoir-déporté, 
p. 261).
Stern’s work is a bold and heartfelt investigation of the psycho-
analyst’s inescapable implication in the material she analyses, and the 
consequences of such an implication for the theory and practice of psycho-
analysis. For her, the trauma of the camps is part of the post-war human 
condition; ‘vous êtes – vous aussi – tous, toutes tatoués, psychiquement’, 
she suggests (p. 210). This invalidates psychoanalysis as a position of 
knowledge seeking to unlock the analysand’s ‘little secrets’. At the same 
time, a reinvigorated psychoanalysis, which for Stern would be a psycho-
analysis guided by Lacan, is also urgently called for, since it alone can 
trace and attend to psychic scars unavailable to conscious, conceptual 
reflection. As analyst and survivor, she describes herself as faced with 
a double bind, requiring her both to bear witness and to psychoanalyse 
even when the two activities are in conflict with one another, and when 
Auschwitz is for ever intractable to the psychoanalyst’s gaze. It is not a 
question of resolving this double bind so much as learning to inhabit it 
without betraying either the survivor’s pain or the analyst’s clinical duty. 
This entails rethinking the relation between analysand and analyst, who 
is incited to learn from the survivor’s non-conceptual savoir-déporté 
rather than to seek to confirm what was already known. The roles of 
analyst and analysand have to some extent switched over. The section of 
Stern’s book devoted to le savoir-déporté closes by suggesting that the 
survivor may now become a clinician, because what she knows about 
pain can alleviate the suffering of others. Stern recounts a story about a 
rabbi with curative powers who decides to abandon his patients. When 
they ask him what will become of them, he reassures them: ‘Ne vous en 
faites pas, leur dit-il, allez à la synagogue et le premier à qui vous verrez, 
s’il retrousse sa manche, un petit numéro écrit sur le bras, allez vers lui, 
racontez-lui vos douleurs, et vous verrez, ça marchera très bien’ (p. 262).
The knowledge of stories
The fact that Stern concludes her discussion of le savoir-déporté with 
a story, and moreover a story which encourages us to tell our own 
sorrowful stories (‘racontez-lui vos douleurs’), brings us back to Wiesel’s 
Un désir fou de danser. Throughout Wiesel’s writing, if the survivor 
has any knowledge to transmit, it will take the form of a story, 
rooted in experience (real or imaginary) and almost always opaque 
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and ambiguous. Doriel’s course of psychoanalysis consists largely in his 
recounting of stories to his analyst, not so that she can interpret them, 
but to signal their resistance to her urge to interpret. The non-committal 
‘C’est possible’ with which Thérèse greets Doriel’s explanation of his 
suffering marks a moment of wavering on her part. Having apparently 
won Doriel over to her Freudian perspective, she is no longer sure that 
this is what she should be seeking from him. She appears to understand 
that she has not fully understood. This brings with it a modification 
of the relation between analysand and analyst which has repercussions 
for other encounters described in the novel. Even before this point it is 
clear that Doriel represents a danger for Thérèse. His case unsettles her 
knowledge and experience, and it begins to disrupt her marriage. In her 
sessions with him she behaves unprofessionally: she admits that she tries 
to provoke the transference by which he might fall in love with her. She 
tells him personal details about her private life, and when she breaks the 
analysis she gives him the notes she has kept on him. Who is analysing 
whom here? It is as if Doriel were as much the analyst as the analysand.
This is confirmed by Doriel’s relations with others in the novel, as 
he reproduces something resembling a psychoanalytic situation in his 
encounters. His version of this situation consists in a willingness to listen 
to the stories of others: Laurent is traumatized because he inadvertently 
caused the death of a fellow member of the Resistance during the war; a 
young woman Doriel meets on a plane tells him of her problems in love; 
his benefactor Samek Ternover tells him of his experiences as a deportee. 
Doriel insists that he does not understand: ‘Je n’avais rien compris à ce 
qu’elle venait de dire’ (p. 278); ‘Je n’étais pas qualifié pour ce rôle. Mais 
alors? Alors je me contentai de lui prêter l’oreille’ (p. 298). What is being 
depicted here is the survivor as analyst, willing to hear stories without 
comprehension, qualification or judgement. The survivor-analyst’s 
position is not one of knowledge; rather, it is an attentiveness to the 
pain and the density of experience of others as partially conveyed in the 
tales they have to tell. His subjects do not attribute to him a spurious, 
unfounded authority: ‘Laurent me regarda sans ciller, comme si je venais 
de m’évader d’un asile d’aliénés’ (p. 241). The survivor-analyst may be 
madder than those to whom he attends; yet his madness may also be his 
receptiveness to their pain, his ability to learn the distraught knowledge 
of the suffering other.
Wiesel’s novel develops the complex meditation on madness which he 
pursued throughout his writing career. Madness is depicted here as an 
experience of being locked up, of being cut off from the outside world, 
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but also as a desire to speak, to encounter and to communicate with other 
selves. It is a dangerous contagion, but also a susceptibility to otherness, 
and a form of knowledge in its own right, a theological matter more than 
a clinical one. It turns out to have a curious link to love: ‘il faut être fou 
pour aimer’ (Un désir fou de danser, p. 26), we are told, suggesting that 
in our cynical world love is madness, but also that only the madman can 
love truly. Love is what madness aspires to, as a desperate opening onto 
the world; but love is also the impossible outcome of madness because 
the madman is terribly isolated. It is in this light that the ending of Un 
désir fou de danser can be read. After the curtailment of his analysis, 
and after a lifetime of unconsummated relations, Doriel does indeed 
find love, apparently, when he meets and rapidly sets up home with a 
waitress who is much younger than he is. The final page of the novel sees 
the couple expecting a child. The madman’s vocation for love seems to 
have been fulfilled. What has been generously forgotten here is that this 
is also the barred conclusion of madness, the goal to which it aspires but 
which is unachievable. The happy ending is morally heart-warming but 
existentially false. By concluding in this way, the novel denies its own 
bitter insight that, if madness is a desire to communicate and to love, it 
is also the impossibility of succeeding in either.
Stern writes from the position of an analyst who resists analysis when 
caring, attentive listening is the better stance. Wiesel’s novel depicts an 
analysand who resists being analysed, though he replicates something 
of the analytic situation in his encounters with others. Both Stern and 
Wiesel investigate the questions of who knows what, and who can speak 
on behalf of the other. Both suggest that what survivors know may 
amount to more than their analysts can know about them. To speak 
prematurely, or with unwarranted authority, in the place of the other 
may be to silence her again, to finish off the work of the victimizers. 
Together, Stern and Wiesel elucidate a tension inherent within trauma 
studies. While questioning very radically what it means to represent, 
to know or to be the subject of one’s own experience, trauma studies 
also cannot rid itself of the impulse to speak for the other, to want to 
know more about others than they know of themselves. It runs the risk 
of usurping the other’s voice even as it speaks from a position of urgent 
care. There may of course be no alternative, except silence.
Popular psychology repeatedly tells us that talking about things is 
good for us. Le Serment de Kolvillàg envisages the contrary possibility 
even if it does not finally embrace it. Wiesel’s writing explores the 
painful, ambivalent position of victims who become witnesses in 
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search of secondary witnesses which make possible the uncovering, 
understanding and transmission of their distress. The view of silence 
as salutary is outweighed by the sense that it may also be an act of 
self-destructive self-censorship. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Semprun’s writing sometimes suggests that not telling the story of 
atrocity is both necessary for survival and a kind of time bomb which 
will be all the more destructive the longer it ticks away in the dark 
corners of the mind. Semprun’s characters sometimes die after telling 
their stories. The next chapter looks at the case of someone who really 
did die, at her own hands, within weeks of the publication of a memoir 
of her wartime experiences.
Sarah Kofman’s father was arrested in Paris on 16 July 1942, when she 
was seven. He had emigrated to France from Poland in 1929, and all his 
six children were French-born. His family never saw him again. After 
his arrest, he was deported to Auschwitz where, a year later, a Kapo 
beat him to death because he refused to work on the Sabbath. Kofman 
survived the war thanks to the protection of a non-Jewish woman, to 
whom she refers as mémé, and who became a kind of surrogate parent 
and a sometimes bitter rival with her real mother. As an adult Kofman 
became a noted philosopher; her thesis was supervised by Gilles Deleuze 
and she became a close associate of Jacques Derrida. She published over 
20 books covering a vast range of philosophical issues and authors, 
with a particular interest in the work of Nietzsche and Freud. Derrida 
said that no one in the century had read all the folds of the work of 
Nietzsche and Freud with such pitiless, implacable love (Chaque fois 
unique, p. 214). In 1994, she published Rue Ordener, rue Labat, a short 
memoir describing the arrest of her father and her subsequent wartime 
experiences. On 15 October 1994, she took her own life.
Is there a connection between what happened to Kofman and her 
family during the war, the publication of her memoir and her suicide? 
Some readers have suspected that there is a direct link between these 
events. Kofman’s biographer, Karoline Feyertag, reports comments by 
Kofman’s colleague Jean-Luc Nancy, who lists the publication of Rue 
Ordener, rue Labat as one of the factors which led to her death (Sarah 
Kofman, p. 29). It has been suggested that Kofman’s memoir made her 
traumatic experiences all too present to her again. As Françoise Duroux 
puts it, ‘The autobiographical plunge, practiced in vivo, undoubtedly 
induces an earthquake. Philosophy protects. The plunge causes the 
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philosophical position to explode: Sarah Kofman’s suicidal plunge into 
her own melancholy’ (‘How a Woman Philosophizes’, p. 138; quoted in 
Robson, ‘Bodily Detours’, p. 616). Others have shared the sense of a link 
between Kofman’s wartime traumas and her suicide, as discussed by 
Penelope Deutscher and Kelly Oliver: 
At an homage to Kofman held by her colleagues at the Sorbonne, 
Elisabeth de Fontenay suggested that it is precisely Kofman’s suicide that 
provokes one to reflect on the relationship between her life and work, or 
between her life and her two deaths, the one that she narrowly escaped as 
a child, the other of 1994. Françoise Armengaud suggests that Kofman’s 
death in 1994 could be thought of as the Holocaust having finally caught 
up with her, killing her with the delayed action of a time bomb. (‘Sarah 
Kofman’s Skirts’, p. 8)
Taken together, these accounts suggest that Kofman’s suicide was a 
delayed response to the Second World War: the trauma of war, unleashed 
by the memoir, caught up with her half a century after the event. In this 
light, Kofman can be seen as belonging to a doomed group of brilliant 
thinkers and writers whose suicides have been linked to their experiences 
of war and the Holocaust, including figures such as Jean Améry, Paul 
Celan, Bruno Bettelheim, Tadeusz Borowski and Primo Levi.
To take just one of these important writers, Kofman’s suicide might, 
then, be compared to the death of Primo Levi. Levi was found dead 
on the ground floor of the Turin apartment block where he lived on 11 
April 1987. The police enquiry confirmed the assumption that he had 
deliberately jumped to his death. This was rapidly amplified by the 
belief that his suicide was related to his experiences in Auschwitz. Days 
after his death, fellow survivor Elie Wiesel said that ‘Primo Levi died 
at Auschwitz forty years later’ (quoted Gambetta, ‘Primo Levi’s Last 
Moments’, p. 2); or, as he put it later, Levi’s death is ‘proof that one can 
die at Auschwitz after Auschwitz’ (‘Bearing Witness’). Levi’s biographer, 
Myriam Anissimov, describes Levi’s death as a suicide from her opening 
pages (see Primo Levi ou la tragédie d’un optimiste), and subsequent 
biographers have followed suit. Likewise, in the chapter of his L’Ecriture 
ou la vie entitled ‘Le Jour de la mort de Primo Levi’, Jorge Semprun does 
not doubt that Levi deliberately took his own life. Moreover, Semprun 
points out that the day of Levi’s death was the anniversary of the 
liberation of Buchenwald, the camp in which he (but not Levi) had been 
interned. Semprun assimilates Levi’s situation to his own, surviving only 
as a kind of ghost after the living death of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. 
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He writes twice that ‘la mort avait rattrapé Primo Levi’ (pp. 257, 260), 
the use of rattrapé suggesting that death had not just claimed him, but 
reclaimed him: since Auschwitz, Levi had belonged more to the dead 
than to the living. So why, Semprun wonders, was it suddenly impossible 
for Levi to bear his terrible memories? He quickly answers his own 
question: ‘Une ultime fois, sans recours ni remède, l’angoisse s’était 
imposée, tout simplement. Sans esquive ni espoir possibles’ (L’Ecriture 
ou la vie, p. 260). Semprun, like Wiesel and others, takes for granted, 
first, that Levi’s death was suicide, and second, that it was related to his 
experience of Auschwitz.
The suicide of Levi, like those of Kofman, Améry and Celan, may 
appear to be the final victory of Nazism over those who appeared to 
have survived it. Such a view is underpinned by two important features 
of Holocaust testimony and trauma studies. One is the widespread sense 
among Holocaust survivors that they have not in fact survived, that 
in reality they died in the camps alongside their companions despite 
the illusion of their return. As Mado, one of the speakers in Charlotte 
Delbo’s Mesure de nos jours, puts it, ‘Je ne suis pas vivante. Je suis morte 
à Auschwitz et personne ne le voit’ (p. 66). The other important feature 
is the operation of latency, which Freud described in his analysis of the 
victim of a train crash who walks away apparently unscathed, only to 
develop debilitating symptoms at a later date. According to the concept 
of latency, the consequences of a traumatic event may be felt long after 
the event itself; and in the intervening period the victim may appear to 
be unaffected by his or her experiences. So a friend could say of Levi 
that ‘Until the day of his death I was convinced he was the most serene 
person in the world’ (quoted Gambetta, ‘Primo Levi’s Last Moments’, 
p. 1), while Semprun could describe him as suddenly, overwhelmingly 
driven to suicide by unbearable memories.
Semprun’s rather rapid appropriation of Levi’s death might nevertheless 
give pause for thought. We might wonder on what basis he feels entitled 
to come to such a decisive interpretation of why Levi killed himself. 
In this and other accounts, although Levi’s death is terrible, at least 
it remains intelligible and narratable. It bears a meaning, even if that 
meaning is a depressing one. It is almost as if the Holocaust, which once 
was perceived as a radical challenge to our interpretive frameworks, 
how now been fitted out with concepts and paradigms which allow us 
to make sense of it a little too quickly. Some commentators, though, 
have doubted that Levi’s death was a suicide at all. Diego Gambetta, for 
example, has reviewed much of the evidence: Levi left behind no suicide 
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note, no one saw him jump (or fall) and he had made plans for the days 
after his death, which might suggest at the very least that it was not 
premeditated. Of course, the fact that he did not plan to kill himself does 
not mean that he did not commit suicide. Gambetta argues, though, that 
‘the facts known to us arguably suggest an accident more strongly than 
they indicate suicide’ (p. 11).
Even if we assume that there is a watertight conceptual distinction 
between suicide and accident, that a suicide cannot be accidental and 
an accident cannot be suicidal (an assumption I do not make), the truth 
about Levi’s death will in all likelihood never be definitively settled. The 
case tells us more about the interpreter’s desire than it does about what 
really happened on 11 April 1987. For Semprun, Levi’s suicide confirms 
his view of the pent-up, self-destructive violence which lingers in the 
living dead who survived Auschwitz. For Gambetta, Levi’s (probably) 
accidental death confirms that ‘[his] last moments cannot be construed 
as an act of delayed resignation before the inhumanity of Nazism. He 
never yielded. At most he snapped. On that tragic Sunday only his body 
was smashed’ (p. 13).
A disturbing aspect of this disagreement is the readiness of some 
commentators – whatever their view of Levi’s death – to speak on 
behalf of the dead, to explain their experiences and to endow their final 
moments with a suitable meaning and narrative closure. As explained in 
Chapter 1, I find this appropriation of the other’s voice and experience 
to be, on the very best account, ethically questionable. In Kofman’s 
case, the chronological proximity of the publication of Rue Ordener, 
rue Labat to her suicide (which, so far as I am aware, has never been 
doubted as such) is certainly striking. It is less obvious that this entitles 
us to make a direct causal connection between them. The temptation 
to connect the life and the work is almost irresistible; and we might be 
encouraged in the attempt to find such a connection by the fact that 
Kofman herself was often exercised by the relation between life and 
work in the authors she studied. But is there anything in Kofman’s 
memoir which actually justifies making a link between her life during 
the 1940s, her autobiographical text and her suicide?
Kofman and autobiography
Kofman claimed or confessed that she wanted to tell the story of her 
life: ‘J’ai toujours eu envie de raconter ma vie’; but she also conceded 
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that her life was ‘inénarrable’ (quoted Robson, ‘Bodily Detours’, p. 608). 
She describes a tension between the desire to narrate and a bedrock of 
experience which is not susceptible to ordering through narrative. In the 
context of twentieth-century literature, and particularly the problems of 
narration raised by Holocaust literature and other experiences of trauma, 
there is nothing surprising about this kind of comment. The tension 
between the urgency and the impossibility of recounting is, one might 
hazard to say, a defining condition of much modern narrative. In other 
words, Kofman is certainly not alone in wanting to tell the story of her 
life while sensing that her life is not a story that can be told. Her scholarly 
writing on autobiography, however, adds another dimension to this. In 
her book Autobiogriffures (first edition 1976; second edition 1984), she 
analyses the German author E.T.A. Hoffmann’s fictional autobiography 
of a cat, published in English as The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat 
Murr (1819–1821). In this study, Kofman does not restrict herself to 
suggesting that the complexity of a life cannot be contained within 
narrative paradigms. She goes further, to say that all autobiography is 
necessarily mendacious: ‘Toute autobiographie est mensongère, écrite 
qu’elle est dans l’illusion rétroactive et à des fins d’idéalisation’ (p. 99).1 
The error of readers, she argues, is to seek ‘derrière le texte un autre 
texte qui en serait la vérité’ (p. 22), attempting to explain the text in the 
light of the author’s pre-existing experience, intention and meaning. 
What if, she says, ‘l’auteur voulait justement ne rien dire? […] Si chercher 
derrière le texte et la mise en scène le vouloir-dire de l’auteur était une 
manière d’effacer le texte et l’écriture […]?’ (p. 22).
Methodologically, Kofman here proposes that we should read the text 
for what it is, not as the failed or impeded representation of something else: 
a ‘true’ experience which only partially appears. This is quite different 
from Kofman’s suggestion, quoted above, that her life is ‘inénarrable’. 
If life cannot be narrated, we may nevertheless be encouraged to try 
to understand how unnarrated, unnarratable experiences permeate the 
narrative text. Such a position still presumes that there is a truth behind 
the text, even if it is by its very nature unavailable to language and 
narration. But in Autobiogriffures Kofman suggests that this is itself a 
mistake: reading the text as it is means abandoning the assumption that 
 1 Kofman may be alluding here to Freud’s comments on biographers in ‘Leonardo 
da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood’. Freud describes how biographers ‘devote 
their energies to a task of idealization’, and thereby ‘sacrifice truth to an illusion’ 
(p. 223). I am grateful to Patrick Hayes for drawing my attention to this passage.
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it is a flawed mirror of an absent, perhaps impossible primary narrative 
which would convey the truth of experience.
So how should we read Kofman’s Rue Ordener, rue Labat, and how 
does it offer itself to be read? The book’s title appears to be referentially 
secure: it names two streets in Paris which will indeed turn out to be 
the key locations around which the story rotates, the first being where 
the narrator lives with her Jewish family, the second being where she 
takes refuge with her Catholic protector and surrogate mother after 
the deportation of her father. Readers unfamiliar with the streets of 
Paris might nevertheless be forgiven for speculating about these place 
names. As Verena Andermatt Conley has suggested, we might see 
in ‘Ordener’ either ordonné or ordinaire, and Labat may contain its 
homophone là-bas, an otherworldly elsewhere separate from the rules 
and conventions of the ordinary, familiar world (‘For Sarah Kofman’, 
p. 156). Huysmans’s great nineteenth-century novel Là-bas may be 
invoked as an intertext. And in fact these echoes fit what happens in 
the narrative just as well as the literal reality of the street names. The 
title of the book promises referentiality, but this soon becomes overlaid 
with further layers of meaning. Rue Ordener, rue Labat turns out to 
be harder to pin down than it might first appear. This is indicated by 
the variety of frameworks in which critics have attempted to place 
it: it has been discussed in the contexts of psychoanalysis, feminism, 
trauma studies and the deconstruction of the subject, and even related 
to the form of the fairy tale.2 The apparent literalness and geographical 
specificity of the title soon gives way to a complex, elusive, teasing text.
Before the book proper has even begun, then, the title of Kofman’s 
memoir seems to offer us a stable, referentially secure text while also 
potentially deliteralizing the very terms which name it. This work is, I 
suggest, both grounded and self-ungrounding. Even so, at the core of the 
text is the simple, heartbreaking story of the deportation and murder 
of the narrator’s father and its effects on her and her family. The first 
sentence of the second chapter states factually that ‘Le 16 juillet 1942, 
mon père savait qu’il allait être “ramassé”’ (p. 11; emphasis original); 
and the first sentence of the following chapter states with even more 
poignant simplicity, ‘Nous ne revîmes, en effet, jamais mon père’ (p. 15). 
 2 See Rizzuto, ‘Reading Sarah Kofman’s Testimony’; Robson, ‘Bodily Detours’; 
Horowitz, ‘Sarah Kofman et l’ambiguïté des mères’; Conley, ‘For Sarah Kofman’. 
Conley likens aspects of the book to ‘the utopian form of the fairy tale’ in ‘For 
Sarah Kofman’, p. 158.
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However, nothing in this text remains simple for very long. Before we 
have even got to this point, a short first chapter of barely 100 words 
invites the reader to consider not only the literal events of the following 
narrative but also their emotional meaning. Kofman begins: ‘De lui, il 
me reste seulement le stylo. Je l’ai pris un jour dans le sac de ma mère où 
elle le gardait avec d’autres souvenirs de mon père’ (p. 9). She goes on to 
say that she used it during her school years, and that she still possesses 
it, held together with sticking tape: ‘il est devant mes yeux et il me 
contraint à écrire, écrire. Mes nombreux livres ont peut-être été des voies 
de traverse obligées pour parvenir à raconter “ça”’ (p. 9).
This opening passage has attracted the attention of everyone who 
has reflected seriously on Kofman’s memoir, and rightly so. It has been 
observed that the masculine personal pronouns here link the father to 
the pen; and the passage connects the desire to write with the paternal 
imperative. The pen can obviously be seen as phallic, and the psychoan-
alytic resonance is underscored by the final ‘ça’, this being the common 
French rendering of the Freudian id. It has also been pointed out that 
there is a tragic symmetry to the text, which begins with the loss of 
the father/pen and ends with the death of the surrogate mother, mémé, 
who, the priest recalls at her graveside, ‘avait sauvé une petite fille juive 
pendant la guerre’ (p. 99). 
One part of the opening chapter which, to my knowledge, has not 
been thoroughly explored (and, indeed, which is sometimes elided 
when the passage is quoted) is its second sentence: ‘Je l’ai pris un jour 
dans le sac de ma mère où elle le gardait avec d’autres souvenirs de 
mon père’. This curiously overlooked sentence raises interesting issues 
about the narrator, about her ethics and the ethics of the text, from the 
very beginning. Although the French does not necessarily mean this, I 
presume that ‘je l’ai pris dans le sac de ma mère’ means that she stole 
the pen; she took it without permission from a collection of her father’s 
belongings retained by his widow.3 No other information is given: there 
is no indication, for example, of when the pen was taken other than the 
narrator’s statement that she used it ‘pendant toute [sa] scolarité’. The 
lack of further detail makes it impossible to know what the full circum-
stances are; but we might at least wonder whether taking the father’s 
pen from the mother’s bag wasn’t cruel, callous and vindictive. This may 
be overreading; but at the very least, the sentence opens the text with a 
 3 Conley also refers to taking the pen as a theft: ‘The child pilfers a pen that 
later becomes a fetish’ (‘Sarah Kofman’, p. 192).
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reference to a possible theft. The father’s pen, and with it the right to 
authorship, may be stolen rather than legitimately owned.
This first chapter invites, entitles, almost forces the reader to interpret 
what is to follow not just as the literal recording of terrible events, but 
also as meaningful within parameters which, crucially, the authorial 
voice attempts to predetermine. If we cleverly observe that the paternal 
pen may be phallic, and that the word ça has psychoanalytical resonance, 
we are perhaps not being as clever as we might have hoped: we are being 
fed these interpretive leads from the very beginning. The text guides us 
towards seeing how it should be properly understood. So by the time 
we get to the first sentence of chapter two (‘Le 16 juillet 1942 mon père 
savait qu’il allait être “ramassé”’), facts and interpretations are already 
intertwined. The italicization of the date, 16 July 1942, is a nod and a 
wink to those of us who will immediately recognize it as a reference to 
the Rafle du Vel’ d’Hiv.4 The inverted commas around ramassé signal 
that the word is a euphemism and hint at its more terrible implications. 
Nothing here is as literal as it appears; everything is preinterpreted and 
laden with broader resonance. The text consistently anticipates and 
directs our attempts to make sense of it.
In this context, it is particularly important that, from its second 
chapter, the text makes an issue of the scandal of lying.5 The narrator’s 
father knows that he is going to be arrested. When a policeman arrives 
(it is important to note that this is a French policeman: the roundup 
was conducted by the French, not the occupying Germans), her mother 
claims that the father is not there (‘Il n’est pas là, dit ma mère. Il est à 
la synagogue’, p. 12). Her father nevertheless appears and contradicts 
the mother, allowing himself to be taken away (‘Si, je suis là. Prenez-
moi!’, p. 12). The mother then makes two more attempts to save him. 
First she says that her youngest child is under two years old. Fathers of 
children under two were not arrested at this stage of the Occupation, 
but the narrator insists that her brother had in fact had his second 
birthday two days earlier on 14 July (a date which itself invites further 
interpretation). Then the mother claims that she is currently pregnant 
once more, presumably hoping once again to win the policeman’s favour. 
 4 On 16 and 17 July 1942, a mass roundup of Jews was undertaken in Paris. 
Over 13,000 Jews were arrested, and many were held in the Winter Velodrome. 
They were subsequently deported, mainly to Auschwitz, where the huge majority 
of them were murdered.
 5 For discussion, see Rizzuto, ‘Reading Sarah Kofman’s Testimony’, pp. 8–9.
Traces of War226
The mother’s attempts to save her husband evoke a psychoanalytical 
scenario with which Kofman was fully familiar: the logic of the kettle, 
or in French le raisonnement du chaudron. In Freud’s account, a man 
borrows a kettle from a neighbour and returns it in a damaged state. 
When confronted about this, he replies that he never borrowed a kettle, 
that the kettle was already damaged when he borrowed it and that the 
kettle was undamaged when he returned it.6 Even though these different 
versions of events contradict one another, they have one crucial point in 
common: all versions confirm the desire of the speaker, in this case, the 
desire not to be held responsible. In the narrator’s mother’s version of 
this reasoning, the underlying desire is for the father to avoid arrest: you 
can’t arrest him because he is not here; you can’t arrest him because we 
have a child under two years of age; you can’t arrest him because I am 
pregnant. The narrator is shocked by her mother’s attempt to save her 
father by lying:
Ma mère ment! Mon frère venait d’avoir deux ans le 14 juillet. Et elle 
n’était pas enceinte, que je sache! Je ne pouvais, sur ce point, être aussi 
affirmative que sur le premier, mais je me sentais très mal à l’aise. Je ne 
savais pas encore ce qu’était un ‘mensonge pieux’ (l’on ne prenait pas à 
cette date les pères dont les enfants avait moins de deux ans, et si le flic 
avait été crédule, mon père aurait été sauvé) et je ne comprenais pas très 
bien ce qui se passait: que ma mère puisse mentir m’emplissait de honte et 
je me disais, inquiète et tourmentée, qu’après tout, j’allais peut-être avoir 
encore un petit frère! (p. 13)
I suspect that all but the most rigorous, intransigent Kantians would 
forgive the mother for her lies here.7 In Kofman’s text, however, the 
mother’s lie has the status of an inaugural catastrophe, one which is 
perhaps as traumatic as the father’s deportation. It entails a clash between 
paternal and maternal orders, and between absolute and compromised 
values. The mother lies (‘Il n’est pas là’) in order to save her husband; the 
father insists on the truth (‘Si, je suis là’) even though it will lead to his 
death, leaving his wife a widow and his children fatherless. 
Rue Ordener, rue Labat begins with two transgressions, narrated in 
reverse chronological order: in Chapter 1, the narrator steals a pen (‘Je 
l’ai pris un jour dans le sac de ma mère’) some time after the deportation 
 6 For discussion in relation to Camus’s La Peste, see Chapter 5 of this book.
 7 According to the Kantian categorical imperative, lying is always, uncondi-
tionally wrong, however much it might seem to be justified in individual 
circumstances.
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of the father; in Chapter 2, the mother lies (‘Ma mère ment!’) on the day 
of the father’s arrest. These transgressions are small beer in comparison 
to the genocidal acts which define the context in which they occurred. 
Even so, they crucially inflect the meaning of Kofman’s memoir. Purely in 
terms of how it is presented in the text, the mother’s lying competes with 
and perhaps even outweighs the significance of the father’s deportation. 
The deportation is sad but expected (‘mon père savait qu’il allait être 
“ramassé”’), whereas the mother’s lying occasions a crisis of values and 
belief, preparing the ground for the (albeit ambiguous) replacement of 
the bad, biological, Jewish mother by the good, surrogate, Catholic 
mother: mémé, the woman who takes in the narrator, cares for her, saves 
her from deportation and severs her links with Judaism. 
The inaugural scene of the mother’s lies has a further twist which has 
consequences for the memoir as a whole. The passage explicitly raises 
the issue – unknown to the narrator at the time – of when a lie may 
be a mensonge pieux: a white or benevolent lie. The Jewish tradition 
places great value on truthfulness, even though it acknowledges that 
sometimes circumstances might justify lying. But Kofman’s narrative of 
the mother’s raisonnement du chaudron raises the further problem of 
how to distinguish between lying and truth-telling. How do you know 
when a lie is a lie? In some cases, there is little difficulty. The mother’s 
claim that the father is not at home is shown to be a lie when he comes 
into the room and contradicts her. The narrator knows that the claim 
about her brother Isaac’s age is also untrue. But the mother’s declaration 
that she is pregnant is not so evidently and demonstrably true or false. 
The narrator appears to be particularly disturbed by this declaration: 
‘Elle n’était pas enceinte, que je sache! Je ne pouvais, sur ce point, être 
aussi affirmative que sur le premier, mais je me sentais très mal à l’aise’ 
(p. 13). The mother’s lies cause shock and shame: ‘que ma mère puisse 
mentir m’emplissait de honte’; but the claim about her pregnancy seems 
even more disturbing, leaving the narrator ‘inquiète et tourmentée’ 
(p. 13). A lie is bad enough; a claim that cannot be shown to be either 
true or false appears to be even worse.
The arrest of the father in the second chapter of Rue Ordener, 
rue Labat is the text’s primal scene; and the mother’s actions here 
and the narrator’s response to them appear to be of at least equal 
importance to the actual loss of the father. From here on, the shifting 
sands of knowledge, belief and values are key drivers of the narrative. 
My suggestion here is that the narrator’s ‘torment’ over her mother’s 
possible pregnancy reveals not so much a concern about acquiring 
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another sibling (she already has five, after all) as an anxiety about the 
status of a declaration which is not ascertainably either true or false; and 
this in turn can be linked to a reflection on ambiguity and ambivalence 
which permeates the text. Even when mémé replaces the mother in the 
child’s affections, ambivalence still reigns in relation both to the ‘bad’, 
punitive, biological mother and the ‘good’, caring, surrogate mother. 
After the war, a tribunal decides to let the child stay with mémé rather 
than her real mother. Although this is what the narrator wanted, she 
finds that it also not entirely what she wanted: ‘Je ressens un étrange 
malaise. Sans comprendre pourquoi, je ne me sens ni triomphante, 
ni parfaitement heureuse ni tout à fait rassurée’ (p. 71). When the 
biological mother forces her to return to live with her family, she resists, 
but is also relieved: ‘Je me débattais, criais, sanglotais. Au fond, je me 
sentais soulagée’ (p. 71). Later, she maintains contact with mémé but 
then breaks with her for a long period: ‘Pendant plusieurs années, je 
coupe tout contact avec mémé: je ne supporte plus de l’entendre me 
parler du passé, ni qu’elle puisse continuer de m’appeler son “petit 
lapin” ou sa “petite cocotte”’ (p. 98); and in the final paragraph of the 
book she records curtly that she did not attend mémé’s funeral, without 
giving any account of what prevented her from being there: ‘Je n’ai pu 
me rendre à ses obsèques’ (p. 99).
The signs of ambivalence towards mémé complicate any simple 
opposition between the good mother and the bad mother in Kofman’s 
narrative. This opposition is one of a number of interpretive avenues 
which the text offers us but then does not entirely endorse. The 
implications of the opening chapter, describing the father’s broken pen 
which compels the narrator to write, are not picked up later in the text, 
leaving us to decide for ourselves whether it should be regarded as a 
key to the work or a red herring. Further clues for interpretation are 
offered towards the end of the text, as the narrator explicitly invites us to 
make a link between her memoir and Kofman’s later work. Chapter 18 
describes the picture by Leonardo da Vinci which appears on the cover 
of Kofman’s first book, L’Enfance de l’art, followed by a long quotation 
from Freud which discusses Leonardo’s ‘two mothers’ (pp. 73–74). In 
Chapter 21, the narrator tells us that her mother sometimes locked her 
in a dark room, and then adds a footnote pointing out that she has 
written a book entitled Camera obscura (p. 85); and a further footnote 
refers us to her book Comment s’en sortir?, which discusses a witch-like 
figure from Jewish folklore invoked by her mother to terrify her in her 
childhood (p. 86). As the book draws to its close, then, it appears to be 
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positively encouraging us to interpret Kofman’s work in the light of her 
life and career.
Chapter 19 is particularly interesting in the context of this apparent 
invitation to interpretation. The chapter discusses Alfred Hitchcock’s 
film The Lady Vanishes (1938), which the narrator tells us is ‘l’un de 
[ses] films préférés’ (p. 75), and which (in her account) hinges on the 
distinction between good and bad maternal figures.8 The narrator 
describes how what she finds most powerful in the film is the sequence 
in which ‘la bonne petite vieille, miss Froy’ disappears and is ‘remplacée 
par une autre femme qui se fait passer pour la première’ (p. 75); the ‘bon 
visage “maternel” de la vieille’ is supplanted by a ‘visage effoyablement 
dur, faux, fuyant, menaçant’ (p. 76). The protagonist, Iris, is almost 
persuaded that she was hallucinating after a blow on the head, and that 
Miss Froy had never been on the train. However, Iris later discovers the 
truth, thwarts a wicked plot and saves Miss Froy, who is in fact a secret 
agent in the British Intelligence Service. This account of the film draws 
out its relevance to the narrator’s predicament of being torn between 
two mothers; and moreover, the concluding short paragraph places the 
analysis firmly within a psychoanalytical context: ‘Le mauvais sein à la 
place du bon sein, l’un parfaitement clivé de l’autre, l’un se transformant 
en l’autre’ (p. 77). This offers the reader instruction in how to interpret 
both the current chapter and the book as a whole. Critics have duly – 
obediently? – spotted the Kleinian vocabulary and used it to inform their 
readings of Kofman’s memoir.9
The narrator’s self-interpretation might leave us dissatisfied, however. 
The Kleinian scheme may provide an explanation for some elements of 
the chapter and the work as a whole while failing to account for others. 
It is striking, for example, that the narrator makes nothing of the film’s 
political context. Although it is not explicit that the wicked foreign 
power plotting against Miss Froy represents the German Nazis, the 
hint is pretty unmistakeable.10 The disappearance of Miss Froy could 
therefore easily have been linked to the deportation and murder of the 
 8 For discussion of Kofman’s chapter on The Lady Vanishes and the longer 
version of it in L’Imposture de la beauté, see Conley, ‘Sarah Kofman’.
 9 See for example Rizzuto, ‘Reading Sarah Kofman’s Testimony’, p. 7; 
Horowitz, ‘Sarah Kofman et l’ambiguïté des mères’, pp. 110–11. On problems in 
reading this passage, see Cairns, Post-War Jewish Women’s Writing in French, 
pp. 219–20.
 10 This is made explicit in the 1979 remake of the film, directed by Anthony 
Page, which is set in pre-war Nazi Germany.
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narrator’s father. Moreover, the reading of the film, and by implication 
Kofman’s book, in terms of good mothers and bad mothers, the good 
breast and the bad breast, simplifies the film and the book. As suggested 
above, the relation to both the biological mother and mémé is marked by 
ambivalence rather than being simply polarized into good and bad. And 
in the film, Miss Froy may appear to be a maternal ‘bonne petite vieille’ 
with a kindly face, contrasted with the ‘visage effroyablement dur, faux, 
fuyant, menaçant’ of the woman who replaces her; but in fact Miss 
Froy is also false; she masquerades as someone she is not. Rather than 
a benign, harmless old lady, she is actually a resourceful secret agent 
employing subterfuge and pretence. Everyone is double; appearances and 
reality can never be counted on to match each other, and no one can be 
trusted to be what they seem until the final resolution. Even so, in Rue 
Ordener, rue Labat the narrator’s concluding comments on the good 
breast and the bad breast effectively forestall the possible interpretations 
of the film and of Kofman’s book which such observations might open 
up.
This is all the more significant because a longer version of this 
chapter and its reading of The Lady Vanishes appears in Kofman’s 
posthumously published collection, L’Imposture de la beauté. It turns 
out that the chapter in Rue Ordener, rue Labat contains only the first 
two paragraphs of the longer version of the text. In her memoir Kofman 
ends the discussion of the film precisely at the point when, in the longer 
version, she is about to nuance – and perhaps even undermine – her 
Kleinian interpretation by acknowledging the ambivalence of Miss Froy: 
‘Et pourtant Miss Froy n’est pas aussi “bonne” et parfait qu’il peut le 
sembler: l’on apprend qu’elle est une espionne (même si c’est pour la 
bonne cause, l’anglaise contre celle des Nazis) et qu’elle a donc menti sur 
son identité’ (L’Imposture de la beauté, p. 142). Kofman here concedes 
that the ‘belle image’ of the good mother is now ‘contaminée’ (p. 142); 
and in any case, she goes on to argue that the film’s knowledge of its own 
illusion-making means that ‘il déjoue, comme par avance, toute lecture 
réductrice, “psychanalytique” entre autres, qui se prendrait par trop 
au sérieux’ (p. 145). On Kofman’s account, her own reading should be 
taken with a pinch of salt. This continuation of her discussion of the film 
confuses the terms of her earlier comments, as the good mother turns 
out not to be so good after all; and it explicitly denies the authority of 
an over-serious psychoanalytical interpretation. The fact that Kofman 
doesn’t include these paragraphs in her memoir gives them the status of 
repressed self-knowledge. Rue Ordener, rue Labat allows the Kleinian 
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interpretation to stand unchallenged, as a provocation or perhaps a 
misleading guide to gullible readers. The text gives us guidance about 
how it should be read, while mocking us if we take it at its word too 
readily.
At moments, the Rue Ordener, rue Labat looks like a sparse 
testimonial work describing the experience of the Occupation and the 
threat of deportation; but this is largely forgotten as the text focuses 
instead on the psychological narrative of a girl caught between two 
mothers. Part of the problem here is that there is no reality behind the 
text which can be separated from its interpretation(s), no simple story 
which can be told independently of the possible meanings that it can be 
made to bear. What is presented here, rather, is a preinterpreted reality 
in which the reality cannot be disentangled from its preinterpretations. 
In other words, the whole text mirrors the mother’s declaration that 
she is pregnant: unverifiable, it hovers between event and meaning, 
between a desire for autobiographical literalness and a sense that no 
such literalness is available because facts are always already interpreted, 
always already experienced as meaningful.
Conclusion
In its second chapter Kofman’s memoir raises the question of its own 
truth and reference through the narrator’s anxious response to the 
mother’s lies. The father tells the truth, and dies for it. The mother lies, 
and survives. And her lies culminate in a declaration (‘J’attends un autre 
enfant’, p. 12) which for the moment can neither be verified nor falsified. 
The text then stages two responses to this situation. The daughter is 
left ‘mal à l’aise’, ‘inquiète et tourmentée’ (p. 13), and the policeman 
who has come to arrest the father simply does not know what to make 
of what he has heard: ‘Le flic, lui, paraît embarrassé. Il ne veut prendre 
sur lui aucune responsabilité’ (p. 13). Later in the text, the narrator will 
implicitly identify with her mother when she herself becomes a liar 
during an attempt to return to Paris and to mémé. ‘J’ai perdu ma mère’, 
she tells some men in a lorry, and they appear to believe her (though 
they subsequently hand her over to the police): ‘Je me crois “sauvée”. Je 
ne pensais pas que cela allait être si facile! Si facile de mentir, si facile de 
faire croire à d’autres mes mensonges!’ (p. 84).
Kant condemned all lies on the grounds that, once you accept that it 
is sometimes permissible to lie, it becomes impossible to know whether a 
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person is lying or not. Kofman’s memoir accepts that risk. The mensonge 
pieux may appear justified if it helps achieve a desired, desirable aim: in 
the mother’s case, to save the father from deportation; in the daughter’s 
case, to return to mémé. In the process, though, the regime of truth 
is damaged. The reader may be left, like the narrator, anxious and 
tormented, or like the policeman, simply bemused and unwilling to 
accept responsibility. And we may be less likely to believe the liar in 
the future. At the post-war tribunal which decided who should have 
custody of the young child, the mother claims that mémé had abused 
the narrator. The narrator does not know what she means by this, but 
disbelieves her anyway: ‘j’étais persuadée qu’elle mentait’ (p. 70); and the 
tribunal agrees with her.
The narrator’s shock at the mother’s lies comes from the child’s 
realization that a statement does not always or only mean what it says. 
It is bound up with fears and desires which underlie, perhaps even 
undermine, its literal truthfulness. Rue Ordener, rue Labat becomes 
a problematic example of the testimonial memoir insofar as it instan-
tiates this insight. The simple, harrowing story of the Occupation, 
the deportation of the father and the subsequent effects of his loss on 
his surviving family, is knowingly filtered, before it has even begun, 
through a psychoanalytical grid which places everything in the context 
of a family drama involving absent fathers and punitive mothers. Events 
are preinterpreted, and presented as a function of the meanings we are 
invited to find in them. This does not mean that the facts of the narrative 
are not true; but it does suggest that the facts, such as we are given, are 
inseparable from the interpretive schemes which the text offers us.
So does Rue Ordener, rue Labat tell us anything which would 
help us to understand Kofman’s psychology and suicide? Does it offer 
any support to the view that publishing the account of her wartime 
experiences unleashed a trauma that led her to take her own life? On the 
basis of the memoir, might we say of Kofman what Semprun says of Levi: 
‘Une ultime fois, sans recours ni remède, l’angoisse s’était imposée, tout 
simplement. Sans esquive ni espoir possibles’? In a nutshell, Kofman’s 
memoir refuses any such interpretation. This is a work which does not 
want us to make the leap from text to world or from text to author 
except within the preinterpreted parameters which it lays out for us. 
Wiesel thought that Levi died in Auschwitz 40 years after Auschwitz. 
I don’t know if he was right. But nothing in Kofman’s memoir justifies 
us in trying to make similar sense of her subsequent suicide. Kofman’s 
book actually attempts to prevent us from understanding her suicide in 
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the light of her traumatic memories. It both encourages and frustrates 
interpretation, and in the process it impedes any rapid linking of life and 
work. In fact, as we read the text, we might suspect that it is also reading 
us, offering us titbits for our own interpretive desires – the father’s 
broken pen, the two mothers, the traces of the life in the philosophical 
work – but never letting us feast off them to our fill. More than it tells 
us about the experience of the Occupation or about Kofman’s life and 
death, it plays upon and reveals to us our desire for interpretive schemas 
which will show us, however tragically, that there is some kind of 
sense to be made out of the shards of trauma. Perhaps we prefer tragic 
meaning to benign senselessness. To put it bluntly, though, nothing gives 
us the right to interpret Kofman’s suicide in the light of her memoir.
Rien ne marchait plus dans ma tête. Plus j’essayais de 
comprendre, plus tout se brouillait. C’est ainsi qu’on 
devient fou. Ou amnésique. Je suis devenu fou. 
(Delbo, Mesure de nos jours, p. 160)
This book has not attempted to tell a coherent story about the Second 
World War and the ways in which it has affected the lives and works 
of those who experienced it at first hand. No such story is available, 
possible or perhaps even desirable. It would involve too many elisions, 
obfuscations and simplifications. What is clear is that we are still in 
some sense post-war, in that the war remains a problematic, traumatic 
reference point which will not yet be silenced. The controversy 
around works such as Jonathan Littell’s Goncourt prize-winning Les 
Bienveillantes (2006), which gave voice to a fictional Nazi perpetrator, 
and the film La Rafle (2010), which belatedly reminded French audiences 
of the complicity of their countrymen in genocide, demonstrates that 
we are dealing here with a still-unresolved past. The war continues 
to call for speech, representation, symbolization and interpretation. 
Moreover, these issues matter more than ever. As the living memory of 
the Second World War fades, we are left only with its half-forgotten, 
partly hidden traces, in texts and films which are still, I would suggest, 
under-interpreted. And in a Europe which is once again unsettled, we 
have to fear that unconfronted trauma always risks being repeated, in 
ever more destructive forms.1
 1 I write this sentence on 30 June 2016, one week after the UK voted to leave the 
European Union.
Conclusion
Whose War, Which War?
Conclusion
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I am reminded at this point of one of the great French novels about 
the Second World War, Michel Tournier’s Le Roi des aulnes (1970), and 
in particular the encounter of its protagonist, the Nazi-serving prisoner 
of war Abel Tiffauges, with the commander of Kaltenborn. This latter 
character is an aristocratic career soldier who becomes the head of a 
school for Nazi cannon fodder, even though he is not himself particularly 
favourable to the Nazi regime. In a key passage of the novel, he offers 
Tiffauges an apocalyptic vision of the war as the explosion of symbols:
Et tout cela est symbole, tout cela est chiffre, indiscutablement. Mais 
ne cherchez pas à comprendre, c’est-à-dire à trouver pour chaque signe 
la chose à laquelle il renvoie. Car ces symboles sont diaboles: ils ne 
symbolisent plus rien. Et de leur saturation naît la fin du monde. (p. 321)
Tournier’s disturbing novel describes and exemplifies this catastrophic 
explosion of symbols: nothing means what it seems, everything is to 
be interpreted, but interpretation never reaches a final destination. In 
the formulation promulgated by Ricœur, ‘le symbole donne à penser’ 
(see for example De l’interprétation, p. 46). The inherent ambiguity of 
the symbol is a provocation to interpretive reflection. But the apparent 
generosity in Ricœur’s use of the word donne is double-edged. While 
opening up possibilities of meaning, it also excludes the possibility of 
assured conclusion. The consequences of this are epistemological and 
ethical. Free interpretation may turn out to lead dangerously close to 
Tournier’s moral apocalypse.
The most influential formulations of trauma studies have often 
stressed the unspeakability or unrepresentability of the experience of 
historical violence. As Caruth puts it in a much-quoted passage, the 
traumatized ‘carry an impossible history within them, or they become 
themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess’ 
(‘Introduction’, p. 5). Astute critics such as Thomas Trezise and Sharon 
Marquart have suggested, however, that stressing unspeakability can 
have silencing effects on those who want or need to speak (see Trezise, 
Witnessing Witnessing, pp. 2–3; Marquart, On the Defensive, pp. 7–8). 
To impose a generalizing theory on the diverse experiences of survivors 
is to find another way of not listening to them. From a hermeneutic 
perspective, listening is always already interpreting; and if listening is 
essential to the testimonial process, then interpretation exactly coincides 
with the possibility of witnessing. It is part of it from the very beginning.
What I have called ‘traumatic hermeneutics’ here is not, then, 
something which comes after the experience of war, or after any other 
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traumatic disturbance. It belongs to the experience as it belongs to 
the very possibility of its narration and reception. It is certainly not 
a guarantee or even a distant promise of definitive understanding. 
Hermeneutics is not and never was anything of the sort, despite how it 
has sometimes been portrayed, especially in French and French-inspired 
theory. Hermeneutics is, rather, an attempt to manage the proliferation 
of meaning, that is, the attempt not to be overwhelmed by it, to make it 
liveable against all the odds. This entails, inevitably, constantly skirting 
the likelihood of error and misunderstanding, perhaps to a catastrophic 
degree. Inhabiting the conflict of interpretations risks perpetuating a 
history of violence even while it endeavours to appease it. To illustrate 
this, I turn again, for the last time, to Charlotte Delbo.
In Chapter 2, I discussed Loulou, one of the figures in Delbo’s Mesure 
de nos jours, who is a different man when he returns from deportation. 
We are told that he was one of seven survivors from the convoy which 
took him to the concentration camps, another being a man named 
Jacques. Later in Mesure de nos jours, Jacques narrates the story of 
his return. He comes back later than the other survivors, does not wish 
to recount his experiences to curious fellow passengers on the train 
to his home in Charente, arrives to find no one to greet him and soon 
discovers that his parents are dead and his home destroyed. The passage 
is haunted by a sense of return to something which no longer exists, a 
return which is not a return. Jacques, like other figures in Delbo’s texts 
and in trauma texts more generally, comes back and does not come back, 
returns to encounter the impossibility of return. When he tries to find 
former Communist Party resisters and fellow survivors, he is met with 
hostility and suspicion which he finds incomprehensible. He visits his 
comrade Vincent:
‘Vincent! C’est moi, Jacques. J’ai changé, mais c’est moi, Jacques’. Il restait 
planté devant sa porte, muet, et je suis resté devant lui sans comprendre. Je 
ne saurais dire aujourd’hui s’il était ennuyé, gêné ou mauvais, j’étais trop 
secoué pour remarquer quoi que ce fût. Des suppositions me passaient 
par la tête, trop rapides pour que je puisse les formuler maintenant. 
Vincent avait été arrêté et il n’avait pas tenu. Ou bien Vincent n’était pas 
des nôtres et il avait passé de l’autre côté. Ou bien Vincent était devenu 
fou. Ou bien moi. Aucune de ces suppositions n’était vraisemblable et je 
restais là à regarder Vincent qui ne me regardait pas. (p. 158)
This passage gives a powerful account of what is at stake in traumatic 
hermeneutics. It is both impossible and imperative to make sense of 
signs which signify anything or nothing. Vincent’s response to Jacques’s 
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return is incomprehensible: did he betray us, or is he mad or is it I who 
am mad? Any interpretation is possible, but none adds up. And what 
dominates this is the sense that everything has changed and nothing 
has changed: ‘J’ai changé, mais c’est moi’. Jacques emerges from this 
encounter profoundly bewildered: ‘Tout m’échappait. Quelque chose qui 
aurait dû me fournir une clé m’échappait. Quoi? Tout était embrouillé, 
inextricable, bouché’ (p. 158).
We subsequently discover that the way Jacques is treated on his 
return is explained by the suspicion among his former comrades that he 
had turned traitor. Here again, interpretation runs rampant. His very 
survival proves his guilt, when all his fellow resisters were shot or died in 
the camps: ‘D’être le seul survivant ne plaidait pas en ma faveur. C’était 
même la principale preuve contre moi’ (p. 164). In the urgent and insane 
rush to make sense of what happened in the war, conclusions are drawn 
which are false, unjust, violent and almost irresistible. It is only years 
later that the suspicions towards Jacques are allayed, when an alternative 
account of events explains the discovery of the resistance network in 
terms of bad luck rather than betrayal. The truth is restored, but it is now 
too late: ‘On m’a réhabilité. J’ai beau savoir qu’à leur place j’en aurais 
fait autant – parce que moi aussi, j’étais intransigeant –, je ne peux pas 
regarder les camarades comme avant’ (p. 166). Things have been put 
back in place; at the same time, though, they can never be the same again. 
Jacques returns and does not return; he is the same, but totally changed; 
the truth is known, but the trace of error cannot be fully erased.
The story of Jacques illustrates the urgency and violence of interpre-
tation and all the concomitant risks of mis- and over-interpretation. 
We simply must understand these matters, while everything we need 
to say about them may be facile, premature or disastrously wrong. But 
there is another twist to Delbo’s astonishingly intelligent text. Jacques 
is supported through the difficult years following his non-return by 
another survivor, Denise, who returns from Ravensbrück, keeps faith 
with Jacques and becomes his wife. In Jacques’s testimony, Denise is a 
strong but enigmatic figure, devoting herself to helping her husband and 
clearing his name. The passage following the story of Jacques is much 
shorter, and entitled ‘Denise’. Jacques’s sequential narrative contrasts 
with Denise’s more fragmentary text. She begins by describing how 
dedicating her energies to supporting Jacques left her no time for herself:
J’ai eu tant de peine à ramener Jacques sur la rive
je me suis donné tant de peine pour ramener Jacques et pour qu’il vive
que je n’ai pas eu le temps de penser à moi. (p. 167)
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The final lines of the fragment echo this opening:
J’ai eu tant de peine à lui rendre la volonté de vivre
que penser à moi
toutes ces années-là … (p. 169)
One story hides another. Jacques recounts a tale of heartbreaking 
misunderstanding, of heroism and suffering interpreted as betrayal. To 
help him tell this story, Denise suppresses or neglects her own. What is 
said covers over what remains unsaid. Behind the war that is recounted, 
understood and misunderstood, remains another war, other wars, which 
are still untold.
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